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ABSTRACT 
Nearly thirty years have passed since the collapse of communism and the 
developmental paths of former communist states remain diverse and changeable. 
While some countries have fulfilled their expectations by becoming well 
functioning democracies, others have evolved as hybrid regimes or have become 
immersed into new forms of authoritarianism. Against this background, Ukraine 
stands out as a unique case, since its economic potential and democratic aspirations 
were viewed as the ideal basis for a successful post-communist transition. Yet 
notwithstanding the declarations by its officials and attempts at democratisation by 
the broader public (Ukraine hosted two ‘democratic revolutions’), the country is 
still undergoing painful reforms that purportedly help its political, economic and 
socio-cultural transformation.  
Importantly, in this process Ukraine orients itself towards other European 
states and specifically those post-communist states that have become members of 
the European Union (EU), thus, associating their accomplished transitions with 
membership of the EU. Furthermore, Ukraine’s key developmental problems are 
also seen to be rooted in the combination of domestic (identity issue and 
regionalism, corruption and state capture) and external (geopolitical) challenges 
that prevent it from accomplishing its transition. While domestic conditions are 
determinant for the success of post-communist transformation, external assistance 
and especially that of the EU has been vital for post-communist transition in a 
number of European states and could be similarly vital for Ukraine. 
This study investigates Ukraine’s post-communist transition in the context of 
its domestic developments and external influences, particularly EU-led 
Europeanisation. This thesis goes beyond an EU-centred perspective by 
incorporating elements of neoclassic realism into its theoretical framework. This 
study relies on mixed method analysis that incorporates quantitative data but relies 
mainly on qualitative research design in developing conceptual and theoretical 
instruments as well as interpreting and clarifying the results of the study.  
The thesis demonstrates that the initial years of transition were crucial to the 
outcomes of Ukraine’s transformation in general and to the scale and 
comprehensiveness of implemented reforms in particular. Moreover, despite a 
number of Ukraine’s domestic problems such as corruption or nation-building 
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remaining unresolved to this day, Ukraine’s seemingly long transition has become 
the result of contemporary decision-making rather than of inherent historically-
determined conditions. The same goes for EU assistance. As one of Ukraine’s 
biggest aid donors, the EU may become a solid supporter of Ukraine’s 
transformations and it may further advance the implementation of its normative 
agenda. However, this will require two key conditions: first, Ukraine and, most 
importantly, its political elites need to come out with a strong commitment to 
introduce necessary reforms, and, second, the EU should prioritise its normative 
agenda over security and economic interests in Ukraine, especially in the context of 
its competition with Russia.  
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This study is devoted to research on Ukraine’s post-communist transition in the 
context of counter-play between its domestic developments and external influences. 
The former is predominantly investigated by the theories of democratisation, 
including those applied to the post-communist context; the latter incorporates the 
application of theories of international relations with regard to democracy 
promotion and particularly EU democracy promotion. The crosscutting impact of 
selected theoretical approaches provides an in-depth examination of Ukraine’s 
domestic developments that are affected by competing political strategies of 
external actors. 
The first modern democracies evolved in the eighteenth century, and their 
evolution is often viewed as part of historical and domestically-driven processes. 
However, the global spread of democratisation occurred later, when the collapse of 
colonialism revealed a certain pattern of political and economic transformations in 
Southern Europe and Latin America. As the system of communist dominance 
entered its demise at the end of the 1980s, the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1989) 
seemed to be near: the ideological struggle between the capitalist West and socialist 
East was to concede to free market and democracy.  
Nevertheless, the outcomes of global democratisation did not completely 
match expectations. A number of hybrid regimes, or ‘formal’ democracies emerged 
in Latin America, while democratisation in the Middle East stumbled even in the 
aftermath of ‘democratic revolutions’ (Diamond, 2011). Successful governmental 
interventions in the economies of Southeast Asia also questioned the bases of 
economic neoliberalism. Finally, the post-communist transition, once again, 
revealed the importance of the context in which democratic and market 
transformations took place. 
Whereas transitions in Latin America and other parts of the world were 
based on evolving capitalist democracies, the post-communist transition involved a 
structural shift from a communist, single-party political system to democratic 
pluralism, and from an administratively planned economy to an economic system 
governed by the free market. In addition, the post-communist space was not 
contiguous by default (Fish, 2017: 11). The various patterns of transition in the 
region have shown that different transition modes became a product of interaction 
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between political, socio-economic and historical legacies, on the one hand, and 
newly constructed institutions, on the other. Hence the impact of communist 
legacies was considered a determinant for the subsequent post-communist 
transformations.  
In search of the model that allowed transition from communism to a 
functioning sustainable democracy, consolidation of democratic institutions grew 
into a key concept, and external assistance became a crucial component of this. 
Transitions in post-communist Europe seem to have succeeded primarily in those 
states that joined the EU. In contrast, those post-communist countries that were 
exempted from EU membership exhibited barely any progress in democratisation 
until the early 2000s (partially excluding only one exemptional case of Mongolia — 
see the explanation in (Fish, 1998b)). Even after this, they ceded to new EU 
members in terms of democratisation and marketisation. Thus, a relationship 
between the progress in post-communist transition and EU membership may be 
observed (Table 1.1; Table 1.2). 
Whereas some retreat from democracy has taken place in some former 
communist states after they became members of the EU, democratic recession is a 
worldwide trend during the last decade for various reasons (Aghekyan et al., 2018; 
Puddington, 2015). Therefore, not only it does not reflect solely on the EU’s 
domestic problems, but it also should not be considered a one-way move. The 
revealed decline in the quality of democracy among the selected EU members 
(Poland, Hungary, Slovakia) has not shaken their status of free democracies in 
international rankings and may be interpreted as a temporary response to a number 
of crises faced by the EU (Eurozone, Brexit and migrant’s crisis). The question 
remaining however is whether and how the EU may support and assist post-









Table 1.1 The progress in political liberalisation among selected post-






Nations in Transit Corruption Perception 
Index 
2000 2008 2016 2000 2008 2016 2000 2008 2016 
EU members                
East Central 
Europe 
0.78 0.78 0.71 0.71 0.69 0.64 0.45 0.53 0.55 
Baltic States 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.67 0.70 0.70 0.44 0.54 0.62 
Southeastern 
Europe 
0.55 0.60 0.62 0.45 0.52 0.51 0.34 0.39 0.46 
Western 
Balkans 
0.30 0.41 0.34 0.26 0.41 0.39 0.13 0.28 0.40 




0.23 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.37 
Ukraine 0.27 0.45 0.23 0.34 0.39 0.33 0.15 0.25 0.29 
Russia 0.25 0.16 0.13 0.35 0.15 0.07 0.21 0.21 0.29 
Central Asia 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.08 0.06 0.27 0.19 0.25 
Mongolia 0.55 0.57 0.53 n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.3 0.38 
 
Source(s): Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, Freedom House (Nations in Transit, 
reports for various years), Transparency International (reports for various years). 
Note(s): Political liberalisation is based on the Liberal Democracy Index, (LIB DEM) which 
represents ‘to what extent the ideal of liberal democracy is achieved’ and ranges from 0 (no liberal 
democracy) to 1 (ideal liberal democracy) (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, 
Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, et al., 2018) p. 40. The Nations in Transit scores are calculated 
as average of their original scores (1 — most democratic, 7 — least democratic), reversed and 
represented as a ratio from the actual score to the maximum score, meaning that 1 is most 
democratic and 0 – least democratic. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is converted to a 
common denominator, where 0 is highly corrupt and 1 is very clean.  
The states are grouped as follows: 
 East Central Europe includes Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
 Baltic States are Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  
 Southeastern Europe includes Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia.  
 Western Balkans are Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Kosovo 
 Eastern Europe refers toMoldova, Ukraine and Belarus 
 The Caucasus includes Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan 










Table 1.2 The progress in economic liberalisation and development among 
selected post-communist states for the period 1992-2016 
 




Cumulative FDI inflows 










EU members                   
East Central 
Europe 
0.86 0.89 0.89 109 155 76,129 270,193 1,269 4,410 




0.78 0.84 0.86 76 118 14,292 122,836 548 4,451 
Western 
Balkans 
0.56 0.74 0.75 64 103 2,362 30,790 147 2,109 




0.64 0.72 0.71 52 113 10,042 63,032 173 866 
Ukraine 0.67 0.76 0.76  42 70 3,336 40,753 68 889 
Russia 0.69 0.73 0.76 63 108 9,998 43,108 69 304 
Central Asia 0.59 0.61 0.62 71 139 10,787 59,408 178 883 
Mongolia 0.69 0.78 0.8 n/a 167 n/a 2,030 n/a 761 
 
Source(s): European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, Transition Reports 
for various years) 
Note(s): Economic scores (EC TR) are calculated as ratios of average scores of Economic 
Transition to their maximum meaning (EBRD original indices are ranked from 1 to 4.33, where 1 
refers to a centrally planned and 4.33 to an advanced (free) market economy). Accordingly, 1 
represents free market and 0 not free market. For the groups of states, indices represent average 
meanings with the exception of cumulative FDI inflows, which represent sums. The states are 
grouped as in Table 1.1. 
 
Indeed, it appears that at the beginning of transition post-communist states 
in East Central Europe and (to a slightly less extent) the Baltic States had more 
favourable conditions for subsequent transformations than the others. The 
communist rule in East Central Europe was weaker than in Soviet Republics, 
allowing the formation of relatively strong and reform-oriented opposition. The 
shared commitment by broad public and elites led to their active engagement in the 
breakdown of the communist rule in these states (Ekiert, 1996; Ekiert & Kubik, 
1998). As a result, the countries of East Central Europe and the Baltics (where very 
strong anti-Russianism was a driving factor of pro-reform and pro-Western stances) 
took a course for rapprochement with the EU straight after the collapse of 
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communist dominance and secured external (EU) assistance with regard to 
implementation of necessary political and economic reforms (Petrovic, 2013: 7). 
By taking a course for the European integration, local elites in these states 
locked in the momentum and path for post-communist transformation through 
Europeanisation. On the one hand, accession resulted in the integration of former 
communist states into European political institutions and market while, on the 
other hand, EU membership ‘covered’ social costs of their transition (Crampton, 
2002: 420) and patched the holes caused by enormous economic recession at the 
beginning of transition (Fish, 2017; Petrovic, 2017). 
In contrast, the immerse of the remaining post-communist states into the 
form of protracted post-communism (Bunce, 1995a) or illiberal democracy 
(Levitsky & Way, 2010; Petrovic, 2013) allowed suggesting that successful post-
communist transition was impossible without membership in the EU or at least 
without significant external assistance on the EU’s part. Not only non-reformist 
elites retained their power in the remaining post-communist states, but also the 
absence of contacts with the EU isolated these countries from the influence of 
liberal institutions. Moreover, while all post-communist states relied on external 
assistance (including in such basic aspects as food and medication in the first years 
of transition), this assistance was more substantial and was more effectively 
allocated in post-communist states which were included in the process of EU 
accession than in those which were excluded from this process (Petrovic, 2017). 
As a result, EU membership began to be seen as the main ‘leverage’ of the 
EU’s ‘transformation power’ (Grabbe, 2006; Vachudova, 2005), reflected in the 
consolidation of societies in transition towards post-communist reforms as well as 
locking in the momentum of transition through their inclusion into European political 
and market institutions. The ‘active leverage’ of the EU’s membership became 
determinant for the consolidation of democratic institutions among transition states 
and served a preventive mechanism from possible dropbacks towards 
authoritarianism.  
On this background and given recent anti-democratic developments among 
selected EU member-states, the quest of sustainability of democratic institutions has 
been closely linked to the processes of European integration and social factors of 
democratisation. The same pertained for studies of the EU’s impact on third states, 
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which in the absence of membership incentive, was rather limited (Börzel & 
Schimmelfennig, 2017; Schimmelfennig, 2012; Vachudova, 2005; Youngs, 2004). 
Indirect Europeanisation is seen as an alternative for EU democracy 
promotion and consolidation. In the modern political science literature, 
Europeanisation reflects on the incorporation of EU rules and norms into the 
political, legal and social structures of the states which wish to be Europeanised 
(Flockhart, 2010; Radealli, 2003). In the context of post-communist transition, not 
only the EU could have offered a legal template for respective institutional changes, 
but it also provided mechanisms for consolidation of these institutions through 
socialisation (intensity of personal and inter-governmental contacts) and persuasion 
(communication of EU norms). Yet whether these mechanisms could sufficiently 
advance to democratisation in non-member states remained an open question, 
because the progress of democratisation in post-communist states remained rather 
slow even after the EU’s increased engagement (Table 1.1).  
Furthermore, whereas some links between external and domestic factors of 
democratisation can been drawn, there was no integration theory on international 
aspects of democratisation and their precise relationship with domestic institutions 
and structures (Magen, 2009). So why and how Ukraine’s post-communist 
transition may be considered an insightful case study under given circumstances? 
First, Ukraine represents a Pandora’s box with regard to predication or 
modelling of its democratising efforts. On the one hand, Ukraine has been relatively 
successful in its transition progress in comparison with other post-Soviet states 
(Table 1.1; Table 1.2). The country has revealed strong public demand for reforms 
by hosting two democratic revolutions that were viewed as a chance for Ukraine’s 
democratic consolidation. Yet none of these efforts resulted in significant progress 
on consolidation of democratic institutions, while Ukraine’s progress in transition 
has corresponded more so with its economic rather than political liberalisation. 
Second, Ukraine’s domestic developments are strongly interrelated with 
external influences due to the counter-play between Ukraine’s identity 
(unaccomplished nation-building) and structural, and geopolitical constraints of 
post-communist transition. Ukraine’s position between East and West portrays it as 
a historically Eastern state with modern aspirations of closer association with 
Western countries and organisations, particularly the EU. As both Russia and the 
EU have promoted different foreign policy strategies in Ukraine, these efforts may 
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have a rather counter-playing impact on Ukraine’s domestic institutions, either 
undermining or assisting Ukraine’s transition.  
Ukraine is also in the process of its state- and nation-building whereas its 
nation-building is inevitably linked to the course of foreign policy which 
corresponds with identity narratives in the country (Prizel, 1998). As a result, EU 
or Russian efforts are determinant for Ukraine’s self-perception, which makes 
external factors of Ukraine’s post-communist transition even more important for 
the levels deeper than political or economic transition. On this background, 
intangible factors of Ukraine’s Europeanisation may serve as additional tools for 
Ukraine’s post-communist transformations.  
Finally, although the EU’s interest in Ukraine has been generally growing, 
which was reflected through the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) and (later) the Eastern Partnership (EaP), as well as growing political and 
financial support after the Maidan revolution, both Ukraine and the EU have faced 
a number of domestic limitations with regard to EU assistance to Ukraine.  
For example, a narrative of joining the EU has been actively promoted by 
Ukraine’s political elites in pushing towards closer cooperation with the EU and 
political mobilisation. Even the Maidan revolution began as Euromaidan in favour 
of association with the EU and was seen as an opportunity to accomplish Ukraine’s 
democratic consolidation through the course on European integration. Post-
Maidan Ukraine even seemed to have excluded Russia from its policy-making 
agenda for the sake of that course. Regardless, Ukraine’s progress in democratic 
consolidation has been more modest than anticipated.  
Similarly, the EU is facing a number of limitations in assisting Ukraine: such 
problems as enlargement fatigue and a series of crises mentioned before have 
excluded the membership incentive from the EU-Ukraine agenda. As a result, 
Ukraine will ‘definitely not be able to become a member of the EU in the next 
twenty to twenty-five years’ (Juncker (2016) in UNIAN (2016)).  
All the aforementioned issues make Ukraine a unique case for studying 
domestic and external factors of transition. Moreover, Ukraine also reflects on a 
number of problems raised and/or omitted by existing literature. Among such 
problems or gaps are the following: 
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 Limited understanding of transition as a process of economic reforms and 
democratisation exclusively, which fails to take full account of post-communist 
transition as a complex systematic process with a strong social component. 
 An absence of integrative theory of the role of external and domestic factors 
of democratisation leads to an absence of integrative explanation of post-
communist transition as a whole. 
 A lack of critical approach towards the mechanism and outcomes of 
‘democratic revolutions’ in Ukraine and some other post-Soviet states as part of the 
democratisation process. 
 There is an almost unanimous view that the EU is a democracy promoter 
par excellence with a lack of critical evaluation of respective EU policies, especially in 
the context of geopolitical competition with Russia in the EU neighbourhood. 
 Finally, the EU-centred approach lacks the element of ‘receptiveness to the 
Union’s ideals’ (Haukkala, 2008b: 37), which requires a more context-oriented 
research with regard to Europeanising states. 
 
1.1. Research statement and aims 
This thesis concentrates on investigating the key challenges of Ukraine’s post-
communist transition in the context of membership-exempted Europeanisation. 
The following objectives have been aligned with this research: 
1. To determine domestic challenges and opportunities of Ukraine’s post-
communist transition; 
2. To evaluate the degree of the EU’s impact on Ukraine’s post-communist 
transformations (the limits of Europeanisation); 
3. To create a roadmap for Ukraine’s successful transition on the basis of the 
above-listed factors. 
The respective objectives correlate with the following research questions: 
1. What are the key factors that have impacted and determined the process of 
Ukraine’s post-communist transition? How do these factors interact in Ukraine’s 
context and what patterns and outcomes do they create? 
2. How has the EU supported / deterred Ukraine’s post-communist transition 
with its actions and policies? 
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3. How can Ukraine-EU cooperation be further enhanced to positively 
contribute to the successful post-communist transformation of the country? Which 
kind of cooperation is determinant for this success and how can the role of the EU, 
Ukraine or other actors be respectfully moderated? 
 
1.2. Methodology 
In order to answer the abovementioned questions, this thesis applies a mixed 
method analysis incorporating qualitative and quantitative data (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010) where qualitative (interviews) 
and quantitative (trade statistics, indices) data collection complement qualitative 
data analysis within the conceptual framework of this research. 
In order to determine the core factors of Ukraine’s post-communist 
transition, both primary (reports, press-releases, publications on the results of 
observations, results of public opinion polls and elections, laws and legislative 
documents, statistical data) and secondary (academic journals, magazine and 
newspaper articles, books, thesis dissertations) sources of literature have been 
analysed. 
One of the methodological problems that this research deals with is that 
there are no clear indicators that allow to track institutional changes, which are 
fundamental to this research. Moreover, existing indicators that provide a basis for 
possible statistical analysis are also imperfect. Many of provided indicators 
themselves represent experts’ evaluations (Freedom House indices of Nations in 
transit), while weighted indices may overlook some peculiar developments in 
favour of comparative generalisation (Treisman, 2012). These indices may similarly 
be limited in terms of categories used (Polity IV) or provide little insight on 
institutional change (Nations in Transit provide a brief overview of changes in 
regime characteristics rather than more durable institutional changes) or social 
outcomes (World Bank Governance Indicators) (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 
2010). Finally, many of existing data sets measure perceptions only (Corruption 
Perceptions Index, Worldwide Governance Indicators). Furthermore, data often 
differs, relating to different periods of time and data is not necessarily available on 
an annual basis.  
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As a result, the choice of research methods is based on researcher’s personal 
experiences, experiments, logical thinking or observations, stemming from a 
pragmatic approach (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). For example, studying 
institutions and nation-building is possible only upon a rigorous in-depth research. 
Similarly, distinguishing the effects of Europeanisation from domestic or other 
externally-driven modernisation changes is impossible without a hand from the 
researcher. Considering existing gaps in literature and available data sets, 
interviews have complemented this research with additional data. Semi-structured 
interviews were chosen in order to achieve a balance between ‘open-ended and 
more guided responses’ (Fischer-Smith, 2015: 18).  
Some of the data used for this thesis has been incorporated from the project 
C3EU (50 interviews and media analysis) run by the National Centre for Research 
on Europe at the University of Canterbury. 1  Semi-structured interviews with 
Ukrainian newsmakers, cultural and business elites, representatives of civil society 
and decision-makers were held during December 2016-February 2017 in three 
regions of Ukraine (East, Centre and capital city Kyiv). During the same period, 
interviews with EU stakeholders were held in Brussels (13 interviews). In-text 
quotations of interviews held Ukraine are labelled ‘c3Ukr’, while in-text quotations 
of interviews with EU officials are labelled ‘c3EU’. 
Data collected specifically for this research includes semi-structured 
interviews with representatives of Ukraine’s civil society during January-March 
2016 (14 interviews) mainly from Kyiv but not limited to it. Experts from respective 
organisations were involved in analysing EU policies in Ukraine or highlighted 
cooperation between the two parties. These are Ukrainian think tanks, analytical 
centres and research institutions that cover a range of aspects such as legislation, 
migration, political convergence and media coverage (for example, Internews 
Ukraine)2 in the context of Ukraine-EU cooperation. A snowball technique was 
                                               
1 Crisis, conflict and critical diplomacy: EU perceptions in Ukraine and Israel/Palestine (C3EU) — 
the project is supported by the Jean Monnet Lifelong Learning Programme, Directorate General for 
Education and Culture of the European Commission. The project is led by the National Centre for 
Research on Europe (NCRE), University of Canterbury, New Zealand. More information on the 
project may be found at http://www.euperceptions.canterbury.ac.nz/projects/c3eu/  
2 Internews Ukraine is one of the leading media NGOs, working in Ukrainian media and 
communication market since 1996. Mission of organisation is the promotion of European values in 
Ukraine through development of successful media. The organisation empowers independent and 
pluralistic media in Ukraine; improves journalism standards and local media legislation; assists the 
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applied with regard to the choice of organisations, wherein the first points of 
contact were think tanks and analytical centres listed in the Global Go To Ranking 
and the Ukrainian Think Tanks Liaison Office in Brussels.  
The questionnaire for interviews was divided into two main sections 
wherein the first section was devoted to questions on Ukraine’s post-communist 
transition and the second section elaborated on the role of the EU in Ukraine’s 
domestic transformation. The questionnaire and the information sheet are attached 
in Appendices A and B respectively. All the above-listed documents as well as 
permission from the Ethics Committee of the University of Canterbury were sent to 
interviewees as part of the approaching process prior to interviews. Written consent 
was considered during the preparation, but oral consent was prioritised because 
requesting a signature could have produced negative associations among 
respondents in Ukraine (Fischer-Smith, 2015: 20). The protection of identity of 
interviewed experts was paramount for this research.  
As a result, interviews have provided this investigation with information that 
allowed testing some of the key relationships in the framework of this research. In-
text quotations of respective interviews are introduced under ‘interview’ label in the 
body of this thesis (e.g. interview1, interview2 etc.).  
Finally, a number of think tanks in Ukraine provide insightful and reliable 
surveys and public opinion polls (Razumkov Centre, Ilko Kucheriv Democratic 
Initiative Fund, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology) which have also 
advanced to this research and exempted the researcher from the need to conduct a 
separate survey research. 
 
1.3. Importance of the research and Contribution to the 
body of knowledge 
This thesis provides theoretical and empirical findings that are of interest for 
scholars, decision-makers and all those who want to get a rigorous insight in 
Ukraine’s on-going transformations.  
                                                                                                                                         
development of full-fledged democracy and civil society in the country; journalism networking and 
communication support; new media and social journalism. Website: http://internews.ua/, 
Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/internewsukraine 
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From a theoretical perspective, it provides an in-depth review of existing 
concepts of post-communist transition. By contrasting limitations of their respective 
explanations, it concludes that a number of theoretical schools have agreed on a set 
of criteria and processes which should be incorporated in the framework used in the 
thesis. While this thesis looks at post-communist transition through institutional 
perspective, it also adopts transitologist argument of transition through two stages 
of democratisation (regime change and consolidation of democratic institutions). 
Moreover, the role of agency cannot be undermined especially during the turning 
points, whereas historical legacies (institutionalist argument) and socio-economic 
development impact the consolidation of democratic institutions in the medium to 
longer run. 
The thesis also systematises studies on post-communist transition and 
theories on international relations and democratisation (particularly, developments 
that highlight the process of Europeanisation, EU foreign policy and normative 
power relationships) in order to establish a link between foregoing processes and 
their concepts.  
Thus, the theoretical framework of this research is expanded from political-
economic reading of transition to deeper societal processes and perceptions as 
source of legitimacy for external actors. Whereas many studies concentrate on the 
analysis of individual aspects of transition (democratisation, or marketisation, or 
state- or nation building) neglecting the systematic character of transition changes, 
this study provides an evidence on how the determinants of post-communist 
transition interact. 
 Empirically, this thesis tracks the dynamics of Ukraine’s formation and the 
cyclic character of its post-communist transformations. It highlights the causes and 
outcomes of Ukraine’s two democratic revolutions, demonstrating how the logic of 
Ukraine’s domestic policies interacts with the logic of external agents.   
Similarly, the thesis provides a critical evaluation of democracy-promotion 
efforts of external actors such as the EU in its counter-play with different strategies 
applied by Russia. Whereas EU assistance is generally viewed as advancing to post-
communist transformations, this research demonstrates a counter-play between EU 
normativity and interests that derive from the geopolitical aspect of its relations 
with Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, the thesis concentrates on the perceptive part 
of Europeanisation, which has been largely neglected in EU studies.  
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This thesis accordingly draws a realistic framework for cooperation between 
Ukraine and the EU, which may advance to a successful Ukraine’s post-communist 
transformation later on. This approach does not necessarily insist on EU 
membership as the driving force behind successful post-communist transition. 
Instead, the thesis goes beyond this limitation and proposes a roadmap for 
Ukraine’s transition which would be based on limited EU assistance and might be 
of use to both scholars and decision-makers. 
 
1.4. Limitations and key assumptions (hypotheses) 
Given the broad scope of issues highlighted in this thesis, there is a risk of it being 
too broad in scope. In order to avoid this, the following limitations have been 
applied to this work.  
The thesis concentrates solely on the case of Ukraine, and some 
comparisons stemming from this research (for example, with other post-Soviet 
states or new EU members) are made in order to better clarify and/or strengthen the 
core argument and the presented findings. 
Similarly, this thesis prioritises the analysis of EU policies and their impact 
on Ukraine’s democratisation over the impact of other actors (Russia, the United 
States, international financial organisations), whose influence serves only as a 
corrective factor. The interests of third parties are considered only to the extent they 
may impact Ukraine’s transition. Therefore, comprehensive or comparative 
research of EU domestic policy-making is not provided.  
Finally, one of the main challenges and limitations of conducting this 
research refers to Ukraine’s on-going crisis. Not only does the unstable military 
situation make data collection impossible in some parts of Ukraine, the war also 
radicalises opinions on the situation in Ukraine both within and outside the 
country. This inevitably complicates the search for a golden mean aligned with a 
more pragmatic and rational approach. Moreover, political, economic and socio-
cultural consequences of the on-going crisis represent additional challenges to the 
search of a proper model for Ukraine’s accomplished transformations.  
Some of the assumptions (and hypotheses) that may lead towards the 
construction of such a roadmap within existing theoretical explanations may be 
grouped as follows: 
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1. Domestic factors of post-communist transition are more decisive than 
external ones; 
2. The impact of the structural factors on post-communist transition has been 
less important than the political decisions which are not necessarily moulded by 
structural constraints.  
3. EU effects concentrate mainly on the institutional and interactional levels 
of post-communist transition.  
4. EU presence in Ukraine remains rather superficial, which requires a more 
context-based approach, including the need for a better understanding of Ukraine 
and its needs.  
 
1.5. Structure of the thesis 
The structure of this thesis reflects the research objectives and questions that have 
been defined in the preceding sections.  
Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the significant prior research in this area 
and justifies the choice of Ukraine as a case study. The chapter provides an insight 
into the methodology involved, the limitations and importance of the research as 
well as presenting the key hypotheses and assumptions of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 offers a rigorous review of theories and concepts within three key 
themes. The first theme covers the literature on theories of democratisation and 
post-communist transitions beginning with modernisation and transitology theories 
and proceeding with economic and specifically post-communist transition theories. 
The second theme elaborates on studies that explain the role of international agents 
and structures in democratisation and domestic institutional changes. These cover 
international relations theories and their evolution among EU studies towards such 
areas of study as Europeanisation and the EU’s normative power. Finally, the third 
theme combines these approaches in one conceptual framework that explains 
relationships between the domestic and external factors of post-communist 
transition in general and in Ukraine’s context specifically.   
Chapter 3 provides an insight into Ukraine’s historical background aligned 
with Ukraine’s historical legacies, the establishment of communism and, finally, the 
character of communist rule in the country. This chapter distinguishes legacies and 
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patterns of socio-political systems, which were inherent to Ukraine throughout its 
history or were produced specifically by a communist regime. 
Chapter 4 examines the dynamics of Ukraine’s post-communism with 
specific attention to state-building (institutionalisation of democratic and market 
relations) reflecting on the cyclic nature of Ukraine’s hybrid political regime and 
produced state capture phenomenon. The chapter portrays Ukraine’s democratic 
revolutions as part of this hybrid regime rather than the opposite and provides a 
discussion of vital issues in Ukraine’s nation-building stressing that success in 
democratic nation-building may lead to Ukraine’s democratic consolidation. 
Chapter 5 demonstrates how Ukraine’s domestic developments interface 
with the interests and policies of third actors. This chapter demonstrates the 
environmental presence of competing parties (namely the West and Russia) as a key 
limitation for Ukraine’s democratisation and identifies the areas in which third 
actors have the greatest impact. Chapter 5 also provides a critical analysis of EU 
democracy promotion efforts in Ukraine, explaining why some of these efforts 
failed and how the situation may be changed to favour Ukraine’s successful 
transition. 
Finally, Chapter 6 presents a discussion on how empirical evidence supports 
theoretical explanation and/or provides additional challenges to theory and policy 
provisions. This chapter provides a conclusion which may be used as a roadmap for 
Ukraine’s successful post-communist transformations and explores whether this 




 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND PRIOR 
RESEARCH 
This chapter provides a critical review of the literature devoted to post-communist 
transition. The first part of the chapter deals with theories of modernisation and 
transitology as well as institutional and comparative approaches towards post-
communist transition. The second part of the review investigates the mechanisms 
and effects of the activities of international actors on post-communist 
transformation, including theoretical developments in the area of international 
relations and Europeanisation. The final part of the chapter defines a framework for 
Ukraine’s post-communist-transition.  
 
2.1. Theorising post-communist democratic and economic 
transition 
Although the concept of post-communist transition emerged after the collapse of 
communist dominance in East Central and Eastern Europe, democracy was slowly 
spreading worldwide prior to that, in stages categorised as the three ‘waves of 
democratisation’ (Huntington, 1993b).  
1. The first wave began the slow democratisation of Great Britain in the 
seventeenth-eighteenth centuries (with gradual introduction of elections) and 
peaked at the proclamation of independence by the United States of America. 
Twenty-nine countries democratised during the first wave, but their number 
reduced to twelve due to the rise of fascism in the interwar period. 
2. The second wave of democratisation followed World War II and 
lasted until 1962 (this was characterised by the collapse of the colonial system). 
About thirty-six countries democratised, but only thirty remained democracies at 
the end of the researched period. 
3. Finally, the third wave of democratisation spread in almost all 
regions of the world: it began in Southern Europe in 1974, reaching Latin America 
in the 1980s, Southeast Asia in 1986-1988, and former communist states at the end 
of the 1980s. Twenty-three out of thirty-nine states of the third wave have had at 
least one democratic experience before, while others were never democracies but 
always autocracies (Huntington, 1993b: 44). 
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A number of approaches have evolved in order to explain the state of 
democratic transition during the respective waves. 
 
2.1.1. Modernisation, the civilisational approach and the transitology 
paradigm of democratic transition 
The first wave of democratisation coincided with the boost of industrialisation and 
urbanisation. It was associated with long-term patterns of development — the 
building blocks of a structural, or modernist, approach that did not treat post-
communism as a specific case of modernity and studied general patterns of social 
evolution and democratic development.  
One of the first modernist approaches is Marxism, which claims that the 
ruling class (bourgeoisie) maintain their power by means of alienation of the ‘means 
of production’ from the oppressed class of workers (proletariat). Meanwhile, 
deepening economic and political inequality prompt an anti-capitalist revolution 
leading to the establishment of a new social order with fully eliminated inequality 
— communism (Marx & Engels, 1948).  
Yet in general, modernisation more often concentrates on long-term patterns 
of democratic development (Lipset, 1959: 72). Thus, Weber (1946: 226) has pointed 
that new forms of social organisation (bureaucracy) are the key feature of evolving 
democracies, while some societies (those that profess certain types of Protestantism) 
have been more successful in rationalising modern values than others. Against this 
background, modernisation scholars have distinguished two groups of mediums 
that favour democratisation in the long run: socio-economic and socio-cultural 
factors (Lipset, 1959: 72).  
In the first group are industrialisation and urbanisation that advance to 
economic prosperity and a corresponding rise in educational standards, mobility, as 
well as social equality. By promoting the rise of the middle class and related 
increase in political participation, modernisation secures political change and 
legitimacy of a democratic regime (Lipset, 1959).  
In the second group are supporters of the civilisational approach, who, 
although sharing the idea that socio-economic development supports 
democratisation, claim that a specific cultural background (Western culture and 
norms) is a determinant for democratisation (Huntington, 1993b). This approach 
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considers civilisational differences as a source of conflict between democratic 
Western and ‘backward’ non-Western (Orthodox Christian and Islamic) societies 
(Huntington, 1993a), viewing social traditions in Eastern Europe as the key 
prerequisite for the adoption of the communism ideology (Janos, 1993: 8). 
While the socio-economic approach does not explain why technologically 
advanced Nazi and communist regimes turned totalitarian, the civilisational 
approach fails to explain how several non-Western civilisations and even non-
European states successfully democratised after World War II (Japan, India and 
Turkey). In post-communist space, Mongolia represents another challenge for the 
theory as the only country that not only has successfully democratised after the 
collapse of communist rule but also did so without resource to EU assistance (Fish, 
1998b). For similar reasons, the structural factor of geographic proximity fails to 
explain the success of non-European states in democratisation. Rather closeness to 
the West supports democratic transition within a broader set of factors (Fish, 2017), 
including by means of diffusion of information and communication flows (Kopstein 
& Reilly, 2000).  
In the background of the third wave of democratisation, also viewed as a 
product of international democratic diffusion (Huntington, 1993b; Schmitter & 
Karl, 1994), a transitologist approach (O’Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead, 1986) 
appeared as an alternative to modernisation.  
Unlike scholars of modernisation who study social prerequisites of 
democracy, transitologists concentrate on regime change and factors sustaining 
democratic regime. By implication, the breakdown of authoritarian rule allows the 
establishment of a democratic regime (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 2013). At this stage, 
the skills and choices of political elites are crucial for democratic transition 
(Diamond, Linz, Lipset, & Samudavanija, 1989: 14). In turn, democratic 
consolidation reflects a more substantial engagement of citizens in the political 
process through elections and ‘fair access to public agencies and courts’ (O'Donnell, 
1996: 45-6). While ‘vertical accountability’ implies accountability between political 
elites and the public, ‘horizontal accountability’ represents a balance among public 
institutions (O'Donnell, 1998). Finally, economic development advances to 
democracy either by strengthening the legitimacy and stability of democratic 
regimes or by nourishing the regime change in favour of democracy.  
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In this regard, both modernisation and transitology theorists have found a 
consensus: while transitologists share the modernist belief that increasing the 
quality of life positively affects factors corresponding with democratisation (such as 
civil society) (Diamond, 1992), scholars of modernisation share the transitologist 
argument that democratic sustainability requires ‘fair’ and ‘effective’ institutions 
that satisfy the needs of all political actors (Przeworski, 1991: 26, 32-3). 
Notwithstanding the consensus, transition states — Ukraine among them as 
will be demonstrated in Chapter 4 — often fail to move from regime change 
towards sustainable democracy being locked in a hybrid regime of ‘unconsolidated 
democracy’ or rather ‘unconsolidated authoritarianism’ (Way, 2005a: 234). 
Therefore, a somewhat ‘mechanistic’ portrayal of transition whereby the use of 
specific leverages produces predictable outcomes (Bideleux & Jeffries, 2007: 543-4) 
does not work in practice, prompting re-conceptualisation of transitology in favour 
of the institutional approach.3  
 
2.1.2. The institutional approach towards post-communist 
democratisation 
Whereas transitologists investigate ‘the conditions and modes of transition’, 
institutionalists study ‘causes, conditions and models of the consolidation of young 
democracies’ (Croissant & Merkel, 2004: 1). They view institutionalisation, or 
embodiment of rules and practices, as ‘a state-dependent process’ (Powell & 
DiMaggio, 2012: 12) rooted in relationships between institutions, environment, and 
agents. Thereby, democratic transition is comprised of a network of relationships 
between changeable conditions, actors and their institutionalisation (Elster, Offe, & 
Preuss, 1998: 1-2), whereby successful transition is associated with the creation of 
an institutionalised (consolidated) democratic order. In this vein, post-communist 
transition may be defined as  ‘triple transition’ in terms of building the institutions 
of the nation-state, democratic political system and market economy (Offe, 1991).  
Meanwhile, various institutionalist approaches explain the creation of an 
institutionalised democratic order in different ways. While ‘old institutionalism’ 
studies the evolution of formal institutions, ‘new institutionalism’ concentrates on a 
                                               
3 for more information, please see the debate between Bunce (1995b) and Karl & Schmitter (1991) 
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counter-play between various institutions (Abrutyn & Turner, 2011: 300). The latter 
makes neo-institutional explanations of a particular interest for those studying 
various contexts of democratic transitions.  
One of the neo-institutional branches, rational institutionalism, is set upon 
a framework of behavioural theories implying that the decisions by political and 
economic actors are driven ‘not by impersonal historical forces, but by a strategic 
calculus’ of other actors’ behaviour (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 944-5). Therefore, 
institutions represent arrangements that the majority of actors agree upon so far as 
the agreed framework benefits them more than any other. 
Unlike rational institutionalism, the sociological approach attempts to 
explain existing social structures by ‘transmission of cultural practices’ into 
normative regulations. Through this, respective scholars gain understanding of how 
organisational practices result in the same structures in culturally different nations 
and states, combining institutional (organisational) and cultural explanations in one 
(Hall & Taylor, 1996: 947).  
Further, the constructivist approach has evolved as part of the sociological 
one through the analysis of the endogenous construction of institutions (Schmidt, 
2010). By implication, institutions provide norms of behaviour, which individuals 
associate themselves with, and in such a manner shape the preferences and 
identities of these individuals (Powell & DiMaggio, 2012: 9-10).  
Aside the afore-listed approaches, historical institutionalism views 
institutions as ‘formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions 
embedded in the organisational structure of polity or political economy’ (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996: 937-8). This approach deals with ‘big, substantive questions’ and 
theorises ‘about historical dimensions of causation’ (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002: 3, 6). 
It also elaborates on the importance of agency in historical sequence and views 
institutions as ‘consistent and stable constraints on behaviour’ (Lewis & Steinmo, 
2012: 323). Such argumentation portrays historical institutionalism as a ‘third way’ 
between the sociological and rational approaches (Ikenberry, 1994).  
Historical institutionalism views post-communist transition as a complex 
and unique phenomenon; it often points to a combination of factors necessary for 
successful post-communist transition and involves studying the historical and 
communist legacies, context and dynamics of post-communist transition. For 
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example, Bunce (2005) highlights strong nationalistic views as crucial factors for the 
formation of powerful anti-communist opposition and subsequent political 
transformations. In turn, the mode of imperial rule is also considered crucial for the 
pace of nation-building in Eastern Europe (Bunce, 1995a). Meanwhile, other 
institutional scholars claim that national unity and mass mobilisation are more 
likely to succeed in combination with other preconditions of democratisation, such 
as stability of borders and composition of citizens (Rustow, 1970: 350-1), economic 
‘greed’ of political elites, and international recognition (Roeder, 2007: 9).  
Therefore, institutionalists also reflect on the transitologist argument that 
‘agreements about stateness’ precede ‘agreements about democracy’ (Linz & 
Stepan, 1992: 123-4), whereas state-building is viewed as an institutional process 
that is more likely to be accomplished through decolonisation and secession of self-
governing territories, or segment-states from existing empires (Roeder, 2007: 9).  
The legacy of the past represents a point of reference for the beginning of 
transition, because old actors and institutions try to adapt themselves to a new 
environment. Apart from ‘temporal and spatial context’, ‘structural’, ‘institutional’ 
and ‘interactional’ levels of analysis of post-communist transition reveal a causal 
relationship between communist legacies and transition outcomes (Ekiert & 
Hanson, 2003: 17-9). By implication, communist institutional arrangements have 
endured as legacies, and, following the collapse of communism, have partially 
endured in the newly constructed democratic institutions (Ekiert, 2003).  
Some scholars consider long-term factors of post-communist transition to be 
more determinant in this respect. For example, the theory of structuration claims 
that social systems comprise of human actions, but these actions are guided by 
certain rules (social practices) reproduced by individuals through reproduction of 
knowledge and context (Giddens, 1984: 25). Similarly, Kitschelt (2003) refers to 
collective memories while explaining how pre-communist legacies have shaped 
diverse communist regimes and how their strength, determined by the duration of 
communist rule, has reflected in diverse modes of post-communist transition 
(Kitschelt, Zdenka, Radoslaw, & Gabor 1999). Yet his emphasis on pre-communist 
legacies also downplays the role of agency, while the only window of change left by 
the structuration theory reflects on the limited character of knowledge and 
resources by individuals (Giddens, 1984: 17, 22-4) as well as individuals' exposure 
to alternative cultural schemas (Sewell, 1992: 27). 
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In contrast, a number of other scholars, albeit emphasising the importance of 
communist legacies for post-communist transition, concentrate on agent-driven 
explanations of transition. By implication, the results of the first post-communist 
elections reveal the extent to which ‘inhibiting’ communist legacies (Ekiert, 2003) 
have affected the mode of transition (Petrovic, 2013) and have partially reproduced 
in newly created democratic institutions (Bunce, 1995a). Meanwhile, the 
distribution of power between old political elites and new opposition on the eve of 
regime change is also viewed as a factor that has shaped the mode of regime change 
and, hence, the success of post-communist democratisation (Gill, 2017; McFaul, 
2005).  
Whereas this idea overlaps with the transitologist argument that the 
character of elites determines the mode of democratic transition (O’Donnell & 
Schmitter, 2013; Karl & Schmitter, 1991), McFaul's (2002) claim that non-
cooperative transitions advance rapid and comprehensive democratisation 
contradicts the transitologist argument that stable democratic development requires 
pacted and non-violent regime changes.  
In consideration of the determinant role of structure or agency in transition 
as well as the debate on pacted and non-cooperative transitions, path-dependence 
appears as a potential compromise. It implies that in a moment of crisis or cleavage 
structural constraints weaken to the extent they cannot constrain decision-makers 
anymore (Mahoney, 2001), and the respective decision of policy-makers reproduces 
itself, sets up an institutional path and makes the adopted institutional change 
irreversible.  
Path-dependence has allowed combining communist legacies and agency in 
post-communist studies (Ekiert, 2003), since the first post-communist elections are 
often viewed as a critical juncture: they have determined the character of political 
elites that came to power and, therefore, the mode of transition (Fish, 1998a). Path-
dependence also reveals how a new political order becomes a product of combining 
both ‘new and old’ norms (Eyal, Szelényi, & Townsley, 1998: 14-5) and, finally, it 
may be equally used to research on revolutions and democratic revolutions, with 





2.1.2.1. The institutional approach and its relevance to Ukraine’s post-communist transition 
Each of the above discussed explanations can be used in explaining some of the 
various aspects of Ukraine’s transition, which is sometimes viewed as quadruple 
rather than triple, because it involves painful state and nation-building along with 
political and economic reforms (Kuzio, 2001b). The former derives from imperial 
legacies as pointed by Bunce (1995a), portraying Ukraine’s post-communist 
transition as post-colonial rather than post-authoritarian (Kuzio, 2002a), especially 
in light of Ukraine’s ‘tensions with post-imperial Russia’ (Motyl, 1997a: 433, 438-
9). Such argumentation appears to favour the structural explanations of Ukraine’s 
post-communist transition, but a number of Ukraine’s post-communist 
developments point to the opposite.  
Although Ukraine’s weak nationalism has prevented it from becoming a 
strong state after the downfall of communism (Roeder, 2007: 9-28), Ukraine has 
also featured in strong mobilisation, reflected not only in the ‘tides’ of nationalist 
mobilisation during the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Beissinger, 2002), but also 
in a number of democratic revolutions in post-communist Ukraine. Whereas some 
scholars consider ‘colour revolutions’ which occurred in Ukraine and some other 
post-Soviet states in mid 2000s as part of further international democratic diffusion 
(Bunce & Wolchik, 2006) and a third wave of democratisation (Bunce, McFaul, & 
Stoner-Weiss, 2009; McFaul, 2010), others explain them through a balance 
between structural and institutional variables of post-communist transition 
(Beissinger, 2007).  
This thesis concerns the latter. Whereas Ukraine’s democratic revolutions 
(of 2003-2004 and 2013-2014) may be viewed as a source of democratic 
consolidation (Kubicek, 2007; McFaul, 2007; Pifer, 2007; Wilson, 2006), they also 
reveal a number of unresolved transition problems: endogenous division 
(Katchanovski, 2014), geopolitical tensions (N. R. Smith, 2015) and, most 
importantly, communist legacies — with most of them reflecting the institutional 
factors of Ukraine’s post-communist transition. Therefore, the institutional 
approach may be more suitable than other approaches in explaining the patterns 
and outcomes of Ukraine’s post-communist transition. 
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For example, the path-dependence approach allows operating not only with 
big issues such as consolidation of the Ukrainian nation-state4 but also with smaller 
critical junctures such as democratic revolutions. As such, the institutionalist 
approach portrays the first post-communist elections as the key marker of Ukraine’s 
post-communist institutional change whereby, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 
4, the takeover of the former nomenklatura in 1991 was caused by the absence of 
revolutionary elites (Motyl, 1997a). Presumably, the dominance of non-reformers 
in Ukraine’s politics determined the mode of Ukraine’s post-communist 
transformation and, in such manner, affected the outcomes of the transition. In 
addition, the institutionalist approach views the dominance of the former 
nomenklatura as one of multiple communist legacies (among them are the strong 
role of informal relationships and patrimonial political culture). As will be 
discussed in Chapter 4, these factors hindered consolidation of democratic 
institutions in Ukraine and are useful in explaining how an overlap between 
communist legacies and newly established institutions of democracy and market 
economy occurred in Ukraine instead of its rapid and comprehensive transition.  
 
2.1.3. Theorising economic transition 
Whereas socialist economy was shaped by the Marxist ideology, the pace of 
economic transformation in post-communist states was determined by political 
elites, who used respective schools of economic thought to justify their reform 
choice. In the beginning of transition, classical economic school could not provide a 
template for transformation. Moreover, it largely treated centrally planned 
economy as a ‘temporary deviation from the generally accepted capitalist norm’ 
(Papava, 2005: 78).  
The classical economic school relied on the concept of the invisible hand 
introduced by Smith, in which the market naturally establishes the rules for 
economic actors. When the Great Depression broke out, a state-oriented approach 
was offered by Keynes, who insisted on the necessity of governmental intervention 
                                               
4 in Chapter 3 these will be reflected in several critical junctures: the Christianisation of Rus’ in the 
tenth century, the establishment of an independent Cossack state in 1648, the establishment of the 
Ukrainian People’s Republic and its yielding to Soviet Ukraine in 1918, and the establishment of 
independent Ukraine after the collapse of communism in 1991. 
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in crises. By the time the need for economic transition from socialism was revealed, 
the leading theoretical approach in the economic field was neo-liberalism.  
With regard to post-communist marketisation, neoliberal ideas were 
structured in the package of reforms known as the Washington Consensus (WC). 
Originally developed for economic restructuring in Latin America, the package was 
not viewed as a transition pathway for former communist states (Williamson, 
1993). However, the WC was selected for ‘speed and comprehensiveness’ (Aslund, 
2007) and was actively promoted by international financial organisations (IFOs) for 
its ability to stabilise economies in transition states. 
At the early stages of post-communist transition, transition governments 
entered into a debate about the sequence and the speed of reforms that soon 
developed into a debate about whether they needed to seek gradual or radical (shock 
therapy) changes of economic policies. In practice however, this debate was not as 
important as the credibility of political leaders in implementing the declared 
objectives of economic reform, i.e. whether the economy of a particular post-
communist state had been (really) reformed/marketised or not (Lavigne, 1999b: 
116-8).  
The pace of reform was driven purely by political considerations (Lavigne, 
1999b: 119-20) whereas gradualists called for the consideration of the importance of 
market institutions for successful transition and smoothing out the social costs of 
transition (the main critique of the neoliberal approach), while shock therapists chose 
radical reforms to demonstrate a definitive break with the communist past (Pickel, 
1997). The selected modes of economic reform reflected on various paths of post-
communist transition chosen by political elites. Whereas Hungary’s gradualism was 
dictated by its high progress in liberalisation even prior to the collapse of 
communism, gradualism in countries such as Ukraine was only alleged and, as will 
be shown in Chapter 4, served as an excuse for not reforming.  
In fact, both gradual and shock approaches implied a shift to a market 
economy through the adoption of neoliberal principles and differed in the pace of 
this adoption. Moreover, any alternatives that fell in line with market socialism could 
not be realised at the time, because, unlike the WC, this alternative lacked feasible 
programmes of economic reforms. Furthermore, transition governments depended 
on support from external donors (including such IFOs as the IMF and WB), who 
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backed up the WC and shock therapy (Papava, 2005: 83). Thence, refusing the WC 
meant not reforming at all. As an example, Ukraine’s neither shock therapy nor 
gradualism resulted in a ‘shock without the therapy’ (Dobbs, 1993) — a severe 
economic recession and poor progress in marketisation as opposed to advanced and 
high-pace reformers from East Central Europe and the Baltics (Table 1.2). 
With time, the optimal model for economic transition emerged, combining 
macro-economic stabilisation, liberalisation, and privatisation with social security 
system and institutional framework (Papava, 2005). However in the beginning of 
transition, the WC was the only available reform package, and the ability to 
implement it or to fit it to the context of transition states depended fully on 
transition governments. 
The importance of the relationship between political will and economic 
reform has increased the explanatory value of political economy for post-
communist economic transition (Lavigne, 1999b: 274-5; Pickles & Smith, 2005). 
For example, the public choice theory claims that governmental officials may act 
not only for the sake of public interests but also in pursue of their personal interests 
(elections, bureaucracy or rent-seeking, as in the case of the debate mentioned 
above or in Ukraine’s state capture that will reflected upon in Chapter 4). Along 
with elites, the role of state in transition and especially with regard to institution-
building (market institutions and rule of law) is also considered crucial (Ellman, 
1995; Taylor, 1994) — both being seemingly omitted in Ukraine. 
In this regard, the institutional approach views the main task of post-
communist economic transition in creating an institutional system that will 
promote stimuli for efficient production. Meanwhile, creating such a system 
represents an incremental process of overlapping existing legacies — political, 
economic and legal norms — that evolve in selected societies in the light of 
endogenous developments and/or external shocks (North, 1997: 141-7). 
Similarly to the importance of the balance of power on the eve of communist 
collapse for progress in democratisation, the initial differences in economic 
performance and existing market institutions as well as the political choice of 
economic reform in the beginning of post-communist transition became crucial for 
subsequent economic transformations of post-communist states (De Melo, Denizer, 
Gelb, & Tenev, 2001; Gelb, Melo, Denizer, & Tenev, 1999). As will be discussed in 
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Chapter 4, the takeover of conservative elites in Ukraine not only had stalled 
political reform in the country but hindered economic transformation as well, 
preventing the establishment of effective production stimuli. Among additional 
factors, the level of economic liberalisation was a determinant for economic growth 
in the long run and, thus, crucial for establishing sustainable democracy (according 
to the transitologist and modernist arguments). 
Finally, although simultaneous implementation of political and economic 
reforms and the initial ‘momentum’ of transition (Offe, 1991; Roland, 2000; 
Stiglitz, 1999) had been crucial for the overall success of post-communist transition, 
the importance of agency persisted. In the flow of transition, the impact of initial 
economic conditions also diminished. Therefore, if reforms are implemented, they 
take effect regardless (Gelb et al., 1999). Communist legacies prove important for 
explaining why reforms have not taken off in some countries (as Ukraine) but are 
not determinant for the outcomes of transition per se. 
 
2.2. International context of post-communist transition 
Whereas most scholars agree that domestic factors of post-communist transition 
were determinant for its success (Börzel & Risse, 2000; Grzymala-Busse & Luong, 
2002; O’Donnell et al., 1986), external assistance provided significant facilitation. 
As has been mentioned in introduction and preceding sections, those states that 
lacked foreign assistance were slow in introducing political and market reforms, 
while the negative experience of unassisted post-communist transition delivered a 
belief that former communist states were unable to complete it on their own 
(Coricelli, 2007; Offe, 1997; Petrovic, 2013) 
Although these views were not definitively set one way or another, foreign 
assistance remained important for successful post-communist transition. Whereas 
some democracies such as the U.S. established themselves as ‘qualifiers’ of 
democracy (Magen & McFaul, 2009), democratic transition in post-communist 
context took place mainly on the background of European integration. Therefore, 
conceptualising the very process and the respective role of the EU in post-
communist democratisation requires an insight into the basic paradigms of 
international relations and Europeanisation. 
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2.2.1. Theories of international relations: realism, liberalism and 
constructivism 
Although democratisation became part of discussion in the international arena in 
the twentieth century, international relations were and/or are not primarily 
relations about democracy. Rather the three dominant paradigms in international 
relations (realism, liberalism and constructivism) explain the nature and the system 
of these relations without a necessary link to democracy.  
Thus, representatives of realism view the international system as anarchy 
dominated by power struggle (Morgenthau, 1973: 8). They believe that states as the 
main international actors use power to satisfy their national interests (Wohlforth, 
2008: 33) by balancing against specific threats or international actors that have 
achieved dangerously high level of power (determined by military capacities, 
economic development, size of population, and natural resources) (Waltz, 2014: 
117).  
Yet the interpretation of power depends on relations between actors that 
exercise and experience it (Dahl, 1957), while the application of power is limited to 
the analysis of what power actually is (Dahl & Stinebrickner, 1963: 33). This 
critique was reflected in the ideas of the liberal school that refused the idea of power 
as a determinant of international politics.  
Instead of viewing the system of international relations as anarchy, 
liberalism portrays it as a social structure created by international actors to satisfy 
their interests. The system benefits those agents that have established it and, 
therefore, implies certain power asymmetry (Gilpin, 1983: 9), wherein hegemony 
serves a solution against the takeover of anarchy through maintaining liberal 
international economy (Gilpin & Gilpin, 1987) and liberal international order 
(Keohane, 2005).  
Similarly to the liberal theory of political economy and in contrast to the 
realist approach, liberalism in international relations restrains the role of the state in 
the international arena, while admitting that domestic factors determine the 
interests and policies of states (Panke & Risse, 2007: 90). In line with a ‘two-level 
game’ metaphor, national interests derive from the political struggle of conflicting 
domestic groups (‘demand’) and are then broadcasted by governments to the 
international arena (‘supply’) (Moravcsik, 1993: 480-2; Putnam, 1988). 
 
 29 
The structure of international relations becomes more complicated, as state-
organised international organisations and non-governmental actors join in (Nye & 
Keohane, 1971: 332). Interdependence of international actors also grows stronger, 
and ‘asymmetrical interdependence’ turns into a ‘source of power’ (Keohane & 
Nye, 2001: 10). The network of such interdependences, which is based on inter-
state arrangements, represents the international order (Keohane & Nye, 2001: 17) 
maintained and promoted by hegemon. Post-war environment made the United 
States a hegemon that created and supported international organisations and thus 
constructed ‘a liberal-capitalist world of political economy’ (Keohane, 2005: 136-7). 
Whereas the Cold War was accompanied by an ideological struggle, the 
collapse of communist dominance led to a widespread adoption of liberal values 
not least because of the articulation of ‘soft’ power and attractiveness of new values. 
Soft power implies the ability to shape the perceptions and preferences of others by 
literally making them want what you want (Nye, 1990: 166). It is based on ‘co-
opting’ through coercion (‘sticks’), incentives (‘carrots’), and attraction. Yet soft 
power differs from traditional power, because it prioritises ‘softer’ mechanisms of 
impact such as diplomacy (communication) and non-governmental activities 
(exchange, education, media) as opposed to military power that negatively affects 
the image of an international actor (Nye, 2008: 94-5, 102-7).  
A continuous projection of an ideal image of self serves as an additional tool 
to maintain power over the targeted society (Steele, 2010: 29-32). Soft power builds 
upon ‘affective investments by [targeted] audiences in narrative identities 
constructed by states’ soft power efforts’ (Solomon, 2014: 737), whereas the use of 
proper narratives allows particular actors to literally ‘shape the world’ 
(Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, & Roselle, 2013: 1). 
The narrative approach reflects the ideas introduced by constructivists, who 
view the international system as a social construction where identity, socialisation, 
and discourse prevail over material values. Hence, the system of international 
relations represents a system of interrelations between actors, where power and 
structure are not the causes but the outcomes of such interdependence. The 
distribution of power is determined by ‘culturally constituted’ ideas, while the 
interests of nation-states are contingent and socially constructed through their 
identities (Wendt, 1999: 1, 119, 233).  
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By implication, international actors create ‘the underlying rules of the game’ 
and, by embedding them into identities of other actors, make these actors adopt or 
follow the rules (Adler, 1997: 337). March and Olsen (1998) explain this process by 
‘logic of appropriateness’, wherein the expectations and preferences of international 
actors derive from their perceptions and ideas. In turn, these ideas create particular 
behaviour that corresponds with specific identity. International actors use these 
identities to fit in social frames shaped by the rules, specific to the society, group or 
organisation they belong to, including for international institutions (March & 
Olsen, 2004: 692).  
Despite visible differences in interpretations of power, international actors 
may equally exercise power in its materialist (realist) or constructivist (perceptions) 
meaning. Moreover, the three theoretical paradigms have several points of contact. 
According to neoclassic realism, any state relies on ‘relative material power 
capabilities’ in formulating its foreign policy (Rose, 1998: 146), while the 
application of power depends on the context in which the country acts. Elites and 
their perceptions of power as well as the ability to mobilise and ‘extract’ national 
resources affect the country’s foreign policy (147). Systemic pressures of external 
environment constrain the behaviour of states, while their foreign policies represent 
an attempt to balance between external pressures and domestic politics in order to 
develop as closely ideal foreign policy as possible. Importantly, such an 
incorporation of liberalist and constructivist arguments in the realist framework is 
called upon to explain a situation when domestic politics and ideas ‘distort’ the 
country from optimal (ideal or objective) foreign policy. Presumably, this 
‘distortion’ is the main reason behind the failure of any foreign policy (Rathbun, 
2008: 310-1). 
By incorporating some aspects of the three key paradigms, neoclassic realism 
provides a point of reference for studies that deal with complex cases such as 
Ukraine. Ukraine is perceived as locked in between liberal Europe and authoritarian 
Russia, whereas the EU refers to its norms as a roadmap for Ukraine’s transition 
and Russia refers to the Russian-Ukrainian brotherhood in holding Ukraine from its 
European course. This battle of the narratives unfolds against the background of 
pursuing real security and economic interests (realist approach), while Ukraine itself 
remains domestically conflicted about the course of foreign policy it has to pursue.  
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Reflected in almost polar versions of policy courses in between and after 
Ukraine’s two democratic revolutions, these developments point to the 
complementary character of the realist and constructivist theoretical approaches in 
Ukraine’s case and especially with regard to a counter-play between the interests of 
Ukraine’s domestic elites and the reflection of these interests in the course of 
Ukraine’s foreign policy (the liberal approach).  
Since Russia does not pose as a democracy promoter and does not provide 
any mechanisms for relevant assistance, EU-led democratisation will be the focus 
of further theoretical investigation in this thesis. Meanwhile, the remaining aspects 
of the three dominant paradigms of international relations are utilised only to the 
extent that they explain certain aspects of Ukraine’s relations with other actors 
(such as Russia) in relation to Ukraine’s progress in post-communist 
transformation.   
 
2.2.2. The mechanisms of democracy promotion and Europeanisation 
Whereas external factors were initially treated as ‘environmental’ influences 
(Pridham, Sanford, & Herring, 1994: 3-31) wherein liberal actors could serve an 
example of possible liberalisation simply by their presence (Manners, 2002), the 
divergence of transition pathways required further research on the causes and 
potential impact of external actors on democratisation. In the post-communist 
context, articulation of Europeanisation advanced to this process primarily because 
many transitions took place on the basis of European integration.  
Europeanisation represents the process of historical and cultural diffusion 
reflected in the construction of European identity (Featherstone, 2003) and/or 
incorporation of European norms in domestic political structures of Europeanising 
states (Cortell & Davis, 1996: 454). European norms hold a special place in the 
Europeanisation framework not only in the course of European integration, but 
also because they make the core of the EU’s ability to impact international actors in 
the international arena. ‘Normative power Europe’ (NPE) is closely associated with 
the EU and its norms and implies the EU’s ‘ability to shape conceptions of 
“normal” in international relations’ (Manners, 2002: 239). Despite the fact that 
normative power is criticised for its narrowly European focus (Diez, 2005) and 
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promotion of the EU’s imperial discourse (Zielonka, 2013), the concept represents 
the core of the EU’s foreign policy and, for this reason, is worth studying.  
EU norms constitute EU founding documents (Flockhart, 2010) and form 
the core of its normative agenda. Membership of the EU or association with the 
European club is not only conditional upon the adoption of respective norms, but 
also EU norms are widely adopted by international organisations. Such overlapping 
endows the EU with the ability to push for both top-down and bottom-up 
democratisation. 
The EU distributes its norms through ‘ideational diffusion’ (Lenz, 2013: 
211), ‘persuasion... invoking norms ... shaping the discourse’ and ‘leading through 
example’ (Forsberg, 2011: 1183) while relying on already known mechanisms of 
internationalisation (Manners, 2002). Thus, contagion (diffusion, demonstration 
effect, or spillover) (Kubicek, 2005) implies a natural spillover of democracy to 
neighbouring states (Huntington, 1993b) including through the process of regional 
integration (Whitehead, 2001) and due to geographic proximity (Kopstein & Reilly, 
2000).  
In the post-communist space, electoral revolutions (began with the peaceful 
revolutions of 1989-1993 (Ekiert & Kubik, 2001) and continued with colour 
revolutions of 2003-2006) are often viewed as an example of successful diffusion 
(Bunce & Wolchik, 2006). Yet their success requires a number of conditions: weak 
authoritarianism, vested external support and, most importantly, collaborative 
networks between democracy promoters and democratising states (NGOs and 
personal contacts). Furthermore, the strength of these conditions depends on 
leverage (vulnerability of governments towards external democratisation effects) 
and linkage (economic, political and other cross-border ties) between former 
communist states and the West. Supposedly, weak leverage and linkage between 
former Soviet states and ‘western-led multilateral institutions’ (Levitsky & Way, 
2006: 379) has resulted in their poorer post-communist performance in comparison 
to Central and Southern Europe, once again pointing to the prevalence of domestic 
conditions for the overall success of democratic diffusion (Bunce & Wolchik, 2007: 
94). 
The importance of the domestic environment has shifted the emphasis in 
democratisation from simply promoting liberal norms to motivating democratising 
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actors to adopt the respective norms. This process relies on convergence, or an 
incentive-based model (Kubicek, 2003) that aims at gradual normative 
rapprochement between democratising states and democratisers.  
EU-led Europeanisation combines both an incentive-based rationalist 
bargaining model of conditionality (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005) and 
social learning and social-drawing models of convergence based on the 
constructivist logic of appropriateness (Börzel & Risse, 2012; Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier, 2005). Yet similarly to diffusion, the success of democratisation 
through convergence depends on domestic environments of democratising states. 
The key feature that distinguishes the EU from other democracy promoters in this 
regard is that the EU has refused deliberate ‘democracy by design’ in favour of 
democratisation through European integration as part of transforming the domestic 
environments of Europeanising states (Dimitrova & Pridham, 2004: 99-104).  
 
2.2.2.1. Democratisation by European integration: conditionality and socialisation 
Having evolved as an economic community, the EU did not initially aim for 
democracy promotion until the accession of former communist states from East 
Central Europe, which urged the EU to adjust its policies from ‘weak conditionality 
and technical assistance’ to ‘stronger conditionality and monitoring’ of institutional 
changes in former communist states (Dimitrova & Pridham, 2004: 101).  
The new approach combined the adoption of acquis communautaire (the EU’s 
acquis, EU law, or acquis — ‘the body of common rights and obligations that is 
binding on all the EU member states’) with economic assistance. The EU promoted 
bottom-up democratisation by actively engaging civil society (including NGOs) in 
candidate states and socialisation through political visits at high level and 
parliamentary cooperation (Dimitrova & Pridham, 2004; Pridham, 2007: 449-50). 
However, this form of cooperation would have been impossible without 
strong political will from transition governments (Lavigne, 1999b: 220). For 
example, some transition states (Poland) began the absorption of EU norms prior to 
integration with the Community (Dimitrova & Pridham, 2004), while other (among 
them Ukraine, as will be shown in Chapter 5) did not begin this even under the 
officially launched partnership programme. Therefore, external assistance 
represents not a cause but a tool to support domestically-driven transformations, 
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wherein the role of the EU is limited to encouraging these changes through 
cooperation (Pridham, 2005: 5, 10-4). 
Respectively, the first stage of democratisation through Europeanisation 
requires domestic consensus on European integration and considers institutional 
transformations in potential (future) member states through the EU’s ‘passive 
leverage’ (Vachudova, 2005: 1-16). Membership incentive ‘strategically’ confirms 
EU intentions to promote a model of democratic stability and prosperity in its 
neighbourhood, serving as bargaining power for the EU (Dimitrova, 2002: 174-7; 
Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008). Membership incentive also provides local 
governments with a legitimate ‘cover’ for the introduction of often painful and 
unpopular reforms (Haukkala, 2008a: 49), affecting the interests of local political 
elites and advancing to the struggle against the remains of communist legacies 
(Dimitrova, 2002). Those states that succeeded in their initial accession-driven 
changes and became members of the EU then proceeded with the consolidation of 
democratic institutions, supported by the EU’s ‘active leverage’. By merging 
political, economic and social institutions of new and old member-states in one 
governance body, the EU set up an environment that favoured political competition 
and prevented communist legacies from restitution (Vachudova, 2005: 1-16, 257-9). 
Europeanisation attained its own logic and momentum, grounded on ‘routinisation 
of EU practices’ (Grabbe, 2006: 203) wherein local decision-makers could no longer 
affect the dynamic of institutional changes in their entirety. 
Notably, whereas conditionality (viewed through the implementation of the 
EU’s acquis) is often criticised for its propensity towards economic issues (Epstein & 
Jacoby, 2014) and formal institutionalisation (Pridham, 2002), the success of 
socialisation also depends on whether socialising actors (such as NGOs) and 
reform-oriented veto-players manage to win over anti-reformist elites (Dimitrova, 
2007; Dimitrova, 2010; Holmes, 2013). 
Therefore, the ideal model of post-communist Europeanisation implies that 
both types of leverage create a self-reinforcing mechanism in which formal 
democratisation during the accession process and socialisation of EU member-
states after the accession prevent the distortion of newly created institutions, which 
took place among non-members.  
The more institution-building norms the EU includes in its conditionality, 
the more likely is successful transformation, as ‘the precision and certitude of EU 
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demands’ determine the strength of the EU’s impact on Europeanising states 
(Grabbe, 2006: 206). In turn, EU membership remains a crucial supporting element 
for routinisation, or socialisation of adopted changes.  
In practice however the EU could not expand endlessly and therefore could 
not apply membership to all of its post-communist neighbours. Having 
accommodated ten new member-states in 2004 (including eight former communist 
states: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia), the EU took pause to digest the expansion (Haukkala, 2008b). Not only 
this was reflected in an unenthusiastic, inertial enlargement in 2007 (Bulgaria, 
Romania) and 2013 (Croatia), but it has also resulted in a more demanding 
conditionality for remaining candidates (Turkey and Western Balkan states) 
(Petrovic, 2017).  
Meanwhile, public support towards enlargement inside the EU declined 
(Pridham, 2007) and, together with undermined economic stability and the 
Eurozone crisis (Silander & Nilsson, 2013), added to the EU’s enlargement fatigue. 
The fatigue signified that the remaining post-communist states had to proceed with 
democratic transitions without relying on EU membership, and this precipitated a 
search for alternative models of democracy promotion. 
 
2.2.2.2. Democratisation without European integration: good governance and socialisation 
By the time the search for alternatives began, the evidence pointed that 
Europeanisation had succeeded primarily among EU member-states, ‘quasi-
members’ (Switzerland, Norway) and candidate countries (Schimmelfennig, 2012: 
22) whose domestic structures were incorporated into the EU’s institutions (Knill & 
Lehmkuhl, 2002; Lavenex, 2011). In contrast, the remaining Eastern and Southern 
neighbours (such as Ukraine) faced less binding transfer of EU rules, while the rest 
of countries did not qualify for the EU’s external governance at all (Lavenex, 2011). 
The EU continued normative expansion in the neighbourhood through 
intensification of cooperation with remaining post-communist states by means of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Yet it excluded promise of 
membership and faced a number of related limitations, which proved important for 
Ukraine’s post-communist transition.  
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Launched in 2004, the ENP spread across sixteen states from Eastern 
Europe (including Ukraine), North Caucasus, Northern Africa and the Middle East 
and aimed to establish the ‘Wider Europe’ or the ‘ring of friends’ through 
normative promotion (EEAS, 2016b). Some EU member-states (Sweden, Poland) 
also urged closer cooperation with former communist states by pushing for the 
Eastern Partnership (EaP) for Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. Yet this policy was 
an extension of the ENP and has suffered from the same limitations. 
In the absence of membership incentive, the ENP’s promise of association 
without membership proved hard to communicate, and it could not provide local 
elites with proper incentives to reform (Haukkala, 2008a; Kubicek, 2005). ENP 
economic benefits covered primarily market liberalisation and technical assistance, 
whereas political and financial commitment from the EU remained weak (Lavenex, 
2004). Altogether these reflected in a similarly weak conditionality (Gawrich, 
Melnykovska, & Schweickert, 2010). 
Among the remaining tools of democracy promotion, the EU could change 
domestic opportunity structures (legislation or the balance of power) and/or use 
socialisation and domestic empowerment to nurture support for EU norms and 
policies in democratising states (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2002). The EU could promote 
its norms in sectors that were less costly to domestic actors (for instance, 
environment), which, by implication, could lead to the spillover of EU norms to 
other fields — the main premise of the external governance approach (Lavenex & 
Schimmelfennig, 2011). Finally, the EU could persuade targeted groups (political 
actors and civil society) to change their ideas about social norms by adopting 
European values (Börzel & Risse, 2009). In practice, the EU combined all the 
above-listed mechanisms (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2002), but in the case of Ukraine, 
each and every of them implied a number of limitations caused primarily by the 
absence of membership incentive, as will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
As the transition experience has demonstrated, normative diffusion succeeds 
only if transition states accept it (Börzel & Risse, 2012). Therefore, EU norms 
should address specific domestic problems (Schimmelfennig, 2008, 2009) or match 
the interests of local elites. Otherwise, EU norms risk being treated as ‘empty shells’ 
(Dimitrova, 2007; 2010). For example, partially adopted legislation on migration 
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and environment in Ukraine did not lead to their spillover to other sectors 
(Freyburg, Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, Skripka, & Wetzel, 2009).  
Furthermore, in the case of Ukraine, the EU had to utilise the interest in self-
enrichment by local elites if it wanted to engage them in adoption and promotion of 
its norms (Melnykovska & Schweickert, 2008a). Yet, as will be shown in Chapters 
4 and 5, rapacious elites would not necessarily be interested in actual liberalisation, 
because the existing political and economic systems in Ukraine benefited them 
primarily by its non-transparency.  
Furthermore, successful institutionalisation of EU norms by means of 
conditionality would have been possible only on the basis of those norms that 
advance institution-building, such as reforms in the civil service sector and 
administrative reform, good governance, the establishment of various regulatory 
commissions and administration of regulative organs and their competition 
(Dimitrova, 2010). As will be revealed in Chapter 5, the adoption of respective 
legislation in Ukraine was launched only after the Maidan revolution and remains 
half-hearted. 
Finally, along with tight conditionality, successful institutionalisation of EU 
norms also require socialisation with ‘a certain degree of decentralisation, resources 
and civil society empowerment’ (Lavenex, 2008: 939, 945). Although Ukraine is 
often viewed as an example of successful diffusion of democratic norms (Bunce & 
Wolchik, 2007), wherein its democratic revolutions reflect on the success of popular 
and, thus, bottom-up, drive to democratisation, it appears that the lack of domestic 
networks (civil society) relevant to European ones may be considered one of the 
reasons why popular aspirations do not result in democratic consolidation 
afterwards (as will be revealed in Chapter 4).  
Whereas the EU is limited by Ukraine’s domestic constraints in terms of 
how far it may push its governance agenda (Youngs, 2009a), another limitation 
derives from the EU’s own approach. Literature on the EU’s normative diffusion 
‘turns a blind eye to issues of (conflicting) interests and power’ (Börzel & Risse, 
2009: 11), especially when these ideas are resisted or contested on the ground. Most 
of the discussion about the EU’s foreign policy and democratisation focus on the 
‘EU’s own approach’ and do not account ‘receptiveness to the Union’s ideals’ in 
the neighbourhood (Haukkala, 2008b: 37). In the context of Ukraine’s two 
democratic revolutions and the on-going crisis, these questions become even more 
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important due to on-going Russia-EU competition over Ukraine (N. R. Smith, 
2015). 
Altogether, these factors demonstrate that EU democracy promotion efforts 
are not necessarily a one-way story of success, but rather that they should be 
considered in combination with Ukraine’s domestic developments and alternative 
(not only normative-constructivist or liberal) explanations. The next section 
elaborates upon how Ukraine’s domestic constraints overlap with external factors 
of post-communist transition. 
 
2.3. A framework for Ukraine’s post-communist transition 
This thesis incorporates conceptual and theoretical elements of post-communist 
transition and Europeanisation frameworks, investigating the links between their 
constituent elements. A conceptual division on post-communist transition and the 
factor of EU assistance is undertaken in order to separate endogenous and exogenous 
factors of transition. This conceptual division allows the investigation into how 
(EU-led) external factors may have affected the domestic processes in Ukraine, or 
which group of factors has been determinant for Ukraine’s post-communist 
transformation.  
 
2.3.1. Framing post-communist transition 
In conceptualising Ukraine’s post-communist transition, this thesis relies mainly on 
institutionalist explanations and the path-dependence approach which allows the 
ordering, or sequencing of Ukraine’s institutional development. In tracking 
Ukraine’s institutional change during the selected turning points and its evolution 
in between them, this study adopts Offe’s definition of the ‘triple’ character of post-
communist transition (Offe, 1991) and primarily relies on the three-level analytical 
approach of Ekiert and Hanson (2003). 
Although post-communist transition is organised across the three key tasks, 
or trajectories: consolidating nation-state in terms of its territories and citizenship, 
reorganising economy, and establishing the rules of politics (Elster et al., 1998: 17; 
Offe, 1991) — analytically and in line with the path-dependence approach, 
Ukraine’s institutional development may be tracked in time (since it is durable) and 
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space (Ukraine has emerged in extremely volatile geopolitical environment). As 
such, Ukraine’s post-communist transition may be viewed as a turn in its path-
dependent development, where the decisions on its identity (nation-state), 
institutions (rules) and agency have been affected by various groups of factors 
(Ekiert & Hanson, 2003). In line with the works by Beissinger (2002), Ekiert and 
Hanson (2003), Giddens (1984), and Offe (1991) these groups of factors may be 
categorised across three levels of analysis: 
 The first level forms the basis of post-communist transition, identifying the 
long-run patterns of historical development (socio-economic, political, cultural), 
their general geographic and demographic characteristics (Ekiert & Hanson, 2003).  
 The second level of analysis deals with the institutional aspect of transition 
by establishing norms, rules and procedures of particular regimes — their 
‘constitutions’ (Elster et al., 1998; Offe, 1991). 
 Finally, the third level represents particular choices and events that derive 
from ‘informal networks’ and ‘interpersonal communications’ (Ekiert & Hanson, 
2003: 20). This level of analysis also includes events that serve as critical junctures 
or produce sequences of events (Beissinger, 2002: 17).  
Such analytical approach allows an investigation into how structural, 
institutional and interactional factors shape the flow of Ukraine’s post-communist 
transition, revealing the ‘causal relations’ between temporal (including with regard 
to ‘the problem of simultaneity’) and spatial contexts of transition. In addition, such 
approach reflects on the importance of legacies and agency for the outcomes of 
transition (Ekiert & Hanson, 2003: 17; Elster et al., 1998: 19). 
For example, collective memories and cultural filters, concerned within the 
structural level of analysis, pass on historical experience and legacies in time 
(Giddens, 1984; Kitschelt, 2003). The most durable patterns of such experience 
form ‘deep’ conditions (Cirtautas & Schimmelfennig, 2010: 437) of institution-
building such as territorial unity and stable borders (Rustow, 1970), identity and 
agreements on stateness (Linz & Stepan, 1992). Although the nationalist and 
civilizational factors may be important as supportive to the coherence of a nation-
state (Kuzio, 2001b), this thesis considers the state to be crucial both in shaping the 
nation (by promoting certain identity narratives) and state institutions. The latter is 
revealed in the rules of bargaining, organisational institutions (electoral systems, 
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legislation) and framing the quality of political elites who should represent the 
nation-state as a whole (Roeder, 2007: 15-6). 
For example, the lack of territorial unity, ethnic composition, identity (some 
may include civilisational aspects (Huntington, 1993a) here), imperial legacies of 
the Russian and Habsburg empires (Bunce, 2005) as well as economic 
specialisation shape the deep conditions of Ukraine’s post-communist transition. 
However, these structural factors do not determine Ukraine’s post-communist 
development per se, because, as was revealed above, the mode of post-communist 
institutional change is determined by political elites (Roeder, 2007: 15-6). 
Moreover, institutions may evolve gradually or they may be adjusted (even 
accelerated) through certain critical junctures that produce overlapping patterns of 
old legacies and new practices (Collier & Collier, 2002). Meanwhile, the extent to 
which old legacies reproduce themselves on the basis of new institutions depends 
on the nature of change undertaken (radical or moderate), the momentum of change, 
and the duration of institutional orders.  
With regard to the character of the change undertaken, the establishment of 
communism is a clear example of radical, revolutionary change. Communism was 
not envisaged for the Russian empire at the time, and a number of institutional 
developments that it produced (such as gender equality, suffrage or labour 
regulations) had not been integral to Eastern Europe and Ukraine in particular. In 
contrast, the culture of political engagement represents a case of evolutionary 
development that did not change significantly even after the collapse of 
communism (this will be revealed in Chapter 4).  
The character of change also overlaps with the momentum of change. The 
most effective path is established only through a combination of both factors (as 
with the establishment of communism in Ukraine described in more detail in 
Chapter 3). However, with regard to Ukraine’s post-communist transition, this 
combination has meant that Ukrainian elites had not undertaken a course for 
radical reform at the beginning of transition (as will be demonstrated in Chapter 4), 
which then resulted in the preservation of communist legacies to a greater degree 
than in ECE states, where the change was more substantial.  
Finally, in considering the importance of duration of institutional order, it 
could be implied that with every subsequent turn of institutional choice, the degree 
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of impact of historical legacies from the previous period on newly established 
institutions decreases. Whereas pre-communist legacies were important to the 
character of the established communist regime (Kitschelt, 2003), they have not been 
equally important to the character of post-communist democratisation. On the 
opposite, communist legacies were more crucial in this respect, and their duration 
correlated with the strength of their impact in Eastern Europe (Ekiert, 1996; 
Petrovic, 2013). Such legacies included charismatic impersonalism, dominance of 
single communist party, the rule of the nomenklatura and the strong role of 
informal relationships (Ekiert & Hanson, 2003) that shaped the very conditions 
under which post-communist institutionalisation began.  
Therefore, communist legacies have influenced post-communist transition 
(Ekiert & Hanson, 2003) by affecting the mode of regime change (Ekiert, 2003) 
through the balance of power that preceded regime change (McFaul, 2005). In turn, 
the mode of regime change has determined the outcomes of democratisation 
(O’Donnell & Schmitter, 2013; Petrovic, 2013; Karl & Schmitter, 1991) such as the 
quality of the established institutions of democracy (Bunce, 1995a; McFaul, 2005) 
and economic reforms. These have been reflected in the features of established 
political regime such as electoral process, division of power, legal and juridical 
aspects of political regime, strongly linked to public opinion and voting behaviour 
(Ekman, 2009; Levitsky & Way, 2002). Therefore, the two key aspects of 
institutional analysis, legacies and institutions, may be grouped as follows: 
 
 
Figure 2.1. The institutional level of analysis 
 
In case of Ukraine, not only the balance of power between the non 
reformists (members of the communist nomenklatura) and reformists (liberal-
democratic political and intellectual elites) on the eve and after the first post-
communist elections, but also the results of two democratic revolutions experienced 
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in 2004-2005 and 2013-2014 were of decisive importance in defining the path and 
outcomes of its post-communist transition (Kuzio, 2008). Both events took place on 
the basis of already established hybrid regime in Ukraine but, as will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 4, were primarily agent-driven. This demonstrates that the 
role of agency remains crucial for the success of post-communist democratisation 
not only in selected big critical junctures (such as the 1917 revolution or the collapse 
of the communist dominance in the 1980s) but also during the subsequent 
institutional development.  
Therefore, institutional change may be produced by the factors concerned at 
the interactional level of analysis, where agency may be considered one of the 
sources of change. Although institutions generally restrain actors in their capacities 
to act (Ekiert & Hanson, 2003; North, 1997; Roeder, 2007), institutionalisation in 
part evolves on the basis of ‘ “contagion” — transfer of ideas, behavioural patterns, 
and cultural practices, as well as mimicry and imitation in institution-building and 
policy innovations’ (Ekiert & Hanson, 2003: 38-9). In addition, political actors 
shape institutions by reaching social consensus, making institutional choices 
(legislation and electoral system) (Howlett, 2009) and deciding on identity (Roeder, 
2007). Finally, political actors create events that produce critical junctures, 
challenging both the existing institutional order and even the social structure.  
In post-communist context, the role of agency was extremely crucial due to 
the lack of its institutionalisation. Particularly, the lack of institutionalised agency 
resulted in that the collapse of communism poured into an uncontrolled event, 
followed by an equally unpredictable and ambiguous transition (Elster et al., 1998). 
Some authors (Beissinger, 2002) point to how such cases (events) challenge the 
structure of social reality turning into a source of change. By building on Gidden’s 
(1984) argument that structure supports action, Beissinger (2002) claims that some 
forms of action may produce unpredictable events that, through constant 
reproduction of agency, undermine structural constraints. In such cases events may 
‘become their own structure entirely’ (17) and form into the patterns of their own 
(such as the ‘tide’ of nationalist mobilisation in the late USSR).  
Importantly, both contagion and event-based change at the interactional 
level of analysis reflects the process of diffusion, meaning it provides not only for 
temporal but also for spatial logic. Accordingly, the source of change may lie within 
cultural and/or behavioural differences among domestic actors (such as political 
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culture), challenges of the environment that requires certain practical knowledge 
(the collapse of communism required new political behaviour) and external 
influences which are especially crucial because different international actors 
promote different norms.  
In countries like Ukraine, which are rich with cultural and behavioural 
differences among domestic actors the factor of external influence may also be 
important in setting the trajectory of post-communist transition. The next section 
elaborates upon the issue by introducing the factor of external influence to the 
above-discussed framework. 
 
2.3.2. Ukraine’s post-communist transition through a prism of 
Europeanisation  
As was demonstrated in Section 2.2.2, European integration was crucial for the 
successful democratisation of former communist states in East Central Europe and 
particularly the Baltic States (former Republics of the Soviet Union), while, in the 
absence of membership, Ukraine’s post-communist transformation was shaped by 
systemic geopolitical constraints and identity issues (Proedrou, 2010).  
The stability of Ukraine’s foreign and domestic policy has remained rooted 
in the ‘balance between Russia and the West, balance between Eastern and 
Western Ukraine, and balance among Ukraine’s political forces’ (D'Anieri, 2012: 
455). While the EU has maintained its course towards closer association with 
Ukraine, Russia has aspired to preserve its impact in Ukraine, not least by utilising 
historical and institutional similarities. Therefore, Ukraine has not been exposed to 
Europeanisation only. In addition, China has launched ‘16+1’ policy for eleven EU 
Member States and five Balkan countries (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro) which may 
expand China’s focus to EU neighbours (Ukraine among them) in the future. Yet, 
Russia and the EU remain the main competing actors with regard to Ukraine so far, 
and their pursuit of competing policies has produced contrasting and/or 
overlapping impacts across various areas in Ukraine (Dimitrova & Dragneva, 




As was clarified by Radaelli (2003: 30), EU norms and rules are ‘first defined 
... in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
discourse, identities, political structures and public policies’. Since the EU 
comprises a variety of differing political institutions and even more diverse 
member-states, political ‘trade-offs’ represent an inevitable part of EU policy-
making (Whitman & Landau, 1996: 174). Although these peculiarities are not the 
main focus of this research, they may explain the lack of coherence in EU policies 
regarding Ukraine. Such trade-offs illustrate that interests (which shape policies), 
institutions (that create constraints or opportunities for policy-makers), and ideas 
(which affect actors’ choices and shape preferences) (Anderson, 2003, p. 44) affect 









Figure 2.2 The conceptual framework of Ukraine’s Europeanisation 
 
 
Many do not see Ukraine as part of European civilisation because its long-
term socio-political, economic (Chirot, 1991) as well as civilisational and cultural 
development (Janos, 1993) differs from the Western European one. However, as 
was described in Section 2.1.1, such an approach is mired in predeterminism, while 
the EU’s motto, ‘United in Diversity’, demonstrates that cultural and political 
differences, on the opposite, constitute the core of European political identity. 
Therefore, although Ukraine may be religiously or culturally different from other 
European states, this should not prevent Ukraine’s normative convergence with the 
EU.  
In this regard, geopolitics, introduced at the institutional level of analysis 
(Ekiert & Hanson, 2003) may be more beneficial in explaining the context of EU-
Ukraine relations. Yet even this factor reflects agency more than geographic (or 




War II is an example of a political choice that set up different institutional paths for 
Western and Eastern Europe and thus became determinant for institutional 
development. Similarly, European boundaries were re-set once again after the 
collapse of communism (Cirtautas & Schimmelfennig, 2010). While East Central 
Europe was treated as part of the Western European culture and was believed to be 
capable of adopting European norms (which affected the views of European and 
domestic policy-makers) (Ekiert & Hanson, 2003), Ukraine was excluded from 
European politics and EU enlargement.  
Importantly however, this does not confirm the structuralist thesis on the 
division of Europe; rather it demonstrates how structural constraints retranslate 
through perceptions of decision-makers and public, thereby affecting post-
communist transition at the institutional (geopolitical) and interactional levels. 
Moreover, this points to the importance of perceptions as part of foreign policy-
making in line with the neoclassic realist approach.  
Geopolitics reveals its presence through ‘institutional regimes, economic and 
political cooperation, and security alliances’ (Ekiert & Hanson, 2003: 35), where 
the EU is an example of such an alliance. Yet in the context of the differing views 
on the EU as democracy promoter vis-a-vis empire and especially in light of the 
EU-Russia geopolitical competition (N. R. Smith, 2015), Ukraine represents a 
unique case to test the validity of EU democracy promotion efforts (N. R. Smith, 
2014a), because viewing EU power as tool of solely democratising effect may be 
wrong (N. R. Smith, 2014b) and asymmetrical interdependence may not have the 
potential to advance democratisation to the extent it is assumed.  
Therefore, EU foreign policy should be evaluated in the context of 
promoting EU democratic values and their institutionalisation, with an emphasis 
on the institutional and interactional factors of Ukraine’s post-communist 
Europeanisation. In this respect, informational and procedural diffusion as well as 
transference become the main tools of the EU’s impact in Ukraine, because they 
shape domestic preferences and policies of Europeanising states. In turn, EU 
cooperation with local political and economic elites as well as non-governmental 
organisations and political parties establishes ‘transnational linkages’ (Pridham, 
2005: 14) that strengthen bilateral cooperation. As such, most of Europeanisation 
mechanisms described in the previous section operate primarily at policy level.  
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Meanwhile, the absence of membership incentive limits the EU’s 
‘transformative power’ (Grabbe, 2006) in Ukraine, meaning that Europeanisation 
risks resulting in formal institutionalisation and even imitation of respective norms 
(Kubicek, 2007). Accordingly, institutional compliance may take place only if the 
adoption of acquis communitaire is combined with simultaneous socialisation. 
Enhanced transnational linkages and increased diffusion may lead to a normative 
change (a change in domestic opportunity structures) in Ukraine and promote 
democratic norms in the country. However, as a shift in perceptions does not 
necessarily imply their adoption and implementation, a persuasive approach 
remains crucial for EU democracy promotion in Ukraine (Sabatovych, Heinrichs, 
Hobova, & Velivchenko, forthcoming 2019).   
Hitherto the EU has created an environment favourable for democratic 
institutionalisation, which puts pressure on decision-makers in Ukraine but does 
not reshape Ukraine’s policy-making. For this reason the impact of external 
environment may become decisive for institutional choices made by domestic 
actors whose role in post-communist transition increases if the gain external 
support.  
Nevertheless, one might be aware of a few issues. First, the extent to which 
domestic actors support EU-led institutionalisation and structures depends strongly 
on Ukraine’s political environment because external models generally follow 
domestic models (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009) while Ukraine’s historical 
development and regional disparities complicate the adoption of EU norms due to 
varying perceived legitimacy of the EU (the Russian issue and Ukraine’s 
regionalism will be discussed in Sections 4.3 and 5.3).  
Second, the interpretation of EU norms as well as geopolitical balance in the 
region (Russia’s position on Ukraine) complicates the analysis within the offered 
framework. Whereas some asymmetry or hierarchical governance (Knill & Tosun, 
2009) is required in EU relations with Europeanising states for the transition state 
to be more interested in receiving rewards than the EU in granting them (Lavenex 
& Schimmelfennig, 2011), the EU should also pursue a normative and not a realist 
(material) interest in Europeanising state, because the latter may negatively impact 
the success of its democracy promotion (N. R. Smith, 2014b). 
Third, one should stress that some representatives of Ukrainian civil society 
consider Ukraine’s post-communist transition accomplished: although this 
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transition has not resulted in the establishment of consolidated democracy, it has 
nevertheless resulted in the establishment of new institutions (interview6). 
Therefore, the quest for Ukraine’s deeper transformations lies in whether it is 
capable of breaking the vicious cycle of Ukraine fatigue in both external and 
domestic transformations or whether what is viewed as protracted 
‘postcommunism’ (post-communist transition) (Bunce, 1995a: 119) reflects the 
accomplished transition from communism to a hybrid democracy.  
 
2.4. Conclusions to Chapter 2 
This thesis aims to combine various theoretical approaches in explaining the flow of 
Ukraine’s post-communist transition as part of its institutional development. In this 
process, EU policies are viewed as an additional layer but not a determinant factor 
of Ukraine’s post-communist transition. 
The choice of the framework is built on sequencing Ukraine’s institutional 
development along three analytical markers of transition (structure, institutions, 
agency) in time (historical institutionalism) and space (Europeanisation). It also 
incorporates those elements of scholarly thought that reflect on consensus among 
various approaches such as the importance of institutions and socio-economic 
development for sustainable democracy.  
The selected framework reflects on Ukraine’s lock-in between the aspired 
model of liberal democracy (European) as opposed to a currently functioning 
model of hybrid democracy. Therefore, this thesis does not treat Ukraine’s post-
communism as a one-way move but instead concentrates on the evolution of 
Ukraine’s institutions and the current capacity of the EU to help Ukraine to build 
the institutions it aspires to.  
 
 48 
 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND 
STRUCTURAL DIMENSION OF UKRAINE’S ‘TRIPLE 
TRANSITION’ 
This chapter provides a detailed overview of Ukraine’s political and socio-economic 
history and explores its impact on the structural dimension of Ukraine’s ‘triple 
transition’. Particular attention is paid to structural patterns, the establishment of 
communist rule, its character and the potential legacies the communist rule could 
have produced in Ukraine. 
 
3.1. The early origins of Ukraine’s statehood  
The origins of Ukraine’s state history can be traced back to the establishment of 
ancient Kievan Rus’ — a proto-state made up of different disjunct tribes — in the 
ninth century. Considering that Western European states already endeavoured to 
move to the feudal level of development, Rus’ commenced the unification of its 
peoples and territories under a shared religion. The Christianisation of Rus’ was 
carried out in 988 by its ruler, Prince Vladimir, who set a path towards 
rapprochement with Byzantium.  
Vladimir’s choice became a building block of the structuralist argument 
regarding the importance of religious choices in establishing the modern differences 
between the advanced West and the backward East in Ukraine’s context (see Chapter 6 
for more details). Yet at the time, this choice was purely rational. Vladimir believed 
that ‘a monotheistic religion’ could consolidate his power, as the adoption of 
religious institutions advanced to the construction of state hierarchy (Zhukovsky, 
1984b). Also, rising Kievan Rus’ achieved a military alliance with one of the 
greatest powers in the region (Poppe, 1997).  
However, Vladimir’s choice of a political and cultural alliance with the 
Byzantine Empire had other path-producing implications for Kievan Rus’. The 
political crisis in the Byzantine Empire and the loss of Constantinople to the 
Crusaders in 1204 deprived Rus’ of its main ally and trade partner. Also, Rus’ was 
undergoing its own crisis. Between 1132-1136 several Rus’ principalities had 
rejected Kiev authority, with Galicia–Volhynia, Novgorod and Valdimir-Suzdal 





Map 3.1 The territory of Kievan Rus’ in 1240 
Source(s): retrieved from Magocsi (2010: 86). 
 
The social organisation of the fragmented Principalities reverted to the 
arrangements of pre-joint Rus’, with only their Orthodox identity remaining 
unaltered. The Mongol invasion (began approximately in 1223, thriving throughout 
1237-1240) further consolidated an ‘“us versus them” mentality shift’ 
(Raffensperger, 2012: 186), strengthening the importance of identity for common 
people. Most of Rus’ territories fell under the Horde dominion, with only Galicia–
Volhynia remaining independent. Yet in 1349, the Principality was divided 
between Poland (Galicia) and Lithuania (Volhynia), and the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania slowly colonised the remaining Rus’ territories, which would later make 
up the core of modern Ukraine (map below). Therefore, Christianisation of Rus’ 
established the only key legacy for the people living at these fragmented territories 
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— the shared Orthodox identity and its collateral, the Church Slavonic language, as 
the key legacy of that period of Ukrainian (pre) history. 
 
 
Map 3.2 The territories of Kievan Rus’ in 1263-1392 
Source(s): retrieved from Magocsi (2010: 134). 
 
Meanwhile, Poland grew into a significant power in the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, and the Polish political model was adopted for the 
Commonwealth (Snyder, 2003). Straddling the middle ground between 
constitutional monarchy and oligarchy, this model was based on Roman law and 
municipal governance. However, religious identity remained crucial for politics.  
While the share of Polish nobility peaked at 8-10%, the percentage of Rus’, 
or Ruthenian, 5 nobility did not exceed 2% (Snyder, 2003; Subtelny, 2009: 83-4). 
The power gap prompted the Ruthenian elites to convert to Catholicism and adopt 
Polish identity in order to be able to protect their property rights. Meanwhile, 80% 
of Ruthenians remained Orthodox peasants (Subtelny, 2009: 81-5). As a result, the 
majority of Orthodox people lost their political representation in the Polish state. 
                                               
5 Ruthenia is hereinafter used as a Latin name for the territory where people of Rus’ (in Latin  
‘Rutheni’) lived. At the time however, the Polish nobility called these territories ‘Roksolania’ and 




The loss of a noble protectorate also led to the weakening of the Orthodox 
Church to the extent that it could no longer protect the parish. In 1596, part of the 
Orthodox clergy signed the Union of Brest that signified the merge of the Orthodox 
Church with the Roman Catholic Church under the protectorate of the Roman 
Catholic Church, leading to the establishment of the Uniate Church. However, this 
move split the Ruthenian community, since only part of the Orthodox clergy 
supported the Union. The split would preserve as a legacy crucial for the 
Commonwealth politics, since the political-identity rift in Ruthenia set up two 
opposing socio-political camps in the country: Orthodox peasants on the one side 
and predominantly Catholic noblemen on the other. The division between the two 
strata started to blur only with emergence of a new type of identity.  
The formation of this identity fed upon the rise of Cossack (from Turkic, 
‘free man’) communities amidst the Dnieper steppes (Subtelny & Vytanovych, 
1984), where serfs and runaways from the neighbouring areas, including the 
Commonwealth, settled the Cossack states, or Cossacksdoms. A tense military 
situation and persistent Tatar threat prompted the settlers to militarise, and their 
self-organised garrisons, or sich, grew into fortified communities, documented as 
early as 1479 (Golovnev, 2015). In 1552, the Zaporozhian Sich was established as 
the ‘Liberties of the [Cossack] Host beyond the [Dnieper] Rapids’ (Krupnytsky & 
Zhukovsky, 1993) and a centre of the Cossack movement in the region. By the end 
of the century, the Cossack registers 6 accounted for 6000-8000 people and were a 
military force to be reckoned with (Subtelny & Vytanovych, 1984).  
Only a free man, an Orthodox believer and a person who knew the Cossack 
language (so-called ‘simple speech’ that evolved at these territories as a vernacular 
language, while the Church Slavonic language remained for public worship) could 
be accepted in the Zaporozhian Sich (Yavornitskiy, 1990a: 117, 145-6), and the 
narrative of free people (Cossacks) who defended their faith has later become a 
crucial part of the Ukrainian national mythology (Sysyn, 1991). Unlike the majority 
of Ruthenian elites, the Cossacks maintained their Orthodox identity and, unlike 
the Ruthenians in other parts of Poland, managed to attain property rights. 
However, Cossack revolts against the Polish authorities were often caused by 
material interests rather than identity (or religious) issues.  
                                               
6 Military formations of the Cossacks registered for a regular military service to the Polish crown 
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Remaining in the registers allowed the Cossacks to maintain wages and 
property rights, control profitable trade and workmanship, and, in some cases, 
avoid the serfdom (Kryp'yakevych, 1990: 50-70). The Cossack starshyna 7 grew as 
an elite by mediating Cossack demands with Polish authorities and even supported 
the legend of their Sarmathian origin (Plokhy, 1992) which fell in line with the 
official Polish narrative of Roksolania (footnote 5).  
Meanwhile, Muscovy that had evolved from the Vladimir-Suzdal’ 
principality joined the battle of the narratives by declaring itself an heir to Kievan 
Rus’, the centre of the Orthodox faith and the last follower of the Byzantium 
Christian tradition. Confirming this relationship required the return of the Kyivan 
principality lost to the Mongols and, later on, to the Poles into the Orthodox family, 
since Kyiv remained a symbol of Holy Rus' and the building block of the evolving 
Russian identity (Plokhy, 2017). Muscovy intensified historical and cultural links 
between Ruthenians/Russians in Poland and Russians in other parts of former 
Rus’, and, as opposed to Polish Roksolania, Muscovy called the same territories 
Russia (Yakovenko, 2009) paving the foundations of what would be later known as 
the Russian world.  
The Cossacks also utilised the idea of the protection of the Orthodox faith 
when seeking public support, but their calls for defence of the oppressed peasants 
and Orthodox believers heavily corresponded with economic interests (Chirovsky, 
1984: 178). Even the beginning of the largest Cossack Revolt in 1648 was caused by 
the offensive of grand landlords against the “liberties” and property rights of the 
Cossack starshyna (Kryp'yakevych, 1990: 63) rather than due to the oppression of 
the Orthodox Church.  
On this background, the Cossack Rebellion of 1648-1654, 8 which is viewed 
as Ukraine’s national-liberation war from Poland, began as a response to economic 
oppression and did not initially aim for the establishment of an independent 
Cossack state. On the contrary, having arranged a military alliance with the Tatars, 
Khmelnytsky, the leader of the Cossack revolt and the first Hetman (the ruler) of 
the Cossack state, declared that the Cossacks were rising ‘against the landlords but 
                                               
7 A privileged category of the Cossacks that performed military and political administration of the 
Sich.  
8 Some believe it ended with the death of its leader, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, in 1657 
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not the [Polish] king’ (Kryp'yakevych, 1990: 53-4, 70), for the sake of Cossack 
liberties and the Orthodox faith.  
Although Khmelnytsky preferred to negotiate with the Polish crown 
(Chirovsky, 1984: 178) and even suspended the military campaign in autumn 1648, 
the Orthodox clergy in Kyiv addressed him as ‘the saviour, deliverer, and liberator 
from Polish slavery’ in winter that year (Kryp'yakevych, 1990: 96). Also, the initial 
success of the Cossack revolt unleashed a wave of elemental unrest among the 
broader public, whose support urged Khmelnystky to pose as ‘the autocrat of the 
Rus’’ (Smoliy & Stepankov, 1995: 203) during negotiations with the Polish crown 
in February 1649. This situation clearly reflects on the Beissinger's (2002) argument 
about the tide of mobilisation, which led to a critical juncture, since the subsequent 
negotiations did not resolve the conflict and led to a full-scale war.  
The Treaty of Zboriv signed on August 17, 1649 confirmed Cossack 
autonomy in Kiev, Bratslav, and Chernihiv regions (i. e., the creation of the 
Hetmanate, or the Cossack state, as on map below) and allowed Orthodox gentry 
of Russian origin to fill an administrative government, but the Treaty forced the rest 
of the remaining rebels back to serfdom (Subtelny, 2009: 131; Yakovenko, 1997: 
214), sparking another tide of repudiation among common Ruthenians.  
 
 
Map 3.3 The Cossack revolt and the establishment of the Hetmanate, 1648-
1649  
Source(s): retrieved from Magocsi (2010: 212). 
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Hence, only under the pressure from the Ruthenian grassroots and after 
1651, the civil war between the Cossacks and the landlords turned into a national 
liberation war between Ukraine (according to modern Ukrainian historiography, 
the Cossack Hetmanate was a Ukrainian Cossack state) and Poland (Yakovenko, 
1997: 201), signifying a critical juncture in Ukraine’s development. During this 
period, the role of agency became determinant, since the Hetmanate turned to 
Muscovy for military support and received it under the Treaty of Pereyaslav (1654) 
which provided the Hetmanate with broad political and religious autonomy within 
Russia.  
Meanwhile, the subsequent Russo-Polish War (1654–1667) and the Swedish 
invasion of the Commonwealth (1655-1660) resulted in the general decline of 
Poland. The death of Khmelnytsky in 1657 led to a thirty-year period of civil wars 
known as the Ruin (1657-1687) wherein the Cossack starshyna split, in support of 
the return to Poland (Smoliy, 1990: 16), while ‘the Cossack rabble’ stood for the 
Russian course (Yavornitskiy, 1990a: 252) which once again points to the 
importance of identity for mass mobilisation at the time. Only the 1667 Treaty of 
Andrusovo, signed by Poland and Russia bypassing the delegation of Cossacks 
authorities, heralded the final decay of the Hetmanate and thus the establishment of 
the institutional path of its future development. 
The Treaty split Ukraine along the Dnieper River into what is now known 
as the Left-bank (part of Russia) and the Right-bank Ukraine (part of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth). Later on, the first partition of Poland by Russia, 
Prussia and Austria in 1772 resulted in Russia’s partial incorporation of the Right-
bank Ukraine. During the second partition in 1793, almost half of the 
Commonwealth, including most of the territories of modern Ukraine, were 
accommodated into the Russian empire, while, after the third partition in 1795, the 
Commonwealth ceased to exist. On the scale of Kievan Rus’, most of its historical 
territories at the end of the eighteenth century had been incorporated into the 
Russian Empire (see Map 3.4): 80% of what is now considered Ukrainian 
population lived there, with the rest remaining in the Habsburg Galicia, Northern 





Map 3.4 Populated by Ukrainians administrative-territorial regions of the 
Russian empire and Austria-Hungary at the end of the eighteenth-beginning of the 
nineteenth century, as contrasted to the territory of modern Ukraine 
Source(s): retrieved from Magocsi (2010: 324) 
 
Although the Cossack Hetmanate is generally viewed as the first Ukrainian 
state entity, its independence survived only the warring years of 1648-1654. Having 
established a basis for the development of modern Ukrainian identity, the Cossacks 
failed to create durable state institutions (K. Wolczuk, 2001). Instead, the 
organisation of the Hetmanate represented a combination of Cossack military 
culture with political arrangements of their metropolises (Poland or Russia). During 
the Ruin period, the socio-political foundations of the Hetmanate continued to 
deteriorate. The starshyna developed into a military elite that made decisions 
bypassing the Cossack Council (Smoliy, 1990: 11) and obtained gentry status in 
Russia. The later further distanced the starshyna from common Cossacks and 
Ruthenian-Ukrainian serfs.  
Although many consider that the first Ukrainian Constitution was adopted 
by the Hetman of the Right-Bank Ukraine Pylyp Orlyk in 1710 and derived from 
Polish political tradition of the Pacta Conventa (Pritsak, 1998), it remained a 
normative document only for four years with the legitimacy limited to the Right-
Bank Ukraine. The metropolises slowly abolished the Hetmanate administration in 
the years 1699-1714 in the Commonwealth and 1709-1775 in the Russian Empire 
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(Subtelny & Vytanovych, 1984), and the Cossack movements turned into 
disintegrated patchy communities, with certain cultural and military traditions, yet 
no rights for self-administration, which was crucial for potential state-building 
according to Roeder's (2007) arguments. 
During the early period of Ukraine’s development, it lacked institutional 
organisation and external support to create an independent state, while the course 
of Ukraine’s development was a result of path-producing choices rather than 
structural determinants. The Christianisation of Rus’ was a political decision that 
led to Byzantium-kind institutionalisation and the establishment of a shared 
Orthodox identity at Rus’ territories. Similarly, incorporation of the Hetmanate 
into Russia became a result of a political manoeuvring at the time. The latter 
determined the flow of Ukraine’s state-building in the nineteenth century, when 
modern nations evolved. During this crucial period, the key feature of the 
Ukrainian nation was its dispersal between the two imperial powers, the Russian 
and the Habsburg one. 
 
3.2. Ukraine’s territories and people in the nineteenth 
century 
Divided among the three regional powers (Russia, Prussia and Austria), Polish 
elites and people naturally aspired to restore an independent Poland and eventually 
took ‘politics to the Ukrainian peasantry’ (Snyder, 2003: 121). The contours of the 
Ukrainian people as a community had also formed by that time. By the mid-
eighteenth century, the vernacular (Cossack) language became a basis of the 
Ukrainian language (Hrytsak, 2004), and the Cossack tradition was still alive in the 
memories of ordinary serfs and nobility.  
Russian authorities responded to Polish initiatives by treating all, including 
cultural, manifestations of Ukrainian or Polish nationalism as anti-governmental. 
The Uniate (Greek-Catholic) Church was treated as part of the Polish anti-Russian 
project; Russification replaced Polonisation at all levels (Subtelny, 2009: 204-6, 210-
1). By the end of the eighteenth century, the Ukrainian-speaking population made 
up 17.8% of the empire and still constituted the majority in most of Ukraine’s 
historical regions (Figure 3.1). Yet the peasant status of the Ukrainian language 
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prevented it from growing into a significant factor of Ukraine’s state-building. Due 
to the fact that a majority of Ukrainian-speakers lived in rural areas (93%, 
according to the 1897 census), Ukrainian language was described as a language of 
low culture (Kohut, 1986).  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Regional distribution of the Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking * 
population within the European regions of the Russian empire, constituent of 
modern Ukraine  
Source(s): the first all-Russian census of 1897, retrieved from Demoscope 
Notes: the Ukrainian language is labelled Little Russian, or Malorusskiy in the census 
 
Indeed, since only 13.2% of Russia’s population lived in cities (according to 
the 1897 census), the peasant status in Russia was not linked to a particular 
nationality or ethnicity, but the peasant status of the Ukrainian language became 
crucial for the success of on-going Russification. Similarly to the Polonised 
Ruthenian nobility in the fourteenth century, Ukrainian landlords and bureaucrats 
willingly followed the course of Russification in the eighteenth century. They did so 
even more willingly because, unlike in the Commonwealth, their Orthodox identity 
did not prevent them from gaining high positions in the Russian imperial 
bureaucracy (Velychenko, 1995). Ukraine became to be integrated into ‘a Russian 
idea of national territory’ not through colonisation but through belonging ‘to the 
imaginary all-Russian community’ (Miller, 2005: 640), or the Russian world.  
By the middle of the eighteenth century, Little Russia denoted the territories 













Other 15% 12% 4% 2% 14% 30% 25% 72% 16% 26%
Ukrainian 79% 66% 93% 81% 69% 42% 53% 20% 81% 70%














(or Cossack) identity grew to be associated with the Russian imperial culture. Only 
a certain attachment to the Cossack past preserved the Little Russian identity as 
somewhat different from the Russian one, albeit a part of a bigger Slavic 
community (Kohut, 1986). 
At the end of the nineteenth century, Ukrainians began to build a sense of 
national consciousness, but strong class division onto rich Russified nobility and 
poor backward peasantry prevented their unification. Whereas in theory (and 
particularly in accordance to the modernist approach) political and national 
arrangements align through the process of the industrial revolution (Gellner, 1983), 
modernisation in the Russian empire was not an evolutionary but a state-launched 
process. 
Russia’s modernisation began around the 1880s, when the country needed to 
catch up with already modernised economic frontrunners. For a comparison, the 
United Kingdom had undergone its industrial revolution in the mid to late 
eighteenth century, western parts of Germany in the first half of the 1800s and the 
Habsburg empire after the wave of the 1848 revolutions. In all the afore-mentioned 
cases, economic transformations were encouraged by political liberalisation, while 
Russia’s industrialisation began prior to political reforms. This led to the 
incorporation of old practices into the new forms of activities, whereas former 
landowners grew as new entrepreneurs and former serfs became their workers 
(Proskuriakova, 2005).  
Furthermore, state administration was stalling the reform process in order 
not to loose the support of nobility. The 1861 emancipation of serfs preserved land 
bounding and resulted in no actual liberation. Similarly, the 1864 administration 
reform proclaimed the establishment of self-governance (zemstva) but de facto aimed 
at rewarding the nobility for their property losses by granting control over local 
administration (Borodko, 2011). 
The absence of real reforms was also reflected in the fact that, unlike 
modernisation in Western Europe that was based on technologies and innovations, 
Russia’s modernisation was resource-driven (Meliantsev, 2004). Whereas by 1913, 
Russian GDP was about the level of the other major powers (Table 3.1), Russia’s 
economic growth was driven by capital investments and the availability of human 




Table 3.1 GDP (in hundreds of 1990 Int. GK$) and trade share (trade to 
GDP ratio in %) in the period 1820-1913 in selected European economies 
 Austria Hungary France Germany Russia United 
Kingdom 
1830 Trade share 11% n/a 8% n/a n/a 19% 
1820 GDP 4.10 n/a 35.47 26.82 37.68 36.23 
1850 Trade share 13% n/a 13% 19% n/a 28% 
1850 GDP 6.52 n/a 58.04 48.18 n/a 63.34 
1870 Trade share 29% 19% 24% 37% n/a 44% 
1870 GDP 8.42 6.46 72.10 72.15 83.65 100.18 
1900 Trade share 25% 22% 23% 30% 15% 47% 
1900 GDP 17.21 11.99 116.75 162.34 154.05 184.86 
1913 Trade share 24% 21% 31% 37% 14% 51% 
1913 GDP 23.45 16.45 144.49 237.33 232.35 224.62 
 
Source(s): GDP data: Bolt and van Zanden (2014); the Maddison-Project (2013); Ortiz-
Ospina and Roser (2016) 
Note(s): 1990 Int. GK$ is a hypothetical currency that has the same purchasing power parity 
as had the U.S. dollar in 1990. Russia’s GDP is presented as the GDP of the USSR based on the 
data from the Maddison project. 
 
Table 3.2 Gross regional product, the share of population and gross regional 







Europe 75.0% 74.0% 72.96 
Poland 8.0% 7.0% 79.01 
Caucasus 7.0% 7.0% 71.33 
Siberia and the Far East 5.0% 5.0% 81.93 
Central Asia and steppe provinces 5.0% 6.0% 56.70 
Vyborg (Finland) 0.4% 0.3% 92.77 
 
Source(s): adapted from Markevich (2014: 24) 
 
Similarly, the main reason behind Ukraine’s relatively high economic 
growth at 2.8-4% per annum was the sufficient resource base (Kochnev, 2016: 19), 
especially in the southern and south-eastern regions colonised at the end of the 
seventeenth and in the eighteenth century. Accordingly, in 1860 Ukrainian 
territories hosted ‘17.6% of the empire's plants, 15.1% of its workers, and 11.8% of 
the value of its output’ (Koropeckyj, 1989), but Ukraine’s GDP per capita was 
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somewhat average between the advancing Europe-bordering territories (Poland and 
Finland) and lagging Central Asia (Table 3.2). 
A similar argument in favour of Russia’s resource-driven industrialisation 
refers to the fact that Russia’s GDP per capita (if its is viewed as a pre-successor of 
the Soviet Union) was almost half of that of Western European GDP per capita 
(Table 3.3). Approximately two-thirds of the Russian population was engaged in 
agriculture, and the average educational standard was at best an average for 
Western Europe at the end of the eighteenth century (Meliantsev, 2004). Yet 
despite the obvious gaps of modernisation, Russia’s economic achievements were 
also very close to those in Eastern Europe (Table 3.3). Moreover, to a degree, the 
process of its political reform resembled that which was taking place amongst its 
closest European neighbours, including the Habsburg Empire. 
 
Table 3.3 GDP per capita in the period 1820-1940 (1990 Int. GK$) in 
Western and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union  
 12 W. Europe* 7 E. Europe* F. USSR* 
1870 2,141 953 N/A 
1890 2,703 1,276 866 
1900 3,155 1,463 1,196 
1910 3,442 1,667 1,348 
1913 3,747 1,726 1,414 
1929 4,452 1,982 1,386 
 
Source(s): Bolt and van Zanden, (2014); the Maddison-Project (2013).  
Note(s): ‘12 W. Europe’ are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
(Centre-North) Italy, Holland/Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, England/GB/UK. ‘7 E. 
Europe’ are Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia. ‘F. USSR’ 
are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. 
 
Political reforms in the Russian and Habsburg empires were both accelerated 
by revolutions (those of 1905 and 1848, respectively). The Russian legislation of 
1905 limited the power of the monarchy just as the Kremsier Constitution had in 
the Habsburg Empire in the 1848; the process was also halted at several points in 
both countries. However, not only the abolition of serfdom in the Habsburg Empire 
occurred earlier than it did in Russia, but it also resulted from strong nationalistic 
movements engaged in by Hungarians, Czechs, and Poles during the 1848-50 
revolution. In 1865 Hungary declared its own Constitution paving a pace for the 
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Austro-Hungarian Compromise of the 1867 (Bunce, 2005) — a demonstration of 
how nationalistic movements were the driving force behind democratisation in the 
Habsburg empire. In contrast, the abolition of serfdom in Russia (in 1861) was 
caused by a fear of revolts by economically-oppressed peasantry (Finkel, Gehlbach, 
& Olsen, 2015), while popular demands were not organised in specific movements. 
Yet the limited character of reforms did not prevent the revolutionary mood among 
Russian public, spilling into the 1905 revolution, while political reforms that 
followed the revolution were half-hearted as well. The Manifesto on the ‘of state 
order’ (17 October, 1905) and ‘The basic laws of the Russian Empire’ (23 April, 
1906) drew the basics of Russian constitution, but the Parliament had no real ability 
to limit the emperor’s power and in this way the flow of liberalisation in the 
Russian empires significantly lagged behind the one of Austria-Hungary. 
Comparing Russia and Austria also makes sense, because the remaining 
20% of (then) Ukrainian population lived in Habsburg Galicia, Northern Bukovina 
and Transcarpathia (Subtelny, 2009: 201). Yet although political and economic 
reforms in the empire (and after 1867, in Austria-Hungary) followed the Western 
European trend, their outcomes were dubious for Ukrainians who lived on its 
territory.  
Ukrainian lands lacked the resources necessary for an increase in 
production. As a result, loosening serfdom and the agricultural reform of 1850 did 
not boost industrialisation and economic prosperity in the region. The Austrian 
authorities treated the eastern provinces (particularly, Galicia) primarily as an 
‘internal colony’ (Subtelny, 2009: 218), and in 1910 the share of industry composed 
only 6.2% of regional product in Galicia and Bukovina (Schulze, 2007: 25). The 
situation in Transcarpathia was no much different, because Hungary did not differ 
significantly from Russia in terms of the composition of its GDP and its rate of 
industrialisation, and Ukrainian lands in Austria-Hungary were some of the least 
industrialised in the country (Magocsi, 1983: 99).  
Under such circumstances, the modernisation of Ukrainian territories in the 
Russian empire was no worse, even if it was not any better, than that of Ukrainian 
provinces in the Habsburg Empire. The key distinctive feature in this comparison 
lies in how the empires treated the national quest. 
The Habsburg Empire embarked on nationalism-favouring policies which 
allowed Ukrainians to protect their native language as part of their identity. 
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However, ‘Austro-Hungarian tolerance towards local cultures’ was reflected mainly 
in not harming these cultures rather than promoting them (Rusanivs'kyi, 2001: 
148). This was particularly visible in Galicia (Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria), 
where Poles represented ‘a historical nation’ and attained high positions in the 
bureaucratic apparatus as opposed to Ukrainians (Snyder, 2003: 127-8).  
Austria also promoted the Uniate Church as ‘a Catholic bulwark ... in its 
borderlands with Russia’ (Snyder, 2003: 124), wherein equating the Uniate Church 
to the Roman Catholic Church allowed to mould a Ukrainian national identity. In 
census data (1880-1900), Orthodoxy was not even separated from Greek 
Catholicism. As a result, whereas 13% of the Austrian population were Ukrainian-
speakers, only 2% of the Austrian population professed Orthodoxy (Andree, 1899: 
310-1), and the Uniate priests considered themselves members of high Polish rather 
than Ukrainian culture (Snyder, 2003: 124). 
Whereas Ukrainians in the Russian empire were assimilated with Russians 
as part of one culture and/or people (respectively, small and big Russians, where the 
leading role was given to big Russians), Habsburg nationalist policies promoted 
national consciousness to the degree at which it could serve the integrity of the 
Austrian state by undermining Russian influence over Ukrainians in Russia or the 
Polish influence in Polish-dominated Austrian Galicia. While the national quest 
and political self-determination became a vital issue for Ukrainians in Austria and 
Hungary, in the Russian empire public aspirations were driven by economic 
liberalisation.  
 
3.3. The Russian Revolution and Ukraine’s national 
awakening 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Russia experienced visible economic 
growth, but its political transformation fell behind. The breakout of World War I in 
1914 further revealed Russia’s technological lag behind already modernised and 
democratised Western states (figure below), while the lack of military success and 
deterioration of living conditions caused by the war encouraged a revolutionary 





Figure 3.2 Level of democratisation in the selected European states in the 
period 1800-1920. 
Source(s): Polity IV, adapted from Marshall & Gurr (2015). 
Note(s): autocracies are ranged on the scale -10 to -6, ‘anocracies’ -5 to +5, and 
‘democracies’ +6 to +10 (Centre for Systemic Peace, 2015).  
 
The challenges of war aggravated the incompleteness of modernisation 
which was a main cause behind the Russian Revolution.9 Whereas modernisation 
required a qualitative shift to new types of social organisation, this change had 
stalled in Russia. New elites (including intellectual elites, or intelligentsia) appeared 
and aspired for liberalisation, but the authorities provided no institutions to realise 
these demands. Russian authorities similarly failed to satisfy the demands of the 
general public, or peasantry (Wood, 2004). The electoral system maintained the 
status quo for ‘lower’ strata even after the establishment of the Russian Parliament 
(Duma) in 1906 (Borisov, Vedeneev, Zaitsev, & Lysenko, 2008: 11-2), while any 
sort of social mobilisation in the Russian empire was also banned until 1905 
(White, 1979b: 31-3).  
Under these circumstances, the first political parties in the Russian empire 
were revolutionary (the Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party formed in 1898 
in Vienna and the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party formed in 1900 in Kharkiv), 
while non-revolutionary parties evolved mainly on the basis of national 
movements, particularly in the Western part of the country, including in Ukraine. 
                                               
9 Consisted of the February revolution in March 1917 (led to the establishment of the Provisional 
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However, the formation of national parties in Ukraine was complicated by a 
societal division between ‘Ukrainian-speaking mono-confessional province and 
non-Ukrainian-speaking multi-confessional city’ (Yanevs'kyi, 2008: 30).  
According to the 1897 census, only 5.4% of Ukrainian-speakers lived in the 
cities of the European Russia, while the largest urbanised ethnic groups in the 
region were Jews (45.35%), Poles (32.97%), Germans (21.97%), and Russians 
(15.66%). Considering that Ukraine’s political movements were organised as local 
hromady (from Ukr. ‘communities’) by intelligentsia from big cities (Chernysh, 
1998: 20), Ukrainians represented a political and urban minority. Their ideas of 
national liberation were isolated from the general public and were largely 
sentimentalised, because Ukrainian intelligentsia at the time was represented by 
writers, poets and historians. 
In contrast, the majority of Ukrainian people in the province were concerned 
with the land issue which derived from extreme socio-economic inequality. Unlike in 
other parts of Russia, by 1919 most of the land in Ukraine belonged to the 
peasantry (63%), but large households owned more than half of all agricultural land 
(Vytanovych, 1967: 9-12, 60). Therefore, even after the abolition of serfdom the 
majority of peasants could not generate income and sustain a living. For them, as 
for the majority of Ukrainian people, ‘national liberation’ was ‘social’ rather than 
national (Yanevs'kyi, 2008: 30).  
Consequently, the most numerous Ukrainian parties were socialist and often 
merged with Russian parties due to common interests. The biggest party in Ukraine 
at that time, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, united with the Russian Social-
Revolutionary Party, or SRs (Kriven'kiy, Postnikov, & Smirnova, 2000: 287-9). In 
contrast, intelligentsia and liberal-oriented social groups preferred informal meetings, 
while conservative and monarchy-oriented strata began to consolidate only after 
1905, and their poor institutionalisation proved to be important during the 
upcoming revolution.  
On March 7, 1917 (February 22 in the Julian calendar) 10 a workers’ strike in 
Petrograd, quickly grew into mass protests and then the revolution. As the army 
refused to support the regime and even joined the protesters, the emperor fled and 
                                               
10 The Julian Calendar was introduced by Julius Caesar and adopted in 45 BC. Pope Gregory XIII 
reformed the calendar in 1582, which endowed the calendar with his name. The Gregorian calendar 
was adopted by Russia in 1918. 
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the members of the Russian Duma took the power. On March 3, 1917 the liberal 
core of the parliament established the Provisional Government, while socialist-
oriented parties began to form their own authority — the Petrograd Soviet (or 
Council). The period of dual power (of the Provisional Government and Petrograd 
Council) accelerated political fragmentation in the country, since radical SRs and 
the Petrograd Soviet viewed their alliance with the Provisional Government only as 
a temporary measure.  
Socialists expanded a network of local and regional councils, or soviets (from 
Russian, ‘sovety’), where the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks (future communists) 
secured the socialist majority. Since 1912, Mensheviks and Bolsheviks represented 
two fractions of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party established in 1898 in 
Vienna. After the February revolution, the Bolsheviks organised their own party, 
the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (of the Bolsheviks), since 1918 — the 
Russian Communist Party (of the Bolsheviks). After the establishment of the Soviet 
Union the party was renamed into the All–Union Communist Party (of the 
Bolsheviks) since 1925, and since 1952 — the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union.  
Meanwhile, similarly to the establishment of the Provisional government in 
Russia, in March 1917, Ukraine formed its own government, the Central Council. 
More than half of its delegates (57-58%) represented the all-Ukrainian Soviets of 
workers, peasants and soldiers’ deputies (Zhukovsky, 1984), yet, already at this 
stage of the revolution, the differences in the positions of the Ukrainian and 
Russian authorities were revealed, as the tide of nationalism was gaining traction in 
Ukraine. 
Initiated by liberal political parties, the Central Council at once took a 
course for nation- and state-building, requesting Ukraine’s autonomy, 
Ukrainisation of tertiary institutions, administration and army, and the recognition 
of the Council’s authority (Levin & Drabkina, 1930). The Provisional Government 
smoothed out these demands by recognising the Ukrainian government an organ of 
the Provisional Government, yet limiting the Council’s jurisdiction to North-West 
of Ukraine (the reflection of historical legacies) and cancelling the Ukrainisation of 
the army.  
Both governments agreed to wait for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly 
to decide on Ukraine’s status in Russia. For the same reason, both governments 
 
 66 
kept on delaying the resolution of immediate issues such as warring in the WWI 
coalition 11  or the promised land reforms, which tarnished their authority and 
secured popular support for more radically oriented socialists (Stepanov, 2008: 82-
3).  
Without waiting for the opening of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, 
which should have taken place on January 18, 1918, the Second all-Russian 
Congress of the Soviets of workers and soldier deputies declared the transfer of 
power to the Soviets on the 7th November (25th of October in the Julian calendar) 
effectively overthrowing the Provisional Government. The revolutionary attempt 
was also undertaken in Kiyv, but the Central Council managed to maintain its 
power there. In response, the Ukrainian Council proclaimed the establishment of 
the Ukrainian People's Republic as an autonomy in the Federal (not socialist) 
Republic of Russia (by the Third Universal of the Central Rada) and called for the 
elections to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly for the 9th of January 1918 which 
was to be gathered in addition to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.  
Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks in Petrograd secured their majority in all newly 
established governing bodies and together with left SRs announced the date of the 
elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. However, the outcomes of the 
elections took the Bolsheviks by surprise: the SRs won almost 50% of seats, while 
the Bolsheviks’ share remained at a modest 23.5%. In Ukraine, the Bolsheviks 
gained only 9.17% of votes in contrast to the Ukrainian and Russian SRs, who 








                                               
11 Russia remained part of the Entente coalition that included the United Kingdom, France and a 




Table 3.4 The composition of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly and the 
results of the elections in the former Russian empire and in Ukraine, December 
1917  
 
All-Russian elections (total 766) Ukrainian lands  
(total 120) All-Russian parties National parties 
SRs 374 Ukrainian SRs 81 Ukrainian SRs 71 
Bolsheviks 180 Ukrainian Social 
Democrats 




24 Alash (Kazakh) 12 Bolsheviks 11 
Mensheviks 22 Musavatists 
(Azerbaijanians) 
10 National minorities 4 
Socialists 5 Dashnaks 
(Armenians) 
9 Ukrainian Social 
Democrats 
2 




 Other socialists 8 Union of Landowners 1 
Autonomists and 
federalists 
25   
 
Source(s): the results of the all-Russian elections are adapted from Protasov (2013), the 
results of the elections in Ukraine are adapted from Zhukovsky (1984a) 
Notes: In Ukraine only 54 of the 79 electoral districts reported the results of the elections 
 
Viewing themselves as the party of power, the Bolsheviks began to plan an 
offensive against the Constituent Assembly directly after the elections. When the 
Assembly finally gathered on the 5th January 1918, Bolshevik supporters alongside 
the soldiers and sailors with the support of the left SRs forced the deputies out of 
the building, launching the beginning of the Bolshevik takeover. 
 
3.4. The Bolshevik takeover of Ukraine 
In contrast to the civilizational and cultural explanations of the rapid Bolshevik 
takeover in Russia, the Bolshevik victory came largely as a result of their party 
institutionalisation (this was despite rather than because of Russian imperial 
bureaucracy) prior to the Russian revolution and effective decision-making in its 
duration. The Bolsheviks won in the capital and big cities and consolidated the 
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active core of Russian population around the soviets, instantly securing their power 
after the October revolution.  
The fact that the Bolshevik movement in Kiyv was not as popular as in 
Petrograd allowed the Central Council to maintain its authority in the capital. 
However, by the end of the year, ‘the power of the Central Council in all major 
centres existed only nominally. Kiyv did realise [the situation] but couldn’t help [it] 
anyway’ (Doroshenko, as cited in (Alekseev, 1930: 79). The revolution as an event 
was gaining speed and momentum.  
The Bolsheviks penetrated the already existing network of regional soviets 
and local peasant organisations (including Ukrainian hromady and zemvsva) 
(Goshulyak, 1994). They invited representatives of other political forces to join the 
communist party (Frolov, 2008: 186-7). On 12 December 1917, the Bolsheviks 
declared the Soviet Ukrainian People’s Republic in Kharkiv; during December 
1917-January 1918 local communists proclaimed Soviet Republics in Odessa and 
Donetsk-Krivyi Rih basin. All three projects reflected a sense of cultural sentiment 
shared by local peoples and the industrial boom experienced in these regions during 
the Russia’s industrialisation.  
The key problem of Ukraine’s nation- and state-building at the time was that 
the idea of Ukrainian nationhood (promoted by the Council) found no support 
among the general public. Although Ukrainian parties won 60% of votes, which 
indicated that local peasants tended to support Ukraine’s autonomy and thus 
shared some sort of national sentiment, their support was passive. Peasants did not 
understand the nature of the on-going rapid transformations and cared more for 
social rather than national liberation. Their vote generally neglected political parties 
and the intelligentsia and was based on support for people of their own social 
background and place of origin (Matvienko, 2014). The Ukrainian parties won 
mainly in the agricultural regions of the Northern Ukraine (Podillya, Kiyv, 
Chernihiv) (Mel'nyk, 2010), while the industrialised South-East quickly came under 
the Bolshevik control, because the Russian political parties focused on the city 
electorate. Therefore, during the discussed turmoil, Ukraine quickly fragmented 
into a patch of distinct communities, which revealed the degree of reproduction of 
previously existing social structures; namely, historical regions. 
With this background, the ability to mobilise people became crucial. 
Whereas the Bolsheviks managed to gather 100 thousand supporters among the 
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local population, the military minister of the newly declared independent Ukrainian 
People’s Republic (declared by the IV Universal of the Central Council on January 
22, 1918) managed to gather at best 15 thousand people (Tantsyura, Kulish, & 
Peresada, 2014: 360).  
Also, the Bolsheviks performed as a united front under the leadership of the 
Russian comrades. The diverse local squads of Bolshevik supporters were united 
into one Workers’ and Peasant’ Army (or the Red Army) that acted as one in both 
Russia and Ukraine. Since 1918, the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, or 
the CPU(b), also became an integral part of the Russian Communist Party 
(Bolshevik), or the RCP(b).  
Moreover, the Bolsheviks realised the importance of propaganda at a time of 
the conflict. The Bolsheviks seized upon popular slogans such as ‘Land — to the 
peasants, factories — to the workers, power — to soviets!’ well-known prior to the 
October revolution. The Bolsheviks had their representatives in all local soviets. A 
total circulation of Bolshevik Pravda together with other communist newspapers 
was of about a hundred and sixty thousand copies (Luk'yanchikova, 2010), while 
the Central Council had ‘not even issued a ... countryside newspaper’ (Goshulyak, 
1994: 39).  
Unlike the Central Council, the Bolsheviks also had some achievements to 
propagate. The Second Congress of the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' 
Deputies had issued the Decree on Land that aimed at redistribution of land and 
the Decree on Peace that promised to stop Russia’s participation in World War I 
the same day the Provisional Government was overthrown. The respective Decrees 
were circulated at once (Ganzha, 2000). In contrast, the Central Council adopted 
the law on land already when the Bolshevik troops broke into Kiev on 26 January 
1918 (Vytanovych, 1967).  
Therefore, it was no accident that the Ukrainian government could survive 
the first Bolshevik offensive only due to external support. Moreover, during this 
critical juncture external support became a crucial factor for the outcomes of 
political struggle and Ukraine’s emerging as a nation-state.  
The alteration of political regimes in Ukraine derived from the balance of 
political preferences among the key warring parties of World War I. After the 
Entente coalition chose to support the pro-monarchical White Army, the Ukrainian 
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government that needed to fight against both the Red and the White Armies was 
forced to seek support with the Central Powers.  
On February 9, 1918 the Ukrainian Central Council and the Central Powers 
signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The German and Austrian forces wiped out the 
Bolshevik troops from Ukraine, and a peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed between 
the Central Powers and the Bolsheviks on March 3, 1918 confirmed Russia’s 
renunciation of its claims over Ukraine.  
The Central Council continued its national-socialist policies under the 
German protectorate, yet it also had to sustain a food supply for the German army, 
which faced severe resistance of local peasantry (Kul'chytskyi, 1999). The Council’s 
failure to live up to its obligations led to the German officials replacing the Central 
Council with the regime of general Skoropadsky, who declared himself the Hetman 
of Ukraine (April 29 - December 14, 1918). Skoropadsky continued the course for 
Ukrainisation and militarisation, yet his return of private ownership and the 
landowners in the province led to social discontent among Ukrainian peasantry 
(Pyrig, 2010).  
Meanwhile, the support by the Central Powers also came to its end, as they 
got mired in their own revolutions. Austria-Hungary was falling apart, with Poland 
declaring its independence in October 1918 and the Ukrainians establishing the 
Western Ukrainian People’s Republic on the territories of Galicia, Bukovina and 
Transcarpathia.  
In Skoropadsky’s Ukraine, the former members of the Central Council 
government (including the head of the former government Vinnichenko and the 
military chief Petliura) formed the Directory and in December 1918 overthrew the 
Skoropadsky’s rule. Political transformations once again reversed towards 
expropriation of property, government control of economy, and deprivation of non-
working class of their rights (Rumyantsev, 1996).  
It was during this period that the Ukrainian People’s Republic (independent 
since 9 January 1918) and the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (formed on the 
remnants of Austria-Hungary) signed the Unification Act on 22 January 1919 and 
finally established a united Ukraine. Yet this act was more symbolic than practical, 
because the new state entity did not survive long in the face of external pressures: 
the launch of the second Bolshevik offensive, the occupation of Southern Ukraine 





Map 3.5 Ukraine in 1918-1920 
Source(s): retrieved from Magocsi (2010: 582). 
 
In addition, the leadership of the Directory split, as its supporters among 
radically oriented peasants and workers could not find consensus with capitalist-
oriented administration (Gai-Nyjznyk & Leiberov, 2013: 63), while a number of 
distinct rebel groups led by local atamans (analogous to Hetman in the meaning of 
a military leader) went beyond the Directory’s control. 
The Directory’s attempt to stop the third Bolshevik invasion in winter 1919-
1920 ended with Petliura’s conducting a peace deal with Poland (the Treaty or 
Warsaw dated on 24 April, 1920), ceding the territories of the Western Ukrainian 
People’s Republic in exchange for Poland’s support in anti-Bolshevik military 
campaign. Clearly, such move was viewed as treachery in Western Ukraine, and 
the warring years of 1919-1920 turned into a war of all against the all — the 
culmination of the reinforcing relationship between event and action.  
Eventually, there remained only three military forces to be reckoned with: 
the Soviet Red army, the Polish Army and fragmented domestic anarchical 
movements. However, after the Soviet-Polish war (January 1919-March 1921) 
ended with the Treaty of Riga on 18 March 1921 and Ukraine survived a series of 
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interventions by foreign powers, the Red army faced only a number of local 
military groups. 
Therefore, the establishment of the communist regime on the remnants of 
the Russian empire became possible due to a number of reasons, least of them being 
structural constraints. The nineteenth-century Russian empire lacked liberal 
experience, but it already began to follow the Western-like pace of liberalisation. 
Similarly, the development of the Little Russian identity points to the appearance of 
national sentiment in its territories, representing a symbiosis of historical legacies 
and political diffusion caused by modernisation.  
In this regard, the sequencing of Russia’s modernisation may be considered 
a more determinant factor for the outcomes of the revolution than the structural 
constraints, because Russia’s participation in World War I disrupted the evolution 
of reforms that began with the 1905 revolution. The course of the Provisional 
Government to continue war became a crucial factor that undermined its support 
among the public. The tsarist legacies of strong socio-economic disparity and 
national quest also came in play in both Russia and Ukraine.  
As the policies by the Ukrainian governments reveal, all (except the 
Hetmanate) followed the course of socialisation of property and governmental 
control, even upon having no clearly defined concept of socialism (Vytanovych, 
1967: 33-4). With this background, the establishment of illiberal regime in post-
revolutionary Ukraine may be considered a rule rather than exception, yet not only 
in the context of Ukraine’s historical legacies but also in the context of the first 
wave of democratisation.  
The key difference in the quality of Ukrainian political regimes refers only to 
whether these regimes were nationalist (Ukrainian) or not. Yet even this factor 
derived from political context of the event. Thus, in May 1920, the Directory 
ceased to be a collective body and turned into a one-man regime ruled by Petliura. 
Similarly, the establishment of the communist rule and its policy choices were an 
outcome of agent-driven factors. The next section elaborates on how the 




3.5. Consolidation of the Soviet rule in Ukraine 
By the beginning of 1921, the system of governance in the former Russian empire 
was practically demolished, and the two forms of governance were competing on 
the ground: the newly established soviets that backed the Bolshevik rule and local 
ataman movements established in line with the Cossack tradition. Whereas during 
the first Bolshevik invasion in 1917-1918, most Ukrainians did not actively engage 
in anti-communist struggle or even supported the Bolsheviks (Skorokhod, 2009), 
throughout the 1920s warring period the conflicting parties exploited the peasantry, 
which reversed their attitudes.  
The Bolsheviks introduced a policy of war communism, based on the 
withdrawal of grain surplus wherein the peasants were forced to supply a standard 
amount of food regardless of the quantity produced (Kotlyar, 2005: 20). State 
procurement at a fixed (almost nothing) price urged those peasants who had a 
surplus to hide their grain. In response, the Bolsheviks launched forced food 
requisition. Not surprisingly, the first anti-communist revolts broke out in Central 
Russia in 1918 and in Ukraine in 1919. Yet being in fact hunger revolts, these 
uprisings lacked leadership.  
On the other side, the Bolsheviks immediately began to consolidate their 
power. In 1919 the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR united their People’s 
Commissariats, de facto subordinating Ukraine’s internal affairs to the Russian 
Commissariat.  
Whereas the February revolution spurred Ukraine’s national awakening, the 
October revolution prompted the establishment of numerous Ukrainian communist 
parties — nationalistic socialist and communist movements promoting the idea of a 
socialist Ukraine. In 1918 the Ukrainian Communist Party (borotbystiv) formed after 
the split of the Ukrainian Social-Revolutionary Party with the idea to promote 
Ukrainisation in order to fit the Bolshevik revolution to Ukraine’s needs and thus 
develop some kind of Ukrainian communism. In contrast, the demands of the 
Ukrainian Communist Party (ukapisty) formed in 1920 were more nationalistic: 
they included Ukraine’s political autonomy, recognition of Ukraine’s sovereignty 
and were based on the critique of the CPU(b) for its affiliation with the RCP(b). As 
such the idea of a socialist Ukraine not only created a potential line of divide 
between urban Russian and rural Ukrainian revolutionaries, but it also posed a 
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threat to the authority of the CPU(b) whose power in Ukraine remained weak 
(Kafars'kyi, 2007; Yefimenko, 2012).  
In response, the CPU(b) monopolised power at the cost of non-communist 
political forces and the acquisition of various leftist and national currents. The 
Party was purged from the non-communist element and with the aim to maintain 
an appropriate class ratio (Zhuravliov, 2000). Whereas the share of the party 
members with non-Bolshevik backgrounds in the CPU(b) peaked at 30% in summer 
1920, it had already decreased to 8.9% in 1922 (Frolov, 2008: 186-7), with the 
representatives of the former national-communist parties barely passing the 4% 
threshold (Frolov, 2002: 45).  
Meanwhile, the lack of Bolshevik authority across the vast territories of the 
former Russian empire and in Ukraine was obvious. During 1921-1922, around 120 
thousand members of the Bolshevik troops were brought into Russian Tambov, 
more than 56 thousand into Ukraine and 12 thousand into Russian Karelia to 
suppress anti-Bolshevik revolts (Plekhanov, 2006: 353). Whereas the Bolsheviks 
managed to strengthen the communist party, they still needed to pacify the people 
by meeting at least some of their demands. 
The first Bolshevik concession resulted in the launch of korenizatsiya (or 
indigenisation) — the policy that aimed at establishing a positive image of the 
communist party by means of engaging local nationals into the political process. 
Although this policy was a concession to the nationalist mobilisation that had been 
spurred during the revolution, Soviet leadership viewed korenizatsiya as a temporary 
solution to ‘pacify’ national communists and promote party monopolisation (Lenin, 
1974a: 335-7).  
Korenizatsiya (in Ukraine — Ukrainisation) fell in line with Lenin’s 
perspective of nationalism permitting a degree of cultural autonomy but no stake at 
bourgeois self-determination (Soviet nationalist policies will be discussed in more 
details in Section 3.6.4). Ukrainian language and culture were promoted at all state 
levels to demonstrate the connection between the party and the people. Cultural 
indulgence and as yet an absence of outright censorship allowed the regime to 
cooperate with the Ukrainian intelligentsia.  
Korenizatsiya also motivated Ukrainian communists to split from their native 
parties and join the CPU(b). Between 1922 and 1933, the number of members of 
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the CPU(b) increased by almost 11 times, the share of Ukrainians grew from 
23.3.% in 1922 to 60% in 1933 (Liber, 1992). In 1927 Ukrainians constituted 10.7% 
of members of the AUCP(b), second only to Russians who composed 66.7% of its 
members (American Library Association, 2016: 6).  
Simultaneously, Lenin emphasised the need for an alliance with peasantry, 
which demanded ‘the replacement of food requisitioning with tax in kind’ (Lenin, 
1921). The introduction of this tax motivated the increase in production and trade 
and became the second key concession of the Bolsheviks. Along with the achieved 
economic growth, the new economic policy (NEP) was also used for the 
socialisation of property through local land communities reformatted into 
communist-like cooperatives (Kotlyar, 2004) and elimination of class inequality 
through redistribution of income. Yet the outcomes of the policy were the opposite 
to the expected ones, as the growth in the market led to the growth of large and 
medium peasantry (Lazurenko, 2010: 215). 
At the end of the 1920s state authorities found themselves in a position of 
the need to choose between continuing the course for the NEP and related 
liberalisation of economic activities or pushing for a more stringent administrative 
control. In practice, this dilemma was resolved in favour of the second option, as 
indicated by Soviet policies after the death of Lenin in 1924. 
Stalin’s course for mass collectivisation, forcible industrialisation and the 
advance of planning became the crucial features of the departure from the NEP. 
Whereas industrialisation and planning will be discussed in more details in Section 
3.6.2, collectivisation has become the key tool for the consolidation of the Soviet 
rule in the USSR and, especially, in agricultural Ukraine. 
More than 3 million peasants in the Soviet Union participated in the anti-
collectivisation struggle during 1930. By the end of 1931, 923 out of the 1630 
uprisings in the Soviet Union had occurred in Ukraine (Ganzha, 2003: 246), not 
least because most of agricultural property there was in individual ownership prior 
to the revolution (p. 64 of this chapter). 
In 1932, peasants disrupted the gathering of the harvest. Instead of 
conceding, the officials withdrew peasants’ documents, bounding them to 
agricultural works. The authorities also increased the tax in kind and introduced 
food requisition as a penalty. The resulting shortage of grain led to a severe famine 
in Ukraine, Central Russia and Asia. According to various estimations, 
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approximately 3-5 million people died as a result in Ukraine and about 5.5-8.5 
million in the whole of USSR (Davies & Wheatcroft, 2004: 401; Ellman, 2005). 
The famine of 1932-1933 is also sometimes viewed as a purposeful genocide of 
Ukrainian people.  
Indeed, both anti-peasant collectivisation and anti-nationalist policies 
undertaken by Stalin occurred at simultaneously; however, whether this proves that 
the anti-peasant and anti-nationalist policies were in fact anti-Ukrainian remains 
debatable (Soldatenko, 2011). On the one hand, Stalin viewed the ‘local 
nationalism’ as a threat of ‘bourgeois nationalism’ that had to be suppressed (more 
information on the issue is in Soviet national policies) (Stalin, 1936). On the other 
hand, oppression of the less conscious peasantry as a class was a first priority in 
increasing the worker class among the population.  
As early as the 1917 Russian Congress of Soviets, one deputy from the city 
council represented a vote of 25 thousand voters, while one from provincial 
councils represented 125 thousand residents. The same ratio was preserved in the 
later-formed Soviet Union, as the ‘ratio 1 to 5 allowed the deputies of the workers 
not to ‘sink’ among the deputies from the less conscious peasantry’ (Zhuravlev & 
Fortunatov, 2013).  
Also, Marxist theory described the accumulation of capital through the 
expropriation of peasantry. Thereby, the offense against the peasantry was 
inevitable, while forcible collectivisation and the famine resulted in the dramatic 
increase of the share of collectivised households from 23.6% to 89.6% within the 
six-year period of 1930-1936 (Nove, 1992: 125, 174). 
Finally, since the formation of the Soviet government, its interpretation of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat justified the policy of mass terror against all the 
enemies of the communist regime. The first wave of terror was launched during the 
civil war and the policy of war communism. The second wave of 1929-1934 
followed the death of Lenin and included the victims of collectivisation and 
political purges for ‘counter-revolutionary activities’, the victims of the 1932-33 
famine as well as political purges against the revolutionary elites (Zemskov, 1995). 
In Ukraine, this period demonstrated a visible shift from korenizatsiya and 
Ukrainisation to Russification and Sovietisation. Finally, in 1936-1938, the Great 
Terror purged all the remaining elements that were potentially dangerous to the 
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regime (party and government officials, peasants, leaders of the Red Army), 
followed by Stalin’s individual-scale purges (Magocsi, 2010: 496-7). The numbers of 
victims of Stalinist repressions vary across sources but on average are 
approximately 20-25 million people who were imprisoned, exiled or executed 
(Politdrug, 2015). In this regard, the Great Terror may be viewed as a final step in 
the consolidation of the communist regime in the Soviet Union and Soviet Ukraine.  
Yet along with 31 million Ukrainians living in the Soviet Union before 
World War II, another 6-7 million, or approximately 16-18% of the total Ukrainian 
population, lived in East Central European countries (map below), where the 




Map 3.6 Ukraine in 1923  
Source(s): retrieved from Magocsi (1996: 560) 
 
The majority of Ukrainians in East Central Europe lived in Poland (around 
4-5 million), which had temporarily evolved into a parliamentary democracy and 
allowed national minorities to have a political representation in the parliament. A 
number of Ukrainian political forces seeking Ukraine’s independence appeared, 
and only socialist and communist parties (banned in 1924) supported the 
unification with Soviet Ukraine at the time (Magocsi, 1996: 635-6). The remaining 
Ukrainian parties in Poland comprised liberal-democratic parties (such as the 
Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance established in 1925) or more radical-
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oriented movements such as the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), 
which adopted terror and sabotage against the Polish government (Crampton, 
1997: 50). 
The opposition between the Ukrainians and the Polish regime was the main 
unifying aspect for all the Ukrainian political groups in Poland. The extent of 
national and economic oppression experienced by the Ukrainians was comparable 
to a “regime of terror” (Kubijovyč, Pasternak, Vytanovych, & Zhukovsky, 2014), 
while reinforced Polonisation and Catholicisation prompted local resistance 
(Kravtsiv et al., 2016). The Piŀsudski’s coup d’etat and Poland’s decline towards 
authoritarianism further radicalised Ukrainian ‘revolutionary nationalists’. In 1930, 
2200 acts of sabotage against the Polish estate were recorded in Galicia (Subtelny, 
2009: 430), and the officials responded with the military pacification against the 
OUN including the oppression of the Ukrainian population.  
In the context of anti-democratic developments in Romanian (monarchical 
dictatorship was established there in 1938) and Polish Ukraine, the only pre-World 
war Ukrainian-populated territory that enjoyed a relatively durable liberal rule was 
Transcarpathia, an autonomy in Czechoslovakia (Magocsi, 1996: 645-9).  
However, after Germany partitioned Czechoslovakia in October 1938 and 
divided Poland with the Soviet Union in September 1939, Stalin quickly established 
the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine. In October 1939, the Assembly adopted 
a declaration on the establishment of the Soviet regime in Western Ukraine and its 
unification with Soviet Ukraine. In 1940 the USSR compelled Romania to concede 
Bukovina and Bessarabia; in 1945 Transcarpathia joined the Ukrainian SSR.  
However, in contrast to the former Russian empire, socio-political 
movements in Western Ukraine were organised, while Soviet repressions against 
the non-communist political leaders and especially the Church (Magocsi, 1996: 
663) was met with severe resistance. In the wake of Germany’s attack on the Soviet 
Union on 22 June 1941, the OUN declared its intention to establish an independent 
Ukraine with a capital in Lviv and ended up with a tactical alliance with Nazi 
Germany against Soviet Russia. However, in July 1941, the German officials began 
the prosecution of the OUN command and, by autumn 1941, disbanded the 
Ukrainian National Council (Magocsi, 1996: 670-2). 
In 1942, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) began to form under the 
aegis of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in exile with the support of OUN(b) and 
 
 79 
OUN(m) groups (headed respectively by Bandera and Melnik). The resulting 
OUN-UPA functioned as a set of discreet squads that fought Germans, Poles 
(including taking part in ethnic cleansings) and Soviets alike. The guerrilla tactic of 
this army led them to conduct an armed struggle against the Soviet regime as late as 
1948-1949, with some squads surviving until 1954 (Sodol, 1993). As a result, the 
Soviet regime was established in Western Ukraine (particularly in Galicia) only by 
means of ‘armed struggle and repressions of local population’ (Pavlenko, 1999: 
161).  
Altogether the above-discussed demonstrates that pre-communist legacies 
were important to the character of the established communist regime 
(corresponding with Kitschelt's (2003) respective argument), while institutional 
factors and the role of agency determined the character of the respective 
institutional transformation. Thus, the absence of institutions that could channel 
social demands in pre-revolutionary Russia resulted in political chaos after the 
revolution, while the Bolsheviks proved to be the only political agents capable of 
institutionalisation by establishing state institutions in the image and likeness of the 
communist party. In this regard, the Russian revolution may be seen as the clearest 
example of an event-based critical juncture that led to the establishment of the 
communist regime in Ukraine and produced a unique institutional path. 
 
3.6. The patterns of communist rule and its developments 
in Ukraine  
This section describes political and economic institutions formed under Soviet rule, 
revealing the impact that communist rule had on political culture and national 
policies in the USSR and Ukraine.  
 
3.6.1. The party-state and the character of political regime in Soviet 
Ukraine 
As the previous sections have demonstrated, prior to the communist takeover 
Ukraine lacked durable experience of statehood. Its borders were constantly 
changing; its people were subjected to Polonisation and/or Russification; its 
attempts at self-administration were taken over by imperial authorities. It was not 
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until the establishment of Soviet Ukraine in the aftermath of the Soviet victory in 
World War II — with all the historically Ukrainian regions finally gathered as one 
state entity — that Ukraine came to be regarded as a single state.  
According to the Soviet Constitution of 1936 Ukraine was a sovereign 
Republic (article 15), while the Soviet Constitution of 1977 confirmed the right of 
the Ukrainian SSR to leave the USSR at any moment (article 72). However, 
Ukraine was de facto bound to its communist party, while the communist party of 
Ukraine had been an integral part of the communist party of Russia (during the 
period from 1918 to 1922), and of the Soviet Union since 1923. Therefore, although 
the USSR was formally a federation of socialist republics, the Russian-backed 
communist party penetrated the governmental structures of the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet people delegated power to the elected local soviets that sent their 
delegates to the territorial and regional congresses. At regional congresses, the 
delegates to the Republican Congress were elected. Finally, members of the 
Republican Congress constituted the All-Union Congress (since 1938 — the 
Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union that consisted of two houses: the Soviet 
(Council) of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities). According to the 1922 
Treaty on the creation of the USSR, the All-Union Congress established the 
Supreme Court and the Central Executive Committee, which elected its Presidium 
(legislative body) and the Council (Soviet) of People's Commissars (an executive 
body renamed as the Soviet of Ministers in 1946).  
Although the Congress represented the supreme body of the USSR, it 
convened only once a year, its successor the Supreme Soviet gathered twice a year, 
the Central Committee met up three times a year — oftentimes for a week or two 
only. Therefore, in the period between the sessions, the legislative and executive 
power de facto belonged to the Presidium and the Commissars (later on, these 
powers belonged to the Ministers) of the Soviet Union, while their decisions were 
obligatory for all the republics and their citizens.  
Each republic of the USSR (including Ukraine) had its own Congress, 
Executive Committee, and Council of People's Commissars etc., but their functions 
were subordinated to the Decrees of the central bodies in Moscow.  
Although the above description explains the highly centralised structure of 
the USSR, it does not clearly establish how the All-Union Congress was actually a 
party-state and not a parliamentary democracy. In order to explain that the latter 
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was indeed the case, it should be noted that the Bolshevik takeover occurred under 
the diminished stateness of the collapsed Russian empire and equally diminished 
political competition. As was demonstrated in the previous section, the Bolshevik 
military success in the 1920s allowed them to launch the political and economic 
monopolisation, whereas mass terror and political purges accomplished the 
demolition of the opposition by the mid-1920s in former Russian Ukraine and by 
1950s in Western Ukraine (Bandera was killed by Soviet security forces in 1959).  
Western Ukraine featured in a strong nationalist sentiment reflected in the 
support to the Ukrainian language and the Church (especially the Uniate Church) 
as part of the Ukrainian culture. This resulted in the oppressive policies of the 
communist regime which deprived the Church of institutional manifestation and 
increased the government’s authority over the Church (Volynets, 2003: 5). As 
opposed to the expected subjection, this spurred the move towards the preservation 
of the Ukrainian culture as the constituent block of the Ukrainian identity.  
Nevertheless, this did not extend to Ukraine as a whole, and, although the 
Church remained an informal authority in the west of the country, the communist 
party was the only acting political force that could induce the system of governance 
with its own representatives. Furthermore, post-war restoration of Ukraine and 
subsequent de-Stalinisation during the Khrushchev thaw pacified nationalist moods 
with the return of Ukrainisation.  
Meanwhile, the governmental structures of the Soviet Union replicated 
those of the communist party. The informal interlacement of the Party and state 
into a party-state was reflected through the fact that the prominent communist 
leaders simultaneously held top positions in the party and state apparatus. The 
iconic leader of the Russian revolution Lenin was the Chairman of the Council of 
People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (1922-1924). After his death, Stalin began 
a political takeover by promoting visible members of the communist party to his 
stronghold, the Party Secretariat, which became the main governing body on the 
day-to-day basis.  
While remaining the General Secretary of the CPSU during 1922-1953 (until 
his death in March 1953), in 1941 Stalin also became the head of the Soviet 
government (the Soviet of People’s Commissars, renamed in the Soviet of Ministers 
in 1946), proving that the Secretary of the CPSU was also a formal leader of the 
USSR. Khrushchev confirmed the tradition by becoming the Secretary of the CPSU 
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in 1953 and then the Chairman in the Soviet of Ministers in 1958. Finally, 
Brezhnev established a custom for the political leader of the Soviet Union to hold 
simultaneously the positions of the First (since 1966 — the General) Secretary of 
the CPSU and the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 
Importantly, both Khrushchev and Brezhnev made their political career in Ukraine 
and, together with a number of other party members, enjoyed a visible degree of 
trust and power in the Soviet party-state system.  
Since not ‘not an important political or organisation issue was solved by 
state bodies ... without the guidance of the Central Committee of the Party’ (Lenin, 
1974b: 1), the members of the communist party (and in particular of the Political 
Bureau, the Organisational Bureau and the Party Secretariat) de facto constituted 
new political elites, and Ukrainians were an integral part of those elites.  
The party-state control was exercised through a broad network of 
communist party organs that allowed penetration of state institutions at all levels of 
Soviet governance. The Party disseminated its power through local Soviets as well 
as through non-party workers and peasants’ conferences, whose best representatives 
were promoted to government positions. The Party relied on a broad network of 
labour unions, which nominally consisted of non-party members but de facto were 
managed by the All-Russian Central Soviet of the Labour Unions, composed only 
of communists (Lenin, 1974b: 2).  
While remaining formally invisible, the communist party de facto penetrated 
all levels of socio-political and economic life, with its informal presence becoming 
more important than the work of its formal institutions. On the surface however, 
the party-state rule made it appear that the officially declared political system had 
no relation to the communist party. Thus, the Constitutions of 1924 and 1936 
merely drew parallels between the Soviet Union and communism, declaring the 
USSR a ‘socialist’ state (socialism in the USSR was proclaimed in 1936), and only 
Article 6 of the 1977 Constitution declared the Communist Party ‘the core of its 
[Soviet] political system, the state and public organisations’. Such a prevalence of 
informal rules over formal institutions became a crucial legacy for Ukraine’s post-
communist transition and, as will be revealed in Chapter 4, for the establishment of 
a hybrid regime there. 
The elections introduced by the communists had no real impact on the 
political situation of the country, because the voting system and the strategy applied 
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by the communist bloc left no real alternatives. The so-called communist-
independent bloc promoted only one single candidate per district, which under 
conditions of the majority voting system, turned the elections into a gamble on 
whether the people supported this one candidate or not (Zhuravlev & Fortunatov, 
2013). 
The party leadership controlled political mobilisation by practically selecting 
the members of the party who were to be promoted through the so-called 
nomenklatura system. Being a central element of the Soviet political system, the 
nomenklatura formed the core of Soviet elites through ‘political recruitment’. On 
the one hand, the nomenklatura list included acting ‘incumbents in political and 
administrative offices’, while, on the other hand, it included potential appointees, 
or ‘reserve for promotion’ (Harasymiw, 1984: 154).  
The recruitment model spread beyond the list of party members to the 
positions of the heads of collective households, newspaper editors and even 
religious organisations (Voslenskiy, 1991b). Collateral to the communist party 
bodies, such as soviets, trade unions, and komsomol had similar lists of their own 
(Harasymiw, 1984: 157), and all members of the nomenklatura had to implement 
the directives of the party without questioning (Hill & Löwenhardt, 1991). 
Eventually, those officials who held the office through this recruitment system 
evolved into a political class of bureaucrats, socialised with communist practices 
through monitored professional growth and ideological work (Harasymiw, 1984: 
158).  
The growth of the nomenklatura sometimes produced challenges for Soviet 
leadership. For example, Khrushchev, who initially managed to withstand the 
pressures of the nomenklatura, attempted to stop the uncontrolled growth of the 
central party apparatus by redistributing political power in favour of the regional 
elites (Lystsev, 2007: 21). However, the insecurity he had caused with his policies 
and the related ‘resentment’ among the nomenklatura elites ‘contributed to 
Khrushchev’s downfall’ in 1964 (Hill & Löwenhardt, 1991: 234). It could be said 
that the dictatorship of the nomenklatura replaced Stalin’s one-man-ruled regime 
and became a party-rule in its complete sense under Brezhnev (Voslenskiy, 1991a). 
In this system, Ukrainian elites were part of the nomenklatura and viewed 




3.6.2. The nature and structure of the socialist economy 
The dictatorship of the proletariat, which, with time, evolved into the dictatorship 
of the nomenklatura, implied the spillover of political monopolisation to other 
spheres of social life including the organisation and functioning of the economic 
system. Communist ideology and party-rule together with the construction of 
economic institutions on the basis of state and collective ownership and a strongly 
centralised system of economic relations based on planning constituted the core of 
the Soviet economic system.  
Party monopolisation and state centralisation set up the main mechanisms 
for party control over the economy. Nomenklatura appointments to the key 
executive positions in the economic sector allowed respective party organs to 
ensure compliance with the communist ideology. Moreover, local or regional party 
authorities settled the disputes between enterprises and the state administration, 
because the CPSU was de facto the highest authority in the state. The management 
of large enterprises was run directly by central authorities (ministries) and party 
organs from Moscow (Lavigne, 1999a: 6).  
The territorial-production principle embedded in politics was introduced in 
economics. A network of industrial departments (Glavmetal, Glavelektro) was 
established to plan and control industrial output in specific sectors along with 
regional and republican Councils of National Economy. Trusts subordinated to 
Supreme Council of National Economy united individual enterprises (Nove, 1992: 
92), forming the basis of a future planning system and resembling the system of 
party control through local organisations.  
While the state needed such organisations in order to bring demand and 
supply together due to the absence of market institutions (Lavigne, 1999a: 6), state 
agencies (State Banks, Pricing Committees) also promoted socialisation of 
economic activities. In 1917 the Supreme Council of National Economy was set up 
as ‘an organ of the national economy and state finance’ and de facto implemented 
nationalisation of industry, banking, and foreign trade during war communism 
(Nove, 1992: 44).  
Although the afore-mentioned developments already included some 
elements of economic planning, the establishment of socialist economy as an 
administratively planned economy did not happen overnight. Whereas the state 
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Commission for planning (Gosplan in Russian) had been established on 21 August 
1921 and was subordinated to the Council of Labour and Defence (evolved into 
‘state planning commission’ by 1923), Gosplan had not been initially established as 
an organ of compulsory planning. To the contrary, its work was to balance the 
accounts and plan economic growth. Only the launch of mass collectivisation in 
1929 indicated the retreat from the NEP which was still officially operational in 
1931 (Nove, 1992: 96, 133, 157).  
The decisive abolition of the market under Stalin was also an indication of 
the accomplished consolidation of communist rule. Whereas the ideological 
promise of Marxism suggested that a communist society could be developed only 
on the basis of a capitalist society (which the former Russian empire was not), 
accomplishing modernisation was vital for the Soviet Union in geopolitical context.  
By that time, the economic success of the NEP paved the basis for Soviet 
modernisation. In 1928 economic growth of the USSR had reached if not exceeded 
its 1913 level (Markevich & Harrison, 2011) due to accelerated investment in 
industrialisation. The increased migration to the cities doubled the number of 
people working in the heavy industry (Davies, 1994: 16), but economic growth 
correlated with the transition to the planned and centralised economy.  
In 1927 the Congress of the Communist Party had declared the First Five-
Year Plan (pyatiletka); in 1929 the implementation of the plan became compulsory; 
and although the state had been increasing pressure on the peasantry as early as 
1926-1928, the peak of collectivisation fell on 1930-1933. It was during this period 
when the crucial features of the Soviet economy emerged and entrenched. 
In parallel to the official state-regulated market, state policies of food 
requisition and price control led to the anchorage of a shadow market that had 
appeared during the civil war. Due to the maintained gap between market and 
state-determined prices — and, later on, between demand and supply — a shadow 
market evolved into a parallel economy based on corruption and large-scale theft of 
state property. By the end of the communist rule, the party nomenklatura 
collaborated with organised crime in the operation of this market (Lavigne, 1999a: 
9-10), linking crime to economic activities and producing a legacy that would affect 
the flow of post-communist marketisation.  
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In parallel, the system of total planning turned individual enterprises into 
single units in the all-state planning system (Nove, 1992: 212). The five-year plan 
(pyatiletka) defined the strategic goals of the economic development, while annual, 
quarterly and monthly plans indicated the progress in its implementation. 
Whereas planning per se is a natural component of any economic activity, 
Soviet planning was not only mandatory but it also reflected the highly centralised 
structure of the Soviet economy. Gosplan estimated all the resources available for 
the planned period and the quantity of goods that could be produced based on the 
existing facilities. It then disseminated production orders through the system of 
ministries and industrial agencies. This elaborate system required consideration of 
how much resources certain enterprises possessed and could provide to specific 
producers; it similarly required information on the distribution of produced goods 
and their pricing. Since distributed from the centre plans of production were based 
on the technological coefficients of optimal production, which was rarely optimal in 
practice (Lavigne, 1999a: 11), this planning system was extremely inefficient.  
Even more crucially, in this economic system fulfilling the plan turned into 
the main indicator of successful management and was often reinterpreted as the 
single purpose of economic activity (Crampton, 1997: 250). The planning system 
devaluated the idea of entrepreneurship, because it replaced self-management with 
adherence to the plan. The obsession with ‘achieving’ and ‘overachieving the plan’ 
often led to ‘accounting fraud’, whereby the economic nomenklatura would fake 
production indicators in order to gain political credit for successful management 
(Harrison, 2011) — a practice which would be embedded in the economies of post-
communist states as well. 
Thus, the planning system could become a working solution only for mass 
production of highly-standardised and technologically undemanding goods, 
including for the requests of war or during the crisis. Yet the socialist system was 
failing in adapting to technological demands, introducing innovations or dealing 
with diversified economy. The negation of consumer demands was also a crucial 
feature of the Soviet economy, reflected in a deficit of goods during the 1970-80s.  
While the Soviet economic growth of 1920-30s was achieved by means of 
industrialisation at the cost of agriculture, the post-war development of the 1950-
60s succeeded due to the engagement of external resources (reparations, dismantled 
 
 87 
equipment, the labour of the prisoners of war) (Figure below). Meanwhile, the 
course of action proposed in the 1970s was to pursue scientific and technological 
innovations, which required additional resources and proved to be a challenge for 
the socialist system. In the absence of external funds the economic growth slowed 
down (from 9.1% to 6.6% between 1956 and 1965), manifesting in reduction in 
capital investments (Orlov, 1987) and further drop of production. Structural 
problems of the socialist economy, such as its extensive character, fixed pricing, 
and production of nonsalable goods were revealed in their entirety (Ikhlov, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 3.3 National income by sector of origin, 1913-1940 (% of net national 
product)  
Source(s): adapted from Davies, Harrison, and Wheatcroft (1994: 272) 
 
Some attempts at a solution were undertaken (for example, the Kosygin 
reform of 1965 that introduced some market elements to the planning system), yet 
none of them succeeded because the very system of planning denied the principles 
that were being introduced (Lavigne, 1999a: 12-3). Meanwhile, the absence of 
political reform denied socialist Republics, including Ukraine, any mechanisms for 





































one of the biggest Soviet economies (Table 3.5), it had little ability to affect its own 
economic transformation.  
 
Table 3.5 Gross production of large-scale industry by regions, 1913-1939 
 
 1912 1928 1933 1939 
Russia 69.9% 73.5% 72.7% 74.1% 
Ukraine 20.7% 18.6% 18.0% 17.4% 
Belarus 0.7% 1.3% 1.9% 1.8% 
Transcaucasia 7.0% 3.9% 4.4% 3.5% 
Central Asia 1.8% 2.1% 2.2% 2.3% 
Kazakhstan - 0.6% 0.7% 1.0% 
 
Source(s): retrieved from Davies et al. (1994: 301) 
 
The lack of economic sovereignty was caused by the fact that the economy 
of the USSR represented not a network of different Republican economies, but a 
single body coordinated from one centre. The system of nomenklatura control and 
central planning made the Ukrainian economy just another level in the distribution 
of the central plan. Simultaneously, Ukraine was integrated in the Soviet economy 
through the system of economic regions and sectoral specialisation. In 1963, 20 
economic regions were established in the Soviet Union, with 5 industrial regions as 
a separate category (Donbas among them), and Ukraine’s economic specialisation 
in this map was set in accordance with its resource capacities: 
 industrialised East, specialising in coal mining, metallurgy, machine-
building and chemical industries (Koropeckyj, 1989); 
 naval-oriented South with machinery-repairing factories and food-processing 
enterprises;  
 and predominantly agricultural West with local oil and coal mines and 
specialisation in sugar and alcohol production (Woroby, 1981: 319). 
The interaction of these specialised regions and individual big enterprises 
was coordinated by state Ministries (of Energy, Transport etc.) within the single 
planning system. In parallel, Soviet economic isolation also implied that most of 
Ukraine’s trade would be located within domestic exchange. Whereas 87% of 
Ukraine’s imports came from Russia (the main supplier of gas and oil for Ukraine’s 
industries), 62.4% of Ukraine’s exports went to Russia as well (Woroby, 1981: 318).  
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The logic of economic autarchism and central planning implied that foreign 
trade was necessary only for balancing the inaccuracies in the plan (to attract 
resources or release excessive production) (Lavigne, 1999a: 11), but such an overt 
interdependence became crucial for an extreme economic downfall that post-Soviet 
states experienced after the collapse of communism. 
In the meantime, Ukraine remained the economic frontrunner in the USSR, 
and the Soviet leadership was even attempting at economic diversification there. 
However, Ukraine’s economic boom, including the 7.1% economic growth in 1970-
1975 (Koropeckyj, 1989), did not seem as impressive as it had originally been 
following a rigorous analysis. Although the share of the Ukrainian SSR in the total 
national income of the USSR constituted 16.2% in 1988 (in addition to 61% of 
Russia, 4% of Belarus, 4% of Kazakhstan etc.) (Bond, Belkindas, & Treyvish, 1990: 
710), its GDP per capita lagged behind that of the Baltic Republics (Latvia, 




Figure 3.4 National income per capita among Soviet Republics (rubles), 
1970-1988. 
Source(s): adapted from Bond et al. (1990: 712) 
 
One explanation for such a distribution is the difference in labour 
productivity. For instance, Ukraine’s agricultural output per worker was 7.9 rubles 
in contrast to 8.8 in Belarus, 11.1 in Lithuania, 10.3 in Latvia and 12.5 in Estonia 












industrial labour productivity was increasing throughout the 1970-1980s, it was still 
lower than in the above-mentioned Soviet Republics.  
Soviet republics also differed in production and consumption of the national 
product. For instance, in 1988, Ukraine’s production accounted for 102,500 mln 
rubles in current prices (Bond et al., 1990: 710, 712), while the utilised national 
income constituted 97,330 mln rubles (Bond, Belkindas, & Treyvish, 1991: 4-6). 
Thus, approximately 5.5% of Ukraine’s national income was redistributed to other 
Soviet republics, and this claim of unfair distribution became one of the slogans in 
favour of Ukraine’s independence in 1991. 
Therefore, Ukraine’s economic growth was extensive and resource-
determined. Ukraine was a leading Soviet producer in the agricultural sector as well 
as in coal mining and black metallurgy, simply because it had the necessary 
resources. In 1985, Ukraine produced 52.9% of sugar; around half the number of 
total railway cars and iron ore; 35-40% of coal, steel and rolled steel; a third of 
televisions and bulldozers; as well as a quarter of machinery in the USSR 
(Koropeckyj, 1989).  
 
3.6.3. Socio-cultural changes in Soviet Ukraine: Soviet political culture  
Under conditions of the complete dictatorship of the communist party, the 
communist ideology became a key determinant of all political, economic and socio-
cultural transformations in the country. This ideology portrayed the communist 
party as a political force working towards the protection of the proletariat. It was 
expected that the proletariat would expand, and this took place. Soviet 
collectivisation and industrialisation, encouraged by price scissors, led to the 
outflow of peasantry from the province. In 1926, Ukrainians already composed 
47.2% of the city population in the Ukrainian SSR, and urbanisation accelerated 
(Table 3.6). During the following period (1926-1989), the share of urban population 







Table 3.6 Urban population in the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, 1926-1989  
 1926 1939 1956 1970 1979 1989 
Total city population 
in the USSR 
17.9% 32.9% 48.3% 56.3% 59.8% 65.9% 
Total city population 
in the Ukrainian SSR 
18.5% 36.2% 46.4% 54.5% 61.3% 66.9% 
 
Source(s): The 1926, 1939, 1956, 1970, 1979 and 1989 census of the USSR retrieved from the 
Demoscope Project. 
 
The goal of urbanisation corresponded with the boost to the educational 
sector, which significantly increased the literacy rate in the USSR. Prior to the 
revolution, the quality of literacy in the Russian empire depended strongly on 
gender, class and area of residence. In the 1760-70s, 84% of the noble males had 
become literate, with only 1,1% to 6% of peasants being literate (Mironov, 1991: 
233). During the Soviet rule, these differences were eradicated through mass 
education and by equalising the rights of all classes and genders to access 
education. Technical specialties were prioritised; however, universal primary 
education was also introduced, which was made mandatory in the cities after 1930. 
By 1939, literacy rate in urban areas exceeded 90% and all areas and genders had 
become literate by 1956: 
 
Table 3.7 Literacy in the USSR, 1897-1979 
  1897 1920 1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 
Rural         
 Males 35.5% 52.4% 67.3% 91.6% 99.1% 99.6% 99.6% 
 Females 12.5% 25.2% 35.4% 76.8% 97.5% 99.4% 99.5% 
 All 23.8% 37.8% 50.6% 84.0% 98.2% 99.5% 99.6% 
Urban         
 Males 66.1% 80.7% 88.0% 97.1% 99.5% 99.9% 99.9% 
 Females 45.7% 66.7% 73.9% 90.7% 98.1% 99.8% 99.9% 
 All 57.0% 73.5% 80.9% 93.8% 98.7% 99.8% 99.9% 
Total         
 Males 40.3% 57.6% 71.5% 93.5% 99.3% 99.8% 99.8% 
 Females 16.6% 32.3% 42.7% 81.6% 97.8% 99.7% 99.8% 
 All 28.4% 44.1% 56.6% 87.4% 98.5% 99.7% 99.8% 
 




However, the significantly increased level of literacy and education was used 
as an instrument for communist propaganda. The Department of Agitation and 
Propaganda had already been created in 1920, and it exercised control over the 
press and tertiary institutions (White, 1979a: 37). The works by Marx, Engels and 
Lenin were promoted in media, art and education.  
However, a lack of initiative remained a key feature of Soviet society that 
would reveal itself in independent Ukraine as well. The active engagement of Soviet 
citizens in socio-political life was driven by conformity and excluded meaningful 
participation despite the nominally increased political engagement (DiFranceisco & 
Gitelman, 1983: 604-5). A system of state-organised trade (workers) unions, 
collective households and youth movements indicated not a degree of active social 
mobilisation but a state-driven construction of a highly clustered society.  
In this social hierarchy, every individual was assigned a particular social role 
(worker, kolkhoznik, pioneer, komsomolets) and attached to a specific kind of 
collective identity (proletariat, intelligentsia) (Hopf, 2002: 41-4). Endowment with a 
class identity situated each individual within a specific behavioural norm and 
allowed the individual to either remain in the general communist flow or to stand 
out as the enemy other (bourgeoisie capitalist). 
Due to the absence of socio-political alternatives, the only choice that every 
individual was provided under such conditions was either to become a member of 
the party and spread its ideology or not, and the majority naturally preferred ‘tactics 
of the habitat’ (Johnston, 2011: 210), embedded in Ukraine’s politics up until today 
(as will be discussed in Chapter 4). The new Soviet citizen demonstrated high 
engagement with socio-political life not because of political consciousness but 
because of the fear that not adhering to the norm would ‘attract unwanted 
attention’ (Fokin, 2014). 
The communist notion of identity and social norms introduced a concept of 
collective belonging that was propagated on the individual and national levels. The 
notion of family was strongly collated with that of the state (Motherland), party 
leaders were associated with fathers and national heroes functioned as sons and 
daughters of the Motherland. The family was portrayed as a part of the state 
mechanism (Kolomiets', 2015: 93-5) and resonated with the image of the USSR as a 
brotherhood of nations or the friendship of people.  
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3.6.4. Soviet national policies 
The brotherhood of nations became a distinct feature of the Soviet attempt to 
mould different nations and ethnicities into one community that was not bounded 
by any emotional or psychological constraints. Controversially however, 
communist inter-nationalism required clearly defined nations, which, nonetheless, 
were not supposed to grow into strong self-determination (bourgeois nationalism) 
and thus hamper unification of the international proletariat. As a result, Soviet 
policies were fated to remain on a delicate balance between oppressing the political 
form of nationalism and promoting its historical and ethno-cultural foundation 
(Brubaker, 1994). 
The first product of such a balance was the policy of korenizatsiya. Apart 
from encouraging the Ukrainian political elites to join the CPU(b), as was described 
in Section 3.5, korenizatsiya was reflected in the promotion of the Ukrainian 
language and culture at all levels of governmental and tertiary institutions. 
However, the character of Ukrainisation was extremely superficial, as the party 
officials worked towards fulfilling the plan rather than on the building-up a 
consolidated Ukrainian community (Kafars'kyi, 2007: 175-6). Moreover, 40.8% of 
those Ukrainians that joined the CPU(b) used Russian language as their native 
language (Table 3.8) due to the legacy of Russification during the tsarist period (this 
issue will be reflected in more detail further in this section).  
 
Table 3.8 The lingual-national composition of the members of the CPU(b) in 
1927 
 Ukrainians Russians Jews Others Total 
Ukrainian as a 
mother tongue 
59.1% 0.3% 1.6% 3.5% 31.2% 
Russian as a mother 
tongue 
40.8% 99.6% 58.6% 48.0% 59.7% 
The language of 
own nationality 
59.1% 99.6% 39.4% 46.2% 66.7% 
Other language 0.1% 0.0% 0.4% 2.2% 0.3% 
 
Source(s): the All-Union Party census (1927) retrieved from the American Library 
Association (2016) 
 
In this regard, deep societal transformations caused by Soviet 
industrialisation and collectivisation advanced Ukraine’s national revival more than 
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the Soviet cultural indulgence. Similarly, any sort of national consciousness was 
primarily a side effect of Ukrainisation rather than its aim. As was described in 
Section 3.2, Ukrainians in the Russian empire were predominantly peasants, an 
urban and a workers’ minority. Yet between 1926 and 1932, peasants rushed into 
the cities and the number of Ukrainian workers tripled, and these people did not 
abolish their cultural traditions (Liber, 1992: 69, 71). At the end of the 1920s, 97% 
of Ukrainian children were studying in Ukrainian schools, and the new urban 
generation did not evolve into a pure working class (e. g. not bounded by national-
bourgeois consciousness) that the officials expected. The definition of nationality 
was fluid and non-refined (Brubaker, 1994). Similarly, the official interpretation of 
nationality in the Soviet Union did not emerge overnight.  
Whereas during the tsarist era nationality was defined in accordance with 
language and religious affiliations, Soviet authorities began to create ‘a "modern" 
socialist multinational federation’ in which ‘backward’ nationalities were to emerge 
as modern nations (Hirsch, 1997: 257, 266-7). By the time this process began, some 
peoples (Ukrainians) had already acquired their own territories, while smaller 
peoples were consolidated either on the basis of titular nationality or on the basis of 
territorial proximity. For the 1929 census, 57 major nationalities were registered as 
part of national consolidation (Hirsch, 1997), and they made the basis for territorial 
composition of the USSR. 
The Soviet Union was organised as a Union of independent Republics, 
which, depending on their national-ethnic background, could involve Autonomous 
Republics, Autonomous regions and Autonomous districts. Such administrative 
division imprinted the bicameral Supreme Council of the USSR that consisted of 
the Soviet of the Union (elected according to class affiliation) and the Soviet of 
Nationalities (elected in accordance with national-territorial division).  
Yet the seemingly democratic basis of the Union in fact supported only 
nominal national sovereignty of the constituent republics: the Constitution 
emphasised the right of the union republics to secede from the USSR but did not 
develop any mechanism for its actual implementation. The all-Union centre was 
responsible for the socio-political organisation of state (up to medical and school 
programmes), making the USSR an empire in its substance (Bunce, 2005).  
In moulding this multinational body, nationality became a crucial tool and a 
marker of Soviet identity. Since 1932 every Soviet citizen had a nationality column 
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in his or her passport and was obliged to choose a nationality from the officially 
composed registers. By 1937 nationality became part of official documentation and 
administration similar to name, address or date of birth; it was embedded in a day-
to-day, social (and, thus, civil) identity as part of the broader Soviet identity.  
Meanwhile, although advancing towards the construction of a nationalist 
sentiment, Soviet construction of nationality also had its negatives. People were 
often limited to choose only from those nationalities that were registered in the 
census lists. Similarly, census-takers would often register people according to their 
passport nationality or even as representatives of the dominant nationality if the 
respondent was from the national minority (Hirsch, 1997). Finally, the fear of 
discrimination (for example, deportation of Crimean Tatars in 1944 was based on 
passport nationality) often pushed people towards the change of their nationality in 
favour of a better one. In Ukraine, a similar controversy was reflected in the fact that 
although Ukrainians served a titular nationality for consolidation of other 
nationalities at the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, Ukrainians themselves had to 
look up to Russians when it came to the all-Union, or Soviet consolidation, as will 
be discussed below. 
On the surface, the recognition of Ukrainians as a titular nation in the USSR 
advanced Ukraine’s nation-state building. The Ukrainian SSR had its state 
administration, and the number of people who registered themselves as Ukrainians 
also increased. If the 1897 census of the Russian empire accounted 22.4 mln 
Ukrainian-speakers, the 1939 Soviet census revealed 23.7 mln Ukrainians living in 
the territory of the Ukrainian SSR alone (despite the losses caused by WWI, the 
civil war and purges). Furthermore, the share of ethnic Russians in such 
multinational regions as Dnipropetrovsk reduced from 17% in 1897 to 9.6% in 1926 
(according to census data). 
On the other hand, the shift in Soviet policies from Ukrainisation in the 
1920s to Russification in the 1930s revealed that Ukrainian-based consolidation had 
not last long. Thus, Ukrainisation of the 1920s was largely a cultural phenomenon 
of support towards the Ukrainian language and folk traditions in order to pacify 
national-communists (as was described in Section 3.5) that unintentionally led to 
the merging of Ukrainian and Russian traditions in the flow of urbanisation 
(discussed above on page 94). However, after Stalin’s takeover, the course had 
changed towards total Russification that was expressed in repressions against 
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supporters of cultural Ukrainisation (for example, Skrypnyk). With time, Soviet 
Russification was established as a political process that aimed at reapproaching the 
various Soviet nations on the basis of or around the Russian core. And although 
post-Stalin Russification attempted to prevent the moulding of these nations 
(Sakwa, 1998: 239), in practice it led to the merging because Stalinist purges left no 
political agents to promote any alternative.  
As a result, language preferences became a crucial marker of the Ukrainian 
national identity and cultural Ukrainianness, while the merging of the Russian and 
Ukrainian identities was revealed in that the share of Ukrainians who viewed 
Ukrainian as their native language declined from 93.4% to 89.1% between 1959 and 
1979. During the same period the number of Ukrainian-language published issues 
dropped in average by 27-36% (Subtelny, 2009: 524). Despite all languages in the 
USSR (including Russian and Ukrainian) were officially equal, there was no law on 
state languages to define their status in the Soviet hierarchy, where Russian was 
unofficially dominating. With exception of Armenia and Georgia such a law did 
not appear until the final years of the USSR: the law on languages that declared 
Ukrainian an official language of the Ukrainian SSR was issued in 1989, while the 
law on languages that declared Russian an official language of the Soviet Union 
appeared in 1990. Against the background of active Russification, it was no surprise 
that the Ukrainian language turned into a cultural, folklore phenomenon, while 
Russian entrenched its positions as the language of business and literacy, inherited 
from the tsarist period as well.  
Successful Russification could have been reflected in demographic changes 
as well. Whereas Russians constituted barely over half of the Soviet population and 
their share in the USSR was steadily declining (from 54.6% in 1956 to 50.8% in 
1989), the share of Russian population in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Baltic 
Republics was increasing, unlike their titular nationalities (census 1959-1989). In 
contrast, the share of titular nationalities in the republics, where the USSR 
promoted nation-building policies, increased (Table 3.9; Figure 3.6). In comparison 
to the earlier discussed process of Europeanisation (Chapter 2 Section 2.2.2) whose 
success could be partially explained by existing socio-cultural similarities between 
Europe and Europeanising states (Flockhart, 2010) the success of Russification 




Table 3.9 The share of titular nationalities in the Soviet Republics, 1956-
1989 
Nationality 1959 1970 1979 1989 
Russia 83.3% 82.8% 82.6% 81.5% 
Ukraine 76.8% 74.9% 73.6% 72.7% 
Belarus 81.1% 81.0% 79.4% 77.9% 
Moldova 65.4% 64.6% 63.9% 64.5% 
Estonia 74.6% 68.2% 64.7% 61.5% 
Latvia 62.0% 56.8% 53.7% 52.0% 
Lithuania 79.3% 80.1% 80.0% 79.6% 
Georgia 64.3% 66.8% 68.8% 70.1% 
Armenia 88.0% 88.6% 89.7% 93.3% 
Azerbaijan 67.5% 73.8% 78.1% 82.7% 
Turkmenia 60.9% 65.6% 68.4% 72.0% 
Uzbekistan 62.2% 64.7% 68.7% 71.4% 
Tadzhikistan 53.1% 56.2% 58.8% 62.3% 
Kirgizia 40.5% 43.8% 47.9% 52.4% 
Kazakhstan 30.0% 32.4% 36.0% 39.7% 
 




Figure 3.5. The growth of the Russian population in the selected Union 
Republics, in 1959-1989 (%), based on the census data 
Source(s): 1959, 1970, and 1989 USSR census, adapted from the Demoscope Project 
 
Moreover, in Ukraine the success of Soviet Russification could be correlated 
with the type of identity and pre-communist legacies. For instance, the 1920s 
















2010: 37-8) because part of the Ukrainian population had already developed a dual 
Russian-Ukrainian identity by that time (Subtelny, 2009: 524-6). Similarly, the 
legacy of the anti-Soviet struggle combined with stronger nationalism in Western 
Ukraine resulted in strong resistance to Russification in the 1950s (Section 3.5), 
while in other regions, anti-Ukrainisation policies evoked imperial legacies and led 
to the overall success of Russification, as was in case of multi-cultural Tavriya and 
Bessarabia (Figure 3.1), colonised by the Russian empire in the seventeenth-
eighteenth century. As such the Little Russian from the Russian imperial past 
evolved into a little brother in the Soviet Union, which explains why the position of 
Ukrainians in the Soviet national hierarchy was visibly more advantageous than of 
some other nationalities. 
The Soviet leadership viewed the Ukrainian nation as part of ‘Slavic 
brotherhood’ and a ’trustful’ Republic despite the Soviet struggle against the OUN-
UPA. The ‘career patterns [of Ukrainians] were almost indistinguishable from those 
of Russians’ (Sakwa, 1998: 252), and the access to power made Ukrainian elites 
interested in the preservation of the communist regime. Meanwhile, the success of 
industrialisation and related achievements in modernisation such as urbanisation, 
eight-hour working day, suffrage, gender quality, access to medicine and education 
also advanced to the legitimacy and attractiveness of communist regime in the eyes 
of the broader public. By associating themselves with the party of power and 
positive achievements of Soviet modernisation Ukrainians more likely followed the 
pace of Sovietisation and Russification (including the reluctance to use the 
Ukrainian language). They equally supported the Soviet struggle against the anti-
Soviet (including OUN-UPA) and anti-communist elements. 
According to the communist ideology, one of the key elements of the ‘anti-
Soviet element’ was the ecclesiastical component of behaviour, or religion which 
poorly corresponded with the image of the new Soviet person — educated, 
hardworking, and knowledgeable but not religious. The communist offensive on the 
Church began immediately after the Bolshevik takeover. The Orthodox Church was 
deprived of property with almost all its clergy killed. By 1940, out of the 55 000 
churches, only 500 survived (Besier & Stokłosa, 2014: 46). Only with the outbreak 
of the Soviet-German War and German occupation of Ukraine, the Soviet officials 
once again changed the course, supporting the Church as a means of anti-Nazi 
consolidation, which resulted in a boost of religious establishments in the USSR 
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and Ukraine during the war and the first post-war years (Beliakova, 2008; Bilous, 
2004; Vojnalovych, 2005: 64-81). However, after Stalin’s death, the closure of 
churches and reduction of clergy (including imprisonment) continued, because 
party leadership viewed ‘scientific-atheistic propaganda as an integral part of 
communist education’ (Vojnalovych, 2005: 79, 81).  
Political agitators and party representatives occupied the role of the Church, 
performing in the purposefully created ‘red corner’ (special part of premises, set 
aside in any organisation for the purpose of agitation and political education). 
Baptism was substituted by oktyabrina, and marriage and memorial services attained 
civic, non-religious character. The Soviet doctrine launched the process of 
substituting the Church holidays with new holidays and festivals that rested on 
political (or cosmopolitical) principles (Zhuravlev & Fortunatov, 2013).  
Involvement of administrative regulation in the private life of Soviet citizens 
was to support the communist premise that improving living conditions and level of 
education would result in general uniformity across varying USSR nations. This 
idea partially worked, as national issues did not affect individual preferences in 
daily life with respect to marriage, friendship or media (White, 1979a: 147-51). 
However, Soviet citizens continued to experience ‘identification both within the 
ethnicity or nation’ while accepting ‘the values and norms of Soviet life’ (Bassin & 
Kelly, 2012: 23).  
The Soviet people represented a supra-national rather than a national level 
of self-identification (Brubaker, 1994: 51), while the Soviet component of identity 
was likely associated with citizenship and common belonging to the great super-
power, the USSR. Meanwhile, the Russian nation was to serve a role model of 
Sovietisation for the rest of nations to follow (Sakwa, 1998: 246-55).  
The policy never aimed at organising the Soviet Union as a Russian state 
(Brubaker, 1994), and Russians occupied top positions in Soviet administration 
being de facto sacrificed for the sake of an exemplar Soviet citizen (Martin, 1998). If 
in the Ukrainian SSR, the titular nation was clearly determined as Ukrainian and 
the Soviet policies reproached Ukrainian nationals (Russified, yet Ukrainian) to the 
power, in the RSFSR the situation was more complex. Since Russians were 
promoted to the centre as exemplar Soviet citizens, the federal status of the RSFSR 
together with Soviet policies of filling up ethno-federal territories with national 
cultures promoted non-Russian nationals or minorities and their culture in the 
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RSFSR (Vasiliev, 2016). Therefore, acting as an empire, the USSR was in fact an 
‘“empire” without a core’ because the Russian identity was transformed into the 
Soviet supra-national identity, while Russians had no clear sense of territorial and 
cultural boundaries. It became increasingly difficult to define what Russia and 
Russians actually were, and they ‘felt no less hard done by than any other 
nationality’ (Sakwa, 1998: 243). The political situation only amplified the existing 
tensions between the centre and the periphery.  
Internal party struggle increased the power of local elites, who managed to 
engage in ‘nationality contracts’, which implied the provision of ‘a package of 
economic benefits to the republics ... at the discretion of the local elites, in exchange 
for the compliance [of local citizens] with Soviet rule’ (Bremmer, 1993: 10-1). The 
more economically advanced the republics were, the more difficult it became to 
achieve such contracts, because the image of Russia as the ‘elder brother’ for the 
elites was ‘counterproductive when applied to developed regions of the Baltic and 
Ukraine’ (Sakwa, 1998: 251-3). For similar reasons, unequal redistribution of 
finances among the republics (p. 90 of Section 3.6.2) only added to the tensions 
between the centre and economic frontrunners of the USSR — a problem that 
became especially visible during the political tensions in the 1980s’, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
3.7. Conclusions to Chapter 3 
As the review of Ukraine’s historical background demonstrates, the country’s lack 
of nation-building experience and stateness could primarily be attributed to 
geopolitical factors. The quality of political and economic legacies as well as the 
types of identities Ukraine gained relied mainly on the qualities of the socio-
political systems adopted by Ukraine’s metropolises. Regardless of the type of 
political dominance, an absence of national elites and their quick convergence with 
the political establishment of the metropolises was common for all parts of the 
country.  
However, Ukraine’s general patters of nation-building and democratisation 
were no different from those of other European states, where nation-building was 
intricately connected with the nineteenth-century modernisation. This chapter 
clearly demonstrates that although the territories of Kievan Rus’ had been divided 
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and fell under the dominance of different political regimes (in the structuralist 
portrayal — civilizations), by the end of the nineteenth century the Russian empire 
joined the developmental trends of its Western neighbours, and Russia’s 
revolutionary drive was no weaker than in Western Europe (Gill, 2017).  
The key difference between the developmental paths of the Russian empire 
and the Western European states lies primarily in asynchronised modernisation. 
While the Western European states had already proceeded with the transition to 
capitalism, Russia had to make this transition under more intense time constraints 
and external pressures. The reason it did not follow the experience similar to its 
Western counterparts resides in the combination of agent-driven factors and events 
that led to the establishment of a communist and not a capitalist regime in the 
country.  
In turn, Ukraine serves as a unique case that demonstrates not only the 
reflections of historical legacies in the evolution of institutions but also their 
diffusion in time and space. Such legacies as religious and socio-economic 
oppression in the Commonwealth and serfdom in the Russian empire were 
reflected in the peasant resistance and support to Ukrainisation during the civil war, 
which, later on, resulted in the NEP and related concessions by the communist 
regime. Certain institutional continuity between the Russian empire and the Soviet 
Union also may be observed (Cossack-atamanshyna traditions; soviets established 
on the basis of zemstva and Russification policies). 
Meanwhile, the event-based approach also proves suitable for Ukraine’s 
case. Thus, the establishment of various political regimes in the country during the 
revolution and the civil war (including those that restored private ownership) 
demonstrates that the establishment of communism was not a predicted event, and 
it depended largely on the strategic and tactical ingenuity of the communist 
leadership.  
Yet probably the key practical outcome for Ukraine’s post-communist 
transition, illustrated in the above observations, lies in the fact that Ukraine’s 
patterns of development were not significantly different from those in Europe 
(especially with regard to national consciousness that began to form at the end of 
the nineteenth century) until the establishment of communism in 1921.  
Furthermore, the establishment of communism became crucial for Ukraine’s 
nation-state building not only in terms of establishing a unique socio-political, 
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economic and cultural entity, but also in the context of constructing the first 
functioning state institutions in Ukraine. On the one hand, the Soviet regime 
consolidated Ukrainian society into a single state; Ukrainian elites became an 
essential part of the Soviet nomenklatura, and Ukraine’s economy improved. On 
the other hand, similar to the Russian imperial officials, the Soviet regime failed to 
achieve economic growth that was driven by technological advance and the 
increasing economic efficiency. The lack of initiative as part of the political culture 
both among the public and the nomenklatura hindered the reforms and hampered 
further modernisation. When the contracts between the centre and periphery failed 
to satisfy the local elites and economic stagnation continued, the Soviet Union 
found itself in a deep political and economic crisis, and Ukraine emerged as an 
independent state primarily due to its status of a segment-state in the USSR. 
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 UKRAINE’S POST-COMMUNIST 
TRANSITION AND ITS INTERNAL CHALLENGES 
This chapter is devoted to the analysis of Ukraine’s post-communist transition in 
the context of its internal transformations. Not only did the country have to 
accomplish the construction of a functioning multi-party democracy and market 
economy, Ukraine also had to emerge from the transition as an independent state. 
This chapter concentrates on the analysis of Ukraine’s institutional development 
aligned with respective political, economic and socio-cultural transformations. This 
chapter offers a critical analysis of Ukraine’s transition and the obstacles the 
country faced.  
 
4.1. Institution- and state-building of independent Ukraine  
This section focuses on the initial stage of Ukraine’s post-communist transition and 
examines the set of events that led to the collapse of communism and the 
establishment of an independent Ukrainian state. The section reveals that despite a 
number of reform attempts during the late Soviet period and the early days of 
independence the members of the former Soviet nomenklatura were not removed 
from power, which effectively obstructed the construction of democratic institutions 
and post-communist/post-Soviet economic and socio-cultural transformation in 
Ukraine. 
 
4.1.1. The role of communist legacies and the ‘momentum’ in 
Ukraine’s post-communist transformation 
 
4.1.1.1. The origins of the collapse of communism in Ukraine  
As Section 3.6 in Chapter 3 has demonstrated, Ukraine’s state institutions were 
shaped largely during communism, and as such they were a reflection of 
communist ideology and a party-state system. Ukraine emerged as a segment-state 
within the USSR, which, on the one hand, allowed the centre to maintain control 
over vast Soviet territories by allowing a degree of self-governance (Roeder, 2007: 
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11-2), but, on the other hand, accelerated centrifugal forces in the Soviet Republics, 
and did so even more rapidly when the authority of the centre faded. 
After the death of Brezhnev in 1982, the USSR went through a period of 
instability. The two General Secretaries changed in three years (Andropov died in 
1984 and Chernenko in 1985) before a new leader, Gorbachev came to power. By 
the time he was elected a General Secretary of the CPSU in 1985, the Soviet Union 
had accumulated a number of internal problems. Quality of life in the Soviet Union 
declined; the share of consumer goods in Soviet GDP was twice as low as in 
Western societies (Danilov, 2000); the crisis in the oil market sharply increased the 
budget deficit. The Soviet Union stagnated, and the resolution of its internal crisis 
required reforms. 
Yet the first attempt at reform (acceleration of socio-economic growth 
launched in 1985) did not take off, because it did not challenge the structure of the 
Soviet economy or its political system. As a result, Gorbachev announced a course 
for glasnost (openness) in February 1986 and extended reforms to perestroika (an 
analogue of English ‘restructuring’) in January 1987. Glasnost slowly transformed 
into a virtually unlimited freedom of speech undermining the authority of the party 
organs, while economic liberalisation (perestroika) led to capturing of all spheres of 
the liberalising economy by the ‘authorised organisations of the CPSU’ 
(Kryshtanovskaia, 1995: 55) through the nomenklatura network.  
Struggling against the nomenklatura, Gorbachev launched ‘party perestroika’ 
(separation of state and party functions) (Kryshtanovskaia, 1995: 54), which 
strengthened the hardliners’ opposition of him. Meanwhile, political reforms that 
allowed the establishment of alternative political parties and strengthened the 
autonomy of regional and local governments also undermined the authority of 
central bodies (including Gorbachev) in the regions. Along with the split in the 
party core this diminished the party monopoly and, thus, the monopoly of state, 
accelerating centrifugal forces among the constituent Republics.  
In this process, the Baltic States were the first to declare their aspiration to 
sovereignty with the Singing Revolution of 1987-1991, while the rest of the Soviet 
republics followed them in the so-called ‘parade of sovereignties’ (Zerin, 1990) 
during 1988-1991 (figure below). Mobilisation spurred an internal logic which 
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turned into unstoppable events that advanced to the future secession of Soviet 
Republics (Beissinger, 2002).  
 
 
Figure 4.1. The timeline of the parade of sovereignties and secession of 
Soviet republics, 1987-1991 
  
An important characteristics of Russia-dominated Soviet institutions was the 
‘alienation of Russians from a [Soviet] state’ (Beissinger, 2002: 387), whereby the 
former Secretary of the Moscow Central Committee of the CPSU Yeltsin emerged 
as a ‘symbol of resistance’ to the party rule (Dobrokhotov, 2000: 526) and a symbol 
of emerging Russian nationalism. The ‘moral victory’ of the anti-communist forces 
seemed inevitable (Beissinger, 2002: 385-6). Although after the 1989 elections 
communists formally made up the majority (85%) in the Congress of People’s 
Deputies and retained top positions (Kryshtanovskaia, 1995: 55), many were ready 
to abandon the CPSU and join the opposition (Dobrokhotov, 2000: 529-60). This 
situation reflected the Soviet legacy of the tactics of the habitat and was mirrored by 
Ukrainian communists as well. 
In contrast to those drives towards sovereignty which were grounded in 
nationalism (as in the Baltic States) or contest-caused (as in Russia), Ukrainian 
parliamentarians adopted a temporising approach by distancing themselves from 
the power struggle between Gorbachev (who also became the President of the 
USSR in March 1990) and the president of the Russian SFR Yeltsin (elected in 



















Russia (declared sovereignty on June 12, 1990) while simultaneously supporting 
Gorbachev’s initiative to renew the Union by holding the respective referendum.12 
The explanation behind such behaviour was that Ukraine’s communist elites 
were among the most conservative in the USSR (Prizel, 2002: 367), and they 
viewed potential secession from the Soviet Union as an opportunity to resist 
reforms by Gorbachev’s centre (D'Anieri, 2007: 78; Prizel, 2002: 368) as well as to 
maintain control over the Ukrainian economy. In this context, Yeltsin’s policies of 
total liberalisation were viewed as even more radical and unacceptable.  
As such, Ukraine’s independence became a result of a counterplay among 
various factors, where nationalist sentiment was the least crucial. Foremost, 
popular support to Ukraine’s national movement that evolved on the basis of the 
OUN-UPA (see Section 3.5 in Chapter 3) was limited mainly to Western Ukraine, 
while the rise of the intelligentsia in during the 1960s (the sixtiers) remained a 
cultural phenomenon in big cities such as Kiyv or in the central part of the country 
(Zakharov, 2003: 28-9). Although some diffusion between these two movements 
occurred, it was the launch of perestroika that led to a rise of alternative movements 
in Ukraine (Kul'chytskyi, 2010). 
Furthermore, the organisational structure of the anti-communist movements 
in Ukraine was weak. Whereas the ‘moral defeat’ of the communist party in the 
Ukrainian elections of March 1990 was obvious (communists gained a formal 
majority of 53% in contrast to 25% for the opposition), the opposition failed to 
unite. The Democratic Bloc consisted of diverse national and cultural movements 
created only on the eve of the elections (Kul'chytskyi, 2010). One of such 
movements, the People's Movement of Ukraine (Rukh) evolved from writers’ 
organisations (Solohubenko, 2009), yet its nationalist agenda met the expectations 
only of a part of Ukrainians (see the next subsection). Similarly, few Ukrainian 
anti-communist protests (a hunger strike by Greek-Catholic priests with a demand 
to legalise their Church in November 1989 in Moscow and a student protest 
campaign know as the Revolution on Granite in October 1990 in Kyiv) represented 
interests of limited groups of people.  
                                               
12 The referedum was held on March 17, 1991. Of the 83.5% turnout, 70.2% of Ukrainian citizens 
supported the preservation of a new Union (Central Committee of the referendum of the USSR, 




As a result, the ability of Ukrainian nationalists to promote their political 
agenda depended on the extent to which the Soviet communist regime had 
weakened. Meanwhile, political decisions of more organised Ukrainian 
communists depended on the outcomes of the power struggle between Russian and 
Soviet political cores.  
The turning point in this conflict was an attempted coup d’état in Moscow in 
August 1991. The putsch was organised by members of the Soviet government in 
order to ‘save the USSR’ by not allowing the enforcement of a new Union Treaty 
(Luk'yanov, 2010). Yet the attempt failed, and Yeltsin’s leading the crowd against 
the putschists quickly transformed him into a symbol of struggle against the 
communist dictatorship, ruining the prestige of Gorbachev and the idea of a 
renewed Soviet Union with it. 
On the 24th August, Gorbachev resigned from the position of the General 
Secretary of the CPSU. On the 5th September, the Congress of People’s Deputies of 
the USSR dissolved itself. In August-November 1991, the remaining Soviet 
Republics declared their independence (Figure 4.1), and ‘Ukraine gained 
independence with surprising ease and as a result of events elsewhere’ (Wilson, 
1997: 24), which, once again, points to the importance of agency and event logic 
during critical junctures. 
 
4.1.1.2. Ukrainian elites and the vacuum of reforms at the beginning of transition 
When on the 24th of August 1991 the Supreme Council of Ukraine declared 
independence of Ukraine, ‘political elites mutated overnight from being an agent of 
imperial power into an independent political actor’ (Prizel, 2002: 366). For 
Ukrainian communists, who felt limited in political and economic power (Sections 
3.6.2 and 3.6.4), independence served as a guarantee of control over national 
resources and a stall of reforms (Section 4.1.1.1). Since the public blamed the 
reforms for the extreme inflation (Dobrokhotov, 2000), the former communists 
utilised the economic argument to gain support.  
On the eve of the declared referendum on independence, the Presidium of 
the Supreme Council of Ukraine addressed the citizens, calling independence the 
only way for Ukraine’s prosperous and democratic development (Shakhrai, 2016). 
Nationalist forces that aspired for Ukraine’s sovereignty naturally joined recoloured 
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communists in supporting pro-independence agenda. Rukh prepared agitation 
material that fell in line with the narrative of Ukraine’s return to Europe (Pidkova, 
2012: 208), ‘Ukraine: a European state by capacities, a Muscovy colony by abilities’ 
or ‘This is how we work and this is what we get’, comparing Ukraine’s production 
output with that one of Western European states (Figure 4.2).  
 
  
Figure 4.2 Placards and agitation materials on the eve of the all-Ukrainian 
referendum on the Declaration of independence held on 01 December 1991. 
Source(s): open web-sources, Ukraïnska Pravda (2012)  
 
While the Rukh agitation met the expectations of the nationalist- and 
Europe-oriented part of the population, ‘the non-nationalist majority accepted the 
argument that independence would leave Ukraine better-off economically’ (Wilson, 
1997: 128). Of the 84.18% turnout at the national referendum, 90.32% voters 
supported the Declaration of independence (Central State Archive of Ukraine, 
1991). This fact proves the extreme fluidity of public preferences during the crisis 
and also demonstrates the important role of social mobilisation at this critical 
juncture. 
Importantly, Ukraine’s national referendum was held simultaneously with 
the first presidential elections, where national communist candidate Kravchuk won 
over the diverse opposition candidates. While this reflected on the takeover of 
former communists in already independent Ukraine, new political leaders of 
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Russia, Ukraine and Belarus also signed the Belavezha Accords on 8 December 
1991 declaring that the USSR had ‘ceased to exist’ (Federal Archive Agency of the 
Russian Federation, 1991). Although they established an alternative organisation, 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), on the same day, ‘the three 
eastern Slav leaders ... were only united in their dislike of Gorbachev’ (Kuzio, 
2001a, p. 356) and had no working alternative to the USSR. Moreover, one of the 
key Soviet players and founders of the organisation, Ukraine, has never signed the 
CIS charter and thus formally has never become a full member of the organisation. 
Ukrainian elites clearly demonstrated that they preferred to maintain their political 
and economic independence from Gorbachev’s collapsing USSR and from 
reformist Yeltsin’s Russia.  
On the domestic scale, the era of independence for Ukraine began with a 
compromise between Rukh and the communists (headed by Kravchuk), which 
deliberately secured the power of the nomenklatura. Subsequently, the rise of 
opposition parties in the 1990 elections brought no real democratisation from an 
institutional perspective (D'Anieri, 2007: 77), which confirms the argument on the 
importance of the balance of power on the eve of transition (McFaul, 2002) and ‘in 
the process of the fall of the USSR’ (Gill, 2017: 85). As the former party 
nomenklatura retained its power, all the key positions in the state remained theirs 
as well. Soviet institutions changed their signs but de facto remained the same: the 
former KGB became the Security Service of Ukraine and the former Gosplan (state 
planning) turned into the Ministry of Economy (Fritz, 2007: 116-7).  
Reform projects could barely pass such a threshold, but neither the former 
nomenklatura nor the former opposition had any coherent plan for transformations 
(Aslund, 2009: 30). Instead, both concentrated on Ukraine’s nation-building 
aligning it with either the return to Europe (as in case of Rukh) (Paniotto, 1991) or 
Soviet-like Ukrainisation in case of Kravchuk. Indeed, construction of an 
independent nation-state was crucial in the context of Ukraine’s triple transition, 
yet it was to occur simultaneously with political and economic modernisation. 
Instead, almost a fifty-million-people country spent the momentum of its transition 
without the main law (Constitution) or any institutional reform.  
Political initiatives aimed largely for the creation of the semblance of an 
independent and functioning state, but these attempts were reflected mainly in 
shaping an image of an independent Ukraine rather than in creating any qualified 
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state institutions. This problem became the main stumbling block of Ukraine’s post-
communist transition. 
Indeed, Ukraine achieved certain sense of stateness during the Soviet period, 
as its governing organs represented Ukraine’s territory and people, and, therefore, 
shaped certain sense of Ukrainianness. Therefore, unlike states with no stateness 
experience prior to independence, Ukraine’s state-building was largely 
developmental and, in theory, this needed to be reflected in political arrangements 
that would organise Ukraine’s governance in line with public expectations 
(Whaites, 2008).  
However in practice, Ukraine had had no experience in any kind of political 
transition. In contrast to most of Central Europe, its post-1917 transition ended 
with the establishment of communist rule while after 1945 the dominance of the 
communist regime was sustained (Chapter 3). In contrast to those countries that 
built their nation-states on the basis of an administrative apparatus that was to 
represent the interests of their diverse peoples (Bideleux & Jeffries, 1998: 590), 
Ukraine had no class of owners to represent such different interests and no nation-
state to mature such institutions (Offe, 1991). In this regard, the construction of 
democratic and market institutions was of a much a greater impact for Ukraine’s 
post-communist state-building than any other factor.  
In practice it became an elite-driven process (Offe, 1991) dominated by the 
former nomenklatura that took place in an environment saturated with communist 
practices. Such legacies as recoloured communist leadership, the nomenklatura’s 
control over newly liberalised economic activities, and socio-economic legacies 
(legitimacy of the regime supported by economic factors, lack of experience in anti-
communist struggle, absence of civil society or other alternative organisations to 
promote liberal values) became the main determinants of Ukraine’s post-
communist transformation.  
Ukraine's transition not only took place on the grounds of the inherited 
Soviet institutions, but Ukrainian elites at the time also assumed that Ukraine’s 
transition would proceed more or less automatically on the basis of existing 
practices. This assumption derives from the fact that Ukrainian policy-makers did 
not adopt any attempt at deep, structural reforms during the initial years of the 
transition, and, as the figure below demonstrates, the key characteristics of 
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Figure 4.3 Ukraine’s democratic institutions during 1991-2017 
Source(s): Polity IV dataset (Marshall & Gurr, 2015) 
Note(s): Indices are built as a ratio of respective indicators to their maximal meaning, with 
1.00 meaning absolute fit with the peak meaning.  
Electoral regime change and competitiveness of elections are represented as one indicator 
because their meanings are similar. 
 
Ukraine’s formal democratic institutions (such as presidency, parliament, 
elections, legislation) were run by the members of the former Soviet nomenklatura, 
who relied on Soviet political, economic and socio-cultural practices (Chapter 3), 
which did not fit the concept of a capitalist democracy that Ukraine declared it 
aspired to. Altogether this led to the intertwining and mutation of old and new 
practices, and whereas such interlacement is natural in the context of incremental 
institutional development, the most important lesson from Ukraine’s transition at 
this stage was the lack of political will and the absence of desire for reforms by 
political elites in order for liberal norms to prevail (Section 2.2.2). 
There was no division of power among the President, Prime-Minister, Head 
(Speaker) of the Parliament and the Parliament and there was also no ‘functioning 
court system’ to ensure ‘a pitched battle’ for control over the branches of power that 
launched at once (D'Anieri, 2007: 80-1; Kudelia, 2012: 419). The newly established 
National Bank was de facto subjugated to the state, while the state regulation of the 












































reformist political core could not solve any structural problems inherited from the 
Soviet political regime and economy.  
Importantly, in 1992, Ukraine was the second largest economy in the USSR 
after Russia. It had no external debts because Russia had assumed the entire Soviet 
debt (Aslund, 2009: 71). Ukraine’s economic prospects were rated as the best 
among the former Soviet Republics (Havrylyshyn, 2014: 165) and were successfully 
exploited by Ukrainian political elites while shaping public opinion against radical 
reforms which could cause strong social shocks. Kravchuk rejected the programme 
of economic reforms that could serve as a basis for negotiations with international 
financial organisations (IFOs) such as the IMF and the WB (Havrylyshyn, 2014: 
165, 169, 172) providing no alternative for reforms. Term ‘gradual reforms’ was 
used as a substitute for non-reforming at all, which, as was announced in Section 
2.1.3, led to a ‘shock without the therapy’ (Dobbs, 1993). 
Coupled with the disruption of cooperative links between Ukrainian and 
other former Soviet enterprises that used to function as one economic body (the 
legacy of the socialist economy), the shock reflected in a 6.3% decline of GDP in 
1990 that deepened to 9.7% in 1992 and 22.9% in 1994. In 1995, Ukraine’s real 
GDP constituted about 45% of its 1989 indicator (table below), whereas in 1999, it 
dropped to 37% of its 1989 level (Prizel, 2002: 365). 
 
Table 4.1 Ukraine’s GDP deflator, growth (%) and GDP value in constant 
prices (2010 US$), 1989-1995 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Inflation, GDP 
deflator (annual %) 
3.8 16.3 95.6 1761.2 3334.8 953.5 415.8 
GDP at market 
prices (bln constant 
2010 US$) 
219.7 205.8 188.5 170.2 146.0 112.5 98.8 
GDP growth 
(annual %) 
3.9 -6.3 -8.4 -9.7 -14.2 -22.9 -12.2 
 
Source(s): WB, World Development Indicators 
 
The closure of enterprises further increased the budget deficit, spurred 
inflation and unemployment. Severe inflation peaked at 3334.8 in 1993 and 
demoralised the society in its entirety. For the 1989-1994 period the estimated share 
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of the black market grew from 12% to 46% (Aslund, 2015: 62). Hyperinflation and 
unemployment increased poverty and the quality of life was even worse than it had 
been in the Soviet period (Prizel, 2002: 365-6).  
The state preserved a monopoly on foreign trade, resources and product 
redistribution, while the former nomenklatura retained control over the economy 
transforming into a strata of rent-seekers who delayed an actual transition and 
reforms in order ‘to maximise market distortions’ (Aslund, 2007: 48) and rise as 
‘new capitalists’ (Havrylyshyn, 2014: 171). By 1993, only 15% of Ukrainian 
enterprises were privately owned, and even these belonged to the former 
nomenklatura (Aslund, 2015: 62). A network of ‘rapacious elites’ (Way, 2005c) 
consisted of ‘managers of large state enterprises (red directors), chairmen of collective 
farms, komsomol leaders who had turned into bankers or entrepreneurs and 
nomenklatura insiders both on the regional and national levels’ (Kudelia, 2012: 
419).  
Old ‘new’ (putatively new but actually old) elites made their margin on the 
difference between international and domestic prices or trade with Russian gas. The 
former nomenklatura also set up small businesses as contractors to big state 
companies and, by gaining credit from the central bank, redistributed finances to 
small ventures that were in their ownership. Such subsidies consumed 65% of 
Ukraine’s GDP in 1992 and 47% in 1993 (Aslund, 2015: 65) apart from budget 
subsidies in agriculture, gas and coal industries that the ‘new capitalists’ used to 
cover the cost of production (Puglisi, 2003: 104-5). As a result, the ‘rent’ collected 
in Ukraine was the highest among former Soviet republics, assumedly amounting 
to the size of Ukraine’s GDP (Aslund, 2000: 264).  
The Soviet legacy of economic success being associated with illegal means 
was replicated in that economic power in Ukraine became irrevocably interlaced 
with access to political power (Sections 2.1.3 and 3.6.2), and privatisation only 
strengthened this relationship. During 1992-1994 around 80% of former state 
companies were privatised by insiders (‘red’ directors) who were able to arrange a 
preferred share allocation. In addition, when in order to accelerate privatisation, the 
government began to issue privatisation certificates, or vouchers13 in 1994 (World 
                                               
13 the certificates were to be exchanged for shares of companies or allocated in investment funds and 
were assigned for every Ukrainian citizen 
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Bank, 1997: 242-5), not only did ordinary citizens not have enough market 
experience to know what to do with these, but also Ukrainians were more 
interested in getting real money than they were in acquiring shares in the collapsing 
industries. 
Together with the legacy of the black market and the dominance of informal 
practices (Sections 2.1.3 and 3.6.2), this led to the situation when investment funds 
bought most of available vouchers, exchanged them for the shares in the most 
profitable enterprises and then onsold these shares to organisations often controlled 
either by the former nomenklatura or by syndicates of organised crime because 
these networks had the financial capacity to make such purchases. This situation 
was determinant in laying the foundations of what would become known as state 
capture.  
 
4.1.2. Ukraine in a ‘state capture’: constructing a hybrid regime of 
‘defective democracy’ and ‘competitive oligarchy’  
4.1.2.1. Ukraine’s belated reforms 
As was described in the previous section, in the absence of political reforms during 
the crucial momentum of transition in 1991-1993, state institutions that were 
supposed to create democratic rules of the game for political elites were basically 
omitted. Although the institutions of democracy (presidency, multi-party elections 
and new legislations) and state administration (organisations and ministries 
independent from the Soviet core) had been introduced, they failed to grasp the 
‘broader’ meaning of the nation-state as the form of governance that frames 
political leaders to act on behalf of all political, economic and ethno-cultural groups 
(Roeder, 2007: 15-6), instead favouring the few in power.  
Against the legacy of state-controlled economy, new economic elites quickly 
realised that control over state institutions could facilitate their profits. This led to 
the transcendence of the economic struggle into political opposition which peaked 
with the political and economic crisis of 1993 which then led to parliamentary and 
presidential elections of 1994. After the elections, communists (86 seats) and 
socialists, viewed as other successors of the CPSU (14 seats), made the only 
working coalition in the parliament (Aslund, 2009: 64; Bilets'kyi M. & 
Pogerbyns'kyi, 1997), while reformist Kuchma (parliamentarian since 1990 and 
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prime minister since 1992) became the president with the support of Ukrainian 
industrialists (Vysotskyi, 2012). However, in the absence of strong state institutions 
and clear division of power, the struggle for dominance between the president and 
the parliament resumed, producing a set of features that would form the core of 
Ukraine’s policy-making.  
Ukraine’s socio-political system represented a hybrid of formal democratic 
institutions and embedded Soviet practices. In light of the presidential-
parliamentarian power struggle during 1995-1996 Kuchma announced a course for 
‘strengthening’ a single executive vertical structure of power as the basis for a 
nationwide policy. Noteworthy, in this process popular appreciation ‘that only 
forceful solutions’ (Motyl, 1997b: 441) could resolve economic depression justified 
the use of ‘extralegal means’ by the president (D'Anieri, 2007: 84) such as 
blackmailing the parliament with public opinion (Vysotskyi, 2012: 108).  
Only when Kuchma threatened the parliament with re-elections on the basis 
of public opinion polls, a temporary consensus about the division of power was 
achieved. In June 1995 the constitutional treaty on the organisation and functioning 
of state and local governance between the president and the speaker of the 
parliament (the leader of socialists Moroz) was signed. The situation repeated when 
Kuchma forced the parliament to adopt the currently acting Constitution of 
Ukraine just in two days (during 27-28 June 1996) by adopting a decree, ‘On 
holding the all-Ukrainian referendum on the adoption of a new Constitution of 
Ukraine’. 
Importantly and in line with the argument that Ukraine’s politics is guided 
not by institutions but by policy-makers, the Constitution did not put an end to 
Ukraine’s political cleavages, because it preserved a set of mechanisms to satisfy the 
representatives of various branches of power. The Constitution turned into an 
object of amends for Ukrainian politicians, which has been reflected in a number of 
Constitutional reforms by other presidents, including in between and after the 
democratic revolutions.  
The man-made character of Ukraine’s institutions is revealed in that 
Ukrainian laws are often ‘a reflection of incumbent authority rather than a cause of 
it’ (Way, 2005a: 245), because Ukrainian politicians shape institutional design to 
favour their needs. In this regard, ‘the way in which the Constitution was adopted’ 
was much more indicative of Ukraine’s rules of policy-making ‘than its content’ 
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(D'Anieri, 2007: 85), because blackmailing and illegal means have grown as 
inevitable part of Ukraine’s policy-making. Since the end of the 1990s their impact 
only strengthened due to the ongoing power struggle. 
Moreover, when in 1998 the communists gained most of the vote (24.65%) 
and managed to create a communist-socialist bloc of approximately 40% of 
deputies in the parliament (Freedom House, 1999), Kuchma launched a so-called 
‘virtualisation of democracy’, whereby formal compliance with democratic 
practices represented a facade of de facto authoritarian practices reflected in 
unequal access to the media, alternative (often falsified) public opinion polls, 
financing social institutions using ‘the party of power’, and election fraud. 
Ukraine’s hybrid democracy allowed a strong president to capture the parliament 
by buying the votes of so-called ‘swamp’ of deputies with no party affiliations for 
better political prospects (Vysotskyi, 2012: 109-10) — a reflection of the communist 
political culture and a feature of Ukraine’s politics till the present day.  
Since Ukraine did not build transparent and accountable institutions, its 
transition became overtly changeable, agent-driven and determined by the balance 
of power in politics. Moreover and in line with the theoretical postulate on the 
determinant role of political decision for the pace of economic reform (Section 
2.1.3), Ukraine’s economic transition was a reflection of its politics.  
Following the promises of his electoral campaign, Kuchma launched 
economic changes immediately after coming into power. The first programme with 
the IMF was signed in 1994 (Aslund, 2015: 65) and it aimed at market liberalisation 
and a mass-scale privatisation. The NBU headed by Yushchenko (who would later 
become the president of Ukraine) restricted monetary emission through a seven-
month ban on issuing credits (Aslund, 2009: 73, 87), which, combined with the 
tightened budget control, reduced inflation from 10,000% in 1993 to 400% in 1995 
and reduced the budget deficit from 5% in 1994 to 3% in 1996 (Havrylyshyn, 2014: 
175; figure below). Ukraine became able to introduce its national currency hryvnia 




Figure 4.4 Ukraine’s inflation, consumer prices (annual %), GDP growth 
(annual %), and GDP at constant market prices (bln constant 2010 US$) for the 
period 1995-2005 
Source(s): WB, World Development Indicators 
 
Ukraine’s progress in reforms in other sectors of the economy was also 
visible in comparison with the previous decision-making vacuum (Table 4.2). The 
share of the private sector’s contribution to GDP increased from 10% in 1992 to 
35% in 1995 (EBRD Transition report, 1995: 61-62). Governmental support for the 
economy dropped from 13.3% of the GDP in 1994 to 6.5% of GDP in 1996 
(Havrylyshyn, 2017). In 1998, privatisation spilled over to infrastructure (EBRD 
Transition report, 1998: 197).  
However, the extent of the economic crisis that Ukraine had experienced 
previously complicated economic reforms. Half of Ukraine’s GDP was produced in 
the informal economy and barter transactions accounted for more than 40% of all 
industrial sales in early 1999 (EBRD Transition report, 1999: 279). State regulation 
was preserved to prevent the complete collapse of medicine and education. 
Liberalisation of grain export was also rejected, because Ukrainian exporters would 
have abandoned Ukraine’s domestic market in favour of more profitable sales 
abroad (Aslund, 2009: 71). And although the parliament continued to block 
Kuchma’s unpopular initiatives (aimed at land privatisation, reduction of social 
expenditures and tax reform (EBRD Transition report, 1999: 279), Kuchma himself 
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Table 4.2 Ukraine’s economic transition, 1994-2000 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Large-scale privatisation 1 2 2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 
Small-scale privatisation 2 2 3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Price liberalisation 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 
Trade and forex system 1 3 3 3 2.7 3 3 
Competition policy n/a 2 2 2 2 2.3 2.3 
Enterprise reform (governance) 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Banking reforms 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Non-banking financial 
institutions 
n/a 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Legal reform (extensiveness) of 
the company law 
n/a n/a n/a 2 2 2 n/a 
Legal reform effectiveness of the 
company law 
n/a n/a n/a 2 2 2 n/a 
Infrastructure reform rating n/a n/a n/a n/a 2 1.7 2 
 
Source(s): EBRD, reports for various years 
Note(s): Economic scores are ranked from 1 to 4.33, where 1 is not free market and 4.33 is 
advanced free economy. 
 
As Table 4.2 shows, Ukraine’s progress in reforms was limited to price 
deregulation, liberalisation of foreign exchange markets and small-scale 
privatisation — those areas which the former nomenklatura had already begun to 
take under their control. Monopolisation in the banking sector and trade, (EBRD 
Transition report, 1997: 209) became the reason behind the low crediting of non-state 
sector. Combined with poor protection of property rights, these prevented foreign 
investors from entering the country and left new business elites as the only potential 
buyers in the market.  
By the end of the 1990s, Ukraine had managed to stabilise its economy, but 
did so without changing the underlying stimuli of its political and economic system. 
This period also corresponded with a growing criticism of the austerity measures 
promoted by IFOs in favour of government incentives to promote economic growth 
(Havrylyshyn, 2017: 92), which altogether led to the abandonment of reforms. 
 
4.1.2.2. Building Ukraine’s post-communist ‘state capture’ 
Economic reforms slowed down in the period between 2000-2003 (Table 4.3.) 
simultaneously with the decline in the freedom of opposition and political 
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liberalisation (Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.5). Considering that the communists and 
socialists had already lost their majority in the parliament by the beginning of the 
2000s, the main reason for the slowdown in reforms was the establishment of a 
competitive oligarchy (so-called oligarchisation of Ukraine) that overlapped with 
state capture as ‘a form of grand corruption’ (Hellman & Kaufmann, 2001).  
 
Table 4.3 Ukraine’s progress in economic transition, 2000-2014. 
 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 
Large-scale privatisation 2.7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Small-scale privatisation 3.3 3.7 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Enterprise reform 
(governance) 
2 2 2 2 2 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Price liberalisation 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Trade and forex system 3 3 3.3 3.7 4.3 4 4 4 
Competition policy 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Banking sector reforms 2 2.3 2.3 3 3 3 2.7 2.7 
Non-banking financial 
institutions 
2 2 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.3 
Infrastructure reform rating 2 2 1.7 1.7 2 2.3 2.3 2.3 
 
Source(s): EBRD, Transition reports for various years  
Note(s): Economic scores are ranked from 1 to 4.33, where 1 is not free market and 4.33 is 
advanced free economy.  




Figure 4.5 Ukraine’s democracy score, 2003-2017 



























































































The ability of the oligarchy to undermine reforms and compromise 
Ukraine’s transparency in governance (Havrylyshyn, 2017: 201; Melnykovska & 
Schweickert, 2008; Figures 4.7 and 4.8) was formed on the basis of the Soviet state-
controlled economy during the reforms vacuum in 1991-1993 (Section 4.1.1), since 
the survival of existing industries required government support or at least informal 
networking (an ‘insider status’ or ‘insider connections’ with law- and decision-
makers) (Havrylyshyn, 2017: 211).  
Delayed privatisation under the Kuchma’s presidency not only failed to 
change these practices but in fact further strengthened the relationship between 
maximising profits and political influence as seen in access to state institutions. As 
a result, Ukrainian public associated the rise of the rich with mass privatisation, 
labelled prikhvatizatsiya (from Russian khvatat’ meaning ‘to grab’) and thereby with 
Kuchma’s rule. The Ukrainian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs which 
served as a networking platform for Kuchma during his electoral campaign in 1994, 
officially, supported a course of liberalisation and reforms but de facto promoted 
‘nomenklatura privatisation’ (Fritz, 2007: 118-9), while the state supported this 
organisation by subsidising the enterprises that provided the Union with their 
services (Puglisi, 2003: 107).  
Ukraine’s state institutions became ‘the platforms for Ukrainian political and 
economic elites to realise their corporate interests’ (interview4) and were shaped in 
order to fit the personal interests of the captors (interview2) rather than to create a 
system of transparent governance. In this rent-seeker/rent-giver relationship, 
economic actors were provided with a political roof (‘cover, protection’), while 
political actors gained financial support to ‘consolidate their positions of authority’ 
(Puglisi, 2008: 57).  
Therefore, the rise of Kuchma in the opposition to the communist-socialist 
bloc (the reflection of power struggle between the parliament and the president) 
symbolised the rise of the oligarchical rule in the opposition to communists who 
refused any reforms that benefited new capitalists. For the same reason, Kuchma’s 
soft liberalisation of prices and mass privatisation corresponded with business 
interests in making profits on the price arbitrage, property capture, and control of 
financial assets (Melnykovska & Schweickert, 2008; Table 4.2 and Table 4.3). 
Companies began to ‘shape the laws, policies, and regulations ... by providing illicit 
private gains to public officials’ (Hellman & Kaufmann, 2001) whereby deputy seat 
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granted juridical immunity to its owner and allowed to avoid prosecution 
(Havrylyshyn, 2017: 213-4) — a problem that remains unresolved.  
In this context, Ukraine’s extreme fragmentation in the parliament (Way, 
2005, pp. 194-195) partially explains Ukraine’s relatively high competitiveness of 
elections, while weak party institutionalisation (Figure 4.3) demonstrates that 
political parties have remained a tool of business- rather than policy-making.  
After winning the 1999 presidential elections Kuchma continued to tighten 
control by establishing a new type of political regime in which ‘the principle of 
political pluralism was replaced by the principle of oligarchic pluralism’ (Prokop, 
2013: 213). By that time he had already set up his own political party (the People’s 
Democratic Party) with the aim to gain control over the parliament after the 1998 
parliamentary elections. However, the party gained only 6.3% of votes (table 
below), and Kuchma began to rely on patronage networks based on 
Dnipropetrovsk family, local ‘political coalitions built upon financial capital’, and 
political parties supported by influential businessmen (Puglisi, 2003: 112-4). 
The president began to play ‘an “integrative role” over a potentially 
heterogeneous political environment’ (Puglisi, 2003: 103) by appointing oligarchs 
from different business groups on president-controlled posts (including in the 
Cabinet of Ministers) (Melnykovska & Schweickert, 2008b) and performing as an 
‘arbitrator’ among oligarchical clans (Prokop, 2013). Kuchma’s prosecution of 
Lazarenko for fraud and money laundering became an example of this ability of the 
president and a warning for the rest of the oligarchs.  
 Lazarenko was a prime minister in Kuchma’s government in 1996-1997 and 
together with his deputy Tymoshenko is believed to have made his capital mainly 
on trade with gas (Fritz, 2007: 120). However, when Lazarenko’s party Hromada 
gained almost as many votes (4.52%) as Kuchma’s party in the 1998 parliamentary 
elections (Table 4.4), a growing opposition and even a conflict between the former 
allies broke out. 
The conflict paralleled the change in the balance of power among Ukrainian 
oligarchs (Bondarenko, 2002), since several gas companies (Industrial Union 
Donbass and state company Republic later reorganised in currently operating 
Naftogaz) competed with Lazarenko’s United Energy Systems of Ukraine for gas 
market (Obozrevatel, 2008). The balance was disrupted when local administration 
in the Donetsk region (one of the biggest industrial centres and thus energy 
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consumers) preferred its own regional trader, the Industrial Union Donbass, to 
rapidly expanding the United Energy Systems of Ukraine.  
In the gas conflict, Kuchma took an arbitrary stance by prosecuting former 
ally Lazarenko (Obozrevatel, 2008) and discouraging the remaining gas 
competitors. Consequently, the position of the leading gas trader was taken by 
another Ukrainian company Naftogaz which evolved into a monopolist in gas 
transit, import, and distribution in Ukraine and remains so today (Obozrevatel, 
2009).  
The whole situation indicated the dominance of a one-man regime over the 
oligarchical pluralism initially supported by big businesses. Kuchma’s growing 
authoritarianism motivated those oligarchs who remained outside the president’s 
inner circle to take control over presidential authority or to oppose it. As a result, 
the remaining outsider oligarchs began to form their own anti-Kuchma coalition in 
the beginning of the 2000s (Melnykovska & Schweickert, 2008b) — a process that 
culminated in the Orange revolution which will be discussed in more detail in the 
next section. 
To summarise the above discussion, oligarchs became the main product of 
merging capitalist practices into the communist-socialist fabric. On the one hand, 
they were the only power capable of sustaining economic activities and shaping the 
market in the beginning of Ukraine’s transition (Aslund, 2009: 262), while, on the 
other hand, they prospered primarily by distorting the economic environment 
(Hellman & Kaufmann, 2001).  
Access to state-backed benefits (a direct outcome of the nomenklatura 
system) resulted in small businesses remaining underdeveloped because oligarchies 
prevented new actors from accessing the market (Aslund, 2007: 273), while large 
businesses remained under-restructured, because capturing the state benefited 
Ukrainian oligarchs more than the competitive market and transparent governance 
(Havrylyshyn, 2017: 201). Not only would such a situation have undermined the 
consolidation of Ukraine’s democratic institutions in the long run (in line with the 
modernist and transitologist arguments), but it also prevented both the construction 
of transparent democratic institutions with equal participation and the introduction 





Table 4.4 Ukraine’s parliamentary elections: voting results and characteristics of main political parties 
 




Elections results  Characteristics of main parties 















Communist Party of Ukraine — 86 seats (19.12%) 
Peasant’s Party — 18 seats (4%) 
Socialist Party — 14 seats (3.12%) 
Centrist: 
17 seats (3.78%) including Kuchma’s Inter-regional Bloc for Reform 
Right: 
Rukh (People’s Movement of Ukraine) — 20 seats (4.45%) 
Other moderate nationalists — 15 seats (3.34%) 
Extreme nationalists — 5 seats (1.12%) 
 
Independents — 163 seats (36.23%) 
Communist Party of Ukraine — re-
established in 1993 after the 
dissolution of the CP(b)U and 
formally not its apostate. Slogan 
‘Workers of all countries unite!’, 
supports communism, Marxism-
Leninism. 







Communist Party — 115 seats (26.03%) 
Socialist-Peasants’ Alliance — 28 seats (6.33%) 
Centrist: 
People's Democratic Party (NDP) — 28 seats (6.33%)  
“Hromada Bloc” — 20 seats (4.52%) — established by Lazarenko and 
Turchynov 
Right: 
Rukh (People's Movement of Ukraine) — 42 seats (9.5%) 
 
Independents — 138 seats (31.23%) 
Rukh (People’s Movement of 
Ukraine) established as a national-
democratic political party in 1993. 
Centre-right, nationalist, pro-











Communist Party of Ukraine — 66 seats (14.67%) 
 
Centrist: 
Our Ukraine (included Rukh and a number of nationalistic and liberal 
parties) — 112 seats (24.89%), leader Yushchenko  
For a United Ukraine (an alliance of left Working Ukraine and centrist 
People’s Democratic Party, Party of Regions and Agrarian Party of 
Ukraine) — 102 seats (22.67%), leader Lytvyn 
 
Independents — 95 seats (21.12%) and others (including left “Socialist 
Party”, leader Moroz and centrist “Bloc of Yuliya Tymoshenko”, leader 
Tymoshenko) 
Our Ukraine established in 2001 in 




For a United Ukraine established in 
2001 in support of Kuchma. 
Centrist, pro-regionalist, pan-Slavic 






Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) — 33 seats (5.67%)  
Communist Party of Ukraine — 21 seat (3.66%) 
 
Centrist: 
Party of Regions (former For a United Ukraine) — 186 seats (32.12%), 
leader Yanukovych 
Bloc of Yuliya Tymoshenko — 129 seats (22.27%) 
Our Ukraine — 81 seat (13.94%) 
Party of Regions, established in 
1997.  
Centrist, regionalist, eurosceptical. 
Slogan “Strong regions! Strong state! 
Rich people!” 
Bloc of Yuliya Tymoshenko 
founded in 2001 in the opposition to 
Kuchma. Centre-left, solidarist, pro-
European. 






Communist Party of Ukraine — 27 seats (5.64%) 
Centrist: 
Party of Regions — 175 seats (35.94%) 
Bloc of Yuliya Tymoshenko — 156 seats (32.12%) 
Bloc Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defence (former Our Ukraine) — 72 
seas (14.81%) 












Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) — 32 seats (7.12%) and “Soyuz” 
(Union) party — 1 seat (0.22%) 
Centrist: 
Party of Regions (leader Azarov) — 185 seats (41.12%) 
Batkyvschyna (Fatherland) (former Bloc of Yuliya Tymoshenko, leader 
Yatsenyuk) — 101 seats (22.45%) 
Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR) (former European 
capital, leader Klytchko) — 40 seats (8.89%)  
Others (United Centre and Party of Pensioners of Ukraine) 
Right: 
Svoboda (Freedom) — 37 seats (8.23%) 
Radical Party (leader Liashko) — 1 seat (0.22%) 
 
Independents — 43 seats (9.56%) 
Svoboda (Freedom) founded in 
1992. 
Right, far-right. Nationalist, 
populist, Eurosceptical. Slogan ‘We 
are the Ukrainians. We are in our 
country given by God. God, give us 
the victory to become the founders 
of the Great State’ 
 
Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for 
Reform (UDAR) founded in 2005. 
Centrist, liberal-progressive, 
euroatlantic. Slogan ‘From the 
success of an individual to the 
success of the country!’ 
2014 (were 
















Bloc of Petro Poroshenko (leader Klytchko) — 147 seats (32.67%) 
People’s Front (leader Yatsenyuk) — 83 seats (18.45%) 
Opposition Bloc (mainly former Party of Regions) — 40 seats (8.89%) 
Others: liberal-nationalist Samopomich (Self Reliance), two deputies 
groups (People's Will, Economic Development) and Batkyvschyna 
(Fatherland) with leader Tymoshenko 
Right: 
Radical Party — 22 seats (4.89%) 
 
Independents — 38 seats (8.45%) 
Bloc of Petro Poroshenko founded 
in August 2014 to promote 
Poroshenko’s programme in the 
parliament. Centre-right, liberal 
conservative, Euroatlantic. 
People’s Front registered in March 
2014 when Yatsenyuk and 
Turchinov left Batkyvschyna. 
Centre-right. Pro-European. 
 
Source(s): Inter-Parliamentary Union (PARLINE) and RBK Ukraïna (2012, 2015) 
Note(s): the main political forces are highlighted in bold 
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As a result, Ukraine’s economic growth in the beginning of the 2000s (figure 
below) became the product of an extensive growth spurred by a fall in the price of 
oil, differences in international currency rates, cheap labour force government 
subsidising (EBRD Transition report, 1997: 10; Havrylyshyn, 2017: 96-7) but not by a 
more efficient production stimuli. Similarly, the physical volume of Ukraine’s GDP 
in 2000 constituted only 43.2% of its 1990 output. The share of innovative 
production in industrial output did not exceed 9.4% in 2000 and was slowly 
declining with its lowest mean of 1.4% in 2015 (SSCU, 1998-2017). Only exploiting 
industrial capacities inherited from the Soviet Union and the favourable 
international conjuncture temporarily allowed Ukraine’s ‘bad’ governance (Figure 
4.7) to miraculously correlate with rapid economic growth (Larsson, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Ukraine’s GDP at market prices, constant and current in the U.S. 
dollar and Ukrainian hryvna for the period 2000-2016 
Source(s): State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (SSCU), WB 
Notes(s): Data since 2010 exclude Crimea, date since 2014 and onwards exclude Crimea and 
the territories of the anti-terrorist operation (ATO) 
 
 Meanwhile, the ‘coalescence of political and economic capital’ (interview3) 
led the corruption perception index for Ukraine in 2000 to be at its worst, and the 
situation did not change dramatically even in the subsequent years: Ukraine 
remained at approximately the same level of corruption as Russia, significantly 




































































































Figure 4.7 Selected governance indicators of Ukraine, 1996-2015 
Source(s): World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Note(s): governance is measured on a scale from -2.5 to +2.5, where a higher meaning 
corresponds with better governance. 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Corruption perception index for Ukraine, Russia, Poland and 
Georgia, 1980-2016 
Source(s): Transparency International, reports for various years 
Note(s): 10 is the least corrupted, 0 is the most corrupted. Data for the USSR (1980-85) and 
Russia (1993-96) may be to a degree extended to Ukraine. 
 
Importantly, whereas a democratic revolution in 2003 in Georgia resulted in 
positive changes in the country, the same did not occur in Ukraine (as will be 
discussed later in this chapter). Meanwhile, the expansion of the illegal economy, 
the lack of transparency and accountability, and the distortions in state apparatus 
weakened Ukraine’s bureaucracy preventing the country from achieving vitally 
needed reforms and securing the requisite resources for these reforms (Hellman, 































































































































































































level and led to a general instability and demolition of state institutions 
(Melnykovska & Schweickert, 2008b).  
Whereas some view this state of politics as a transitional stage towards 
democracy (Nodia, 2002), others consider it as an alternative to it. Thus, Puglisi 
(2003) distinguishes two directions in which oligarchical societies could potentially 
evolve. These are fragmentation of the ruling elites and a consequent loss of power 
or the rise of a strong president who would undermine the power of the oligarchy 
(117-8). The next section demonstrates that Ukrainian oligarchical evolution was 
cyclic, resulting in neither strong democratisation nor strong authoritarianism. This 
further stresses the importance of agency for the overall success of post-communist 
democratic and economic transformations in Ukraine.  
 
4.2. The cyclic nature of Ukraine’s hybrid regime: between 
competitive oligarchy and competitive authoritarianism  
This section demonstrates that Ukraine’s democratic upswings and incidences 
alternated, whereas the strong oligarchy of the post-revolutionary period contrasted 
with the strong presidency between the democratic revolutions. Nevertheless, in 
both cases Ukraine’s political system could be classified as ‘oligarchic capitalism’ 
(when oligarchs fully control weak state institutions) rather than ‘diffuse’ capitalism 
(when political power does not necessarily guarantee economic enrichment).14  
 
4.2.1. Mapping the fragmenting Ukrainian oligarchy  
By the end of the 1990s, Ukraine’s political parties remained weak (Fritz, 2007: 
109-10) and opaque oligarchic groups remained fragmented. The leading oligarchic 
clans slowly evolved into more complex financial-industrial groups and their 
mapping became crucial for understanding Ukrainian politics.  
The rise of oligarchy took place primarily in the country’s economic centres: 
Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk (currently renamed as Dnipro) in such sectors as 
metallurgy, financing and energy (gas trade), and regional structures soon evolved 
in nation-wide business groups (Table 4.5). The biggest financial-industrial 
                                               
14 This classification was provided in Aslund (2007: 264-5) 
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(oligarchical) clans were and are Privat Group (Kolomoysky, Bogolyubov) and 
System Capital Management (Akhmetov, Novinsky) (Chervonenko, 2015) whose 
owners often comprise the top ten of Ukraine’s wealthiest. Competing in 
metallurgy and banking, these two business groups evolved as major economic 
rivals, which was reflected in the political preferences of their owners: the Privat 
Group supported the Orange and then the Maidan revolutions, while Akhmetov, 
Pinchuk and Firtash united around Kuchma’s candidate for the 2004 presidential 
elections Yanukovych and the Party of Regions (Table 4.4 and Table 4.5).  
The Orange coalition that supported the Orange revolution which will be 
discussed in the next section consisted of such parties as Our Ukraine and Bloc of 
Yuliya Tymoshenko and their leaders and was also supported by some smaller 
oligarchs such as Poroshenko, Taruta and Zhevago. However, each of them bid on 
different candidates: Poroshenko had friendly relations with Yushchenko, while 
Zhevago sponsored Tymoshenko’s parties Fatherland and then the Bloc of Yuliya 
Tymoshenko (LIGA. Dosie, 2017).  
Meanwhile, sectorial competition appears a more important factor in 
determining opposition among oligarchical groups than their affiliations to 
particular regions. Akhmetov and Taruta were competing in the Donetsk region for 
metallurgy; Tymoshenko who made her fortune with Lazarenko on gas trade 
opposed Firtash, engaged with previously mentioned Naftogaz. In contrast, 
Poroshenko who made a fortune in candy-making and represented the interests of 
agribusiness maintained his position under both the orange and blue regimes: he 
worked as a head of the NBU under Yushchenko as well as in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and in the Ministry of Economy and Trade under Yanukovych. 
By the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, Ukrainian oligarchs 
were divided primarily into those who had gained positions in Kuchma’s inner 
circle and those who were ousted from it. In this regard, the case of Lazarenko (pp. 
121-2 of Section 4.1.2.2) became a turning point for Ukraine’s politics. By 
prosecuting people from his inner circle and disregarding the interests of the 
remaining oligarchs, Kuchma strengthened the opposition to his regime, including 
among former allies (Way, 2005b).  
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Table 4.5 A list of selected Ukrainian oligarchs and political actors with their respective business and political affiliations  







Sector  City/ 
region  









Kyiv Anti-hero of the Orange 































In office under Kuchma, 
Orange coalition and 
Yanukovych 









In office under Kuchma; 











1000 energy, gas Dnipro-
petrovsk 
Orange coalition; parties 
Fatherland (1999), Bloc 
























Co-owner of Privat 















Supporter of the Maidan 
coalition 
Pryvat Group 1+1, 2+2 
Petro 
Poroshenko 
Head of the NBU 
(2007-2012), 








Yushchenko, the Orange 
and Maidan coalitions; in 
the office under 
Yanukovych; parties Our 
Ukraine; formed his 
party Solidarity 
Roshen 5th Channel 
Serhiy 
Taruta 
Governor of the 
Donetsk region 
(2014) 
126 metallurgy Donetsk Supporter of 
Yushchenko, the Orange 











Donetsk Main sponsor of the 







Source(s): Chervonenko (2015), Forbes, LIGA.Dosie (2017), Puglisi (2008) 
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Whereas Lazarenko (together with his deputy Tymoshenko) and, later on, 
Yushchenko were removed from Kuchma’s inner circle due to their growing 
popularity (LIGA. Dosie, 2017), they were the ones who formed the core of the 
opposition to Kuchma later on. Therefore, Ukraine’s decline in freedom of 
opposition, independence of media and struggle against corruption during the 
discussed period (Figure 4.3, Figure 4.5, Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8) indicated 
Kuchma’s decision on undermining specific oligarchs and business groups, many 
of whom represented the opposition and had their own media.  
The political counterstand had already revealed itself in November 2000 
with the outburst of the tapegate scandal (also known as Kuchmagate scandal), 
which erupted around audio records that provocatively proved the engagement of 
Kuchma in the murder of the journalist Gongadze. Their release was followed by 
several attempts at presidential impeachment in the parliament and saw the peak 
of popular distrust of Kuchma at 60% (Grokholskaya, 2010).  
Throughout December 2000-March 2001 the opposition supported mass 
protests (so-called Ukraine with no Kuchma, or Kuchma Het organised mainly 
by Tymoshenko and her party members such as Turchynov and Lutsenko) and 
demanded Kuchma’s resignation. He remained in power, but during the 
parliamentary elections of 2002 the opposition party Our Ukraine headed by the 
former Prime Minister Yushchenko won most of the votes (23.57%) closely 
followed by the communists (19.98%), socialists (11.77%) and the Bloc of Yuliya 
Tymoshenko (7.26%) (Table 4.4). Therefore, the results of the upcoming 2004 
presidential elections were crucial for gaining a decisive political victory for any 
of the parties.  
In the meantime, the 2002 parliamentary elections also revealed that 
Ukraine’s system of oligarchic capitalism had been institutionalised through the 
parliamentary-presidential power struggle. Those financial centres that did not get 
Kuchma’s roof as protection had to develop a different mechanism for the 
protection of their interests through the parliament. This partially explained why 
parties that formed the basis of the Orange coalition had been created before the 
revolution, while parties in support of Kuchma were created only on the eve of 
the elections (Table 4.4 and partially Table 4.5).  
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Both trends were reflected in the preparations for the 2004 presidential 
elections as well. Having removed Yushchenko and his cabinet, Kuchma began 
to promote Yanukovych as a successor, making him prime minister. The Party of 
regions was quickly re-formatted into a big political force that created its faction, 
Regions of Ukraine, in the parliament (LIGA, 2010). By the time the Orange 
revolution broke out, both parties had already decided on their candidates and 
had even set up a party base for the support of these candidates. 
The afore-listed political developments demonstrate that even though 
Ukraine had followed a path of non-democratisation, its rigid institutional 
environment did not prevent the opposition from uniting around one leader for 
the time of the elections and institutionalising through political parties (e.g. for 
agent-driven factors of democratisation to remain in force). Moreover, the 
political situation at the time resembled a crisis that could produce an impetus for 
institutional change. The next section explores how this promise has evolved in 
Ukraine and why it has not resulted in actual democratisation. 
 
4.2.2. The origins and various facets of the Orange revolution  
The above-described explanation of the causes of the Orange revolution (the first 
of the two Ukrainian democratic revolutions) may appear as an attempt to belittle 
the revolution, because democratic revolutions represent popular uprisings 
against the corrupted regimes and are viewed as a voice of the people (McFaul, 
2002, 2010; Way, 2005a). However, without political support of the organised 
opposition, both Ukraine’s democratic revolutions were more likely to fail. 
Similarly, both Ukrainian democratic revolutions succeeded primarily in 
overthrowing the regime rather than actual democratisation, which in terms of 
outcomes negates their title as revolutions in traditional sense. This section 
concentrates on the political and popular aspects of Ukraine’s first democratic 
revolution in order to explain why its impact on democratisation was limited. 
According to the explanations developed in the flow of the 2000s’ 
democratic revolutions (Beissinger, 2011; McFaul, 2005), in the beginning of the 
2000s political balance in Ukraine favoured a ‘democratic breakthrough’ (Kuzio, 
2008). Kuchma’s alliances became unstable, forcing him to shift from his 
traditional financial base in Dnipropetrovsk towards the Donetsk candidate 
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Yanukovych. The Tapegate scandal and public protests undermined the 
popularity of the regime, and, after a period of stability and economic growth 
(another thesis in support of transitology and modernisation), Ukrainians felt 
ready for a qualitative change. Meanwhile, the opposition united around one 
candidate with reformist background, Yushchenko, who was viewed as a victim 
of Kuchma’s authoritarianism and appeared a balanced and moderate political 
candidate who could cater to the diverse opposition forces. 
As such the nature of competition within Ukraine’s competitive 
authoritarianism provided the opposition with the necessary tools to challenge 
power. For example, although Ukrainian authorities faced no real threat from 
civil society, their former allies constantly challenged each other for privileged 
positions (Way, 2005c), as was revealed by the case of Lazarenko (pp. 121-2, 129 
of this Chapter) as well as the Tapegate scandal initially launched by socialist 
leader Moroz.  
In addition, former allies were often reluctant or even unable to defend the 
regime they had earlier supported as the regime weakened. Such behaviour 
represented one of the remnants of communist political culture and has remained 
intact to this day. Most Ukrainian politicians (including oligarchs) have no clear 
preferences (the so-called swamp) and often accommodate (‘bandwagon’) changes 
(Pleines, 2016: 126) instead of actually opposing the party of the power (D'Anieri, 
2012: 455). During the 2004 presidential campaign some oligarchs even 
supported both Yanukovych and Yushchenko to stay on the safe side of politics  
(Privat Group and Kuchma’s son-in-law Pinchuk) (Hale, 2005: 152). Therefore, 
portraying some candidates as democrats and others as anti-democrats would be 
too narrow a depiction, because they were supported by forces generally not 
interested in building transparent state institutions.  
Meanwhile, the success of democratic revolutions strongly depended on 
the use of public opinion as a source of legitimisation of regime change. In 
opposition to Kuchma’s virtualisation of democracy, the opposition turned to 
social mobilisation (protests) and media, because Ukraine’s civil society was still 
too weak to drive mass mobilisation, although it became more visible from the 
mid-2000s (McFaul, 2005).  
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Importantly, the situation with media has not changed significantly 
throughout Ukraine’s transition. Whereas Ukrainian media represented a tool of 
oligarchic control in the 2000s (the largest media cohorts were controlled by 
Firtash, Kolomoisky and Pinchuk), in 2016 75% of Ukraine’s media still 
belonged to oligarchs (Ukraïnska Pravda, 2016). Therefore, communication of 
the position of a political candidate depended on and still depends on his or her 
relation to a specific oligarchical camp. During the first two rounds of the 2004 
presidential elections, only the 5th channel (owned by Poroshenko who joined the 
Orange camp) supported Yushchenko’s candidacy (OSCE, 2005: 19-23). Under 
the circumstances, the Orange camp began to work more actively on the ground: 
orange was chosen as a symbolic colour for the opposition candidate Yushchenko 
(and it endowed the revolution with a name), while oligarchs supporting the 
opposition invested around 150 mln USD in the Orange electoral campaign 
(Way, 2005c). Already during the final vote on November 21, 2004 thousands of 
supporters of the Orange candidate, including youth movement Pora, gathered in 
the independence square awaiting the results.  
The mismatch between the first results of the elections (Yanukovych 
leading) and exit polls on the election day (predicated Yushchenko’s victory) 
coupled with the evidence of electoral fraud launched the protests at once. 
Having begun with 500 participants on the morning of November 22, the protests 
quickly grew to 80 thousand in the evening and varied between 200 thousand and 
a million when joined by people from the regions. The rally represented a mix 
between a rock-concert and street protests, pointing to the festive, collaborative 
and peaceful character of the event (Beissinger, 2011).  
For two months the Orange revolution had been the unique Event leading 
to a massive change in public attitudes (Katchanovski, 2008). Ukraine’s 
democratic institutions, although remaining part of a hybrid regime made 
ordinary citizens perceive elections as their sacred and inseparable right (Levitsky 
& Way, 2002) and electoral fraud as an open robbery by Kuchma’s regime 
(Kalandadze & Orenstein, 2009). The protests also became a reflection of the 
scale of popular discontent with corruption and state capture. As such, the 
Orange revolution became the first grand-scale event in independent Ukraine 
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which, from the viewpoint of the protesters, revealed that ordinary people could 
cause a political change in the country.  
On 3 December 2004 the Constitutional Court had adopted the decision to 
re-run the elections on 26 December 2004, and the protesters had not left the 
streets until their candidate won. Along with the official inauguration, 
Yushchenko also held public inauguration at the main protesting area — Maidan 
Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) — on 23 January 2005. 
Yet similar to other urban revolutions that sparked in a relatively short 
period of time, the Orange revolution represented ‘the semblance but not the 
substance of democratic change’ (Beissinger, 2013: 590). The Orange revolution 
did not lead to a change in public values, because the participants differed in their 
political orientations and in background: 40% of them simply stood for ‘values of 
a just, democratic society’ and their understanding of reforms was rather 
contradictory (582). The distinct groups of protesters were attracted by different 
leaders of the Orange movement and were united primarily owing to their disdain 
for Kuchma’s political regime.  
Similarly, the Orange revolution did not consolidate Ukrainian society 
around liberal values. Sociological differences portrayed the revolutionaries as 
generally happier and wealthier ‘want-mores’ in contrast to fewer ‘have-nots’ that 
supported the old regime (Beissinger, 2013: 586). At least half of the protesters 
(Ukrainian-speakers from Western Ukraine) supported the civic discourse of 
return to Europe (Kuzio, 2008) and were contrasted to anti-revolutionary 
Russian-speakers from Eastern Ukraine — a division which was set in region-
identity politics and continues to be visible in present-day Ukraine (identity 
divisions and regionalism will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.3 of this 
chapter).  
Therefore, although public aspirations towards democratic change 
increased significantly during the Orange revolution and became the driving force 
behind the protests, the gap between political and popular expectations promised 
to grow into the main barrier in Ukraine’s democratisation afterwards. For 
policy-makers, the Orange revolution represented an attempt to create a balance 
among various oligarchical clans bypassing the president to secure oligarchical 
power. From the public viewpoint, the revolution represented Ukraine’s striving 
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for an open democratic society without oligarchic control, and this gap naturally 
threatened the outcomes of the revolution. 
 
4.2.3. The controversial outcomes of the Orange revolution 
During the Orange revolution, the competition within the established system of 
oligarchic capitalism only strengthened. Kuchma’s retreat from Dnipropetrovsk 
clan in favour of Donetsk candidate led to a split between the two industrial-
financial groups (D'Anieri, 2012: 455); while regional elites in the South-East 
(Donetsk) of Ukraine supported Yanukovych, those in Central and Western 
Ukraine supported Yushchenko. The same split occurred among Ukrainians in 
the respective regions along ideological, language, and religious lines as well as 
foreign policy preferences (Hale, 2005). Reflected in numerous infographics (as in 
map below) these differences raised a debate about Ukraine’s regional divisions 
and suggested that the Orange revolution could perform as a critical juncture for 
post-communist transition of Ukraine. 
 
 
Map 4.1 Ukraine’s voting pattern during the third round of the presidential 
elections (December 26, 2004) in per cents of the votes gained by winning 
candidates in the respective regions  




Some local elites (in Donbas) even used these differences to threaten a 
potential split of the country by offering to establish an autonomous republic on 
the territories won by Yanukovych. The territories were to cover the regions from 
Odesa to Luhansk resembling Novorossiya (New Russia) of the former Russian 
empire and were to follow the state-building example of the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih 
Soviet Republic (Chapter 3 Section 3.4). However, when the Supreme Court of 
Ukraine officially declared the second round of presidential elections illegitimate, 
separatist rhetoric changed towards a more fluid ‘empowerment of regions and 
self-administration’ (Real’naia gazeta, 2016).  
On 26 December 2004, the third round of elections was held, and 
Yushchenko won (51.99% versus 44.2% of Yanukovych). However, his victory 
did not result in significant changes: Ukraine became freer in media and 
accountability but failed to democratise in other areas (Figure 4.3, Figure 4.5 and 
Figure 4.7). The lack of shared agenda among the protesters explains why their 
support for reform disappeared as quickly as the need in protests after the victory 
(Beissinger, 2011). Even a slight improvement in the restraints on authorities 
(Figure 4.3) which became the main achievement of the Orange revolution due to 
adopted Constitutional reform was the result of a deal between the outgoing 
government and the Orange coalition (Kalandadze & Orenstein, 2009). Amends 
to the Constitution which reduced the authority of the president were adopted by 
the Ukrainian parliament (including the Orange coalition) and were signed by 
Kuchma on 8 December 2004 (RIA News, 2006) prior to the third round of the 
presidential elections when none of the parties was sure in their victory.  
As a result, although the Orange coalition had won, the power of its 
president was limited. Ukraine’s parliament remained hard to control 
(communists had almost 15% of votes and Kuchma’s bloc For a United Ukraine 
— almost 23%) (Kalandadze & Orenstein, 2009), and Yushchnenko’s own 
coalition began to undermine his authority by struggling for power from within. 
One of the indicative examples of this struggle was the reprivatisation programme 
launched in February 2005 by newly appointed Prime Minister Tymoshenko. 
Whereas the programme aimed at fair redistribution of economic power among 
Ukrainian businesses, its only real achievement was the reprivatisation of the 
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metallurgical plant Kryvorizhstal. 15  In addition, Yushchenko opposed 
Tymoshenko’s idea to expel those suspected of corruption from the office, 
because they would ‘feel unjust’ if she remained (Ukraïnska Pravda, 2005), as her 
government was also blamed for corruption (Schularick, 2005).  
Hence, the main problem of post-revolutionary Ukraine was not in the 
resumed authoritarianism but of a political ‘stalemate’ (D'Anieri, 2005). 
Yushchenko’s attempt to restrain Tymoshenko by strengthening the authority of 
Poroshenko (and the Ukraine’s Security Council) only added to the collapse of 
the democratisation efforts in Ukraine (Beissinger, 2006). As the parliament failed 
to create a working coalition, Yushchenko made an agreement with Yanukovych, 
which allowed the establishing Yekhanurov (Our Ukraine) government in 
September 2005. However, this government did not last long and in August 2006 
Yanukovych was appointed the Prime Minister. 
In turn, earlier agreement between Yanukovych and Yushchenko 
undermined Yushchenko’s own popularity: during the parliamentary elections of 
2006, the president’s bloc received only 9.62% of votes in comparison with the 
32.14% of votes received by Yanukovych’s Party of Regions and 22.29% for 
Tymoshenko’s Fatherland (Table 4.4.). Extraordinary parliamentary elections 
held in 2007 provided no solution, as the distribution of power remained similar. 
Tymoshenko’s so-called second government was formed in coalition with Our 
Ukraine. However, this time, the coalition had no time to implement any 
reforms, because the 2008 global financial crisis struck.  
Apart from the fragmentation of the Orange camp which led to the failure 
of democratic consolidation, the problem of Ukraine’s state capture was not 
resolved as well: ‘if before the revolution, politics ruled business, the Orange 
revolution gave the opportunity to big and medium-sized businesses to take 
power directly into their own hands’ (Puglisi, 2008: 63). The power of the 
oligarchy grew (Katchanovski, 2008), and only Yushchenko’s personal efforts 
ensured that the democratic trends prevailed.  
                                               
15 In 2004, Akhmetov and Pinchuk bought the plant for 800 mln USD, while the cost of the 
enterprise was evaluated at 4 bln USD. Under Tymoshenko-promoted reprivatisation, 




Meanwhile, a set of gas conflicts with Russia emerged as another factor in 
Ukraine’s politics. The conflict began in March 2005 with the attempt to replace 
barter transactions (wherein Russian gas was supplied at a cheap price as a cost of 
gas transit to Europe through Ukraine) with monetary equivalent. The parties 
could not reach an agreement on pricing and mediators (such as RosUkrEnergo), 
but also when the prices had been finally established, Ukraine turned out to be 
incapable of paying for supplies (Pirani, 2007). This led to a number of gas wars: 
the first ended in January 2006, the second took place between October 2007 and 
March 2008, while the third began in December 2008 and ended in January 2009 
with the signing of a contract on gas transit and supply by Ukraine’s Prime 
Minister Tymoshenko and Russia’s president Putin. 
Against the background of political instability, unpopular decisions and 
deteriorating economic situation, another paradox appeared — the candidate that 
had been removed from power by the Orange revolution, Yanukovych, won in 
the democratically held elections of 2010 by promising to resolve these issues 
(OSCE, 2010).  
The importance of agency that had been revealed on the eve of and during 
the Orange revolution proved to be determinant in shaping the outcomes of the 
revolution as well. Whereas Yushchenko appeared to be upholding democratic 
principles, the pacted Constitutional reform limited his authority and ability to 
reform the country while political squabbles among the former allies blocked the 
work of weak state institutions. Therefore, not only the balance of power but also 
the qualities of political leaders appear to be important in producing or 
undermining institutional changes.  
 
4.2.4. The background, the flow and the consequences of the Maidan 
revolution 
The election of Yanukovych in 2010 became another reflection on the alternation 
of more democratic or more authoritarian regimes in Ukraine as a combination of 
different cycles within one hybrid regime (Hale, 2005) where electoral fallacy 
does not produce democracy (Schmitter & Karl, 1991) due to an absence of 
institutional changes (Schularick, 2005).  
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After the elections, Yanukovych began to take over the juridical system 
through ‘politically biased replacement’ of courts personnel (Nations in Transit, 
2011). The Constitutional Court allowed to adopt the laws by a simple majority 
vote, producing an easily modified political swamp. The Constitutional reform of 
2004 was also abandoned in September 2010 negating the single achievement of 
the Orange revolution. As a result, control over authorities reversed to the 1994-
2003 level (Figure 4.3), while freedom of media and electoral process worsened 
(Figure 4.5). Together with almost doubled growth of wealth among selected 
Ukrainians, these developments were reflected in the perceived growth of 
corruption (Figure 4.8).  
In 2011, the number of Ukrainian billionaires increased from 8 to 23, and 
their geography expanded (Focus, 2011). Between 2010 and 2013, Yanukovych 
eldest son increased the value of his assets from 7 to 510 mln USD, becoming the 
second richest person in Donetsk after Akhmetov (Anti-Corruption Action 
Centre, 2017). Noteworthy, Yanukovych strengthened the power of his Family for 
the cost of the Donetsk group, which negatively affected his relations with the 
clan — the factor that proved important during the Maidan revolution (Nations in 
Transit, 2013). 
In turn, the administrative reform of 2011 which aimed for the reduction 
of bureaucratic apparatus was used to eliminate political opponents from crucial 
positions in regions and to further strengthen the president’s authority (Nations in 
Transit, 2012). As such imprisonment of Tymoshenko for ‘misuse of power’ in 
signing a gas deal with Russia in 2009 (Guardian, 2013) became a symbol of 
oppressing the opposition.  
The parliament elections of 2012 also demonstrated a general decay in 
electoral freedom (Nations in Transit, 2013). The Party of Regions (headed by 
acting prime-minister Azarov) gained a slight majority (29.37%) followed by 
Fatherland (24%) (Yatsenyuk became the leader of the party), and although new 
political parties appeared in the parliament, none of these forces could produce a 
stable majority: the oppositional UDAR headed by Klytchko (13.96%), 




As a result, Ukraine remained a formal democracy officially aspiring for 
reforms but de facto implementing none. Ukrainian officials actively engaged 
international organisations in drafting key law proposals but adopted the less 
transparent versions of them. Having refused from the anti-corruption law 
developed by the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption 
(GRECO) (Nations in Transit, 2012), Yanukovych became the head of the Anti-
Corruption Committee in 2010 instead (Nations in Transit, 2013).  
As Ukraine’s economy remained relatively stable (Figure 4.4 and Figure 
4.6) Ukraine’s economic restructuring practically stopped. By 2010 Ukraine had 
primarily accomplished its reforms in large- and small-scale privatisation, price 
deregulation and liberalisation of trade and forex, while the most important 
competition policy continued to stall with the pulled down liberalisation of 
banking and non-baking sectors (Table 4.2 and Table 4.3). 
Given the afore-mentioned, the situation in Ukraine resembled the one on 
the eve of the Orange revolution: illiberal practices were strengthening against the 
background of stable economy, while civil society remained generally free 
(Nations in Transit, 2012; Figure 4.5). Even the Tax Maidan arranged against the 
adoption of new Tax Codex in 2010 resembled a protesting try-out similar to 
Ukraine without Kuchma that preceded the Orange revolution.  
However, a bigger occasion for questioning the legitimacy of political 
leadership appeared when Yanukovych refused to sign the Association 
Agreement (AA) with the European Union on 21 November 2013 (more 
explanations on why and how this happened will be provided in Chapter 5). 
Supporters of the Association began their demonstrations the same day 
(Euromaidan); however, these turned in a full-scale anti-governmental uprising 
after an attempt of dispersal on 30 November. On 01 December, the opposition 
(mainly Fatherland, UDAR and Freedom) arranged a March of a million which 
spilled into the storming of the president’s administration (ICTV, 2013). The 
protests continued with violent clashes peaking on January 18-25 and on 
February 18-22. As such, the Ukrainian Revolution could be divided into two 
main stages: Euromaidan protests of 21 November, 2013 – 17 February, 2014 and 
the Revolution of Dignity that peaked on 18-22 February, 2014. However, both 
represented one chain of events, herein referred to as the Maidan revolution. 
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The Maidan revolution appeared as a new turn in the cycle of Ukraine’s 
competitive oligarchy; yet it significantly differed from the Orange revolution in 
terms of protesting strategies and context. While the Orange revolution had been 
held in response to electoral fraud, the Maidan protesters questioned the 
legitimacy of the regime itself. Whereas the Supreme Court rebooted the second 
tour of elections in 2004, there was no institutional mechanism to satisfy rather 
vague and ‘blunt’ initial demands of the protesters (Popova, 2014: 65-6), such as 
transforming Ukraine into a ‘normal European’ state (Onuch & Sasse, 2016: 558). 
The position of government also differed from that of the 2004 cabinet. 
Whereas Kuchma was already leaving the office, Yanukovych captured the state 
administration, eliminated the opposition and could remain a president for the 
second term. Therefore, his regime was less cooperative than the one in 2004 and 
his officials applied coercive methods against the protesters. Although these 
methods were moderately violent, the very fact of their use along with the 
politicisation of the juridical system triggered a wave of popular resistance 
(Dubin, 2016). The Maidan-meetings in November evolved into Maidan-camping 
in December and Maidan-Sich (analogy to the Zaporijzhian Sich) in January-
February, becoming an open revolt against the authorities (KIIS & DIF, 2014).  
The Maidan supporters felt deprived of the political rights tightening 
demands and abandoning the strategy of peaceful protests — two key features 
that differed Maidan from the Orange revolution. By the time Yanukovych 
dismissed the Azarov government on 28 January, 2014, the Maidan-Sich had 
already demanded resignation of Yanukovych and were not ready to abandon 
occupied administration offices until their demands were met (KIIS & DIF, 
2014). The protests grew violent, and it became increasingly difficult to determine 
the guilty party, because each of them presented the clashes to their benefit. 
However, the Maidan peaceful protesters (Onuch, 2014) failed to separate 
themselves from more radical and nationalist groupings (Ishchenko, 2016), 
because those non-radical self-defence units (sotni) that began to form at Maidan 
were supported and partially organised by nationalist organisations (the Congress 
of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Right Sector). Moreover, as the clashes 
strengthened, support for more radical measures also grew among average 
protesters (Likhachev, 2015).  
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In the end, radical forces launched a ‘peaceful offensive’ against the 
government forces on February 18 (Ukraïnska Pravda, 2014) and refused to 
accept the agreement signed on 21 February 2014 by the leaders of the opposition 
(Klytschko from UDAR, Yatsenyuk from Fatherland, Tyahnybok from Svoboda) 
and Yanukovych after 77 people had been killed on previous days. The event 
poured into the revolution of Dignity with Self-defence and Right Sector 
occupying state administration and the Supreme Council demanding immediate 
resignation of Yanukovych (Lenta, 2014). Yanukovych fled Kyiv on 22 February 
and gained the asylum in Russia on 26 February 2014, and although radical 
forces were in the minority and did not manage to take over in politics 
(Likhachev, 2015), they drove the protests and closely cooperated with the 
members of the opposition (Katchanovski, 2015a) who ultimately took office.  
Importantly, neither protesters nor experts viewed representatives of the 
Maidan opposition as a source of change in Ukraine (Kuzio, 2013). Those were 
viewed as part of Soviet institutional environment (interview11), or the same old 
system, which the protesters stood against. However, in the absence of tools to 
channel their demands, Maidan participants had to unite with the opposition 
(Chapman, 2014; Kulyk, 2014).  
Moreover, violence exhibited during the protests became a turning point 
for the crisis in post-Maidan Ukraine because the Maidan protests justified both 
the rebellion against the authoritarian regime and militarisation of this struggle, 
reflected in clashes with police, occupation of administrative buildings and the 
use of weapons. This produced a distorted impression that rebelling against the 
unpopular or illegitimate regime was acceptable by any means, and this approach 
was adopted by the opponents of the revolution as well.  
The distortion was further deepened in the context of Ukraine’s 
regionalism, strengthened by undermined legitimacy of state institutions. The 
president fled, the parliament was disoriented. Former members of the Party of 
Regions quickly changed their political affiliations, and the former opposition 
candidate Turchinov was appointed an interim executive. However, popular 
support to the opposition leaders was low. 
The split in Ukrainian society that had formed during the Orange 
revolution between supporters and opponents of the revolution who had opposing 
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political views deepened during the Maidan revolution. The demographic profile 
of Maidan supporters was almost the same as that of the participants of the 
Orange revolution (KIIS & DIF, 2014). Although it represented a broader strata 
of population, only 17% of Ukrainians participated in the protests or supported 
them with donations (Gatskova & Gatskov, 2016: 686), while 50% did not 
support the initiative (Interfax, 2013). Half of protesters were from Western 
Ukraine, one in four from Central Ukraine, and one in five from Southern or 
Eastern Ukraine (KIIS & DIF, 2014). 
Whereas the anti-Maidan rallies had already been launched by 
Yanukovych authorities during Euromaidan, the image of the radical right 
dominating in the Maidan revolution strengthened the public support for the anti-
Maidan movement in South-East of the country (KIIS, 2014). While the support 
for Ukrainian nationalism was traditionally weak in Ukraine (according to the 
Razumkov Centre (2005), in 2005 40% of Ukrainians believed this ideology split 
Ukrainian society) and especially in Russian-speaking regions (see Section 4.3 of 
this chapter), the attempt of the parliament to ban the use of Russian language as 
the official language on a regional level just the next day after the victory of the 
Maidan revolution provoked a radical response. 
The subsequent developments turned into a chain reaction that endowed 
the whole event with self-reinforcing logic. Donetsk deputies demanded to restore 
the law on regional languages and expanded demands to the decentralisation and 
disarmament of illegal military groups (Regnum, 2014). Anti-maidan protests 
grew into pro-Russian protests, and, similar to the Maidan protests which did not 
initially aim at violence, spilled into military resistance (KIIS, 2014). 
Pro-Russian rallies in Crimea led to the toppling of local authorities and 
Russia’s military takeover. New Crimean authorities declared the independence 
of the republic and Russia accepted it as part of the Russian Federation on March 
18. In other regions of South-eastern Ukraine, anti-Maidan and anti-
governmental rallies were organised by local pro-Russian activists and local elites. 
However, in contrast to the Madan revolution when political leaders combined 
their forces with radicals (Katchanovski, 2015a), local elites abandoned the pro-
Russian movement as soon as Kyiv officials labelled it separatist. This made the 
movement more chaotic and difficult to freeze (Guzhva & Korotkov, 2015). The 
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rebels established local militia (self-defence) demanding re-unification with 
Russia, and when independent People’s Republics were declared in Donetsk and 
Kharkiv, acting president Turchinov announced the launch of an anti-terrorist 
operation (ATO) (April 7, 2014), which spilled the conflict into a full-scale war.  
Therefore, against the inherent logic of Ukraine’s unfinished state-, nation-
building and modernisation, Ukrainian democratic revolutions represented only 
‘symptoms of the problems of hybrid and authoritarian regimes, rather than 
solutions to their ills’ (Kalandadze & Orenstein, 2009: 1404). Such revolutions 
indicated certain stages in an overall evolution of society (Katchanovski, 2008) 
but did not imply any changes or disruptions in the established cycle of 
competitive authoritarianism (Hale, 2005). They represented a new type of 
‘revolutionary coup d’état’ when political elites from the same political system 
coordinated the actions of a limited number of civil activists in order to topple an 
existing political regime (Lane, 2008). The next section will elaborate upon why 
such explanation is crucial in the context of Ukraine’s failed attempts at reform. 
 
4.2.5. Institutional changes in post-Maidan Ukraine 
Although the Maidan revolution had initially appeared as a turning point in 
breaking Ukraine’s vicious cycle of semi-authoritarianism, the initial 
improvements in governance efficiency, voice and accountability that happened 
in the aftermath of the revolution were insignificant. Meanwhile, freedom of 
media and civil society, on the opposite, reduced (Figure 4.7 and Figure below), 
while Ukraine’s key problems such as state capture and corruption remained 





Figure 4.9 Ukraine’s democracy index by categories and as an overall, 
2006-2017 
Source(s): The Economist Intelligence Unit, reports for various years 
Note(s): the scales vary from 0 (non-democratic) to 10 (fully democratic). 
 
In this context, the gap between political reforms and popular expectations 
may be crucial in explaining Ukraine’s under-achieving.  
 
4.2.5.1. Political reforms 
The main reason behind the lack of the progress in reforming post-Maidan 
Ukraine lies in the fact that the representatives of the oligarchic system took 
control over politics again (Kuzio, 2016). Whereas some Maidan and ATO 
participants joined the offices (Nyshchuk became the Minister of Culture in 2016; 
Parasyuk, Havryliuk, Nayyem, Leshchenko and Yarosh were elected to the 
parliament in 2014), many were simply used as popular media brands in the 
electoral campaign, while some became as corrupt as their more experienced 
colleagues (a number of debates on this issue launched with the release of e-
declarations by Ukrainian officials (Korrespondent, 2017)). Finally, the number 
of those who could ‘turn the tide’ remained low and some reform-oriented 
politicians would simply leave their offices (interviews3,5,11).  
In this context, the push for reforms has remained beyond the interest of 
the majority of Ukrainian policy-makers and ‘the institutions of shadow and 
corruption relations’ remain the strongest in Ukraine (interview3). An exemplar 
























for the reform of the General Prosecutor’s Office by the Office itself 
(interview13), which indicates that the reform on prosecution, the court system 
and public administration has remained adopted mainly on paper whereas 
impediments from the bureaucratic system remain intact (interview1). Similarly, 
the improvements in judiciary (appointment of judges on a competitive base and 
abolition of inviolability of judges when taken red-handed (Supreme Council of 
Ukraine, 2016) require not only the establishment of new state bodies but also a 
change of procedures and attitudes.  
The majority of Ukrainian policy-makers remain to be associated with the 
system of oligarchic capitalism that Maidan stood against and, thus, partial 
reform equilibrium (Hellman, 1998). The lack of reformist elites and persistence 
of Soviet-like practices make such solutions as replacing all the existing staff on a 
competitive basis (interview1) or cutting down over-expanded administration 
(Aslund, 2016: 8-10) unlikely.  
Ukrainian ‘pro-modernist forces have not yet institutionalised in political 
parties and have not created institutions-fuses which would make the playback 
impossible’ (interview6). Therefore, stable political parties, unions, social 
communities, channels and businesses which would remain afloat irrespective of 
political changes in the country and which would be able to leave their legacies in 
society should be promoted (Kosmehl & Umland, 2016; interview6). However, 
this requires favourable political environment which Ukraine currently lacks. 
Ukraine’s weak political competition derives not only from poor 
institutionalisation (Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.9) but also from political culture. 
Since Ukraine lacks traditions of multipartism, its political parties have no clear 
doctrines or ideologies (interview4). As a result, the culture of an all-taking 
winner and bandwagonning persists even post-Maidan. Poroshenko who was 
elected a president on May 25, 2014 consolidated his power by appointing his 
candidates for the posts of prime-minister (Groisman) and General Prosecutor 
(Lutsenko). The president also restored control over regional and military elites.  
Those formations that grew on the basis of Maidan self-defence or nationalist 
organisations were legalised as special police units in the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. While oligarchs Firtash and Akhmetov had already swung to the former 
opposition after the victory of the Maidan revolution (Aslund, 2016: 3), the 
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opposition between Poroshenko and Kolomoisky ended with the nationalisation 
of PryvatBank — a trademark of Kolomoysky’s Pryvat Group (Table 4.5) — in 
December 2016.  
Meanwhile, Ukraine benefits neither from the dominance of a strong 
president nor from the dominance of strong regional patrimonial elites. 
Accordingly, Ukraine’s decentralisation as a solution to this ill should correspond 
with a more transparent governance at all levels (Kudelia, 2014), while mixed 
parliamentary-presidential constitution will fit the needs of Ukrainian regionalism 
and provide citizens with better opportunities for the removal of poor-performing 
authorities (Hale, 2016).  
Moreover, as Ukraine’s political record demonstrates, president-driven 
reforms under both Kuchma and Yanukovych were relatively successful in the 
first term of their presidency, reversing towards authoritarianism after the next 
elections. Therefore, relatively frequent change of political leadership in Ukraine 
may evolve into a more balanced politics and result in a more efficient system of 
governance in the long term.  
In order to make this premise work, proportional party representation 
should be promoted (Kudelia, 2014; Table 4.4). This may urge political parties to 
replace regional interests with all-Ukrainian political ideology. Furthermore, the 
work of political parties should become more transparent by making the 
distribution of internal finances, the sources of donations as well as the names of 
donors public (Kudelia, 2014). Limiting the amount that one donor may invest in 
political organisations should also prevent oligarch-led monopolisation of parties 
(Antonidis et al., 2017). Finally, in the ideal outcome, the immunity of public 
officials should be abolished as well.  
Yet considering the pace of reforms in Ukraine so far, an in-depth 
renovation of Ukraine’s governance system requires time and, most important, 
political will. Meanwhile, not only do Ukrainian elites resist the change because 
of their corrupt and oligarchical background, but also those very few reforms that 
had been undertaken in Ukraine were pushed by civil society and pressures from 





4.2.5.2. Civil society 
Although the Maidan revolution did not transform Ukrainian politicians 
(interviews6, 14), it did deliver a ‘Ukrainian nation’ which is currently searching 
for political leaders (interview6). In this process, Ukrainian civil society represents 
a paradoxical case, because, although viewed as the main potential source of 
change, it nonetheless does not engage Ukraine’s broader public.  
While the victories of Orange and Maidan revolutions demonstrate the 
Ukrainians’ readiness for radical change, this readiness yields to disillusionment 
about the lack of progress (Gatskova & Gatskov, 2016). Similarly, whereas 
Ukrainian civil society succeeded in channelling popular discontent when protests 
began (most civic activists and youth attended the event) (Gatskova & Gatskov, 
2016) civic organisations did not bring ‘people into the streets in the first place’ 
(Way, 2014: 36). Although Maidan served as the ‘equator’ which prevented the 
country from crossing authoritarian strategic boundaries (interview10), the 
revolution broke out primarily because Ukrainians exhausted their patience. In 
contrast, a general inertia and pessimism resumed in Ukrainian society when the 
revolution did not meet public expectations even if some of the initiatives 
launched were successful (interview1).  
Passivity of social engagement featured by Soviet society has remained 
intact in modern Ukraine. The majority of people still assume that ‘the state is 
responsible for all’ instead of taking responsibility on their own (interviews12, 14) 
because they lack experience in non-forced and voluntary cooperation (Section 
3.6.3). Meanwhile, distrust in state institutions remains strong: trust in the 
president, government, or the parliament among Ukrainian respondents in 2016 
varied between 5.3% and 13% (Zlenko, 2016), and, in the light of perceived 
indifference of elites towards public needs, Ukrainians care more about their 
personal wellbeing than principles of democracy (International Republican 
Institute, 2017). In a similar vein, the number of people who consider that the 
non-democratic regime is more preferable for Ukraine under certain conditions 
has increased from 13% in 2014 to 21% in 2015 (IFES, 2015).  
A belief in a strong and better leader with no self-interest and ‘the greater 
good in mind’ (Hale, 2016: 139) continues to be voiced: the number of 
Ukrainians who supported the idea that, ‘a couple of strong leaders can do more 
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for the country than all laws and discussions’, has increased from 40.5% in 1994 
to 63.2% in 2014 (Gatskova & Gatskov, 2016: 686). Even one of the slogans used 
by Ukrainian nationalists claims, ‘Bandera will come and restore the order’, 
referring to an icon who could establish such an order.  
Popular support for strong leadership in opposition to liberal disorder may 
threaten Ukraine’s democratisation. It does not mean that a strong and 
democratic leader cannot per se appear; rather, the chances for this are low (Hale, 
2016). Meanwhile, Ukraine’s on-going war, radicalisation and militarisation pose 
additional threats to the country’s democratisation. When some activists are 
getting tired of seeing no progress, civil disobedience has the potential to quickly 
turn violent (Jarábik, 2016), as was revealed during the blockade of Crimea in 
2015 and of the self-proclaimed territories of Donbas in 2016.  
Yet, among the positive changes that took place after Maidan are those 
that civil activists have partially undertaken the functions of the state in equipping 
and supplying the Ukrainian army and the trust to volunteers is growing (Zlenko, 
2016). Civil organisation produce drafts and initiatives of laws (interview1) and 
some of them (particularly, the Reanimation Package of Reforms, or RPR) are 
closely cooperating with officials on reform process (interviews1, 6, 7). 
However, most Ukrainian NGOs continue to depend on external 
assistance and financing (by the European Commission, USAID, etc.) lacking 
respective support from the Ukrainian government and public (Lane, 2008), The 
latter is primarily a consequence of the fact that ordinary Ukrainians cannot 
afford to support civil organisations due to personal economic hardship. 
Meanwhile, Western patronage may result in so-called NGO-cracy, where well-
established networks use their access ‘to domestic policy-makers and Western 
donors’ but are generally detached from the broader public (Lutsevych, 2013: 1). 
Lack of knowledge and experience in organising social communities, and the 
persistence of informal networks as part of the dominant political culture 
reproduce the problem (Gatskova & Gatskov, 2016).  
Ideational change that had already begun to occur in Ukraine continues to 
be framed by a minority of reformers. As such, Ukraine’s quick and 
comprehensive transformation in the short term appears to be unrealistic and 
should be replaced with gradual transformations which aim for generational 
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change (Jarábik, 2016). In this regard, young people are often viewed as the 
future solution, because they are more strongly engaged in social mobilisation 
and their active core performed as an organised force during the protests (Bunce 
& Wolchik, 2007). However, it is important not to overestimate the impact of 
youth: over 60% of Ukrainian youngsters are ‘disinterested’ in politics and only 
3% have participated in a civil society or a demonstration (Sasse, 2018).  
This points to the limited character of Ukraine’s democratic revolutions as 
mass events and also shows that all parts of Ukraine’s civil society suffer from the 
same problems. Whereas they aspire for change, they lack organisational 
experience and do not have extensive support from the general public, meaning 
that both civil society and the general public need time to mature. 
 
4.2.5.3. Economic reforms 
Considering the discussion in Sections 4.2.5.1 and 4.2.5.2, a more equal 
distribution of income and economic growth are crucial for Ukraine’s sustainable 
democratisation and development, because equality prevents the rise of 
oligarchies and provides the middle class with capacities to support civil society 
(Madland, 2011). The boost of want-mores in the revolutions also proves this 
point (p. 136 of this Chapter). Meanwhile, Ukraine’s current economic situation 
reflects the opposite.  
Whereas a temporising approach of partial reform allowed Ukraine to 
maintain macroeconomic stability despite the persistence of structural problems 
and the dominance of oligarchy (Hellman, 1998), the system collapsed when in 
only three days (23-25 February 2014) Ukrainian currency was devalued due to 
the regime change (World Bank Open Data, 2016). The subsequent military crisis 
cost Ukraine 4% of its GDP for Crimea and 10% for Donbas (Aslund, 2016: 5), 
and Ukraine found itself in a situation similar to the 1990s (interview12). By the 
end of 2015, inflation had peaked at 43.3%, moderate poverty had expanded to 
22.2% (World Bank, 2016). The government had to deal with huge expenditures 
on pensions (18% of GDP) and energy subsidies (10% of GDP) (Aslund, 2016: 2), 
which made respective reforms a key target in Ukraine’s economic restructuring.  
While the pension reform of 2017 has indirectly increased the retirement 
age (Zanuda, 2017), the medical reform of 2017 resulted largely in the cut-back of 
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state-paid services available to the general public to the basic ones, revised on the 
annual basis (Lebed, 2017). Similarly, energy reform led to a rise in prices for 
corporate and individual consumers in order to achieve cost-recovery balance in 
Ukraine’s energy sector (IMF, 2014). Subsidies were eliminated as the main 
source of corruption, which reduced the Naftogaz deficit to 2% in 2015 and cut 
public expenditures by almost 10% (Aslund, 2016). However, individual subsidies 
for population were not given to households and were accumulated by the 
Naftogaz (Jarábik, 2016), creating a space for corruption. 
The banking reform which was launched in 2014 and is by far considered 
a successful case in Ukraine has also delivered a number of problems. Whereas 83 
out of 180 banks in Ukraine were shut down and state-owned Ukeximbank was 
restructured, the state incurs the expenses through the Deposit Guarantee Fund. 
Meanwhile, only 2 top-managers and owners out of 3,214 requests for the 
prosecution of bankruptcy, were convicted (Fund Deposit Guarantee, 2016: 5). 
This points to the persistence of informal connections in Ukraine’s judiciary and 
business, including in the sphere of recovering financial losses. 
Meanwhile, keeping the current account in balance and controlling budget 
deficit remain the main priorities in Ukraine’s stabilisation programme. 
Stabilisation has already been achieved with the growth of Ukraine’s GDP at 1% 
for the period 2015-2016 (World Bank, 2016), but economic growth remains 
weak due to the depth of experienced fall (Figure 4.6). Furthermore, most of the 
reforms implemented by the government are not only half-hearted because of the 
lack of interest from Ukrainian officials (in line with Hellman’s (1998) argument), 
but also the proposed plan of economic stabilisation does not provide a clear 
strategy for future growth.  
Balancing accounts has become an end in itself, because meeting this IMF 
requirement may guarantee the obtainment of the next credit, which is important 
for repaying the debts and honouring the terms of payments which are already 
agreed. Ukraine’s external debt in 2015 already constituted 131.5% of its GDP, 
yet the country should reduce the size of the debt to 107.5% by 2019 (World 
Bank, 2017). This situation portrays Ukraine’s prospects as a vicious cycle of 
balancing accounts, borrowing finances, paying for credits and balancing 
accounts for the next borrowing, because political and military crisis does not 
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attract alternative sources of growth — investment — essentially this is the key 
problem perpetuating Ukraine’s delayed economic recovery (Figure 5.1).  
Foreign investment is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. However, the 
on-going war makes influx of foreign capital less likely. In addition, Ukraine has 
lost a number of domestic investors. Small and medium business remains 
underdeveloped due to the lack of finances in the internal market and political 
instability. Also, the loss of population due to the war (during 2013-2017 mainland 
Ukraine, excluding Crimea and ATO territories of Donbas, lost approximately 3 
mln people (Ministry of Finances of Ukraine, 2017) not least because of the aging 
population) and the mass emigration of talented Ukrainian students and youth 
(addressed in more detail in Chapter 5) remain a concern.  
Meanwhile, Ukraine’s military expenditure grew from 2.3% to 3.9% of its 
GDP between 2013 and 2015 (World Bank Open Data, 2016), while corruption 
in the army reached its peak with 30% of human losses being suffered not in 
combat but due to poor management (Jarábik, 2016). Ukrainian oligarchs 
continue to benefit from Ukraine’s current situation of neither peace-nor war by 
profiting on ‘ “sewing” tenders for military purposes, smuggling, and tax evasion 
in trade on uncontrolled territories’ (interview11). As a result, the war has a 
strong impact on daily life only for those people who are directly involved in the 
conflict or live in the war-torn territories, whereas the rest of Ukraine faces the ill 
effects of state capture. Property rights remain under the control of Ukrainian 
politicians (Hartwell, 2017) and due to the temporary economic stabilisation, 
Ukrainian officials are likely to refuse painful reforms and condition-driven IFOs 
debts in favour of private borrowing from the external bond market (Aslund, 
2016: 13) — stepping into another round of partial reform equilibrium. As a 
result, the momentum for reforms in the aftermath of the Maidan revolution has 
been lost: painful reforms do take place (pension, medical, energy) but are half-
hearted in their outcomes (governance, freedom of media and civil society).  
 
4.3. Ukraine’s identity and nation-building 
This section provides an in-depth analysis of the problems faced by Ukraine in its 
nation-building. The nature of the country’s regionalism and the clashing 
character of its diverse identities are addressed. However, this section also goes 
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beyond examining the polarisation of different viewpoints on Ukraine’s nation-
building, by focusing on the factors that may advance the country’s democratic 
consolidation. The latter should rely on liberal political culture.  
 
4.3.1. Portraying Ukraine’s regional and identity diversity  
The on-going war in Eastern Ukraine has reflected on Ukraine’s regionalism and 
profound influence of historical legacies in some of the rifts in Ukraine’s modern 
society. As discussed in Chapter 3, Ukraine’s historical attempts to achieve 
independence failed, and the country remained largely a part of those states that 
did not share European patterns of development (interview9). As a result, 
Ukraine was viewed as a ‘state with no nation’ (Korostelina, 2013b), or a ‘new’ 
state (Bunce, 2005), whose crucial problems lied in differing collective memories 
and historical past (Prizel, 2002: 377).  
Whereas Ukraine is perceived as an Orthodox country, its Orthodox 
Church is divided into three branches. According to the 2012 survey (U.S. 
Department of State, 2012), 26% of Ukrainian believers associated themselves 
with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, or the UOC-
MP (traced either to shared Rus’ legacies), 2% with the parish of the Ukrainian 
Autocephalous Orthodox Church (established in the 1920s under the aegis of the 
Ukrainian People’s Republic) and 31% with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of 
the Kyiv Patriarchate, or the UOC-KP (which split from the Moscow 
Patriarchate in 1992). Also, a significant number of people in Ukraine profess 
Greek Catholicism (14.1%) (Razumkov Centre, 2016b) which may be traced back 
to the establishment of the Unaite (Greek-Catholic) Church under the aegis of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.  
Ukraine’s religious diversity is a product of the complex history of nation-
building, during which foreign powers used the Church in order to promote their 
interpretation of Ukrainian identity (Chapter 3), and some of those narratives 
persist today. Whereas the Orthodox community views Greek Catholics as the 
apostates of faith who fell under the Polish dominance, Greek Catholics perceive 
the Orthodox church ‘as a tool of Russification and Russian hegemony’ (Prizel, 
2002: 377). The latter has strengthened in light of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine 
conflict, and in October 2018 the UOC-KP declared itself an independent 
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Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Although active support of Ukrainian officials in 
this move points to the alliance between the church and the state in building an 
independent Ukraine, it has also split the Ukrainian religious community, 
because the official narrative outcasts the UOC-MP as anti-Ukrainian (‘[there is] 
nothing to do here for your [Russian] Church’, Poroshenko (2018) cited in 
Mazurenko (2018)) drawing a line of division within the Ukrainian Orthodox 
community. 
The same split can be seen in the interpretations and reinventions of 
Ukraine’s history and particularly in the perception of Soviet rule in Ukraine. 
While the victory in World War II signified the victory over a Nazi Germany for 
some Ukrainians, this victory marked the beginning of Soviet occupation and 
tyranny for another group of people (Sections 3.4 and 3.5). While the city of 
Donetsk (Eastern Ukraine) celebrates Red Army Day on 23 February, city Lviv 
(Western Ukraine) commemorates the OUN-UPA which fought against the Red 
Army on 14 October (Prizel, 2002: 378-9). After the Maidan revolution and in 
response to the war in Donbas, Ukrainian authorities officially declared 14 
October a day of Ukrainian army and a national holiday (Supreme Council of 
Ukraine, 2014b), and although the date was claimed to be the date of the Cossack 
army, this choice was heavily driven by the desire to deconstruct Soviet-Russian 
legacy in Ukraine. 
Due to the fact that Ukraine’s state institutions have been historically 
aligned with Russian and, later on, Russia-dominated Soviet institutions, 
Ukraine’s nation- and state-building are inevitably linked to the so-called Russian 
issue (Hesli, Reisinger, & Miller, 1998), defined through ‘the status of the Russian 
language and relations with Russia’ (Kulyk, 2011: 633). Dealing with the Russian 
issue is viewed a key task of Ukraine’s post-colonial nationalism (Kuzio, 2002a; 
G. Smith, Law, Wilson, Bohr, & Allworth, 1998) whereas the degree of de-
Russification is indicated by the change in language attitudes. Altogether this 
explains why language preferences are considered more crucial in shaping 
identities in Ukraine than ethnicity (Kulyk, 2011). 
Although Ukraine appears homogeneous in terms of language and 
ethnicity (according to the (SSCU, 2001), 77.8% of its population are Ukrainians 
and 85.2% consider the Ukrainian language to be their native language, most of 
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Ukrainians are bilingually competent. Whereas Ukrainian dominates in the 
public sphere, Russian remains a lingua franca in business and informal 
communication. Together with the fact that most Ukrainians who considered 
themselves to be both Russian and Ukrainian (according to G. Smith et al. (1998) 
25-26% in 1993-1994) spoke Russian (Wilson, 2002), the informal dominance of 
the Russian language is often viewed as undermining the coherence of Ukraine’s 
society.  
The situation has changed in light of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian 
conflict, since Ukrainian officials set up limitations for broadcasting in Russian, 
while civil activists (journalists, Maidan participants, volunteers) popularise it in 
the media (Kulyk, 2016). The share of Ukrainians identifying as both Russian and 
Ukrainian has dropped from 23.1% in 2012 to 12.4% in 2017, and ‘Ukraine has 
become more Ukrainian’. However, this progress was achieved largely at the cost 
of Donbas becoming ‘more Russian’ (Arel, 2018: 189). 
Since Russia exerts its impact through shared Soviet legacies, the Russian 
issue is often linked to the Soviet past (interview5), while post-Soviet nation-
building is linked to the process of de-Russification. First, the country rejects 
Soviet symbols, institutions and representatives in order to protect its ‘national 
interests against the colonial “other”’ (G. Smith et al., 1998: 13-4). During this 
stage, new political leaders essentialise national identity, contrasting the 
imaginable ‘us’ (in-group) to the ‘other’ (non-bounded out-groups) (Kuzio, 2001a: 
343). They historisise the national past which, in a new interpretation, serves as a 
standard against which the community can measure its achievements and 
failures. Finally, political leaders totalise relative differences in society, compelling 
people to associate themselves with a single group based on either assimilation or 
incorporation (Alexander, 2001). This phase corresponds with the standardisation 
of lingual, cultural and educational aspects in order to create ‘a more ... loyal 
citizenry’ (G. Smith et al., 1998: 14-7).  
Ukraine had two possible strategies to deal with the Russian issue. The 
first portrayed Russia as the colonising other whose legacies had to be abandoned 
fully, whereby distancing itself from Russia was even more important than 
distancing itself from Europe, because Ukraine’s close ties with Russia 
complicated the construction of a separate identity (Kuzio, 2001a). This course 
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was launched at once, as Ukrainisation was promoted as a mechanism for de-
Russification in independent Ukraine (Prizel, 1998: 376-8). The Yushchenko and 
Poroshenko governments applied similar policies, albeit to a greater degree. Both 
recasted the OUN-UPA as the Ukrainian national liberation movement and role 
model for modern Ukraine, notwithstanding the controversy surrounding this 
organisation among Ukrainians (Katchanovski, 2015b). 
From the opposite viewpoint, Ukraine could act as ‘a bridge-builder 
between East and West’, belonging to a wider Europe with Russia and at the 
same time preserving historical links with the Slavic community (Schularick, 
2005: 235). Kuchma’s policies fell in line with this declaration, because he 
historicised Ukraine’s identity without essentialising or totalising it. As other 
moderate politicians (including the ousted Yanukovych), he exploited the 
expectations of the Russophone population by emphasising a need for closer ties 
with Russia (Kulyk, 2017) but avoided, excessive Russianism in order to not 
hamper Ukraine’s ‘Europeanness’ (K. Wolczuk, 2000: 682-9). 
Although Kuchma’s approach did not aim to portray Russia as other in 
ethnic territorial sense (Kuzio, 2001a: 356), it aimed for the construction of 
sovereign Ukraine. Having supported the idea of equalising Russian and 
Ukrainian languages as official languages during his electoral campaign, Kuchma 
in fact maintained Ukrainian as the only state language. The number of 
Ukrainian schools increased (figure below) and promoted the Ukrainian identity 
(Arel, 2018).  
Meanwhile, Russian-speaking Ukrainians maintained a strong 
representation in state institutions (Kulyk, 2017), which maintained their loyalty 
to the state. Ukraine’s self-identification slowly moved towards portraying Russia 
as the other, in part because of Russia’s own actions (gas wars, border problems 
with regard to island Tuzla in Kerch Strait and post-Maidan conflict) (Arel, 2018; 
Armandon, 2013; Barrington, 2018; KIIS, 2015) (the change in the attitudes to 
Russia will be also discussed in Section 5.3), and as such Kuchma’s quiet 
Ukrainisation advanced Ukraine’s peaceful nation-building more than the radical 
slogans of revolutionary governments. A moderate approach lessened Ukraine’s 
regional differences while strengthening a civic, or derzhavnyk (Kuzio, 2002b) 
notion of Ukraine’s identity whereby Ukrainian elites enjoyed independence from 
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Russian decision-making and agreed on the need to build a political Ukrainian 
nation based on ‘inclusivity and a liberal democracy’ (Kuzio, 2002b: 136).  
 
 
Figure 4.10 Ukrainisation of schools in the selected regions of Ukraine as 
comparison between the share of Russian-speaking population and the share of 
students studying in Ukrainian-language schools, %, 1991-2011. 
Source(s): Statistics, politics, society (2017); SSCU (2001) 
 
Derzhavnyk policies were criticised only for the lack of a strong emphasis 
on Russia’s otherness as part of promoting Ukraine’s independence. As Prizel 
(2002) claims, support of independence in Russian-speaking regions is weaker 
than in Ukrainian-speaking regions irrespective of ethnicity (381), and the notion 
of Ukraine as ‘a deeply divided society with a pronounced pattern of regional 
diversity’ (Wilson, 1997: 1) remains overtly persistent. 
Ukraine’s fragmentation is often reflected through polarisation of either 
two (West and East) or four regional blocs (East-West-Centre-South), and the 
same polarisation narrative persists for identity types in Ukraine. Thus, Riabchuk 
(2012) distinguishes ‘the strong ethnic Ukrainian’ and the ‘strong Eastern Slavic’ 
identities, wherein the ‘Ukrainian national’ follows the trend of ‘return to Europe’ 
associated with European values and institutions, while the ‘Little Russian’, 
‘post/crypto-Soviet’, or ‘East Slavonic’ identity is ‘anti-Western, authoritarian’, 
and ‘conservative’ (Riabchuk, 2012: 443-4). One of the explicit narratives of this 
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‘A sincere supporter of Ukraine’s independence is a young Ukrainian-speaker who 
lives in Western Ukraine, confesses to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and is 
a supporter of the party Freedom. An opponent of Ukraine’s independence is a poor 
elderly Russian-speaker who lives in Donbas, who is an atheist or confesses to the 
Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy and is a supporter of the Communist Party 
of Ukraine’, (Polishchuk, 2013). 
 
Indeed, portraying Ukraine as a divided society is easy, because a number 
of public opinion polls support this argument, not least with regard to regional 
division (Figure 4.11; Table 4.6). Regions form their own, regional identities 
based on ethno-lingual homogeneity or historical experience and regional cultures 
(Barrington, 2002). In Ukraine, some of such identities are narrowly local 
(Carpathian Rusyns, lemky), some pertain to specific regions (donchanin, new 
Russian, Crimean people, Kievans, Podolians, Volhynians, Galician and Dnieper 
identities) (Wilson, 2002; 42-3). Finally, some local, regional, or territorial 
identity narratives are promoted as national identity narratives. Thus, Galician 
identity recalls with a narrative of ‘fight for Ukraine’s independence’, Dnieper 
identity resembles ‘recognition of Ukraine’s independence’, Eurasianism 
corresponds with a dual identity narrative, while Soviet identity with a Soviet 
identity narrative (Korostelina, 2013a; Wilson, 2002). 
 
 
Figure 4.11 Results of the public opinion poll: ‘Do you believe that 
Ukrainian culture or lifestyle are closer to Western or Russian values?’ (8-15 
April, 2014), % 














Table 4.6 Positive support for the selected political currents among the 
regions of Ukraine (%), 19-25 June 2008 
 West Centre South East 
Ecology/green 31.4 27.2 47 36.2 
Communist -57.4 -28.2 10.2 -1.5 
Liberal -9 -20.2 -15.8 -20.4 
National radical -7.8 -23.6 -45.9 -32.7 
National democratic 41.4 1.8 -33.9 -11.8 
Social democratic -11.9 -7.4 27.9 -3.1 
Socialist -28.7 -14.1 25.7 -0.7 
Christian democratic 28.5 -10.5 -5.2 -7.6 
 
Source(s): Razumkov Centre (2008) 
Note(s): The degree of support is calculated as a difference between the shares of positive 
and negative attitudes about the selected political currents. 
West includes such regions as Volhyn’, Zakarpattya, Ivano-Frankivs’k, Lviv, Rivno, 
Ternopil and Chernivets’k regions; Centre: City Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kyrovograd, 
Poltava, Sumy, Khemnyts’k, Cherkasy and Chernighiv regions; South: Crimea, Odesa, Kherson 
and Mykolaiyv regions; East: Dnipropetrovs’k, Donetsk, Zporizhja, Lugansk, Kharkiv regions. 
 
Identity mapping heavily corresponds with Ukraine’s historical regions, 
filled in with specific political culture formed on the basis of their historical 
experiences (Kulyk, 2011: 633).  
 
Table 4.7 Types of cultural tradition by regions of Ukraine, %, 31 May-18 
June, 2007 
 
 West Centre South East 
Ukrainian 79.9 69.1 40.9 42 
Soviet 5.8 17 26.5 22.7 
Russian 0.9 3.7 18 18.1 
European 8.8 6 8.1 4.7 
Other 1.2 0.6 1 1.1 
Difficult to identify 3.4 3.6 5.5 7.8 
 
Source(s): Razumkov Centre (2007) 
 
Nevertheless, in the hierarchy of such factors of electoral vote as place of 
residence, language preferences, and national self-identification (Hesli et al., 
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1998), ethno-lingual differences are not determinant once the regional factor is 
controlled for (Barrington, 2002). Similarly, whereas the Russian issue remains 
crucial for voting preferences (Hesli et al., 1998), it may be explained not only 
from the identity perspective but through the prism of ‘historical, economic, 
geographic (e.g., proximity to Russia) and demographic characteristics’ of 
Ukraine’s regions (Barrington, 2002: 461). As such region represents a far broader 
category of analysis than identity or language.  
However, the common economic interests and close economic ties with 
bordering regions may serve as a counter balance to various Ukrainian identities. 
While geographic closeness between Russians and Ukrainians in the bordering 
regions resulted in their ‘alikeness’ in terms of views and values (Grogan, 2016), 
Russian-speaking Ukrainians have nonetheless transformed into Ukrainians while 
maintaining their language preferences (Kulyk, 2017).  
Regardless of the above-discussed fluidity and complexity of Ukraine’s 
regionalism, it should be noted that the regions are not acting on their own. 
Instead, agency is crucial in evoking collective memories and historical analogies 
and in supporting certain identity narratives. As multiple Crimean crises, the 
Severodonetsk meeting of 2004 and the on-going Donbas War demonstrate, the 
role of agency grows at a time of a crisis. For example, a standoff between the 
Crimean and Ukrainian governments cannot be explained only by initially weak 
support to Ukraine’s independence at the peninsula (54.19%) and, thus, historical 
legacies (Crimea was transferred from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954). 
Attempts to adopt its own Constitution elect its own president and even secede 
from Ukraine continued in Crimea throughout 1992-1994. Yet the key factor that 
led to the destabilisation of the situation was the election of the pro-Russian 
president and the key factor that prevented or, as in 2014, promoted 
destabilisation — Russian (non)-interference (some references to this will be made 
in Chapter 5).  
Therefore, popular moods could support political decisions of regional 
elites, but inherent regionalism did not threaten Ukraine’s independence in the 
absence of political stimulus. This once again points to the importance of agency 
even in such grand-scale processes as nation-building whereas historical analogies 
create a basis for reproduction of action (history) during critical juncture.  
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4.3.2. Moulding Ukraine’s identity 
As the above and particularly the previous discussion in Chapter 3 demonstrate, 
Ukraine’s modernisation may allow to overcome Ukraine’s regional and identity 
divisions and proceed with democratic nation-building that relies on civil society, 
human development, as well as political, economic and social equality. Yet 
suggesting that ethnic Ukrainian identity may further advance Ukraine’s 
transition, because representatives of this identity are more supportive of liberal 
reforms in contrast to more pro-authoritarian representatives of the Eastern Slavic 
identity (Shulman, 2005) may be misleading.  
First, the selected identities represent strong opposing groups (Shulman, 
2005), and they do not reflect the middle ground or approximately 60% of 
Ukrainian population (Wilson, 2002: 40) who do not necessarily view themselves 
as Russians or both Russians and Ukrainians.  
Second, most of Ukraine’s identity narratives remain dominantly ethno-
lingual (Brubaker, 2011) with only 16% of Ukrainian elites adhering to a multi-
cultural or civic identity narrative.16 This means that supporting either of the 
existing ethno-lingual identities would not advance Ukraine’s peaceful nation-
building (Brubaker, 2011), and this has already been demonstrated in the on-
going Donbas war.  
Finally, there are more similarities among the representatives of the 
contrasted identities than it may initially appear, because Ukraine’s self-
perception of a ‘poor, constantly oppressed, constantly suffering’ country 
(interview1) results in that both identity groups seek external approval: ‘What will 
America say? Or what will Russia say?’ (interview12). Meanwhile, Ukrainians 
tend to follow those sources of information (and assumedly role models), which 
support already formed expectations and beliefs (Szostek, 2017). Those who 
support the Russian position in the on-going conflict refer to those sources of 
information that reinforce their views and vice versa. Therefore, Ukrainians who 
are trapped in the on-going crisis are not exposed to propaganda war to the extent 
it is believed, because identities do not change in a short duration. 
                                               
16 this estimation should not be generalised, as it is derived from the interviews with 43 
respondents and therefore does not represent all Ukraine (Korostelina, 2013a: 295). 
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Importantly, such a conclusion would imply that the support for reforms 
has had significantly less importance in comparison with the support for a 
particular type of identity or vector of foreign policy. For example, support for 
EU-led reforms may be explained by the fact that the implementation of these 
reforms would automatically reunite Ukraine with its European family. While 
this narrative has become particularly visible in post-Maidan Ukraine, the lack of 
critique towards EU policies in light of the EU’s multiple crises demonstrates that 
Ukraine’s European choice has turned into a 'self-fulfilling prophecy' which 
disregards domestic developments inside the EU (Hobova, 2016).  
Such an approach does not oppose Ukraine’s regionalism with its 
counterbalancing economic considerations in the context of Ukraine’s 
asymmetrical integration (Shulman, 1999). While ‘identities frame an issue, 
whether respondents consciously prioritise them or not’ (Arel, 2018: 188), some 
believe that ‘economic calculations drive political attitudes in Ukraine more than 
identity’ (Barrington, 2018: 181).  
While identity differences are not important under normal circumstances, 
they become crucial during turning points (such as the on-going war) when 
individual preferences becomes determinant (Szostek, 2017). Thus, the pro-
Russian unrest in Eastern Ukraine was caused by ‘a sense of abandonment by 
Kyiv rather than by Russian language and pro-Russian foreign policy issues’ 
(Giuliano, 2018: 158) and was an emotion-driven impulse rather than a rational 
decision. The same refers to the evolution of the Maidan protests from peaceful to 
violent (Section 4.2.4). 
Whereas Eastern Ukrainians are traditionally viewed as more pro-Russian, 
pro-authoritarian and pro-‘statist’, Western Ukrainians also support ‘statist 
policies internally and protection externally, and there is no evidence that 
corruption is lower in Western Ukraine than in the East’ (D'Anieri, 2012: 452).  
 
‘We often have paternalistic thinking that Europe will help us, foreign countries 
will help us ... We often say that the East is paternalistic. Don’t be illusive. The 
West of Ukraine is paternalistic too; only it relies on foreign countries and the 




Hence, associating Russophone views with the persistence of Soviet 
political culture in Ukraine would be short-sighted. Moreover, political culture 
and identity are not mutually substitutive. The former is associated with a set of 
values and beliefs that represent individual and collective experiences (sometimes 
reflected in civil identity), while the later reflects a perception of self in contrast to 
others (Wiarda, 2016) (and may be ethnic or civic). In this context, identity is 
often ‘imagined’ (Anderson, 2006: 6), constructed, or narrated (G. Smith et al., 
1998: 119). 
The problems arise when these imagined features of identity shape the 
boundaries of real polities (G. Smith et al., 1998: 1), and Ukraine represents the 
case. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former nomenklatura embarked 
on reinventing history in order to justify Ukraine’s sovereignty and preserve 
power, reproducing the only nation-building experience they knew — the ethno-
linguistic approach (Chapter 3 Section 3.6.4). Moreover, whereas Ukrainian 
political actors of all ideological colours prioritised the country’s sovereignty and 
independence, being civic, or ‘pragmatic nationalists’ (Kuzio, 2002b: 78, 83-4), 
during the elections all used regional stereotypes creating ‘two Ukraines’ (Osipian 
& Osipian, 2012). On the one hand, Ukrainian political forces labelled the 
nationalism of their opponents as bad, while, on the other hand, they supported 
bad nationalism to win the votes and to prevent the creation of a united 
Ukrainian identity which would have undermined their authority (Way, 2005a). 
As such dismantling historical memories displaced the modelling of Ukraine’s 
development (interview6), while manipulation, politicisation and radicalisation 
displaced nation-building. 
Yet what actions can be taken in this respect? First, as the previous section 
has demonstrated, Ukraine’s nation-building policies throughout the 1990s 
created a more coherent Ukraine. Therefore, Ukraine’s peaceful and democratic 
nation-building is possible if Ukrainian elites stop manipulating identity 
narratives in political discourse. Civic identity should be prioritised over 
territorial, ethnic and particularly opposing narratives (Brubaker, 2011; 
Korostelina, 2013a) in order to minimise social cleavages and to maintain the 
course for peaceful and liberal nation-building (Brubaker, 1996). Although only a 
minority of Ukrainians share a truly civic multi-cultural identity narrative, the 
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assumption that ethnic Ukrainian nationalism evolves into liberal political 
movement (Kuzio, 2002b) allows to assume that other ethnic identities in 
Ukraine can presumably do the same.  
Significantly, the majority of Ukrainian people do not belong to any of the 
contrasted strong identities and are rather malleable in their self-identification. 
Public opinion polls often indicate that the majority of Ukrainians have no clear 
ideological views (51.8%) or even have no religious affiliations (62.5%) 
(Razumkov Centre, 2009). Approximately the same-size threshold of 60% was 
named by Wilson (2002) who considered Riabchuk’s concept of Ukraine’s society 
as a ‘30-60-10’ society, where 30% of the population was consciously Ukrainian, 
10% consciously anti-Ukrainian and the rest formed a ‘premodern majority’ that 
formally supported Ukraine’s independence but remained culturally and 
linguistically Russian (Wilson, 2002). This majority is often labelled pro-Russian 
and anti-reformist, although, on the opposite, it could promote Ukraine’s civic 
nationalism if it embraced liberal political culture.  
In this context, the main task for Ukraine’s policy-makers and intellectuals 
lies in the search for a reason that will unite all the people of Ukraine instead of 
supporting competing camps. In this regard, establishing civil society (based on 
civil identity) is crucial for constructing supporting elements of civic identity such 
as ‘liberty, prosperity and welfare, a common social contract of reciprocal rights 
and obligations, or constitutional patriotism’ (Wilson, 2002: 31).  
Civil identity is also vital for multi-cultural societies because it grants 
incorporation of all members of community while maintaining some primordial 
qualities (religion, language, culture) (Alexander, 2001). In Ukraine’s context, 
this would preserve some elements of ethno-lingual identity at the level of 
national symbolism and historicisation, while lessening the degree of polarisation 
among supporters of various identity narratives (Arel, 2018).  
Liberal political culture should also make people less dependant on the 
ethnic component of their identities. As such Ukraine’s successful 
democratisation is possible only when Ukrainians change their attitudes towards 
respect to property, legal system and rule of law as part of liberal culture 
(interview13). The desire of the Maidan participants to live like in Europe and to 
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build a normal European state (Section 4.2.4) reflects on the opportunity for 
doing so. 
In search of a basis for Ukraine’s national consolidation, it is important to 
stress that 84% of Ukrainian citizens adopt ‘weakly or strongly inclusivist stances’ 
of community (Zimmerman, 1998: 49). Moreover, Ukrainian people support 
Ukrainianness when it is associated with personal benefits and support a certain 
vector of foreign policy if this allows Ukraine’s domestic players to achieve and 
establish beneficial to Ukraine cooperation (Armandon, 2013). Therefore, the 
popularisation of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainiannes lies in Ukraine’s real 
achievements and the advantages that Ukrainian citizenship brings to its people. 
On the other hand Russian-speaking Ukrainians do not necessarily 
represent a source of Russian intervention as some fear. Often, these Ukrainians 
represent a middle ground between the conflicting strong ethnic identities. For 
example, 60% to 80% of respondents in Southern and Eastern Ukraine supported 
close relations with Russia but of independent Ukraine (KIIS, 2014), and ‘the real 
sympathy that Ukrainian citizens express toward this country [Russia] does not 
mean that they are ready to accept any kind of Russian behaviour or policy 
toward Ukraine’ (Armandon, 2013: 295). At the same time, neither the ethnic 
Russian nor ethnic Ukrainian narrative can accommodate this group of people 
(G. Smith et al., 1998: 119-20), despite the fact that, being an integral part of 
Ukrainian community, they wish to negotiate the content of Ukraine’s national 
identity (Rodgers, 2006: 171).  
The main obstacle in this process is the on-going war in Eastern Ukraine 
which has polarised existing divisions in Ukraine and turned all supporters of the 
Russian course into domestic agents of imperial Russia. Such an approach 
towards shaping the Ukrainian identity overlaps with inherited ‘communist 
totalitarian culture’, as ‘there is no culture of dialogue in a broad sense in 
Ukraine’ (interview13). Due to the on-going conflict, this feature of society has 
only strengthened, whereas the totalising Ukrainian narrative as the one opposed 
to Russian and any pro-Russian narrative follows the same communist illiberal 
pattern although it is declaratively aiming for the opposite. 
Whereas support for Ukraine’s independence has grown in general, the 
split between the mainland Ukraine and the war zone has deepened (Arel, 2018). 
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More than half the respondents from the West and Centre of Ukraine supported 
the termination of any relations between Ukraine and these territories (Razumkov 
Centre, 2016a), and the silent support for such actions by state officials 
demonstrates their support for one dominant narrative.  
Another danger of totalisation in Ukraine is that Russophone population 
has no ‘clear-cut sense of identity’ (Kuzio, 2002a: 22) and risks joining one of the 
radicalised identity camps in Ukraine (G. Smith et al., 1998: 135). In the context 
of Ukraine’s dominant Soviet-like political culture, this also explains the quick 
polarisation of society along ethno-cultural or ethno-lingual lines and a quick turn 
of the tide in favour of another ethnic narrative instead of maintaining the fluid 
boundaries between identities. The process has been reflected in the unexpectedly 
rapid growth of support towards the OUN-UPA whose popularisation had been 
originally doubted (Katchanovski, 2015b). The share of citizens who supported 
the idea of the OUN as a national liberator grew from 20% in 2010 to 27% in 
2013 and 41% in 2015, although data for 2015 excluded Crimea (Rating, 2013; 
2015). Many Russian-speakers from join military formations with strongly anti-
Russian and even Nazi rhetoric, while a number of Russian-speaking Ukrainians 
profess guilt for being Russian- and not Ukrainian-speakers.  
Therefore, although the Maidan revolution has launched a process of 
revitalising or reinventing a Ukrainian identity, the ‘Russian issue’ remains 
central to this process and Ukraine’s further unification becomes impossible 
without resolving this issue (Kuczhynska-Zonik & Kowalczyk, 2016). Indeed, 
Ukraine’s historical experiences inevitably bound it with Russia, while Ukraine’s 
modern development supports the course for Europeanisation, and joining either 
Europe or Russia would imply the rejection of the external other and the 
domestic group bonded to it. 
Due to the fact that totalising ethnic identity does not appear as a peaceful 
solution, Ukraine’s nation-building should aim for the promotion of civic identity 
by civil means. As this section has already demonstrated, Ukrainians support 
reforms and a common aspiration to live in a better country. Therefore, 
promotion of liberal political culture should prevent the fragmentation of 
Ukrainian community and support the unification of its people on the basis of 
civil identity which is associated with civic identity in Ukraine.  
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 Due to the fact that liberal values are viewed as those that are promoted by 
the European Union, Ukraine’s Europeanisation (a concept that will be discussed 
in greater detail in the next chapter) may partially advance Ukraine’s nation-
building by replacing ethno-centred Soviet-style nation-building with a civic 
European type of state- and nation-building. However, the latter remains a 
difficult task as will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
Moreover, the one-sided promotion of European integration over the 
Eastern integration was not economically, politically or culturally efficient for 
Ukraine (Shulman, 1999, p. 934) and remains non-beneficial for Ukraine’s 
nation-building because it does not take into account Ukraine’s close ties with 
Russia. As such, the EU’s potential impact on Ukraine’s nation-building is 
limited to the promotion of democratic values in general, while Ukraine remains 
a sole actor with regard to the construction of its shared identity. 
Ukraine’s current and post-conflict nation-building should be grounded in 
the growing integration between its regions and unification on the basis of shared 
priorities. Inter-regional cooperation among Ukraine’s most distant regions may 
include strengthened economic ties, tourism and cultural and education 
exchange. Simultaneously, such issues as common Eastern Slavic heritage, 
Ukrainian culture, economic prosperity, equal political rights, co-existence in one 
state and resolution of the common problems (in political and economic 
transformations) were named as a basis for potential cooperation and the 
construction of a united Ukrainian community by respondents from both Lviv 
and Donetsk (Shulman, 1999). In this context, Ukraine’s unification is still 
possible, although it becomes more complex, as the war goes on. 
 
4.4. Conclusions to Chapter 4 
While the above discussion reveals the importance of historical legacies and 
particularly communist legacies for certain aspects of Ukraine’s post-communist 
transition, including the character of elites, public preferences and political 
culture, it proves that the window of opportunity for Ukraine’s transformation 
into a more transparent and democratic community exists and that it may be 
realised primarily through agency.  
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Whereas the role of agency in the beginning (momentum) of Ukraine’s 
transition has not advanced to swift democratic transformation due to the 
persistence of the nomenklatura, Ukrainian people have remained the main agent 
and are currently searching for a new leadership to establish the fair rules of the 
game and a fair system of governance. Important in this context is the fact that 
the lack of strong state institutions which has prevented Ukraine from becoming a 
full-pledged democracy has also prevented it from becoming an assertive 
autocracy. Therefore, Ukraine’s competitive oligarchy has unintentionally 
provided Ukrainians with several windows of opportunities for political change. 
In this process, Ukraine’s regional and identity divisions appear to be less divisive 
than commonly suggested, because economic and political cooperation may be 
efficiently utilised for balancing identity and regional differences in Ukraine if 




 THE ROLE OF THE EU AND OTHER 
EXTERNAL FACTORS IN UKRAINE’S POST-
COMMUNIST TRANSITION  
This chapter offers an analysis of EU-Ukraine relations in the context of 
Ukraine’s post-communist Europeanisation and other external factors (such as 
Russia’s influence) that have affected Ukraine’s progress of transition. This 
chapter specifically addresses questions raised in Chapter 2 of this thesis, 
examining the mechanisms of Europeanisation and the EU’s ability to promote 
its values (particularly, democracy and market economy) in Ukraine in the 
absence of the prospect of EU membership. Moreover, Ukraine’s specific 
problems such as the impact of geopolitics and the quest of self-determination are 
also considered. 
 
5.1. The role of the EU (and geo-politics) in Ukraine’s 
post-communist transition 
As was described in Chapter 2, the central question in analysing EU democracy 
promotion efforts lies in distinguishing the impacts between its normative and 
calculus approaches. While the EU is visibly normative, which is supported by its 
founding documents, ‘in certain policy areas and geographical contexts’, the EU 
‘behaves in a state-like manner’ (N. R. Smith, 2014b: 584). EU interests in 
Ukraine revolve primarily around security, trade and regime (democracy) 
promotion (N. R. Smith, 2014a), yet prioritisation of any of these depends on the 
EU’s constantly changing context. Nevertheless, security is often prioritised over 
market liberalisation and democracy promotion, as will be demonstrated in this 
section. 
 
5.1.1. The role of geopolitics in Ukraine-EU relations 
While some would portray EU policies in 1990s Ukraine as lacking geopolitical 
motivations (R. Wolczuk, 2003: 176), this period of bilateral cooperation between 
the two parties was characterised by the EU’s overall disinterest in Ukraine. At 
the time, the EU was still deciding on its identity and the scope of enlargement 
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(the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992) and accepted only those states that 
expressed their desire to join the EU, while Ukraine demonstrated no such 
interest and was not institutionally ready for membership of the EU (R. Wolczuk, 
2003: 160). 
Meanwhile, the West in general (namely the EU and the USA) ‘pursued a 
“Russia-first” policy towards the CIS’ (Kuzio, 2001a: 351), wherein a strong 
Russia was viewed as a guarantor of regional stability in the post-Soviet space 
and international players unofficially agreed that Ukraine was the remainder of 
the post-Soviet space and was not joining other integration projects (interview3). 
In addition, Ukraine was not viewed as a truly European state (Kuzio, 2001a). 
Ukraine was perceived as an extension of Russia and the other in cultural terms 
(Basystyuk, 2012), and such views prevailed even in the aftermath of the Orange 
revolution (Youngs, 2009b).  
The European borders drawn by civilisational differences and Cold War 
legacies remained intact (Chapter 2: 44-5) and were similarly valid for Ukraine as 
they were for Turkey (interview9-2). In this context, Ukraine remained and 
continues to remain a ‘small coin in high geopolitics’ (interview2), whereas 
geopolitics is a determinant for both the successes and failures in Ukraine’s 
liberalisation. However, in the 1990s the EU’s approach towards Ukraine was 
rather indifferent. 
The first normative document establishing the basis for mutual 
cooperation between the parties was a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA). Indicatively, it was signed in 1994 (in comparison, Poland began its 
accession negotiations in 1990) and came into force only in 1998. Although the 
Agreement envisaged support to Ukraine’s transition, bilateral political dialogue 
was represented largely by consultations and economic cooperation (European 
Commission, 2003c). Neither did the Agreement include any clear indicators to 
monitor the progress of Ukraine’s reforms, which made it a declaration of intent 
rather than a roadmap for Ukraine’s democratic transition. As a result, up to the 
end of the decade, EU assistance targeted mainly the Chernobyl (nuclear) issue 
and business enterprise restructuring.  
Similarly limited in its impact was a programme on Technical Assistance 
to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) launched in 1991 by the 
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European Council. The programme was ‘to assist economic reform and recovery 
in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ (Council of the European Union, 
1991: 2), but was elaborated on the basis of Euroatom and the EEC and 
prioritised nuclear safety. As an outcome, initial assistance was implemented on a 
decentralised basis and in the form of grants (Council of the European Union, 
1993), while monitoring and evaluation were introduced in 1996 through the 
construction of a network of expert monitors, with tendering introduced in 2000. 
Institutional reforms appeared in TACIS only in 1996 (Council of the European 
Union, 1996) and were included in the list of areas of cooperation in 2000 
(Council of the European Union, 2000). Not surprisingly, EU interventions 
during the 1990s did not affect policy design in Ukraine and often stumbled on 
the ground owing to the absence of state policies in respective areas (European 
Commission, 1998b: 20). Altogether this proves that despite the EU’s support for 
reform, the Ukraine’s domestic environment remained crucial for the 
implementation of received assistance.  
On the other hand, the EU’s interest in reform was reflected in a rather 
modest size of assistance provided for the CIS states and Ukraine in particular 
(Table 5.1). For a comparison, by the end of 1996, the PHARE programme 17 
provided its recipients with €6.6 billion, while TACIS made only €2.8 billion 
available (European Commission, 1997). Although Ukraine remained one of the 
key recipients of EU assistance among the former communist states, second only 
to Russia, 18  the volume of assistance enjoyed by the CIS countries was 
significantly smaller than reform support enjoyed by the candidate states, 
especially if recalculated per capita (Table 1.2).  
Moreover, the difference in the volumes of financing remained intact. 
While €11 billion ‘of cofinancing for institution building ... and investment 
support’ were allocated for the PHARE states in 2000-2006 (European 
Commission, 2003d), during the same period only €3.2 billion euro became 
available for the TACIS programme (European Commission, 2006d). Thus, even 
                                               
17 originally developed for Poland and Hungary in 1989 as ‘Poland Hungary Aid for the 
Reconstruction of the Economy’, and, throughout the 1990s, extended to other EU candidates 
(Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania) 
18 during 1991-1994, Ukraine consumed 9.7% of TACIS funds in comparison to 36.3% of those by 
Russia (European Commission, 1995); in the 2000s the share of Ukraine reached 15% in 
comparison to 26% of that one of Russia (European Commission, 2006c: 100) 
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the focus of the programmes (institution-building as opposed to technical 
assistance) differed, and although legal assistance and institutional reforms finally 
settled among the priorities of EU external aid for Ukraine in the 2000s, their 
share remained rather modest (Table 5.2), pointing to the fact that the EU’s 
leverage and linkage with Ukraine remained weak.  
 
Table 5.1 The distribution of TACIS assistance in Ukraine per sector (mln 
euro) for period 1991-1998. 




1.47 17.35 12.18 4.32 10.56 10.14 13.86 10.65 
Food and 
agriculture 












4.66 2.89 6.30 4.05 7.04 7.95 3.08 8.17 
Unallocated 0.00 0.00 3.78 1.62 3.52 3.01 1.54 3.91 
Total allocated 24.75 48.20 37.80 25.38 28.80 24.39 29.26 31.60 
 
Source(s): European Commission (1998b: 20) 
Note(s): data are calculated from the data provided in the report 
 
Table 5.2 The distribution of EU commitments and disbursements in 
Ukraine per sector (mln euro) for the period 2002-2009. 
 Contracted Paid  Contracted Paid 
Energy 396.07 231.1 Education 15.12 10.29 
Legal, administrative, 
institutional reform 
120.37 77.33 Transport 11.77 7.71 
Border management and 
migrations 
106.06 95.74 Civil Society 10.76 10.09 
Economic development 104.86 70.22 Environment 10.26 6.35 
Social consequences of 
transition 
40.37 36.68 Media 4.64 4.04 
Miscellaneous 12.51 6.8 
 
Source(s): retrieved from European Commission (2010e: 7)  
Note(s): Since 2000, EU assistance reports are sorted not by specific programmes but by 
countries, regions and themes 
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In addition, the focus of the EU shifted towards stronger regional cohesion 
and a more global approach. Ukraine as well as other post-Soviet states was 
merged with developing countries under the framework of EuropeAid (European 
Commission, 2007a: 172; Council of the European Union, 2005). Although in 
2007 TACIS was replaced with the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument, 
or ENPI, which was to become a reflection of strengthened cooperation between 
the EU and its neighbours, the number of paid contracts under the ENPI declined 
significantly (Table 5.3), while the lack of supporting networks (see Chapter 2, 
pages 32, 37) limited Ukraine’s capacity to process external assistance. Almost a 
third of all available funds were not implemented.  
 
Table 5.3 Distribution of EU commitments and disbursements in Ukraine 
by instrument (mln euro, %) for the period January 2002-September 2009. 
 Commitments Disbursements 
 mln euro % mln euro % 
TACIS 635.09 76.3% 483.3 86.9 
ENPI 103.34 12.4% 27.18 4.9 
Other instruments 94.36 11.3% 45.87 8.2 
Total 832.79 100.0% 556.35 100 
 
Source(s): adapted from European Commission (2010e: 8)  
 
Meanwhile, other major powers such as the U.S. and Russia concentrated 
on Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament (D'Anieri, 2012) and security. After signing 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Ukraine joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
(February 1994) and was assured in the security of its territorial integrity and 
political independence by Russia, the U.S. and the U.K. (the Budapest 
Memorandum on Security Assurances) in February of the same year. However, 
since then, Ukraine’s security has been aligned with a balance in Russia-U.S. 
relations (D'Anieri, 2012).  
While Ukraine’s democratisation was not at stake during the first decade 
of its post-communist transition, the country became a tool of security bargaining 
by bigger regional powers. Its post-communist reforms lacked supervision from 
the EU, while consecutive Ukrainian governments continued to portray their 
country as a ‘keystone in the arch of European security’. As a result, when 
Western relations with Russia worsened (particularly in such geopolitical aspects 
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as NATO enlargement and the Balkan conflict), U.S. and European politicians 
slowly changed their perceptions of Ukraine towards its becoming a ‘guarantor 
against the revival of Russian imperialism’ (Kubicek, 2005: 277). The differences 
in the Western camp lay only in how quickly this decision matured, as European 
politicians embraced this approach slightly later than American politicians 
(Kubicek, 2005).  
The Westernisation of Ukraine since then has not represented a final goal 
but has only signalled the beginning of transformations in the whole region, 
including Russia (Kaminski & Frenkel, 2016). In this context, democracy 
promotion was one of the tools for securing EU external borders (N. R. Smith, 
2015), which was reflected in the EU Common Strategy on Ukraine adopted in 
1999. ‘The emergence of a stable, open and pluralistic democracy in Ukraine’ and 
‘cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs’ were aligned with ‘the 
maintenance of stability and security in Europe and the wider world’ as the main 
strategic aims of the EU in Ukraine (European Council Common Strategy on 
Ukraine 1999: 1-2). Strategic cooperation with Ukraine was often emphasised as 
a ‘source of regional stability’ (p. 1 of the Strategy). 
Moreover, in the beginning of the 2000s, Ukraine’s stabilising economy 
delivered another incentive for the EU’s growing interest in the country. 
Ukraine’s skilled labour force and a relatively large market indicated its strong 
economic potential (Kubicek, 2005). The attractiveness of the Ukrainian market 
was amply demonstrated in the intensification of trade relations and investment 
flows. By that time, EU assistance in economic reform was considered efficient, 
although it fell in line with Ukraine’s partial reform equilibrium (Chapter 4, 
Sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.5.1: 148), and economic recovery of the transitioning states 
allowed the strengthening of bilateral and regional cooperation (Council of the 
European Union, 2000). 
However, EU investors began to appear in Ukraine only in 2002. Whereas 
EU-Ukraine cooperation practically stagnated during 1991-2001, the boost of 
investment to Ukraine occurred only after the victory of the Orange revolution 
(Figure 5.1  on inward investments). The event shifted Ukraine’s foreign policy 
preferences to the West and the EU in particular (Figure 5.1  on outward 
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investments), while Ukrainian officials sufficiently liberalised foreign exchange 
system and trade.  
 
    Inward investments    Outward investments 
  
  Figure 5.1 Ukraine’s inward and outward investments by key partners 
(mln USD) for the period 2001-2016  
Source(s): SSCU 
Note(s): Since 2013, the data exclude Crimea and Sevastopol, and since 2015, the ATO 
territories of Donbas region are additionally excluded 
 
It is noteworthy that Cyprus became a main destination for Ukraine’s 
outward investments and the main EU investor in Ukraine (Figure 5.1 ). The 
reason for that lay in the special status of Cyprus, set by the Agreement on the 
avoidance of double taxation of income and property (Supreme Council of 
Ukraine, 1982) and Convention on the avoidance of double taxation (Supreme 
Council of Ukraine, 2013) that exempted residents of Cyprus from tax on income 
(including dividends, interest, royalties, and property). Obtaining residency was 
conditional only upon the amount of capital available for the applicant, and 
although conditions tightened in 2009, these have not stopped Ukrainian 
investors from obtaining residence permits and even EU (Cyprus) citizenship 
(Beswick, 2017; Farolfi, Pegg, & Orphanides, 2017). Despite a number of 
attempts to denounce the agreement of 2013, Ukrainian-Cypriot tax relations 
remain unchanged. In post-Maidan Ukraine the investigations associated with the 
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Cyprus financial flows and money laundry target not only Ukraine’s former 
president Yanukovych and his entourage, but also Ukraine’s current oligarchs 
(Zinets & Afanasieva, 2018). In light of Cyprus’ status of a tax haven for 
Ukrainian businesses, most of Ukraine’s financial flows, as revealed in Figure 5.1, 
appear to represent either hot capital (approximately 40% of inward investment) 
or the scale of money laundering in Ukraine (almost 90% of Ukraine’s outward 
capital) 
The importance of Ukraine’s growing economy to the EU’s search for 
bottom-up tools of democratisation has also resulted in the EU’s retreat from 
normativity with regard to Kuchma and his policies. Whereas the Tapegate 
Scandal (see Chapter 4) cost Ukraine its participation in the 2002 NATO summit 
(which indicated the strength of the U.S. position in the scandal) the Council of 
the EU expressed only ‘concerns’ with no real sanctions against Kuchma 
(Kubicek, 2005: 280). The 2002 EU-Ukraine Joint Statement even offered to 
“intensify discussions on the effects of enlargement” in the PCA stressing the 
progress in Ukraine’s reforms (Council of the European Union, 2002, p. 1). The 
Commission continued to claim that Ukraine made ‘a progressive transition to 
democracy’ even on the eve of the Orange revolution (European Commission 
2004b: 9) when, as was revealed in Sections 4.1.2.2 and 4.2.1, de facto policies of 
the regime were becoming more authoritarian. 
Therefore, Ukraine’s importance for the West at the beginning of the 
2000s was based primarily on the extent of its possible detachment from Russia’s 
sphere of influence (Kubicek, 2005). The EU considered Kuchma a ‘useful bridge 
to Moscow’ (Youngs, 2009b: 360), and EU geopolitical interests overwhelmed its 
interests in democracy promotion. Simultaneously, the EU seconded the 
American initiative for democracy promotion as a tool for security promotion for 
pursuing mainly economic interests: the PCA between the EU and Ukraine 
concentrated on legal provisions for the control of goods, capital and labour 
(European Commission, 2003c) and offered no substantial tools for 
democratisation.  
The EU continued to encourage Ukraine’s European aspirations in almost 
every statement but provided neither proper ‘carrots’ (promise of membership) 
nor stringent ‘sticks’ (sanctions against authoritarianism) (Kubicek, 2005: 285), 
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and Ukraine’s domestic policies were equally declarative with regard to 
Europeanisation, as will be revealed in the next section. 
 
5.1.2. Ukraine’s multi-vector response to geopolitical challenges 
Since the beginning of Ukraine’s transition, Ukrainian elites promoted Ukraine’s 
sovereignty as a tool to trade more personal benefits (including from Russia) 
while simultaneously using closer ties with the EU as leverage against Russian 
influence in Ukraine.  
Accordingly, Kuchma’s multi-vector foreign policy aimed at a careful 
balance between Russia and the West, in which Ukraine’s declarations towards 
integration with the EU and joining the NATO did not impede Ukraine being 
heavily subsidised by Russian gas (Proedrou, 2010). Internally, the multi-vector 
foreign policy supported the aspiration of the majority of Ukrainians to maintain 
close and friendly relations with Russia, while simultaneously holding out a 
‘carrot’ to those who aspired for reintegration with Western Europe by joining the 
European Union (Makhorkina, 2005).  
This ‘middle ground’ position in Ukraine’s foreign policy derived from its 
internal balance of power as well. Whereas the president’s administration 
remained a primary determinant of Ukraine’s foreign policy, the Parliament, as 
was demonstrated in Chapter 4, constantly challenged the president’s authority. 
For example, when Kuchma turned to Russia at the beginning of the 2000s, most 
Ukrainian businesses, in contrast, were actively engaging in global markets. 
Ukraine’s economic growth at the beginning of the 2000s coincided with the 
successful redistribution of economic power and legalisation of oligarchs’ 
business activities, in which EU legislation could establish ‘civilised rules of the 
game’ (Melnykovska & Schweickert, 2008b: 15; D'Anieri, 2012: 454; interview 
11; Sections 4.1.2, 4.2.3 and 4.2.5). Also, the growth of business profits depended 
on Ukraine’s ability to benefit from its inclusion in global economy. 
Consequently, oligarch-dominated export-oriented industries lobbied for 
internationalisation and eventually sought out European association (Figure 4.6; 
Table 4.5).  
As a result, although Ukrainian officials had already declared the course 
for European integration as the only solution to Ukraine’s ills as early as the mid-
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1990s, Ukrainian oligarchs began to support this course only in the mid-2000s. A 
widespread view adopted by Ukrainian businessmen was to make money with 
Russia but to protect profits in Europe (Puglisi, 2008). The distribution of 
outward investment flows proves this point (Figure 5.1 ) along with the 
correlation between illicit financial flows and foreign direct investments (Kar & 
Spanjers, 2015). Thus, the accounts of Yanukovych and his entourage suspected 
in the embezzlement of funds were blocked in Switzerland, Liechtenstein (M.V., 
2014) and frozen in the EU, where Austria appeared to be the most popular 
destination (General Court of the EU, 2016). Accounts of Azarov and his family 
were found in Switzerland and Cyprus (Harding, 2016), while leaked documents 
from Mossack Fonseca (a Panamanian company that provides law and corporate 
services) has also demonstrated that the current president of Ukraine has a 
number of bank accounts in the British Virgin Islands, Cyprus and the 
Netherlands (Babinets & Lavrov, 2016).  
This notwithstanding, the scale of money laundering in Ukraine has 
remained extreme (estimated as over US$116 billion during 2004-2013, as was 
demonstrated in Figure 5.2). Supposedly, these funds were invested through 
‘intricate chains of shell companies, registered through tax havens’ in ‘European 
and American assets’ (Bullough, 2017), which, together with sufficient legal 
support from lawyers made it almost impossible to trace these funds or to prove 
their embezzlement (Interfax, 2017; Harding, 2016; M.V., 2014). 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Estimated illicit financial flows from Ukraine (mlns of nominal 
U.S. dollars) for the period 2004-2015. 









2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
 
181 
While the EU remained a popular destination for Ukrainian oligarchs to 
secure their finances, EU companies also served as a good leverage against 
heavily-capitalised Russian companies that could threaten Ukrainian business in 
Ukraine. Ukrainian oligarchs preserved rent-seeking schemes with their Russian 
colleagues (Proedrou, 2010: 453), while the EU provided Ukrainian business with 
better opportunities for financial growth (Puglisi, 2008).  
Altogether this explains the success of multi-vector foreign policy under 
Kuchma, although some division between pro-Russian and pro-European (pro-
Western) politicians penetrated the discourses of Ukraine’s politics after the 
Orange revolution. Those under Kuchma’s protectorate attempted to balance by 
presenting Russia as a part of Europe and portraying Ukraine not as a ‘buffer’ but 
as a ‘bridge’ between Europe and Russia (Kuzio, 2001a: 360), while the 
opposition split into ideologically driven national-democrats with either a clear 
Western-oriented stance (Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine) or rather pragmatic 
positions that emphasised the importance of Russia for Ukraine’s development 
(Tymoshenko’s Fatherland) as was partially revealed in Table 4.4. Yet most 
Ukrainian political forces began to support Ukraine’s greater openness and 
inclusion in regional and international organisations (Makhorkina, 2005), 
because pro-Western policies allowed local businessmen to protect themselves 
from Russian influence while simultaneously gaining access to the international 
market and, thus, profits from sales.  
Indicatively, Russian and Western politicians also viewed Ukraine’s multi-
vector foreign policy as capitalisation on Ukraine’s geopolitical importance for 
the sake of Western money and exploitation of privileged relations with Russia 
(Schularick, 2005: 241-4). However, due to the fact that both Russia and the West 
paid with respective kinship in order to lure Ukraine to their spheres of influence, 
one may conclude that this tactic of balancing generally benefited Ukrainian 
politicians. Moreover, as Ukrainian oligarchs remained key veto players in 
Ukraine’s politics, the EU could consider them a potential tool for bottom-up 
Europeanisation.  
As Ukraine stabilised its economy and started advancing with selected 
economic reforms (Table 4.2; Figure 4.6), the EU began to use market 
liberalisation as economic incentive that could push Ukrainian business elites 
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closer to the EU (Melnykovska & Schweickert, 2008a) without preluding 
Ukraine’s potential membership. By this process, economic integration still could 
result in Ukraine’s compliance with EU norms (European Commission, 1998a).  
However, Ukrainian oligarchs needed only ‘a minimum of formal 
institutions’ to engage in business in the international arena (Melnykovska & 
Schweickert, 2008b: 24). They did not intend to promote deep and 
comprehensive institutional reforms (Proedrou, 2010: 450), because those would 
have undermined existing corruption schemes (Chapter 4). As a result, if EU 
interests contradicted the expectations of Ukrainian oligarchs, Ukrainian elites 
restricted the EU’s impact on respective policy areas, and the same persists to the 
present day (interview13).   
As such, EU aspirations for Ukraine’s democratisation (insofar as there 
were any) on the eve of the Orange revolution were doomed to fail. Rather, the 
Orange revolution became a successful example of revolutionary regime change, 
in which the interests of anti-Kuchma oligarchs coincided with interests of the 
EU and the U.S. who viewed Kuchma’s reorientation to Russia as a bad 
geopolitical development.19 
During the 1990s, Russia, although remaining a regional hegemony, could 
not offer Ukraine any tangible benefits that would tempt it to remain in the orbit 
of Russian influence. Russia itself was undergoing a number of domestic 
transformations heavily relying on external assistance, including that of the U.S., 
EU and IFOs (Shevtsova, 2010). Russia’s weakness and course for alignment 
with Western institutions allowed Ukraine’s realignment with the EU. As a 
result, the EU’s regional economic dominance provided it with an opportunity to 
impact Ukraine to a greater degree than Russia (N. R. Smith, 2014a). However, 
after the entry into office of a new president (Putin) the situation changed. Russia 
resolved its Chechnya conflict and stepped into the zone of a stable economic 
growth, while Putin’s claim that Russia needed ‘strong state power’ (Putin, 1999) 
was realised in tightening authoritarianism (McFaul, 2004) and a more 
demanding foreign policy.  
                                               
19 in the aftermath of the Tapegate scandal Kuchma began to slowly loose support from his 
Western partners and reorienting towards Russia (p. 178 in this Chapter). 
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The 2000 Concept of the Russian Federation's Foreign Policy stressed that 
Russia’s calculations on ‘new equal, and mutually beneficial partner relations 
between Russia and the outside world’ were not justified. The country began to 
prioritise security interests and changed the focus of foreign policy towards 
cooperation with China and India as well as the formation of the Neighbourhood 
zone in Russia’s perimeter. The Concept also declared ‘security [of Russia], 
preservation and strengthening of its sovereignty as well as territorial integrity, 
strong and authoritative positions in international community that meet the 
interests of the Russian Federation as a great power the best’ a top priority in 
Russia’s foreign policy. 
Whereas the U.S. viewed cooperation with Russia as a necessary part of 
European security (particularly in the light of NATO enlargement), Russia was 
supposed to be second to U.S. democratisation and security efforts in the region 
(White House, 2006: 39) (including those in Ukraine). Meanwhile, Russia 
preferred a more independent approach, while the EU supported U.S. initiatives 
viewing the USA and particularly NATO as the guarantors of European security 
(EEAS, 2003: 6). 
Given the context of Russia’s influence in Ukraine, both the EU and the 
U.S. supported democracy promotion initiatives in the region as a tool to serve 
their security interests. With regard to Ukraine, this was reflected in that both the 
U.S. and the EU (through an OSCE mission) legitimised the claims of the 
opposition for power during the Orange revolution (A. Smith, 2015: 9-10). Their 
targeting of domestic agents through democratic revolutions was later confirmed 
as an efficient strategy for democracy promotion.   
The U.S. and the EU relied on a network of international and Ukrainian 
organisations, whose reports were reflected in Ukraine’s international rankings, 
including Freedom House (Beissinger, 2006; McFaul, 2007).  Youth and civil 
organisations that organised the protests had been trained under the aegis of the 
U.S. agencies and with participation of revolutionary activists from other post-
revolutionary states (Serbia and Georgia), visible in the construction of 
collaborative networks among youth and civil society (Bunce & Wolchik, 2007; 
McFaul, 2007).  
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Targeting of domestic actors was also reflected in the use of the desire of 
Ukrainian officials and oligarchs to be considered part of the international 
community and civilised world, described in Section 5.2.1 as leverage. 
Meanwhile, active linkage was reflected in the U.S. and EU officials denouncing 
the actions of authoritarian Ukrainian officials as opposed to expressing their 
support to the opposition forces, including through visits at high level during the 
electoral campaign (McFaul, 2007). In this regard, soft politics allowed to 
legitimise and create the positive image of Western-backed candidate 
Yushchenko when the Yanukovych camp tried to link Western support to the 
opposition leader (Lane, 2008; Wilson, 2006). 
With this background, although democracy promotion is not limited to a 
regime change (instead it should prioritise the strengthening of democratic 
institutions (Gershman & Allen, 2006)), the support towards the regime change 
was a key tool of democracy promotion by democratisers at the time. Moreover, 
it was viewed as a necessity in light of Kuchma’s reorientation to Russia and U.S. 
president Bush’s expansionist doctrine (A. Smith, 2015).  
As an outcome, although the EU and U.S. approaches with regard to 
democratisation are generally different (the EU professes a more ‘developmental’ 
approach that views institution-building as part of broader national development, 
while the U.S. supports ‘political’ and agent-centred changes), both actors have 
complemented each other’s actions throughout Ukraine’s transition and 
especially during ‘democratic revolutions’ (Carothers, 2009).  
Although the Orange revolution is often viewed as a sudden success that 
provided the EU with opportunities for political expansion (Youngs, 2009b), this 
expansion had been launched prior to the event. In its Communication of 2003, 
the EU had established the concept of ‘Wider Europe’ and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), paving a basis for so-called ‘association without 
membership’ (European Commission, 2003a) (some details on the programme 
have been already provided in Chapter 2). In 2004, the official launch of the ENP 
confirmed a course for a new type of relations that were ‘distinct from the 
possibilities available to European countries under Article 49 of the Treaty on 
European Union’ (European Commission, 2004a: 3). 
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The ENP once again stressed its objective of ‘strengthening stability, 
security and well-being’ in the region (p. 3) by means of rapprochement with the 
EU, including joining the EU’s Internal Market, implementation of EU norms 
(rule of law, good governance, human rights, market economy and sustainable 
development) as well as joining ‘certain ... aspects of the EU’s external action’ 
such as the struggle against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and conflict resolution (European Commission, 2004a: 3). Thereby, 
the ENP allowed the EU to satisfy its interests in trade, democracy promotion 
and security in Ukraine. 
However, Russia viewed this policy as an offensive against its own living 
space, because the share of the EU in Ukraine’s trade and investment was steadily 
growing (Figure 5.1, Table 5.4), and the EU’s political engagement in Ukraine 
similarly increased.  
 
Table 5.4 Ukraine’s main trade partners by region (%) and balance of trade 


















1996 57.5% 24.4% 11.1% 6.9% -4.0 -1.2 2.2 -0.3 
1997 49.1% 27.9% 15.1% 7.9% -4.3 -1.8 3.0 0.2 
1998 44.2% 31.9% 14.3% 9.6% -3.7 -1.0 2.1 0.5 
1999 42.5% 30.4% 17.0% 10.1% -3.5 0.2 2.5 0.6 
2000 43.8% 30.2% 15.1% 10.9% -3.6 0.5 2.6 1.0 
2001 42.0% 32.1% 15.6% 10.3% -4.2 0.8 3.0 0.9 
2002 38.0% 34.1% 18.1% 9.9% -4.6 0.9 3.9 0.8 
2003 37.8% 36.0% 16.3% 9.9% -5.5 0.8 3.5 1.3 
2004 38.3% 33.5% 17.5% 10.8% -6.8 1.5 5.6 3.4 
2005 39.1% 32.0% 18.8% 10.1% -6.5 -1.9 3.9 2.6 
2006 38.9% 34.0% 17.5% 9.5% -7.8 -4.1 2.3 2.9 
2007 39.6% 33.0% 18.1% 9.2% -7.4 -8.3 1.8 2.5 
2008 37.1% 30.9% 20.6% 11.4% -10.2 -10.7 0.4 1.9 
2009 39.0% 29.3% 21.9% 9.8% -6.2 -5.9 5.6 0.8 
2010 40.5% 28.7% 21.2% 9.6% -8.0 -6.1 3.7 1.0 
2011 42.0% 29.0% 20.5% 8.5% -11.0 -7.8 4.5 0.1 
2012 39.0% 28.2% 22.7% 10.1% -9.2 -9.1 0.5 1.9 
2013 35.6% 31.2% 22.8% 10.3% -5.9 -10.3 1.6 0.9 
2014 29.7% 35.1% 24.2% 11.0% -2.4 -4.1 4.5 1.4 
2015 24.2% 37.5% 25.9% 12.4% -2.7 -2.3 5.1 0.5 
2016 19.3% 40.5% 27.4% 12.8% -2.5 -3.6 2.9 0.4 
2017 19.8% 41.3% 25.5% 13.5% -4.6 -3.3 2.3 -0.8 
 
Source(s): SSCU 
Note(s): Data for 2014 and 2015 exclude Crimea, Sevastopol, and the territories of Donbas 
where the ATO is conducted. 
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Indicatively, while Russia simultaneously stressed a need to create a 
‘stable and united Euro Atlantic region — from Vancouver to Vladivostok, not 
allowing its new fragmentation’ (Administration of the President of the Russian 
Federation, 2008), the EU did the same by intending to extend the ‘European 
peace project’ without drawing ‘new dividing lines in Europe’ (European 
Commission, 2003: 9). However and although both parties declared the same 
peaceful aims, their integration projects clashed in the neighbourhood region, 
where Ukraine became the apple of discord. 
 
5.2. The EU in Ukraine’s Europeanisation after the 
Orange and Maidan revolutions  
Whereas Russia represented the main source of the EU’s geopolitical entrapment, 
geopolitics also closely interrelated with the EU’s normative entrapment in 
Ukraine. The latter is evidenced in the communicative entrapment, conditioned 
by the definition of Europeanness and criteria for becoming a European state, 
which was and is important for Ukraine in the context of its Europeanisation. 
 
5.2.1. The implications of association with no membership 
Although the EU genuinely supported the Orange revolution, it did not initiate 
Ukraine’s democratic breakthrough per se. Rather the success of the Orange 
revolution ‘de-entrapped’ EU strategic aims, allowing to combine strategic 
(geopolitical and trade interests) and normative (democracy promotion) aims in 
the flow of rapprochement with Ukraine (Youngs, 2009b: 366-7). For new 
Ukrainian officials, integration with the EU and NATO became a first priority 
(Yushchenko, 2005), allowing the EU to promote its policies (such as the ENP). 
One of the signs of this was the adoption of the Country Strategy Paper 
2007-2013 that declared an aim ‘to develop an increasingly close relationship, 
going beyond past levels of cooperation to gradual economic integration and 
deeper political cooperation, including on foreign and security policy’ (European 
Commission, 2007c: 2). Ukraine was being subjected to the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and ‘to the external dimension of the EU’s 
internal policies’ (Strategy Paper, p. 2). In contrast, the EU’s support for such 
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important areas as democracy, good governance and administrative capacity-
building was realised primarily through the intensification of trade and 
investment relations, poverty reduction and through the promotion of stability 
and security in the region (Strategy Paper, pp. 3-4). Therefore, the Strategy Paper 
did not provide any clear mechanisms for Ukraine’s democratisation apart from 
the assumption that overall economic stability would almost automatically 
deliver positive results with regard to Ukraine’s transition to democracy and 
market economy. 
However, in order to monitor the implementation of the Strategy in 
Ukraine, two National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) for the periods 2007-2010 
and 2011-2013 were established on the basis of the ENPI, a financial tool of the 
ENP. The Action Plan, established as an instrument of the ENP in 2004, also 
advanced the monitoring of the situation in Ukraine. The plan was negotiated by 
the parties (Petrovic & Klatt, 2015) and included a number of indicators that 
allowed the monitoring of Ukraine’s progress in reforms and, therefore, 
elaborated on the Strategy Paper regarding more specific issues.  
The first Action Plan for Ukraine was adopted for three years beginning in 
2005 and was followed by annual reports. The 2005-2008 Plan emphasised the 
scale and comprehensiveness of reforms that Ukraine had to undertake. In the 
field of political dialogue, an emphasis was made on democracy promotion (free 
elections, reforms of the judiciary and administration, struggle against corruption) 
and cooperation on foreign and security policy (European Commission, 2005: 3-
7). The EU also promoted principles of market economy by approximating 
Ukraine’s legal regulations to European laws (the same was applied to trade and 
investment regulations, taxation, competition policy, intellectual and property 
rights) and the implementation of structural reforms (especially privatisation and 
the reduction of the role of state in price-formation and banking) (pp. 8-9).  
Initially, some progress was achieved: Ukraine held free parliamentary 
elections in 2006, constitutional reform was launched, and the country joined the 
Council of Europe’s group of states against corruption (GRECO), which 
improved Ukraine’s positions on electoral freedom and human rights (European 
Commission, 2009d). However, this progress was limited. Implementation of 
reforms ‘lagged ... due to long pre- and post-election periods of political 
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instability’ (European Commission, 2006b), which continued throughout the late 
2000s. Ukraine has not accomplished its constitutional or judicial reform 
(European Commission, 2009d); the parliamentary changes in the electoral law 
were criticised and no progress was made in the anti-corruption struggle 
(European Commission, 2010c). This half-hearted reform overlapped with the 
situation described in Sections 4.2.3, 4.2.4 and 5.1.2 and may be observed with 
regard to the efficiency of the ENPI as well. 
As Table 5.5 illustrates, throughout 2007-2010, the effect of the ENPI was 
rather similar to that of the TACIS (Table 5.3). Implementation of reforms was 
not balanced, especially with regard to democracy and good governance. On the 
other hand, the EU committed more funds than initially programmed and its 
support could have been greater if Ukraine had aspired to the implementation of 
reforms.  
 
Table 5.5 EU aid to Ukraine under the ENPI by sectors (in %) and by 
years of the NIP (mln euro) for the periods 2007-2010 and 2011-2013. 
National Indicative Programme (NIP) 
Ukraine 2007-2010 
Programmed Committed 
Support for democratic development and 
good governance 
30% 7% 
Support for regulatory reform and 
administrative capacity building 
30% 42% 
Support for infrastructure development 40% 51% 
Total NIP 2007-2010 494 mln euro 522.6 mln euro 
National Indicative Programme (NIP) 
Ukraine 2011-2013 
Programmed Committed 
Good governance and the rule of law 20-30% 20% 
Facilitation of the entry into force of the 
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 
(including a DCFTA) 
25-35% 28% 
Sustainable development 45-55% 52% 
Total NIP 2011-2013 470 mln euro 483 mln euro 
Grand total Ukraine 2007-2013 964 mln euro 10005.6 mln 
euro 
 




Yet Ukraine’s market liberalisation succeeded only to a degree and only 
when the EU (European Commission, 2003b) and the U.S. pushed for Ukraine’s 
internationalisation. In 2005, the U.S. declared Ukraine a market economy; in 
2008, Ukraine gained membership in the WTO, which created a basis for its 
economic rapprochement with the EU. However, Ukraine still had to promote 
structural reforms of its economy (European Commission, 2006b), while 
Ukraine’s officials generally neglected reforms in administrative and judiciary 
frameworks, taxation and property rights (European Commission, 2009d). As a 
result, Ukraine lagged behind East Central European states and most Balkan 
post-communist states with its progress in economic transition (Table 1.1 and 
Table 1.2). 
Such ambiguous outcomes of EU policies in post-revolutionary Ukraine 
could be generally explained by the EU’s overemphasised belief in Ukrainian 
elites, whose obsession with the struggle for power led to chronic political 
stalemate and prevented the country from reforming. Yet the ENP itself also had 
a number of flaws that made this policy unfit for substantial democracy 
promotion. 
Whereas the takeover of the Orange coalition symbolised the normative 
victory of the EU and boosted Ukraine’s aspiration for a European future, the 
EU’s declarative support and even enhanced mechanism of cooperation (the 
ENPI and Action Plans) was not enough to sustain these aspirations. By 
removing the membership ‘carrot’ from agenda, the EU devalued its capacity to 
inspire and motivate Ukraine’s elites and people to more substantial reforms 
(Petrovic & Klatt, 2015).  
EU-Ukraine Action Plans remained rather superficial in terms of problems 
they tackled. Apart from the Twinning programme that aimed at capacity-
building of the Ukrainian agencies, the areas of cooperation tackled either EU 
strategic interests (stability of gas transit, enhanced trade and control over 
irregular migration) or social developments (transport infrastructure and 
demographics in Ukraine) (Table 5.6). This limitation of the Action Plans derived 
from the limitations of the ENP itself. 
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Table 5.6 Priorities in EU-Ukraine cooperation for the period 2007-2009  







EUBAM (EU Border Assistance 
Mission to Moldova and 
Ukraine) 
Control over irregular migration, approximation of Ukraine’s border 
management with EU/Schengen standards 
35 
Twinning (institutional 
cooperation between public 
administrations) 
Building up the capacity of the Ukrainian ministries and agencies to commit 
ENP Action Plan and related agreements 
20 
Energy Strategy in Ukraine Ukraine’s integration in the EU Energy Market and stability of gas transit 






Promoting mutual trade Gradual integration of Ukraine into the EU Internal Market 45 
Twinning Building up the capacity of the Ukrainian ministries and agencies to commit 
ENP Action Plan and related agreements 
21 







Transport Strategy in Ukraine Institutional reform in transport sector (European Commission, 2009b, Annex 1: 
5)  
65 
Environmental strategy in 
Ukraine 
Sustainable development of society and demographic situation (European 
Commission, 2009b, Annex 2: 14)  
35 
Twinning   and   ENP   support   
technical assistance (European 
Commission, 2009b: 3) 
Building up the capacity of the Ukrainian ministries and agencies to commit 
ENP Action Plan and related agreements, to prepare Ukraine towards the 
implementation of the DCFTA, and to provide sector-wide support (European 
Commission, Annex 3, 2009b: 22)  
16 
 
Source(s): European Commission, ENPI Annual programmes  
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For Ukraine, the concept of association with no membership was 
ultimately vague. EU demands for reforms were seen as those that required 
almost no efforts from the EU but massive obligations from Ukraine (N. R. 
Smith, 2014a). Ukraine demanded guarantees from the EU before taking any 
further steps in reform, while the EU viewed the implementation of reforms as an 
inalienable precondition for the beginning of any negotiations on future EU-
Ukraine relations.  
Moreover, both parties implied different meanings of Europeanness as 
well. While EU officials abided by the content of association with no 
membership, Ukrainian people and officials began to push for political 
rapprochement viewing membership as their final aim. 
In this regard, although the EU had established a monopoly on the notion 
of Europeanness, it could not continue its enlargement without damaging this 
image. Meanwhile, belonging to the European in-bound group remained 
inextricably linked with membership in the EU (Haukkala, 2008a). As a result, 
the EU preserved the status quo by limiting the content of Europeanness to the 
decisions of the European Commission on the implementation of ENP-related 
Action Plans (Leino & Petrov, 2009), and the EU’s approach on determining 
which states are eligible to become its members remained and remains rather 
vague (Wallace, 1992).  
Indeed, stable democratic institutions, a market economy and the ability of 
a potential member to meet its obligations in the EU (the Copenhagen criteria) 
allow the EU to reinforce its values in the candidate countries, but these values 
remain highly abstract, and only EU bodies may decide on whether the 
candidates meet their demands of membership or not (Article 49 of the Treaty on 
European Union, p. 43). Moreover, whereas ‘any European state which respects 
the [European] values’ may become a member of the EU (Article 49), this 
Europeanness is ‘geographic’ (European Commission, 2018d), which does not 
explain why integration has been removed from agenda for some states which are 
geographically European such as Ukraine. 
Most Ukrainian respondents considered Ukraine a European state in 
cultural and historical terms (albeit not political and economic, according to 
Razumkov Centre (2012)), and while popular support for the Western course has 
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not been definitive among the Ukrainian public, Ukrainian officials have largely 
succeeded in shaping Ukraine’s pro-European aspirations: 
 
 
Figure. Results of public opinion poll, ‘In your opinion should Ukraine 
join the EU?’ 
Source(s): Razumkov Centre (2016c: 7) 
 
First, Ukraine’s policy-makers declared Ukraine a European state. 
According to the law On the key directions of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine of 
1993, Ukraine aimed for ‘the restoration of ... connections with European 
civilisation’, acceleration of democratisation and market reforms through closer 
cooperation with Western European states (Article 3A, point 1B). Ukraine 
aspired to become ‘an influential European state’ (the Article 3A, point 1C) and 
was labelled ‘a European state’ by Article 11, part 1 of the law On the principles 
of Domestic and Foreign policy of Ukraine dated 2010. Importantly, both laws 
declared EU membership a main priority in Ukraine’s foreign policy.  
The EU’s ‘association with no membership’ was perceived as ‘virtual’ 
policy in Ukraine (Kuzio, 2003: ). Ukraine’s status of ‘as plausible ... candidate 
for EU membership as New Zealand’ (Kubicek, 2005: 280) was almost an insult 
to Ukrainian officials (Youngs, 2009b). Yet Ukraine’s official pro-European 
rhetoric lacked substantial reform as was revealed in Chapter 4, further explored 
in this section and will be further revealed in Section 5.2.3.2. 
Meanwhile, the importance of the membership incentive also lay in related 
financial benefits such as substantially higher volumes of financial and technical 

























































































risk and reform (this would be later claimed by the Azarov’s government in 
2013). As was demonstrated on pp. 173-4 of this Chapter, the TACIS and 
PHARE programmes were very different in their scope and focus, and although 
EU assistance cannot be measured in financial terms alone, the scale of technical 
and expert assistance under the PHARE programme was incomparably higher 
than that for the remaining post-communist states.  
Moreover, the urgency and timing of the respective programmes also 
demonstrates that EU assistance reached East Central European states earlier 
than former Soviet republics due to visible interest of local elites in receiving this 
assistance (Petrovic, 2013; Section 2.2.2 of this thesis). Potentially, EU interest in 
Ukraine’s reforms could have been greater if Ukrainian elites had demonstrated a 
similar request of their own (Table 5.5). However, in an absence of such requests, 
EU democratisation efforts in Ukraine fell behind those of security and trade, as 
mentioned in the previous section.  
Ukraine failed to meet the democratic criteria of the EU at the beginning 
of the 2000s and again in the 2010s. Ukrainian politicians concentrated on pro-
European declarations (including those enumerated in the legal provisions 
mentioned above) but not on actual reforms, and, even potentially, Ukraine could 
only become eligible for EU membership if it met the political and economic 
conditions of the EU.  
Against this background and given the position of EU officials, it had to be 
apparent to Ukrainian people and officials that Ukraine’s rapprochement with the 
EU was generally ‘welcomed’ (European Commission, 2005) but only in the 
context of those aspects of cooperation that the EU declared in the ENP. 
Meanwhile, the EU had no plans for Ukraine’s accession and Ukraine’s progress 
in reforms remained its own problem.  
 
5.2.2. The Eastern Partnership and the EU’s ‘rhetorical entrapment’  
Throughout the 2000s, EU-Ukraine relations could be characterised as 
temporising. After the big bang of 2004 and the accession of Bulgaria and 
Romania, the EU began to experience enlargement fatigue. The EU not only 
required more time to absorb already accepted members, the opening of 
negotiations with the Balkan States and Turkey also raised a number of debates 
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around the necessity of the EU’s further enlargement in the context of historical, 
civilisational, political and socio-economic explanations (Petrovic, 2013: 139-40; 
Phinnemore, 2006). Ukraine was not viewed as part of old or/and new Europe, 
which together with above-mentioned context explained the comparative lack of 
EU interest in further enlargement.  
However, instead of clarifying its position on the normative agenda, the 
EU continued to tighten the accession conditions for the candidate states, which 
complicated the accession process (Petrovic, 2013: Chapter 5; 2017). Indeed, this 
prevented the EU’s further enlargement but made it less attractive for those states 
that remained outside the European club. Moreover, while tightening of the 
accession conditions may be explained by a more complex socio-cultural and 
political context of the candidates, EU accession preferences continued to remain 
vague and momentum-driven. While the accession of Romania and Bulgaria was 
accompanied albeit with geopolitical concerns, the membership of Turkey 
became increasingly marginalised in the agenda primarily due to civilisational 
rather than normative differences — at least not until the more recent 
deterioration in relations between the EU and Erdogan’s Turkey (Casanova, 
2006; Müftüler‐Bac, 1998). Accordingly Ukraine began to draw parallels between 
its own and the Turkish case (interview9-1; Kuzio, 2006; Schimmelfennig, 2008). 
Finally, the EU also experienced ‘rhetorical entrapment’ between strategic 
geopolitical constraints such as Russia and normative constraints of association 
without membership in Ukraine (Youngs, 2009b). From a normative perspective, 
the EU had to maintain its course of democracy promotion. However from 
geopolitical perspective, both Russia and the EU encouraged Ukraine to join their 
integration projects, which forced the competing actors to make certain 
concessions to Ukrainian officials. This created a situation when, on the one 
hand, the EU has rhetorically supported democracy promotion in Ukraine, but, 
on the other hand, it has neither sanctioned the Ukrainian government for 
violation of EU norms (in order not to become a less attractive integration pole) 
nor provided a membership incentive which could have pushed for 
democratisation (for reasons described in the beginning of this section).  
Therefore, only such domestic breakthroughs as the Orange revolution 
could provide the EU with a legitimate cover to push for more reforms in 
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Ukraine. Yet, as the initial stage of this single de-entrapment passed with the end 
of the Orange revolution, the rhetorical trap resumed and EU-Ukraine relations 
reversed to the state of ‘the door neither closed nor open’ (Youngs, 2009b: 367-8) 
— a narrative that remains present to this day (c3EU5,6).  
As demonstrated above, the number of problems in the ENP required 
action, and the solution seemed to be found in tightening relations between the 
parties. The Eastern Partnership (EaP), a sub-policy of the ENP was launched in 
2009 for six post-Soviet states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, 
and Ukraine, and it aimed at accelerating reapproachment between the EU and 
its Eastern neighbours.  
While the EU generally confirmed the need to ‘strengthen’ the ENP 
(European Commission, 2006a; Council of the EU, 2006: 18), new members 
from East Central Europe and the Baltic states were a driving force behind the 
initiative (Petrovic & Klatt, 2015). Poland even presented ‘the deal as a path 
toward EU membership’ (Goldirova, 2008), and since the EU’s ambiguous 
position on association persisted due to the differences among its member-states 
and consensus policies that derived from negotiating these different positions, the 
EaP became a reflection of a temporary consensus on Ukraine and other Eastern 
neighbours (Haukkala, 2008a; N. R. Smith, 2014a; Youngs, 2009b).  
The consensus lay in strengthening bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
in Eastern Europe by signing association agreements, establishing deep and 
comprehensive free trade areas (that could ‘grow into a Neighbourhood 
Economic Community in the longer term’), enhancing people-to-people contacts 
and supporting economic and social development (European Commission, 
2008b: 3) without providing the neighbours with any membership incentive. 
The EaP aimed to ‘accelerate political association and further economic 
integration between the European Union and interested partner countries’ 
(Council of the European Union, 2009c: 5), wherein economic convergence and 
mobility of citizens (visa liberalisation) were to motivate EU neighbours to 
reform, while cooperation on energy (‘supply and transit’) and institution-
building (strengthening administrative capacity ‘through training, technical 
assistance and any appropriate innovative measures’ (8, 7) allowed the EU to 
achieve its strategic aims in the region. 
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The EaP also included a promise to provide the participants with more 
economic assistance (Petrovic & Klatt, 2015) by gradually increasing EU aid 
throughout 2010-2013 (European Commission, 2010d: 3; Figure 5.3) and 
introducing macro-financial assistance (Council of the European Union, 2011a: 
4). The aid was to support institution-building (AAs, visa liberalisation, 
Twinning), regional development programmes (infrastructure, human capital, 
small and medium enterprises) and four policy platforms (democracy promotion, 
economic integration, energy security and people-to-people contacts). Therefore, 
the EaP targeted not only national and local governments (through twinning 
contracts) but also civil society and small and medium enterprises (European 
Commission, 2010d: 4, 8). As such, the EU wanted to persuade Eastern 
neighbours to ‘mutually commit’ to its norms and policies (European 
Commission, 2008b) in exchange for more economic assistance (Petrovic & 
Klatt, 2015). For Ukraine that meant that the EU offered economic integration as 
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replace the Action Plan as a more advanced instrument of EU-Ukraine bilateral 
cooperation (European Commission, 2009e). The EaP intensified the process of 
rapprochement, providing Ukraine with closer level of cooperation with the EU, 
yet without the prospect of membership. The upcoming Association Agreement 
was to facilitate Ukraine’s ‘greater political association and economic integration 
with the EU’ (Council of the European Union, 2009a: 4), wherein the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) became a main component of the 
upcoming Agreement. 
It is hard to judge, however, whether this initiative allowed the EU to 
motivate Ukrainian political elites for reforms (Haukkala, 2008a) or to approach 
Ukrainian oligarchs (Melnykovska & Schweickert, 2008b) and promote EU trade 
interests in Ukraine, because the economic effects of such cooperation were 
dubious. Although EU investments poured into the country due to the interest of 
foreign investors in Ukraine’s market (Figure 5.1 ), Cyprus remained dominant in 
the inward and outward EU investment flows. Since the DCFTA had not been 
signed, the EU market also remained closed to those Ukrainian goods that made 
a core of Ukraine’s exports to the EU (steel and agricultural products) (Haukkala, 
2008a), and such a situation did not favour Ukraine’s interests.  
Moreover, economic incentives turned subsequent EU-Ukraine 
negotiations on political and economic association into a tool of trade between 
the parties, because the EU’s offering of economic integration overlapped with 
the hope of its officials that the EU’s remaining neighbours would remain outside 
the European club, while Ukrainian authorities intended to gain more benefits 
and aid from the EU.  
Meanwhile, Ukraine’s presidential elections of 2010 ended with the 
victory of Yanukovych who had lost during the Orange revolution and was 
viewed as rather pro-Russian. Nevertheless, Yanukovych sought a solution that 
allowed deeper integration with Russia without precluding an association 
agreement with the EU (D'Anieri, 2012). Ukraine maintained the course of the 
previous government and the decision to sign the AA, including the DCFTA, 
declared during the Yanukovych presidency.  
At the 2010 Ukraine-EU Summit, Ukraine undertook a number of 
obligations on reforms (including constitutional, regulatory, administrative, and 
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energy), wherein ‘the depth of the EU-Ukraine relationship’ was to ‘be 
determined by the implementation of reforms and by further consolidation of 
common values’ (Council of the European Union, 2010: 1). The same condition 
was confirmed at the 2011 EaP Summit (Council of the European Union, 2011a: 
2). Economic reforms and strengthening institutional capacity were set as key 
priorities for all the EaP states. 
This was evident in three priorities of the NIP for Ukraine for 2011-2013. 
The first priority referred to good governance and the rule of law concentrating 
on judicial reform, combatting corruption and organised crime, border 
management as well as reform in public administration (culture of transparency 
promoted mainly through human resource management) and public finance 
(accountability of government expenditure and approximation of the tax system 
in line with EU standards). Other priorities lay in the facilitation of the AA and 
DCFTA and the achievement of Ukraine’s sustainable development through 
Ukraine’s integration into the European Energy Market and Trans-European 
Transport Network, environmental protection, regional and rural development 
(European Commission, 2011c: 4, 8-24).  
Similar aims were marked in respective Annual Action Programmes, with 
the EU combining its conditionality and socialisation mechanisms. On the one 
hand, the EU supported justice reform and Twinning programme and, on the 
other hand, it emphasised people-to-people contacts, participatory governance 
and social infrastructure (in Crimea) as examples of regional and community 
development (Table 5.7).  
In contrast to the 2007-2009 Annual Programmes (Table 5.6), EU 
programmes after the launch of the EaP were becoming more context- and 
reform-oriented. Whereas Twinning technical assistance represented the only 
instrument of institutional support during 2007-2009, throughout 2010-2013 the 
EU additionally promoted community-oriented initiatives (regional development 
policy, regional policy and community-based approach) aimed at local 
development and self-administration. EU programmes also incorporated plans for 
specific reforms such as those in the justice sector in 2010 or civil service in 2011 
(Table 5.7).  
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On the other hand, the evolution of the programmes also demonstrates 
that despite the EU’s continued socialisation mechanisms in its policies regarding 
Ukraine, the EU was much more limited in its promotion of conditionality 
because the Ukrainian officials professed a rational approach and implemented 
only those EU demands that met their political interests. Although the EU 
committed more assistance to Ukraine from 2011, the gap between committed 
and implemented funds continued to steadily grow (Figure 5.3). 
Due to the fact that economic recovery was a key priority in Yanukovych 
and his Party of Regions agenda, his government concentrated on fiscal 
consolidation and economic reforms (including a gas sector reform of 2010 that 
allowed Ukraine to join the European Energy Community in 2011) but neglected 
constitutional reform. Whereas regulation of business activities was enhanced, 
the situation with regard to human rights and elections was deteriorating 
(European Commission 2011d; 2012c). By 2012, EU cooperation with Ukraine 
progressed mainly in the field of energy (joining the Energy Community Treaty) 
and visa liberalisation (European Commission, 2012c), while the only hallmark 
of reforms in 2013 was the Criminal Procedure Code (European Commission, 
2014d).  
Accordingly, the adoption of EU normative documents was limited to the 
areas of interest of the Ukrainian decision-makers, who eventually undermined 
EU conditionality. Socialisation remained weak and the EU strategy of 
democracy promotion was confined to formal democratisation (Casier, 2011). 
Against this background, the AA appeared as the only tool that could push 
Ukraine’s elites towards the implementation of comprehensive institutional 
changes.  
The EU began to emphasise the efficacy of governance (Youngs, 2009a), 
because strengthening ‘the capacity of the Ukrainian administration to face the 
integration challenge’ (European Commission, 2009a: 20) could enable the 
Action Plan, the Association Agreement and the DCFTA (22). However, at the 
time, the EU did not promote transparency or accountability of governance in 
Ukraine (Youngs, 2009a), which weakened any potential impact on substantive 
democracy promotion.  
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While some initiatives towards reforms in the justice sector and public 
administration were included in EU-Ukraine Action Plans in 2010 and 2011, by 
2013 the focus of cooperation shifted towards regional cooperation and more 
interest-driven issues such as energy, transport and migration (Table 5.7). 
Simultaneously, EU efforts within the EaP were built in a way that 
allowed the EU to realise its interests in Ukraine as well as to motivate Ukraine’s 
elites to comply with EU requirements. Political association represented a tool for 
democracy promotion and promotion of EU security interests; economic 
cooperation provided Ukraine with a financial carrot while satisfying EU trade 
interests; cooperation in the field of mobility opened opportunities for greater 
socialisation (people-to-people contacts) simultaneously protecting the European 
border from uncontrolled migration (Table 5.6, Table 5.7 and Table 5.8).  
As such the AA became a consolidated framework for bilateral 
cooperation that could potentially satisfy the interests of both partners, albeit to 
the extent determined by the EU and under its guidance. Yet the problem of the 
ENP as a top-down approach remained unresolved (Haukkala, 2008a; 
Korosteleva, 2011). Ukraine was put in a position of a student, because it could 
not shape European norms and because the EU could not allow a non-member to 
determine the content of its norms. Simultaneously, the EU could not clearly 
explain what exactly it was promoting under the aegis of ‘shared norms and 
values’ (Korosteleva, 2011). As a result, cooperation between the parties became 
limited to the discussion around the upcoming AA and DCFTA, and 
negotiations became a bargaining game. 
Whereas the AA appeared as a tool that could result in Ukraine’s 
democratisation through ‘convergence and approximation ... to European Union 
values, standards and norms’ in ‘political, economic and legal areas’ (Council of 
the European Union, 2011c) including through ‘approximation with the EU 
acquis [in all sectors] and the overall modernisation of Ukraine’s institutions’ 
(European Commission, 2012c: 2), Ukraine required guarantees from the EU. 
Ukrainian elites were interested in certain material benefits more than vaguely 





Table 5.7 Priorities in EU-Ukraine cooperation for the period 2010-2013.  







Support to the Justice Sector 
Policy Reforms in Ukraine 
Reforms in justice sector (European Commission, 2010a, Annex 1: 4) 10 
Support to the Joint 
Cooperation Initiative in 
Crimea 
Social and economic development in the region through the promotion 
of tourism, development of social infrastructure, and attraction of 
investments (European Commission, 2010a, Annex 2: 16) 
12 
Community Based Approach 
phase II 
Strengthening participatory governance and community-based 
initiatives through enhancing citizenry participation in decision-making 
and energy efficiency (European Commission, 2010a, Annex 3: 41) 
17 
Twinning and ENP Support 
Technical assistance 
‘Meeting the objectives of the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda, as well 
as prepare for implementation of the Association Agreement and the 
DCFTA’ (European Commission, 2010a, Annex 4: 49) 
11 
EU 2010 Contribution to the 
Eastern Europe Energy 
Efficiency and Environment 
Partnership Fund (European 
Commission, 2010a: 3) 
Energy efficiency and environmental projects (European Commission, 




over 55 mln 
euro) 
Support to the Border 
Management Sector Policy in 
Ukraine (European 
Commission, 2010b: 3) 
‘Secure borders and the facilitation of legal movements of persons and 









Support to EU-Ukraine 
Agreements 
Raising Ukraine’s institutional capacities to meet the demands of and to 
implement the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, including the 
DCFTA, and visa liberalisation dialogue (European Commission, 
2011a, Annex 1: 4) 
30 
Support to Ukraine's Regional 
Development Policy 
‘Social, economic and territorial cohesion of the country’ (European 
Commission, 2011b, Annex 1: 5) 
20 
Second EU Contribution to the 
Eastern Europe Energy 
Efficiency and Environment 
Partnership Fund 
Energy efficiency and environmental projects (European Commission, 
2011b, Annex 2: 15) 
15 
Reform of the Administrative 
Legal Framework and Civil 
Service in Ukraine 
Implementation of the Action Plan, the EU-Ukraine Association 
Agenda and the support of Public Administration Reform through a 
coherent legal framework (including Code of Administrative 
Procedures), law on civil service, reform in justice service (European 






Framework Programme in 
support of EU-Ukraine 
Agreements 
Preparation and implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement, including the DCFTA and visa dialogue/Visa 
Liberalisation Action Plan (European Commission, 2012a, Annex 1: 6) 
27 
Support for migration and 
asylum management in Ukraine 
Alignment of Ukraine’s migration management with European 
standards and in line with visa liberalisation (European Commission, 
2012a, Annex 2: 18) 
28 
Third EU Contribution to the 
Eastern Europe Energy 
Efficiency and Environment 
Partnership Fund 
Energy efficiency and environmental projects (European Commission, 




Ukraine’s Energy Strategy Support of Ukraine’s energy needs and preparing for the the    
Association Agreement/DCFTA (European Commission, 2012b, 
Annex 1: 12) 
45 
Community Based Approach to 
Local Development – CBA 
Phase II 
Strengthening participatory governance and community-based 
initiatives through enhancing citizenry participation in decision-
making, energy efficiency, networking and community mobilisation 








Improving Ukraine’s cohesion through the promotion of 
competitiveness of regions, territorial socio-economic integration and 
effective state governance (European Commission, 2013, Annex 1: 11) 
55 
National Environmental Policy EU environmental acquis approximation and support towards 
Ukraine’s Water Policy (European Commission, 2013, Annex 2: 373) 
55 
Sector Policy Support 
Programme 
Support towards Ukraine’s gradual integration in the EU Internal 
Market through the implementation of the AA and DCFTA in the area 
of technical barriers to trade, harmonization with EU regulatory 
framework and institutional infrastructure (European Commission, 
2013, Annex 3: 65) 
55 
Support to EU-Ukraine 
Agreements 
Raising Ukraine’s institutional capacity to implement the EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement, including the DCFTA, and visa 
liberalisation/Visa Liberalisation Action Plan by improving ‘policy 
making system and institutional framework’, introducing ‘state aid 
control system in Ukraine’, supporting ‘participation of Ukrainian 
administrations in selected EU programmes’ (European Commission, 
2013, Annex 4: 82) 
21 
 
Source(s): European Commission, ENPI Annual programmes  
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In this regard, the membership incentive could have become a solution for 
Ukraine, but the EU’s official discourse remained the same. Although Ukraine 
was declared ‘a European country with European identity’ that shared ‘a 
common history and common values’ with the EU (Council of the European 
Union, 2011c), the prospect of Ukraine’s membership remained outside 
discussion. The EU’s position during the negotiations on the AA also revealed 
that its overall approach in Ukraine had not changed since the victory of the 
Orange revolution and had therefore not been elaborated upon. EU 
representatives refused to include any allusion to Ukraine’s potential membership 
in the text of the Agreement or to go for broader economic concessions (Azarov, 
2013). 
Therefore, although the EaP implied an increase in economic assistance 
for Eastern Europe (Petrovic & Klatt, 2015), this support depended on the signing 
of the AA and DCFTA. As Figure 5.3 demonstrates, there was no significant 
growth in aid for Ukraine following 2012, while the absence of the prospect of 
membership did not provide Ukraine with any guarantees on how to compensate 
for a potential loss of Russian market. Ukraine could not remain simultaneously 
part of the European and Russian economic projects (this will be revealed in 
more detail in Section 5.3), but in the course of EU-Ukraine negotiations on the 
AA EU officials provided no solution to this problem (Azarov, 2013). 
The trading aspect of the negotiations received even more attention in the 
context of the geopolitical situation in the region. By pushing for political 
association and economic integration with Ukraine, the EU underestimated the 
geopolitical factor of Russia and deprived Ukraine of space to balance between 
Russia and the EU. Ukraine’s interests were thereby neglected (N. R. Smith, 
2014a), while the interests of Russia and the EU in Ukraine clashed.  
The calculus logic of the EU also explains why negotiations over the AA 
and DCFTA with Ukraine continued even in the absence of progress in such 
important democracy promotion areas as reforms of the judiciary, public 
administration and constitutional reform (European Commission, 2013b). At the 
16th EU-Ukraine Summit held in February 2013, both parties once again 
‘reaffirmed’ their course for rapprochement and their intention to sign the AA, 
although Ukraine had to comply with obligations in the Conclusions of the 10 
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December 2012 Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union (Council of the 
European Union, 2013b). 
Meanwhile, the country was regressing towards authoritarianism (Section 
4.2.4), but, similarly to the case of Kuchma in the early 2000s (Section 5.1.1), the 
EU did not go beyond expressing ‘extreme concerns’ (European Commission, 
2011b). Together with Ukrainian authorities, EU officials ‘noted’ the resolution 
of the European Parliament of 13 December 2012 (Council of the European 
Union, 2013b) on the prosecution of the opposition in Ukraine (European 
Parliament, 2012), and threatening the non-signing of the AA and the DCFTA 
(driven by imprisonment of Tymoshenko and Lutsenko as members of the 
opposition) yielded results in the face of Russia’s growing pressure on Ukraine.  
The promise of signing the AA was also maintained at the 2013 Eastern 
Partnership Summit held in November 2013. However, by that time Ukraine’s 
progress in cooperation with the EU was reduced to energy cooperation (with 
Ukraine intending to become a regional hub for gas transit) and visa liberalisation 
(Council of the European Union, 2013a), and Ukrainian authorities decided to 
postpone the signing of the AA. The events that followed turned into the Maidan 
revolution and became a turning point in EU-Ukraine relations.  
Similar to the EU’s strategy during the Orange revolution the EU 
combined its efforts with the U.S., relying on the network of NGOs and soft 
power policies. Indeed, in line with its developmental approach the EU promoted 
negotiations between the opposition and Yanukovych which led to signing the 
Agreement on settlement of political crisis in Ukraine on February 21, 2014 
(witnessed on behalf of the EU by the foreign ministers of France, Germany and 
Poland). However, the Agreement did not take off, as Euromaidan grew into the 
Revolution of Dignity, leading to a regime change. As such, the EU once again 
seconded the U.S.’ more stringent position (Breaking:...Urmas Paet and 
Catherine Ashton discuss Ukraine over the phone, 2014; BBC, 2014) by 
recognising the legitimacy of the newly established regime, because Ukraine’s 




5.2.3. Assisting Ukraine in the aftermath of the Maidan revolution 
After the victory of the Maidan revolution (described in Chapter 4), the belief in 
Ukraine’s onward transformations and the demand for reforms was strong; yet 
the country had also to deal with its economic downturn. In the face of these 
challenges, the EU prioritised macroeconomic stabilisation while stressing the 
need for Ukraine’s struggle against corruption and promotion of fiscal 
transparency (Council of the European Union, 2014: 13). The contents and 
implementation of these reforms are analysed in greater detail in the following 
sub-sections. 
 
5.2.3.1. The content of EU democracy promotion and market initiatives in post-Maidan 
Ukraine 
Similar to the situation in the early 1990s, when the EU prioritised urgent issues 
(including humanitarian aid) in its assistance to Ukraine, in 2014 the Union 
started supporting Ukraine’s macro-economic stabilisation. The EU established a 
package of financial aid that was to exceed €11 billion. The Commission’s direct 
support comprised development (€1.5 billion) and macro-financial assistance 
(€1.6 billion), while the majority of funds were targeted for cooperation with 
European financial institutions (European Commission, 2014b: 9).  
Nevertheless, the aid was distributed for the period 2014-2020 and was 
established for stabilisation purposes rather than for structural transformations. 
Therefore, the package was not pre-designed to solve the crisis and was poorly 
defined in terms of incorporated reforms (European Court of Auditors, 2016: 16, 
28).  
Similarly, although the Maidan revolution began as a move towards closer 
political and economic association with the EU, the adoption of the desired AA 
and the DCFTA became a cause for more criticism.  
The political provisions of the AA (political dialogue and association) 
were signed on 21 March 2014 and followed by the ratification of the economic 
part on 27 June 2014. Economic provisions (‘Justice, Freedom and Security’, 
‘Economic and Sector Cooperation’, ‘Financial Cooperation, with Anti-fraud 
Provisions’, and ‘Institutional, General and Final Provisions’) were partially 
applied from 1 November 2014, but ‘Trade and Trade-related Matters’ only came 
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into force on 1 January 2016 (under pressure from Russia that feared of an influx 
of cheap European goods through Ukraine in Russian market) (European 
Commission, 2014e; European Commission, 2015d; CEPS, 2014; Deutsche 
Welle, 2014).  
The key aims of the political and economic provisions of the Agreement 
were elaborated on calling for the ‘gradual rapprochement between the Parties 
based on common [EU] values’, political dialogue, regional and international 
stability, Ukraine’s ‘gradual integration in the EU Internal Market’, ‘cooperation 
in the field of Justice, Freedom and Security’ and ‘other areas of mutual interest’ 
(Article 1 of the AA: 6). In this way, the AA set the pace for Ukraine’s 
convergence with European political and economic institutions, including 
compliance with EU interests by ‘taking into account the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union, including the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP)’ (page 5 of the AA) (CEPS, 2014).  
Importantly, there was no rigorous debate on the advantages of the 
upcoming agreement for Ukraine before the last-minute decision of Yanukovych 
to withdraw from negotiations. Even afterwards, this decision was explained by a 
potential loss of Russian market and social hardships of the associated reforms 
(Kotsyna, Artazei, Golotyuk, & Galukh, 2013) rather than by any visible flaws 
with regard to the strengthening of Ukraine’s democratic institutions. The 
capacity of the AA to lead to reforms in general was not questioned; the debates 
concentrated mainly on trade and financial preferences, while the AA was 
declared the path for Ukraine to become more democratic and prosperous. 
However, a careful analysis of the document, which was generally 
neglected during the negotiation phase and even after the Agreement has been 
signed, demonstrates that the AA concentrates primarily on formal 
democratisation, trade issues and security. For example, although cooperation in 
such spheres as rule of law (Article 14), anti-corruption (Article 22) and judicial 
cooperation (Article 24) are listed in the Agreement, the rest of priorities in Title I 
refer mainly to security (Articles 8-13), migration, labour regulation, border 
management and combatting crime (Articles 16-21, 23 of the AA). 
Moreover, the only promise of the Agreement that may lead to the 
establishment of more efficient institutions in Ukraine refers to Ukraine’s 
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commitment to gradually approximate its ‘legislation with that of the Union’ (5) 
in specific sectors such as energy (Articles 337-342), macro-economic cooperation 
(Articles 343-345), public finances (Articles 346-348) and so on. Therefore, EU-
Ukraine cooperation should be reflected in the adoption of acquis communitaire by 
Ukraine (Articles 337-452).  
However, trade and trade-related matters remain a top priority of the 
Agreement, because any specific principles and obligations under Title IV (‘Trade 
and trade-related matters’) are not to be ‘prejudiced’ by other provisions of the 
AA (Article 474). Eighteen out of twenty one rounds of negotiations on the AA 
between 2007 and 2012 were devoted to the DCFTA, while the trade agreement 
comprises three quarters of the AA in its final version.  
As a result, whereas the AA was portrayed as a panacea to Ukraine’s ills 
during the Maidan revolution, its ability to be one was less certain. It also 
remains to be seen whether formal democratisation such as the adoption of EU 
legislation can result in substantive democracy, largely because adopted 
legislation has yet to be implemented. Nevertheless, some progress in the EU’s 
approach towards Ukraine’s democratisation is visible.   
During the initial period after the Maidan revolution the EU dealt mainly 
with urgent issues such as macro-economic stabilisation (‘EU Support to Ukraine 
to Re-launch the Economy’) or preparation for the implementation of the AA 
(‘State building contract for Ukraine’ and ‘Technical Cooperation Facility’ listed 
in Table 5.8). Only subsequently the EU began to push for accountable and 
transparent governance (European Commission, 2016e; Table 5.8).  
The EU’s ability to promote institutional changes should be reflected in 
the implementation of institution-building aspects of the acquis (Chapter 2: 37) 
and most importantly in reforms targeting the judiciary, the constitution and 
corruption. The urgency of this made the EU push for these reforms in 2016 




Table 5.8 Priorities in EU-Ukraine cooperation for the period 2014-2016  






State building contract 
for Ukraine 
Direct financial support to Ukraine aimed for ‘the fight against corruption, public 
administration reform and constitutional and electoral law reform’ through direct 
budget support (European Commission, 2014a: 3). Addressing ‘short-term 
economic problems and preparing for in-depth reform in the context of political 
association and economic integration with the EU on the basis of the 
AA/DCFTA’ (European Commission, 2014a, Annex1: 8) 
232 
Ukraine civil society 
support programme 
Support to civil society through grants and service contracts (European 
Commission, 2014a: 3). Strengthening the capacity of civil organisations to 
participate in political dialogue and fostering institutional and social dimensions of 





‘EU Support to 
Ukraine to Re-launch 
the Economy’ (EU 
SURE) 
Strengthening the capacity of Ukrainian authorities to develop and implement 
effective policy towards small and medium enterprises (SME), developing SMEs 
sector (European Commission, 2015b, Annex 1: 15), through ‘service contracts 
and in the form of reimbursement of up to 50% of the participation in EU 
programme fee’ and in the form of indirect management from the EBRD 




Raising government’s capacity to implement AA and DCFTA-driven reforms, 
including in governance, economic governance, trade (statistics, technical barriers 
to trade and financial services), energy, transport and social reforms (European 
Commission, 2015b, Annex 2: 10) through EU grants, service/supply contracts 










The establishment of accountable and transparent multi-level governance under 
direct management through service contracts and under indirect management with 






Initiative in Ukraine 
Strengthening state institutions, enhancing parliamentary oversight, strengthening 
the role of media and civil society in anti-corruption initiatives ‘under direct 
management through service contracts and under indirect management with the 





Implementation of the AA and DCFTA, prioritising the media freedom, economic 
governance (financial services), transport and social reforms under direct 
management through grants, service contracts and under indirect management’ of 




Reform of Public 
Administration in 
Ukraine 
Improving ‘professionalism, accountability, effectiveness and efficiency of the 
Ukrainian public administration’ (European Commission, 2016c, Annex 1: 20) 
through direct budget ‘support, service contracts, twinning and under indirect 
management with the World Bank’ (European Commission, 2016c: 2) 
104 
Support to Rule of 
Law Reforms in 
Ukraine (PRAVO) 
Technical expertise to support the reform of the justice sector and law enforcement 
‘under direct management through service contracts’ and under indirect 
management with European agencies (European Commission, 2016d: 2) 
52.5 
 
Source(s): European Commission, ENPI Annual programmes  
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As it has been mentioned in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.5), several anti-
corruption bodies have been established in Ukraine to investigate and prosecute 
corruption: the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), the 
Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office and the National Agency for 
Prevention of Corruption that is to specifically monitor political corruption. A new 
Public Procurement law entered into force on 19 February 2016; an e-procurement 
system (ProZorro) was set up; and a civil service law entered into force in May 
2016 (European Commission, 2016a: 4, 6, 10). 
Amendments to the Constitution also took place. The law on cooperation of 
territorial communities in June 2014 launched Ukraine’s decentralisation, while 
amendments to the Tax Code in 2015 stimulated financial decentralisation. The 
establishment of the Supreme Council of Justice, the mandatory re-certification of 
all judges as well as abolition of immunity for judges signified the main changes 
envisaged by the reform of judiciary (ICTV, 2017). 
However, as Chapter 4 demonstrated, Ukraine’s overall progress in reforms 
remains half-hearted, and the pace of reforms has slowed. In the beginning of its 
adaptation to EU norms (2014-2015), Ukraine could not fulfill all legal obligations, 
but it launched a number of legal projects and progressed in approximating its 
legislation to EU norms in selected areas (mainly energy and public procurement). 
However, whereas between July-November 2016 Ukraine implemented 8 out of 44 
obligations envisaged for this five-month period, from December 2016-October 
2017, Ukraine only managed to fulfill 10 out of 86 envisaged obligations in ten 
months (Kovtun & Chernetska, 2017: 8-9; Naumenko, Stepanenko, & Zavoritnia, 
2016; Stepanenko & Dobrynska, 2016: 6). 
Moreover, Ukraine’s ‘preelection political maneuvering’ impacts the reform 
process by slowing the overall progress. Ukraine’s politicians tend to promote only 
those changes that allow political reshuffling (judiciary, decentralisation) and thus 
the elimination of political competitors on the eve of the 2019 presidential elections 
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017). In contrast, Ukrainian 
experts recognise reforms of judiciary, law enforcement agencies, civil service as 
well as tax and anti-corruption reform as those that have generally failed (DIF, 
2017).   
Electoral legislation has yet to be ‘harmonised and consolidated’; the rules 
adopted for the distribution of funds to the regions were not followed and thus 
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prevented the realisation of fiscal decentralisation (European Commission, 2017a: 
4). Similarly, the electronic asset declaration system can become a great step 
towards transparency of civil servants; yet, by mid-October 2017 only 61 out of 1.2 
million e-declarations were verified (European Commission, 2017a: 6), and no 
consequence has been cited for submitting false information or faking these reports. 
Nonetheless, Ukraine’s sound progress in reforms has been declared on 
paper and in reports, including those of the EU: 
 
‘In 2015-16, Ukraine has undertaken in-depth structural reforms in some key sectors” 
particularly “improved governance, the fight against corruption, judiciary reform and 
public administration reform, including reform of civil service and service in local self-
government bodies’ (European Commission, 2016a: 14), 
 
 de facto implementation of reforms is often reflected in the imitation of progress.  
For example, although the elections of judges to the Supreme Council of 
Justice took place, their professionalism and independence remains questioned and 
will require further investigation (European Commission, 2017a: 7). Similarly, civil 
service reform focused on ‘the transparent and merit-based recruitment of officials 
(based on Reform Staff Positions)’ (European Commission, 2017a: 4), yet around 
90% of former policemen have successfully passed widely publicized re-attestation 
(Shramovych, 2017), while the replacement of staff in prosecution offices resulted 
in the rotation of staff among the regions. Consequently, no introduction of new 
personnel and thus no real rotation occurred. Moreover, job competition for civil 
service was also accompanied with non-transparent practices: 38% of applicants 
consider that some applicants made preliminary agreement with the recruitment 
commission, 20.4% claim that corruption disrupted the process (Hranit, 2017).  
As was described in Section 4.2.5, anti-corruption institutions were also 
quickly subjugated to Ukrainian politicians and oligarchs (European Court of 
Auditors, 2016) and turned into their battlefield: the General Public Prosecutor's 
Office represents interests of President Poroshenko and NABU is controlled by 
parliamentary coalition (officially the organisation is subjugated to the Cabinet of 
Ministers) (Iwański & Piotr, 2017; Makarenko, 2017). Against this background, 
establishing the Anti-Corruption Court in June 2018 has been so far the main 
achievement in combating corruption, because the candidates occupying positions 
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in the Court will be subjected to evaluation of the council that includes 
international experts (BBC, 2018).  
Yet in light of the struggle between the Prosecution Office and NABU it 
remains to be seen how effective the work of the newly established Anti-Corruption 
Court will be. Meanwhile, prosecution of corruption remains slow, because some of 
the first investigations were launched against public figures (European 
Commission, 2017a: 6) associated with the former regime (Dobkin and former 
officials from the times of Yanukovych presidency) (Lefter, 2017) whose 
prosecution brings no implications for the balance of power in post-Maidan 
Ukraine. Meanwhile, conviction rates remain low (Council of Europe, 2017), and 
those public figures whose arrest was popularised as a great achievement of the 
Prosecution Office have been mainly released on bail (Raida, 2017).  
In addition, bribing the prosecution office for ‘non-prosecuting’ allows to 
keep the ‘case’ from reaching the court (Aslund, 2016), while enabling state 
representatives (or those aware of this information) with a tool for blackmailing. 
Another negative trend in this regard is that Ukraine’s prosecution office has gained 
access to personal information of journalists who investigate the cases of corruption 
(Drik, 2018). Together with Ukraine’s worsening indicators of freedom in media 
and ‘state-sanctioned violence’ (Jarábik & de Waal, 2018) this suggests growing 
authoritarianism as part of the cyclic nature of Ukraine’s hybrid regime.  
Therefore, the EU’s impact on Ukraine’s domestic transformations remains 
limited to the choices of local decision-makers, because most current initiatives are 
built around formal institutionalisation (pro-Zorro, e-declarations, the Anti-
Corruption Court). In this context, changing Ukraine’s ‘ways of doing things’ 
remains the main problem for EU democracy promotion. 
Meanwhile, the Ukrainian government continues to be inefficient in 
distributing donor assistance (European Court of Auditors, 2016: 17; Figure 5.3) 
and, more importantly, in making this process transparent. The Ukrainian 
parliament had revoked the draft of the law on technical assistance in February 
2014 during political turmoil, and the process has not been re-launched since then 
(European Court of Auditors, 2016: 14).  
In the absence of clear regulations, foreign assistance is very often just 
‘sacked into sand’ or ‘carved’ (interview11). Donor projects become stuck or remain 
under-implemented. Although Ukrainian officials are interested in bringing more 
 
214 
money to the country, they often neglect planning and risk evaluation, which 
results in wasting of borrowed funds instead of their investment, while Ukraine still 
has to pay its debts back (Shkarpova & Ostapchuk, 2016).  
Meanwhile, EU efforts in intensifying its work on monitoring the 
implementation of reforms is limited to the initiatives of Ukrainian government 
(such as setting up a web-portal that allows to track adoption and implementation 
of the AA) (Sydorenko, 2017) or annual reporting. Moreover, international donors, 
including the EU, provide no clear information on the efficacy of their assistance 
(European Commission, 2015c). For example, EU programmes of sector budget 
support reveal ‘weak track record of reform policy implementation in Ukraine’ 
(European Court of Auditors, 2016: 24), while EU aid is generally represented by 
‘classic technical assistance projects’ (Ash et al., 2017: 5) which are standardised 
and not context-oriented.  
As a result, not only ‘monitoring in some areas’ and ‘greater emphasis on 
beneficiary accountability’ (European Court of Auditors, 2016: 43) should be 
prioritised, external donors should also help Ukraine to process their aid by 
elaborating on the projects launched under their aegis, wherein Ukrainian and 
international (European) experts should work together. 
The main positive development in the context of accountability is reflected 
in the provision of funds in small instalments upon the fulfilment of EU conditions 
such as adoption of specific regulations or laws in accordance with the ‘more for 
more’ principle (EEAS, 2014b) and the launch of the Open Aid Ukraine Project 
that in a testing regime allows to coordinate donor assistance in Ukraine (Ministry 
of Economic Development and Trade, 2018). However, as has been mentioned 
above, a more nuanced approach is needed. 
Finally, whereas the degree of control from the EU is necessary for the 
success of any reforms in Ukraine, Ukrainian and European officials as well as the 
public have different perceptions of the extent to which the EU should intervene. 
These perceptions do not shape Ukraine’s politics but may reveal expectations 






5.2.3.2. The EU’s resumed rhetorical entrapment 
As previous sections have demonstrated, one of the main problems that prevents 
the EU from promoting reforms in Ukraine is the lack of political will within 
Ukraine. However, the EU is also constrained by a number of other conditions. 
Although both European and Ukrainian elites agree that the EU may offer 
its vision of Ukraine’s development, the EU cannot order specific actions to achieve 
this (interview11) because the degree of EU assistance is limited to the ability of 
Ukrainians to solve their problems on their own (interview9-2). ‘The EU cannot 
change the mentality of Ukrainian society’ (interview7) or its political culture 
(interview14) (K. Wolczuk, 2000), and although it is attempting to change existing 
traditions and practices (interview7), Ukraine still needs to mature towards certain 
EU norms (interview4). The country requires substantial social changes that will 
allow it to live up to these norms and realise Ukraine’s European aspirations 
(Dragneva-Lewers & Wolczuk, 2015: 128).  
 What remains important in this context is that Ukrainian civil society elites 
perceive that the EU’s pressure on Ukrainian officials is essential for the success of 
Ukraine’s transformation (interview12). For example, the establishment of the 
above-mentioned Anti-Corruption Court has become possible primarily due to 
pressure of the IMF and public call by the U.S. State Department (BBC, 2018). The 
EU could suggestively exercise similar pressure, because ‘if not for the war and the 
economic collapse, which forced Kyiv to seek external financial assistance and 
political support, the modernisation of the state would have proceeded even more 
slowly and with yet greater difficulty’ (Olszański, 2016: 1). 
In stark contrast, the EU is reluctant to exert more pressure so as not to 
appear a dictating or a dominant power (c3EU10). As a result, Ukrainian 
politicians frame the EU’s impact on Ukraine’s democratisation similarly to the 
situation that occurred in other former communist states that proceeded with the 
accession (Chapter 2). The EU respects Ukraine’s sovereignty and endows 
Ukrainian elites with responsibility for the country’s domestic transformations. In 
this regard, the country follows the pace of East Central European states that began 
their accession with EU conditionality and under the aegis of EU financial and 
technical assistance even in the absence of membership guarantees at the beginning 
of their transitions (Schimmelfennig, 2001).  
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However, the problem of real democratisation remains open with regard to 
both the contents of EU-promoted reforms and their ability to produce the change 
as well as regarding the implementation of these reforms in Ukraine, because the 
EU’s capacity to promote democracy in Ukraine remains limited due to both 
Ukraine’s domestic barriers and the external challenges that the parties face in their 
relations.  
With regard to the first, EU initiatives need to address both Ukrainian civil 
society and officials, whereas motivating the latter remains a key problem. While 
Ukrainian politicians appeared to have consolidated around the idea of European 
integration following the Maidan revolution, this change occurred primarily in the 
field of rhetoric (interview3) and resulted in ‘euro-imitation’ in practical terms 
(interview11).  
After the victory of the Maidan revolution, the Ukrainian Parliament 
declared membership of the EU the only alternative for Ukraine, claiming that, 
‘Ukraine as a European state sharing the common values of democracy and the rule 
of law emphasises its sovereign choice in favour of future membership in the 
European Union in accordance with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union’ 
(Supreme Council of Ukraine, 2014a). However, as Sections 4.2.5 and 5.2.3.1 
revealed, while the initial year after the Maidan revolution resulted in the adoption 
of a several initiatives, since then the pace of reforms slowed down. 
The resulting ‘euro-imitation’ is based on the implementation of EU-backed 
reforms in a manner that no actual changes occur (interview11; Chubyk, 2015; 
Section 5.2.3.1), while feigning some progress should entitle elites with receiving 
more financial aid ‘for [the sake of] reforms’ (interview12,13; (Valevskyi, 2017)). 
The risk of reforms imitation remains for the remaining EaP states (Grigoryan, 
2016), and a similar perception is shared by EU officials who claim that their 
Ukrainian colleagues view the EU as a ‘money bag’ (c3EU2) while the EU cannot 
find alternative ways to provide Ukraine with assistance aside from its corrupt 
politicians (c3EU3). As a result, the narrative of ‘the door neither closes nor opens’ 
penetrates EU-Ukraine relations, while the door ‘from being three quarters open is 
now one quarter open’ due to a general slow-down in reforms (c3EU5). This 
perceptions gap between EU and Ukrainian elites further points to the importance 
of managing expectations in Ukraine-EU relations.  
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Meanwhile, ‘euro-imitation’ is also present in portraying Ukrainian 
development as tied to the EU and which ultimately includes membership of the 
EU (Sakwa, 2016, 2017), allowing Ukrainian politicians to gain some ‘cheap 
popularity’ (interview11) and legitimacy in the eyes of broader public. The narrative 
of ‘Europe’ was actively promoted by oligarch-owned media and then exploited by 
Ukrainian political elites (Orlova, 2017) during the Maidan revolution and 
afterwards, described as euro-populism. This narrative has become official with the 
adoption of the Strategy for Communication in the field of European integration for 
2018-2021 years, aimed at the establishment of ‘the assertion of the conscious 
support of Ukraine’s membership in the EU’ in Ukrainian society (Supreme 
Council of Ukraine, 2017). 
However, at times euro-imitation may result in tangible outcomes, but this 
becomes possible only when EU pressure corresponds with the rhetorical 
entrapment of Ukrainian officials. For example, visa liberalisation pushed for the 
‘adoption of legislation on preventing and fighting corruption and the establishment 
of a single and independent anti-corruption agency’ (Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine: 8) which would not have taken place otherwise (interview3). 
Conclusively, some of the instruments of EU pressure should reflect an absence of 
any room for manoeuvring by current Ukrainian elites in light of their obligations 
(interview3).  
In a similar manner, Ukraine’s dependence on external financing may allow 
the EU to promote stronger conditionality, because financial leverage by the IMF 
and the EU is the strongest by far in post-Maidan Ukraine (Jarábik & de Waal, 
2018). The gap between EU commitments and actual financing (Figure 5.3) points 
to that the failure to meet EU criteria deprives Ukraine of a next tranche of macro-
financial assistance from the EU. Therefore, the ‘more for more’ principle remains 
the best example of positive conditionality in Ukraine so far (interview1); the 
‘financial whip’ forces Ukrainian elites to implement at least some reforms 
(interview12).  
Similarly, the EU combines its efforts with the IFOs in attempt to promote 
reforms in Ukraine. The establishment of the Anti-Corruption Court in Ukraine is 
one of such examples (Interfax, 2018), and both the EU and IMF combine their 
efforts in promoting privatisation (particularly land privatisation) as well as 
 
218 
liberalisation of energy prices and liberalisation in the banking sector as conditions 
for their financial assistance.  
Yet excessive pressure from the EU may have negative consequences. For 
example, liberalisation of energy prices has become a heavy burden for average 
Ukrainians, despite the fact that the energy sector in Ukraine has not visibly 
progressed in its modernisation (Section 4.2.5). Similarly, privatisation of land 
remains a debated issue, because in Ukraine land is traditionally viewed as a 
national treasure that belongs to people and cannot be sold.  
Moreover, some EU actions that aim for the adoption of acquis 
communautaire result in democratisation on paper but disregard the Ukrainian 
context. For example, one of the criteria that Ukraine had to fulfil in order to obtain 
a 600-million euro tranche of assistance in 2017 was the abolition of the ban on 
exports of round timber (and wood in general), notwithstanding the deteriorating 
situation with illegal exports of Carpathian woods to European countries. As EU 
officials explain, the moratorium on exports has not prevented mass deforestation 
and wood smuggling (EEAS, 2016a). Moreover, Ukraine has not yet adopted a 
wood audit system; work in this area has only just begun. However, the offered 
alternative to ban ‘all logging’ instead of banning exports (European Commission, 
2016a) may not work as well. Whereas a moratorium on round-wood exports 
limited deforestation to a degree by making all wood exports illegal, the ban on 
logging will likely fail, because all the reforms that have aimed for the 
implementation and enforcement of law in Ukraine have failed.  
Such cases as the round timber example demonstrate that EU policy choices 
in problematic situations are made in a manner to ‘save face’ (c3Ukr24), yet the EU 
often appears unaware of Ukraine’s specific context and the consequences that the 
adopted formalities may have for Ukraine’s economy or environment. Therefore, 
‘tailoring’ the EU’s policies to ‘the concerns of the wider public’ (Jarábik & de 
Waal, 2018) should be done not only in order to project the image of a friend but 
also in a manner that reveals genuine goodwill on part of the EU towards Ukraine’s 
long-term prosperity. 
Yet considering Ukraine’s public interests may remain a problem for the EU 
in light of the geopolitical concerns and the dynamic of its relations with Russia. 
The Russian presence pushes the EU to support Ukraine’s ‘declarative democrats’ 
even in the absence of solid reforms and for the sake of not having an even more 
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populist or, worse, pro-Russian regime established in the country (Ash et al., 2017: 
6). Therefore, EU policies in Ukraine are driven mainly by competition with Russia 
(N. R. Smith, 2015).  
 Due to Russia’s presence, the EU cannot stop supporting Ukraine 
financially despite the lack of reforms in the country because losing Ukraine is not 
in the EU’s interests (Ash et al., 2017: 6; interview13). The EU similarly cannot 
quit and acknowledge that years and millions of euros of support have vanished 
with no progress to show in Ukraine (Kubicek, 2005). Therefore, the EU’s 
normative entrapment results in a situation wherein both Ukraine and the EU are 
interested in making it appear that problems do not exist and that the existing 
framework of cooperation works (interview11). Both actors are immersed in a sort 
of euro-imitation, with Ukrainian officials attempting to make it appear that they 
implement reforms and EU officials doing the same to show that Ukraine has 
achieved some progress.  
Indeed, some progress has been achieved but it does not include 
comprehensive institutional changes. Whereas the weakness of Ukraine’s state 
institutions was a key reason behind its failed reforms in the beginning of its 
transition (Section 4.1), the construction of these institutions under control of the 
EU could be both an advantage and a disadvantage to Ukraine. The EU’s impact 
may benefit Ukraine’s transformations if EU declared goals match its actual 
policies but may deteriorate if geopolitics prevails over EU normativity. 
For example, although the EU may potentially do more for Ukraine, it does 
not push for stronger democratisation with the same persistence that was reflected 
in its security (particularly due to the conflict with Russia) and trade (DCFTA) 
initiatives. Irrespective of the colours of Ukrainians government, EU cooperation 
with them was stable and reflects a gradual pursuit of EU strategic goals (in 
security, energy and trade) whereas only Ukraine’s domestic de-entrapment allows 
the implementation of the EU’s normative agenda in the country. In the absence of 
domestic demand for democratisation, the EU continues to cooperate with 
Ukrainian (including authoritarian) officials because its bargaining power still 
allows the EU to achieve calculus aims in Ukraine. Therefore, the EU engages in 
Ukraine actively only if this involvement is in the EU’s vital interests (interview1).  
In turn, the EU’s rhetorical entrapment with regard to the prospect of 
Ukraine’s membership in the Union may be explained both by civilisational 
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(Ukraine is part of Slavic but not European civilisation) and rational considerations 
(the EU has immersed in a set of domestic crises, while Ukraine’s accession delivers 
too many liabilities on the EU’s part). Even in 2013, a ‘certain conventional Berlin 
wall between Ukraine and the EU ... matched with [the EU’s] eastern borders’, and 
Ukraine remained in a ‘grey zone’ (interview6). Although the country ‘escaped’ 
from the post-Soviet political space in the aftermath of the Maidan revolution, it 
has not yet paved a clear way to the EU (interview3), while the EU used ‘grey 
zones’ to ‘control the problems that stem from neighbouring areas without having 
to grant them full membership and European identity’ (Haukkala, 2008a: 48). 
Meanwhile, the EU does not seem to be changing its strategy with regard to 
Ukraine in the near future. This was confirmed by the 2016 EU Global Strategy 
where the EU encourages the ‘resilience’ of its neighbours through ‘a credible 
enlargement policy’; yet, the promise of this enlargement spreads only to the 
Western Balkans and Turkey whereas the rest of neighbours (including Ukraine) 
remain part of the ENP framework (EEAS, 2016c: 23-5).  
Although the document supports the EU’s course for global norms 
promotion, the EU addresses its own citizens (Mälksoo, 2016) and reflects on its 
own nature than communicating to the outside world. The strategy also 
demonstrates that the EU has not yet formulated mechanisms for engagement and 
dealing with global rising powers such as Russia (Howorth, 2016), which is also 
important for Ukraine. 
With regard to other issues such as Ukraine’s market liberalisation, the EU’s 
unawareness or possible ignorance of Ukraine’s context was revealed. By 
abolishing all customs duties on exports and imports as well as subsidies for 
agriculture and exports (Article 32 of the AA), the AA undermined competitiveness 
of such vital branches of Ukraine’s exports as agriculture and metallurgy. However, 
this would have nevertheless corresponded with the paradigm of market 
liberalisation if the EU had eliminated its own subsidies as well. In contrast, only 
direct payments for agriculture amount to an average of €41 billion per year (€293 
billion for period 2014-2020), excluding payments for market measures and rural 
development (European Commission, 2017b: 2). Similar asymmetry is observed in 
a better protection of EU agriculture in the AA and DCFTA with limitations that 
made no significant improvement for Ukraine: EU ‘markets that were open have 
remained open, while those that were closed, remain closed’ (Reuters, 2016). 
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The structure of Ukraine’s trade with the EU is also becoming more 
asymmetrical: Ukraine exports raw materials (food, coal) and semi-manufactured 
products (steel) while importing finished and technologically complex goods from 
the EU (equipment and pharmaceutical products). Ukraine’s much-needed 
modernisation and diversification is not taking place, and the country is slowly 
emerging as supplier of raw materials being unable to comply with EU standards in 
other sectors. In the aftermath of the on-going crisis, the drop in inward investment 
was also most significant from the EU (Figure 5.1).  
As a result, EU assistance in Ukraine’s transformations may be described as 
very limited and superficial. It does not tackle Ukraine’s severe problems because 
an external actor cannot solve these; indeed, in an attempt to solve some of 
Ukraine’s ills the EU may even amplify them. As such the need to consider the 
interests of third parties is necessary for the EU if it is to avoid rhetorical 
entrapment and to achieve democratisation results in Ukraine.  
 
5.2.3.3. EU perceptions in Ukraine and the importance of socialisation 
As Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and especially 5.2.3.2 have demonstrated, a degree of 
misunderstanding and misperception persists in relations between EU and 
Ukrainian officials. Whenever EU policies are viewed as ambiguous and vague in 
Ukraine, Ukraine’s perspective may be crucial for understanding which initiatives 
are expected from the EU and which are viewed as vital for Ukraine. This is 
especially true in those areas of cooperation, where the EU’s progress in promoting 
reforms is limited or may be limited.  
Problems of Ukraine’s post-communist transition, such as oligarchisation, 
modernisation, corruption and nation-building (interview1,2,15) demand EU 
assistance the most. While a need for reforms is a necessary precondition to avoid 
rollbacks similar to what recently occurred in Greece (economically), or Bulgaria 
(in terms of anti-corruption struggle) (interview3), Ukraine’s transition needs to be 
implemented as a step-by-step process (interview4). Ukrainian civil society views 
the EU as an actor that can actually promote the institutional changes necessary for 
Ukraine and may bypass corrupt Ukrainian officials by supporting civil society 
through ‘more broad Europeanisation at the level of behavioural, cultural and 
social norms’ (interview3).  
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This argument stresses the importance of socialisation and good governance 
for the actual communication of EU norms abroad and falls in line with theoretical 
developments in Chapter 2. Having introduced its normativity through 
implementation of the AA (interview3), the EU serves as a role model for social 
cohesion and tolerance in Ukraine (interview14), which is crucial for Ukraine’s 
nation-building (Section 4.3.2). On this background and considering the 
engagement of youth in both democratic revolutions in Ukraine (Sections 4.2.2 and 
4.2.5), scientific (school and university) exchanges are vitally important for shaping 
a different worldview among Ukrainian youth (interview1) and educating new 
political elites (interview12). 
 On the other hand, Ukrainian civil organisations have to evolve as 
independent bodies, because Ukrainian third sector ‘lives on grants’ (interview2) 
and is still weak (interview14). Civil society has not yet become a ‘systemic player’ 
in policy-making or in communication with Ukrainian policy-makers (interview4).  
As the biggest donor of developmental aid in Ukraine (interview3), the EU 
may finance specific projects in the third sector, which will have a more significant 
impact on Ukraine’s domestic transformations than direct budget support 
redistributed by Ukrainian officials (interview3). Some progress has been achieved 
in this sector, particularly with regard to the establishment of the RPR and the EU-
Ukraine civil society platform as well as the participation of the Ukrainian civil 
society delegation at the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (European 
Commission, 2015c: 10) as well as introduction of service contracts and indirect 
management in EU policy programmes in Ukraine (Table 5.8). 
However, given the context of power asymmetry between Ukraine and its 
neighbours, the country should push towards a more independent development 
(Section 4.2.5.2). While Russia exerted significant impact on Ukrainian political 
elites at the beginning of Ukraine’s post-communism, following the Maidan 
revolution, the same asymmetry is observed with regard to the relations between 
Ukrainian elites and the West (the EU and the IMF) (interview2). In an absence of 
Ukrainian elites with ‘state thinking’ (as revealed in Section 4.1.2.2) and EU’s 
inclination towards self-interest, this may not benefit Ukraine in the long run.  
Although ‘Europe appreciates Ukraine’s efforts’ (interview2) and perceives 
Ukraine as ‘a figure on a “chessboard of Brzezinski”’ to a lesser degree than Russia 
(interview1), ‘Brussels views Kyiv as a source of problems’ (interview9) and is 
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ready for concessions (such as ‘freezing’ the conflict in Eastern Ukraine) 
(interview11) if these advance to the EU’s overall good (Section 5.2.3.2). In this 
context, the EU is interested in its own security in the first turn, and whereas EU 
norms remain important in constraining EU interests, calculus logic dominates in 
foreign policy (N. R. Smith, 2014b).  
Indeed, the EU is not responsible for Ukraine’s transformations, especially 
in the context of its ‘primitive’ and unpredictable environment (interview2,13). Due 
to Ukraine’s domestic constraints, association with the EU remains a better than 
nothing option, as ‘there are practically no instruments apart from external factor 
and [EU] roadmap that may allow to quickly and step-by-step reform the country 
domestically’ (interview3).  
Similarly, the EU could have been a significantly more efficient actor in 
Ukraine if it supported more durable and long-term institutional projects such as 
local governance (U-LEAD) and especially through service contracts and under 
indirect management of the EU and international organisations (some of these 
initiatives were mainly launched in 2015 and 2016 as shown in Table 5.8). 
While tight conditionality remains beyond the context of Ukraine-EU 
relations, stronger socialisation and education should become a priority. If the EU 
is to achieve any substantial democratisation, it should also place more emphasis 
on public dialogue with Ukraine. Furthermore, it should target the sustainability of 
offered reforms and improve the design of conditions and monitoring of financial 
assistance as well as its implementation (European Court of Auditors, 2016: 42-3).  
In turn, Ukrainian civil society needs to find a way to protect Ukraine’s own 
national interests beginning with domestic changes and promote only those EU 
initiatives that benefit Ukraine in a long run (interview12). Only by reforming itself 
from within by becoming a democratic and prosperous state will Ukraine be able to 
reduce the impact of the geopolitical factor (interview11). However, in light of the 
discrepancies between elites and the general public, this process appears to be 
extremely prolonged. 
Although Ukraine’s aspirations to become a democracy are viewed as a 
major driver of its relations with democracy promoters (IFES, 2015), the economic 
factor prevails in popular expectations (Jarábik & de Waal, 2018). Whereas 
Ukraine’s cultural-historical background is associated with Russia and Ukraine’s 
aspirations for liberal democracy with Europe (Figure 5.4), the majority of 
 
224 
Ukrainians associate membership in the EU with free movement of people (38.6%), 
better quality of life (36.8%) and free access to education in European universities 
(33.7%) (Razumkov Centre & DIF, 2015).  
The European idea was to a degree ‘mythologised in the Ukrainian political 
discourse’ (a quote from (Center for Peace, 2001: 2) in Kubicek (2005: 281)). The 
‘euro’ is added to everything believed to be of a better quality (‘euro-windows’, 
‘euro-renovation’) (interview1; Hromadske, 2016), and Ukrainians combine 
material well-being and democratic values in the image of an ideal EU that is like ‘a 
dream for Ukraine’ (interview6). Thus the European idea ‘turned into a substitute 
of the late communist myth, with no firm connection with the reality’ (Center for 
Peace, 2001: 2), cited in Kubicek (2005: 281).  
 
   
Figure 5.4 Values that Ukraine presumably shares with Russia (chart to the 
left) and the West (chart to the right), 2014 
Source(s): retrieved from IFES (2014) 
 
Importantly, this idealisation and perceptions of the majority of Ukrainians 
about the EU are not based on their personal experiences or actual knowledge 
about European integration. Many Ukrainians did not understand until 2013 that 



































































































































































(interview3). Supporters of Euromaidan did not initially differentiate between 
signing the Association Agreement and EU membership. Yatsenyuk’s commercial 
on euro-association portrayed it as a step towards obtaining membership in the EU 
(Yatsenyuk, 2013), whereas the AA was delivered to Ukraine as a substitute for 
membership by EU officials (another reflection on euro-populism and imitation). 
The number of those who have visited the U.S., Canada or EU Member-
States constituted only 22.5% of the Ukrainian population in December 2012 (DIF 
& Razumkov Centre, 2012) and grew by a small amount to 26.2% in November 
2015 (DIF & Razumkov Centre, 2015), pointing to a weak linkage and networking 
between Ukrainian and European general public. Moreover, whereas 23.2% of 
Ukrainians view visa-free travelling to Europe as a necessary condition to feel 
European (DIF & Razumkov Centre, 2015), only 25% of Ukrainians actually know 
their rights and obligations with regard to visa-free travelling to the Schengen zone 
(Shumeiko, 2017).  
Freedom of movement, education, and migration are closely interlaced with 
perceptions of those Ukrainians who view the visa-free regime (granted to Ukraine 
in June 2017) and access to European education as an opportunity to live better. 
While 37,000 Ukrainian students were studying abroad during 2000-2012, their 
number bounced to 47,724 within the 2013-2014 academic year, and patterns for 
the choice of place of study were similar to those for labour migration (IOM, 2016: 
15). In 2017, 12% of Ukrainians claimed they would consider going abroad for 
seasonal or pat-time work (Institute of Sociology NAS & DIF, 2017: 8) and by July 
2017 over five million people have already obtained biometric passports (a 
necessary condition to be eligible to use visa-free regime with the EU), which 
makes visa liberalisation by the EU appear in Ukraine as a potential new source of 
‘brain drain’ (Pshenichnykh & Morozova, 2017).  
Ukraine’s internal differences regarding foreign policy preferences have also 
sharpened among various groups. Regional divisions with regard to support of 
membership in the EU remained intact even upon exclusion of Crimea and the 
Donbas war-zone from the polls (Figure 5.5). The same trend in regional 
differences applies to the importance of a visa-free regime with the EU or 
membership of NATO (Razumkov Centre, 2016c: 5), meaning that strongly EU-
oriented citizens remained EU-oriented while strongly Russia-oriented Ukrainians 





Figure 5.5 Regional distribution of support of membership in the EU  
Source(s): Razumkov Centre (2016c, p. 4) 
Note(s): Crimea and the ATO-zone of Donbas are not included in the poll. 
 
On the other hand, Ukrainians in the blurring regions of the Centre and the 
South find the search for a clear stance somewhat more complicated than others 
(described as ‘society 60’ in Section 4.3.2), as only ‘Hard to tell’ responses illustrate 
(Figure 5.5). After the Maidan revolution, the greatest drop in support of the 
Eastern vector of integration occurred in Eastern Ukraine, and this was partially 
due to disillusionment with Russian policies and war (interview3; Figure 5.6). The 
same trend can be seen in a change in the priorities of Ukraine’s foreign policy 
towards the EU and the growing importance of the U.S. as a great power and ally 
in fighting against Russia (Pshenichnykh & Morozova, 2017). 
 
 
 Figure 5.6 Ukraine’s public attitude towards Russian authorities, 
distribution by macro-regions, %, 2016 
Source(s): KIIS, released by Paniotto (2016) 
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The problem of idealisation of external political actors is an important issue 
in the context of shaping foreign policy preferences, their relation to identity issues 
and especially in the context of wide-spread populism and manipulation with public 
opinion in Ukraine.  
And whereas the provisional success of the multi-vector foreign policy and 
promotion of Ukrainophone narrative in the official discourse (Section 4.3) 
partially advanced the portrayal of the EU as a better alternative to Russia, 
Ukraine’s internal divisions aligned due to the diffusion of competitive yet fluid 
narratives, with the majority of Ukrainians supporting official discourse due to 
Ukraine’s dominant political culture of mimicry. In this context, the EU’s positive 
image in Ukraine may become either a source of a positive change (with regard to 
political culture) or a tool of euro-imitation only.  
 
5.3. The Russian issue in Ukraine’s foreign policy  
As was described in Sections 4.3 and 5.2.3.3 of this thesis, Ukraine’s identity 
and self-perception are related to its closest neighbours, whereas formal alignment 
with Western political and economic institutions and cultural association with 
Russia make these actors influential in Ukraine’s domestic transformations. In 
addition, the Russian issue is crucial for the EU’s geopolitical entrapment, affecting 
EU policy choices and normativity in Ukraine. This section briefly highlights the 
extent of Russia’s influence on Ukraine’s post-communist transformations. 
Since the collapse of communism, Russia’s impact in Ukraine pertained 
with regard to security, energy, and the identity issue (the latter was revealed in 
Section 4.3). Russia has also remained crucial for Ukraine’s stability, being 
consistently vocal about Ukraine’s ‘westward orientation’ viewed as a threat to 
Russia’s own security (Schularick, 2005: 8). Russia considers Ukraine both as part 
of its historical-cultural space (East Slavic community), as a large borderland that 
may protect Russia from military invasion from the West and as economic (energy) 
bridge with the EU because most of Russian energy pipelines run through 
Ukrainian territory (Tsygankov, 2014).  
At the beginning of transition, the peaceful dissolution of the USSR for 
Russia and Ukraine occurred primarily because there was no real disruption of 
economic ties between the former Soviet Republics and their elites (Schularick, 
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2005) and thus no threat to their security (D'Anieri, 2012). In addition, Russia was 
significantly weakened by domestic problems (constitutional crisis of 1993, two 
wars in Chechnya and finally, the financial crisis of 1998), which prevented it from 
exercising hegemony.  
Given this background, Ukraine’s achievements in sustaining its sovereignty 
in the 1990s could be explained by the weakness of Russia at that time. As former 
presidents of Ukraine (Kravchuk and Kuchma) emphasised, Ukraine managed to 
solve the 1990-91 and 1994-95 Crimean crises only ‘thanks to Yeltsin who did not 
interfere and did not allow other Russians to interfere’ (Sidorova, 2014).  
Russia’s weakness and course for alignment with Western institutions also 
made Ukraine’s similar realignment with the EU and NATO free of geopolitical 
consequences due to moral, socio-economic and political collapse in the former 
Soviet Republic (R. Wolczuk, 2003). Furthermore, during the first decade of its 
transition Russia had no specific foreign policy strategy on Ukraine. Russian 
officials did not yet fully comprehend the fact that Ukraine had become an 
independent state, and also Russia had no sources of influence on the country apart 
from the cultural legacy and energy issue (Bukkvoll, 2001). These aspects (identity 
issue and economic factor) proved to be the main tools of Russia’s impact in 
Ukraine later on. 
Meanwhile, Ukrainian development during the 1990s was somewhat of an 
inertial Ukrainian SSR (interview6). Ukrainian people continued to be supportive 
of economic and political alliances with Russia (Section 4.3.1) and the rent-seeking 
policies of Ukrainian elites (particularly, gas arbitrage) while their Russian 
colleagues preserved a mechanism for mutual understanding. Later on, this 
mechanism allowed Russia to continue impacting Ukraine’s domestic policy-
making as did Ukraine’s energy dependence on Russia. 
Ukraine’s industries relied (and continue to rely on) on huge amounts of 
cheap energy resources in order to maintain their profitability. Between 1991-2008 
gas imported from Russia constituted approximately 80% of Ukraine’s total gas 
consumption; this dropped after the outbreak of the global financial crisis. The 
trend towards the decrease in consumption stabilised only in 2011 and particularly 
after the Maidan revolution and the Ukrainian crisis (Figure 5.7). Therefore, this 
drop in consumption was primarily a consequence of the political and economic 
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crisis of 2014-15 rather than the result of a planned strategy for a decrease in gas 
consumption, which also took place.  
In addition, the gas issue turned Russia-Ukraine relations into a series of 
mutual blackmailing. Throughout the 1990s Russia threatened Ukraine with 
disruption of gas supplies for non-payment as well as for unsanctioned withdrawal 
of transit gas or its dilution, while Ukraine threatened Russia with the disruption of 
transit to Europe. Gas relations evolved into a tool of political restraint, especially 
visible in the aftermath of Ukraine’s democratic revolutions. Thus, after the victory 
of the Orange revolution, Russia’s pressure on the allegedly pro-Western 
government partially resulted in the dismissal of Tymoshenko’s first government 
and signified a series of gas crises (Section 4.2.3 of this thesis).  
 
 
Figure 5.7 Ukraine’s gas consumption, share of import in gas consumption 
as well as the ratio of positive trade balance to its volume for the 1996-2016 period 
Source(s): Naftogaz of Ukraine; SSCU 
Note(s): Data for 2010-2015 excluding data on Crimea 
 
A more demanding foreign policy towards Ukraine on Russia’s part was 
dictated by a change in its foreign policy strategy (already mentioned in Section 
5.1.2 of this chapter), caused by Russia’s domestic developments and geopolitical 
changes. At the beginning of the 2000s, Russia’s economic growth and domestic 
political consolidation allowed it to promote more assertive foreign policy. Russia 
also signalled that it wanted to be treated as an equal partner in relations with the 
USA and the EU (Tsygankov, 2015), who were more actively engaging in post-























































































































neighbourhood as well visions of this neighbourhood began to overlap (Section 
5.1.2: 186).  
Against the background of democratic revolutions that spilled across the 
region, Russia viewed the Orange revolution as an offensive against a range of its 
values (shared Slavic cultural legacy with Ukraine) as well as security (new 
Ukraine’s officials declared a course for joining NATO), trade and energy interests 
(Tsygankov, 2015).  
However, due to the fact that there was no clear foreign policy strategy 
developed for Ukraine in the previous period, Russia’s instruments of influence 
were limited to economic tools, such as energy and trade (Russia remained 
Ukraine’s key trading partner), which shaped the pace of cooperation with 
Ukrainian authorities. Accordingly, a set of ‘gas wars’ in the 2000s (Section 4.2.3) 
became a hallmark of tension in Russia-Ukraine relations. 
The peak of the gas standoff took place from 6-20 January 2009, when the 
supplies to Europe were disrupted. Although the EU made attempts to mediate 
negotiations between the conflicting parties (European Commission, 2009c: 2), it 
was interested in the immediate resumption of gas supplies to its peoples and 
industries in the first place (Council of the European Union (2009b). As a result, 
Ukraine had to go for concessions and on January 18, 2009 to sign a contract 
between Gazprom and Naftogaz that bounded the country to consume an agreed 
amount of Russian gas annually throughout the 2009-2019 period under market 
price that was significantly higher than in previous agreements (Guardian, 2009). 
The same situation took place once again after the second (Maidan) revolution in 
Ukraine, when the issues related to pricing and payment resumed, and, by 2016, 
Ukraine stopped directly purchasing Russian gas, receiving reverse supplies from 
Slovakia. This time, the EU took a leading role in negotiating this solution. 
Russia’s responses to Ukraine’s internal political changes reveal both the 
true degree of Russia’s impact in Ukraine and tools as well as the limitations of 
such an impact, especially in the course of Ukraine’s fluctuations between pro-
Western and pro-Russian governments to which Russia had to adopt. 
When the Orange revolution was ‘reversed’ with the election of allegedly 
pro-Russian Yanukovych, Russia-Ukraine relations appeared to become relatively 
stable, and Russia provided Ukraine with trade preferences and the cheaper gas 
prices as carrots for political loyalty. In the course of the Kharkiv Pact signed in 
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2010, the gas price for Ukraine was reduced by 30% in exchange for the lease of the 
military base in Crimea to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet till 2042 (Harding, 2010). And 
whereas this act could be viewed as Ukraine’s reorientation towards Russia, 
Russia’s impact on Ukraine’s elites remained relatively superficial (A. Smith, 2015).  
This was manifested in Ukraine’s refusal to join the Customs Union with 
Russia. The project was launched in the beginning of the 2000s when Russia 
promoted the idea of a single economic space between the former Soviet states 
(Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2012). However, this move pertained more to politics than 
economics (Moshes, 2013a) and could not provide Ukraine with the trade benefits 
it aspired for. Ukraine’s trading relations with Russia were already settled, while 
enhanced trade with Belarus and Kazakhstan could not provide an equal substitute 
to Ukraine’s growing trade with the EU (Moshes, 2013b). As a result, although 
with the election of Yanukovych Ukraine reversed its pro-NATO course in favour 
of resumed ‘beyond block’ status (Supreme Council of Ukraine, 2010), it similarly 
refused Russia’s proposal to join the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan (Tsygankov, 2015). 
Therefore, even the establishment of allegedly pro-Russian president did not 
lead to the subjugation of Ukraine’s foreign policy to Russian interests. Although 
Russia backed Yanukovych during the 2010 presidential elections by making 
concessions on gas pricing, which positively affected his image (N. R. Smith, 2015), 
Russian agent-driven tactics did not succeed in promoting Russian interests at its 
best.  
Rather it was Ukraine’s economic and energy dependence on Russia, 
‘perpetuated by the rent-seeking strategies of oligarchic interests and the lack of 
comprehensive economic reform’ (Dragneva-Lewers & Wolczuk, 2015: 8) that 
made Russia’s impact in Ukraine possible. Yet whether these two factors were a 
purposefully delivered state policy on Russia’s part or a form of interaction that 
evolved during the initial years of transition in both countries remains to be 
debated. 
It is clear, however, that even against the background of Ukraine’s energy 
dependence on Russia, Ukraine did not stimulate a significant increase in the 
production of its own gas primarily due to domestic reasons. The national stock 
company Naftogaz of Ukraine established in 1998 with an objective to clean the 
energy market from small private mediators turned into a monopoly that benefited 
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only those who controlled it. The company was overwhelmed with taxation and 
corruption, which undermined its capacity to invest in gas production. The rent-
seeking practices also made both Russia and Ukraine unwilling to liberalise gas 
trade. Even political competition between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko as well as 
gas crisis of 2006 resulted from a struggle for control over the energy business 
(Proedrou, 2010: 451), while corruption in the gas sector continues until the present 
day (Section 4.2.5). 
In addition, Ukraine did not manage to ensure alternative supplies in a 
broader geopolitical context. Ukraine’s attempt to substitute the supply of Russian 
gas with Turkmen gas failed because Russia remained and remains a main transit 
country for Turkmen gas to Europe. Similarly, the success of the construction of 
alternative gas routes generally depends on the outcomes of the geopolitical 
counter-balancing between Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the EU, where Ukraine is a 
minor player.  
Finally, whereas the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine represents the 
Achilles’ heel for Russia’s export-oriented gas sector, Ukraine’s dependence on the 
transit routes is also strong.  Even during the on-going conflict with Russia, gas 
transit remains the main source of income for Ukraine constituting 54.8% of 
Naftogaz income in 2016 despite the fact that the volumes of the transit of Russian 
gas decreased almost twofold between 1998 and 2016 (Naftogaz of Ukraine, 2016). 
Ukraine’s income from gas transit also constitutes the main share of its 
service exports and thus of trade balance. Ukraine made 22.5% or almost 3.4 bln 
USD of its income from pipeline transportation in its total exports of services in 
2013 (SSCU, 1998-2017). Because this sector of services secured the transit of 
Russian gas and remained stably profitable, Ukraine’s total balance on trade with 
services remained positive. However, the ratio of positive trade balance with 
services to its general volume has decreased by almost twofold with the decrease in 
transit (Figure 5.7). Thence, blackmailing the supplies of Russian gas for political 
reasons as well as the request for an increased tariff rate (part of the Stockholm 
arbitrage launched in 2014) are not efficient in the long run (Bros, 2016).  
Moreover, every gas crisis between Ukraine and Russia has resulted in new 
attempts at route diversification by Russia. The total capacity of Russia-launched 
pipelines reached 103.9 bln cubic metres per annum, and if the planned 
construction of North stream 2 is completed by 2019, the total capacity will amount 
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to 158.9 billion cubic metres per annum (Gazprom, 2018) with the ability to cover 
Ukraine’s total capacity of 146 billion cubic metres per annum (Naftogaz of 
Ukraine, 2016).  
More importantly in the Europeanisation context, the European support for 
Ukraine’s position on energy matters appears to be rather questionable, because all 
three actors (Russia, the EU and Ukraine) are engaged in complex geopolitical 
energy games in pursue of their own interests (Kropatcheva, 2011). Although 
Ukraine is in the process of closer integration with the EU in the energy sector, EU 
dependence (and particularly Germany’s dependence) on Russia’s gas supplies and 
prioritisation of own energy security remain high. When Russia-Ukraine disputes in 
2005-2009 threatened the security of gas supplies to Europe, European officials 
blamed Ukraine in the stall (Proedrou, 2010: 447) and demanded to ‘to resume gas 
deliveries to the EU immediately’ (Council of the European Union, 2009b). When 
the Russian-Ukrainian conflict broke out in 2014 and the EU launched a set of anti-
Russian sanctions, these did not stall the construction of the Russia-promoted 
North stream 2. Therefore, although the EU may remain an important motivator 
for Ukraine’s domestic market transformations, it does not guarantee the protection 
of Ukraine’s national interests on a regional scale. 
Under these circumstances, Ukraine should not expect that external actors 
would resolve its energy problems. Along with diversification of gas supplies, 
Ukraine has to prioritise the development of its domestic energy market 
(liberalisation, stimulation of energy production as well as gas and hydrocarbon 
extraction) and more efficient consumption of energy in general (modernisation of 
industrial enterprises; reduction of consumption by population). Some measures 
with this respect have been taken; however, as Section 4.2.5 demonstrates, price 
liberalisation should be complemented by investments in Ukraine’s gas sector. 
Meanwhile, lack of external investment remains the main problem of Ukraine’s 
economy (Jarábik & de Waal, 2018). 
The fact that energy cooperation remained one of the most productive areas 
in EU-Ukraine relations even under the Yanukovych administration (Table 5.7) 
attests to the argument that Ukraine’s policy-makers pertained towards a more 
independent foreign policy irrespective of the colours of its governments. Moreover, 
during the Yanukovych presidency, the economic factor was the main determinant 
of Ukraine’s policy choices, wherein Ukraine’s prolonged negotiations with the EU 
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on the AA and DCFTA and on-going negotiations with Russia represented a key 
element of Ukraine’s bargaining game (Dragneva-Lewers & Wolczuk, 2015: 83). 
During the Yanukovych presidency, Ukraine de facto resumed a course for 
multi-vector foreign policy trying to negotiate between both Customs Union and 
DCFTA (D'Anieri, 2012) and Ukraine’s efforts failed, primarily because its key 
neighbours did not manage a consensus: Russia did not want to open its markets to 
the EU, while the EU could not do the same to non-members of the WTO Belarus 
and Kazakhstan (Moshes, 2013a). Ukraine was compelled to make a choice which 
it was not ready to do: it was trapped between EU and Russian leverages, while 
choosing either was not in Ukraine’s interests. 
Moreover, as the EU-Ukraine convergence was progressing, Russia’s 
responses became tougher as well. For example, even under the Kharkiv Pact, 
Ukraine continued to pay more for Russian gas than Germany or Italy which made 
both Ukrainian officials and people disillusioned with Russia’s kinship (Moshes, 
2013b) in the light of  Russia’s pragmatic policies.  
Russia moved towards a zero-sum approach, wherein trade preferences and 
the cheaper gas prices were the carrots of its foreign policy and the sticks implied 
depriving Ukraine of these preferences (N. R. Smith, 2015: 10-1). Russian 
authorities lured the Yanukovych government with financial benefits; yet they 
similarly threatened Ukrainian government with potential losses. In April 2013, 
Putin claimed that Ukraine’s gains from membership in the Customs Union could 
reach 9-10 bln USD per year (mainly from cheaper gas prices and tax-free exports 
of Russian oil), whereas signing the AA with the EU would result in trade barriers 
with Russia and tightened border control (UNIAN, 2013; Forbes, 2013). The same 
was repeated during the Maidan revolution when Russia granted Ukraine $15 
billion as non-concessional loan in order for Ukraine to reconsider its move 
towards the EU (Gorchinskaya & Marchak, 2013). However, when the tactics 
failed, Russia moved towards a zero-sum approach that sought hard economic and 
military measures.  
After the victory of the Maidan revolution, Russia seized control over 
Crimea and incorporated it into Russian territory. On the day of the official 
incorporation, Putin declared that this move was partially caused by the deprivation 
of Russians of their historical memory, language and culture. He also outlined the 
need to protect Russian citizens and Russian-speakers (Washington Post, 2014). 
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This statement overlapped with the idea of compatriotism that could be viewed as 
another tool of Russia’s impact on domestic policy-making in third countries.  
Importantly, although Russian and Russian-speaking diasporas are viewed 
as a potential source for pro-Russian mobilisation and proved to be such in the flow 
of the Ukraine crisis, these communities remain diverse and fragmented. The 
situation also persists because Russian political elites have not conceptualised 
compatriotic moods in specific policies (Suslov, 2017) and have not ‘channelled’ 
these moods. This was specifically reflected in sporadic and unorganised character 
of mass mobilisation efforts in South-eastern Ukraine in spring 2014 known as the 
Russian Spring (Section 4.2.4).  
Distinct movements appeared across the whole region, while the movement 
in Eastern Ukraine originated from both rational logic of Donbas workers to 
maintain close economic ties with Russia and nostalgia for the Soviet Union among 
part of local population (O’Loughlin, Toal, & Kolosov, 2017). Because language 
and religious identification were crucial in the polarisation of Ukraine’s regional 
differences during the on-going conflict (Ivanov, 2016), sense of belonging to the 
‘Russian world’ was also reinforced in Ukraine.  
Importantly, the idea itself remains very vague and is limited to geopolitical 
and cultural space distinguished by shared Russian culture (Skvortsov, 
Vereshagina, & Samygin, 2016). The concept of the Russian world as well as of a 
Russian in general (in reference to the speech by Putin mentioned above) becomes 
even more vague in Ukraine’s context, because historical, religious and cultural 
similarities shared by Russians and Ukrainians inevitably lead the debate on 
Russian compatriotism to the discussion on identity (addressed in more details in 
Section 4.3). Therefore, Russia’s impact on public perceptions in Ukraine remains 
limited to Russia’s ability to function as a role model for Russophone Ukrainians 
rather than to specific public policy. Being closely connected with identity 
narratives, the application of the Russian world in real politics remains an object of 
individual preferences and emotive responses (Section 4.3).  
Furthermore, the sense of belonging to the Russian world may lead to 
positive perception of Russia’s foreign policy in general, yet it has in fact a very 
limited impact and no clear mechanisms for its promotion. In December 2014, the 
share of people in Donbas who openly supported the creation of New Russia 
(Novorosssia) did not exceed 20-25% (O’Loughlin et al., 2017), not to mention the 
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already emphasised absence of Russia’s state policy towards compatriots. As a 
result, popular pro-Russian moods in Ukraine could be triggered, but their scale 
remained limited, while the lack of organisation prevented them from 
institutionalising into a tool of Russia’s impact on Ukraine’s domestic politics 
(Section 4.2.4). 
Finally, Russia’s coercive actions in Ukraine have also resulted in 
controversial outcomes: while reinforcing the sense of belonging to the Russian 
community among Russophone Ukrainians, Russia caused frustration and 
disappointment among other Ukrainians, which was reflected in an increase of 
their support to pro-Western course (Figure 5.6). 
 In this context, the attractiveness of the EU (64% of Ukrainians positively 
evaluated its actions in comparison to 12% of those who positively evaluate 
Russian actions) (IFES, 2015) has become a product of two simultaneous processes: 
the EU’s long-term strategy in the country (that incorporated the promotion of EU 
norms and its positive image in Ukraine) and Russia’s tough responses to Ukraine’s 
domestic political developments, especially in the aftermath of the Maidan 
revolution and despite the fact that EU policies regarding Russia’s actions are 
restrained and ambivalent (Howorth, 2017).  
Ukraine once again has found itself at the crossroads between Russia and 
the West: Ukraine’s future stability depends on its ability to strike a balance 
between the two. Meanwhile, the key limitation for this balancing act is that ‘the 
EU does not care enough about Ukraine’s pro-European choice’ continuing to be a 
distant dream, while Russia remains ‘in stark contrast, an immediate, short-term 
reality’ ( Dragneva-Lewers & K. Wolczuk, 2015: 128; Puglisi, 2008: 76).  
 
5.4. Conclusions to Chapter 5 
EU assistance to Ukraine’s post-communist democratisation has largely 
depended on the extent to which Ukrainian elites have aspired to reforms. While 
the momentum for reforms was missed in the beginning of transition, the EU 
followed a developmental approach based on cooperation with Ukrainian officials 
to a degree that satisfied EU interests. Only when the EU and Ukraine began to 
share a common border, did their cooperation strengthen, resulting in tension 
between the EU and Russia. 
 
237 
The subsequent competition between the two actors led to the EU’s 
rhetorical entrapment, which, in line with the premises of neoclassic realism, has 
undermined the EU’s capacity to achieve the declared policy aims in Ukraine. 
Whereas EU conditionality is generally limited to the choices of Ukraine’s policy-
makers, EU-led socialisation has yet to produce cognitive change among broader 
Ukrainian public. As such EU linkage and leverage in Ukraine have strengthened 
but they have not become determinant for Ukraine’s transformations. Furthermore, 
overt dependence on EU decisions by Ukraine may have negative consequences in 
the light of EU-Russia competition. As such the EU’s normative power in Ukraine 
rests on the EU’s democratic and economic attractiveness but remains a part of 






 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
This chapter provides a brief overview of the research. It captures the key findings 
and the methodological approach used for the study. The main emphasis of the 
chapter, however, is a summary and discussion of the research conclusions, 
including discussion of the research questions and hypotheses defined in the 
Introduction (Chapter 1). 
 
6.1. Summary of the research problem and methodology 
The collapse of communist dominance in Eastern Europe launched the process of 
complex post-communist transformation which comprised both political and 
economic transition as well as consolidation of post-communist nation-states. The 
divergent paths of post-communism have shown that this process required a 
thorough approach which should have been dealing with legacies of communism 
and other country specifics in which the transition took place. Cross-country and 
regional differences in approaching the challenges and pace of post-communist 
transformation have split post-communist states into ‘high-pace’ and ‘low-pace 
reformers’. While the first group of countries (mainly in East Central Europe) were 
able to overcome most of the key transformation challenges by quickly embracing 
democratic norms and accomplishing their transition to a market economy, the 
second group (post-Soviet and Balkan states) fell into a state of prolonged or stalled 
transition. 
Although geographic and historical factors could be applicable in explaining 
this line of division, ‘high-pace reformers’ not only had more favourable domestic 
environment for the implementation of reforms, but they also received significant 
EU assistance and support for the respective changes. In contrast, those states that 
remained outside the EU’s influence and its institutional pressures were also those 
which fell behind in their post-communist liberalisation. The division was further 
deepened by the fact that EU membership could not be extended endlessly, while 
the EU was still supposed to play an important role in domestic transformations of 
the countries that fell in the grey zone of democratisation — through conditionality 
and assistance and in the absence of membership incentive. 
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Ukraine appeared as a country which could accomplish its transition — with 
limited assistance of the EU. The country was relatively more successful in its 
political and economic transformations than other states from the grey zone (Table 
1.1 and Table 1.2 in Chapter 1). Ukraine’s model of oligarchic capitalism preserved 
political pluralism which under pressure from Ukrainian nationalism prevented the 
consolidation of authoritarianism. Finally, Ukraine formally declared its desire to 
join the European Union and had consequently approached the EU, which 
strengthened cooperation between the two parties and allowed the EU to achieve a 
greater normative impact in Ukraine.  
However, a number of attempts towards democratic consolidation (such as 
Ukraine’s democratic revolutions) and the EU’s efforts to promote democracy in 
the country have generally failed. While Ukraine’s electoral process and civil 
society have remained generally free, corruption, weakness and non-transparency 
of state institutions as well as unaccomplished nation-building remained the main 
domestic problems for Ukraine’s transition. An absence of clear prospect of 
membership in the EU also coupled with the increasing pressures from Russia, 
representing external factors that contributed to the failure. Ukraine consequently 
emerged as a unique case for studying various aspects of post-communist 
transformation, including the impact of external influences on the drive towards 
democracy.  
While various theoretical approaches explain post-communist 
democratisation from different viewpoints, two of them appear particularly 
important in explaining the features of Ukraine’s post-communist transition. The 
first is the institutional approach which can be considered as a middle ground 
between pre-deterministic modernisation and structural theories and agent-centred 
transitology that emphasises the role of political and social actors or agents 
throughout the process of regime change and post-communist transition. Second, 
the path-dependence approach provides a useful tool for explaining some of the 
decisions made by the agents as crucial in setting the trajectory of the transition. In 
this context, critical junctures may be represented by events with self-reinforcing 
logic and agency. 
 This thesis has also tested the mechanisms of democracy and market 
economy promotion used in the process of Europeanisation within the framework 
of neoclassic realism in examining the impact of external actors (and particularly 
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the EU) on all three aspects of Ukraine’s transition. Although previous studies have 
emphasised specific domestic or external determinants of post-communist 
transition, this study incorporates both domestic and external factors into one 
framework. 
A number of works on Europeanisation have referred mainly to EU 
member-states, while the investigation of the EU’s impact on countries outside 
Europe was more limited. The analysis of the EU’s foreign policy was often EU-
centric and lacked critical and context-based analysis. This study provides an 
alternative approach by incorporating calculus logic into the Europeanisation 
framework and by stressing the importance of studying the perceptive part of 
Europeanisation from the perspective of the actor who seeks to be Europeanised — 
in this case, Ukraine. 
This study was partially conducted in Ukraine; it relies on mixed method 
that incorporates quantitative data but is guided mainly by qualitative research tools 
in setting up the design, developing conceptual and theoretical instruments and 
interpreting and clarifying the results of the study. This research is based on the 
extensive review of relevant literature, data from publically available surveys and 
interviews with civil society in Ukraine. The main interviewing phase of the 
research took place in January-March 2016. Some additional data were obtained 
from interviews held during December 2016-February 2017.  
The next section provides conclusions for each of the three research 
questions raised in this thesis, and answered in accordance with the above-outlined 
theoretical and methodological framework. 
 
6.2. Review and discussion of the main conclusions  
This thesis has addressed three research questions:  
1. What are the key factors that have impacted and determined the process 
of Ukraine’s post-communist transition? How do these factors interact in Ukraine’s 
context and what patterns and outcomes do they create?  
2. How has the EU supported / deterred Ukraine’s post-communist transition 
with its actions and policies? 
3. How can Ukraine-EU cooperation be further enhanced to positively 
contribute to the successful post-communist transformation of the country? Which 
 
241 
kind of cooperation is determinant for this success and how can the role of the EU, 
Ukraine or other actors be respectfully moderated?  
The first question concerns domestic and external factors of Ukraine’s post-
communist transition, answers to which, together with corresponding conclusions 
are summarised in Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 sum up the 
answers to the second and third research questions and outline the main 
conclusions which have been drawn in this regard. 
 
6.2.1. Domestic factors in Ukraine’s post-communist transition 
Academic literature portrays Ukraine as a new and divided state with 
persistent patterns of historical, political, socio-economic and cultural divisions. 
These divisions have been revealed in the origins of Ukraine’s stateness, 
unaccomplished nation-building and domestic fragmentation — the main structural 
factors of Ukraine’s transition. Meanwhile, weak state institutions; wide-spread 
corruption and the persistence of non-reformist elites are considered the main 
problems on institutional and interactional levels of analysis. This section 
demonstrates how the various aspects of Ukraine’s post-communist transition have 
been grouped within the structural, institutional and interactional dimensions. 
 
6.2.1.1. Clarifying domestic factors in Ukraine’s transition 
Foremost, Ukrainians do not view Ukraine as a state in transition from 
communism but view it as a state with an already established free market and a 
system of competitive oligarchy as a form of democracy (Chapter 1: 46-7). 
Nonetheless, Ukraine is yet to proceed with the consolidation of its democratic 
institutions. As such the major challenges to Ukraine’s post-communist transition 
are concealed within its political culture and the on-going search for national 
identity — those issues that most starkly represent Ukraine’s communist legacies. 
Furthermore, the problems of combatting corruption and non-transparent practices 
are also bonded to political culture. Altogether, these facts demonstrate that 
Ukraine still has not completed its post-communist transition. Although the 
country has managed to succeed in some aspects of transition (electoral fallacy and 
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liberalisation of economic activities), it is yet to achieve progress in others (political 
culture and nation-building). 
In this process, structural (including civilisational) factors have not been 
determinant for the outcomes of Ukraine’s post-communist transition per se. Rather 
structural constraints and historical legacies feature as deep conditions that may be 
overcome with time. In this process, institutions represent a middle ground between 
the continuity of structural constraints and old institutions and a change produced 
by new decisions that result in the establishment of new institutions. Therefore, 
decisions and policies may produce institutional change and potentially counter 
structural constraints. Below are Ukraine’s key historical legacies that have 
reproduced themselves as major conditions: 
 Ukraine has a weak historical legitimacy as a state due to its 
limited experience of independent policy-making and the absence of clearly set 
borders: Kyevan Rus’ in the tenth-twelfth centuries was a proto-state, Cossack 
Hetmanate in 1649-1654 lacked proper state institutions, the Ukrainian People’s 
Republic of 1917-1921 lasted for only four years and also failed to create durable 
state institutions. 
 Until 1991 Ukraine was predominantly ruled by foreign powers. 
 Enduring foreign rule was decisive in shaping Ukraine’s 
institutions and practices which differed at different territories: this was 
especially important in the context of pre-war Habsburg legacies in Western 
Ukraine and Russian imperial legacies in the rest of the country. As such, 
Ukraine’s state institutions were formed mainly under Soviet rule (Sections 3.6 
and 4.1.1 of this thesis). 
 Ukraine’s regional differences were formed through the 
stratification of varying (externally imposed) legacies that differed in quality, 
duration and the area of distribution. These legacies have accordingly found 
their reflection in Ukraine’s modern regionalism, identity differences and 
differing perceptions of the course of foreign policy (Section 4.3).  
 Class division within Ukrainian society has overlapped with an 
identity rift: since historically the majority of Ukrainians were peasants, they 
viewed economic and political elites as either Polonised or Russified. The same 
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division exists in modern Ukraine, where political elites are alleged as either 
pro-Russian or pro-European but not those caring about Ukraine.  
 The history of Ukrainian lands and people also shows that regime 
changes in Ukraine had a predominantly rebellious and militarised character 
(revolts, revolutions), which made Ukraine a suitable case for the path 
dependence approach. 
This leads towards two additional important conclusions. First, since 
external actors were powerful in affecting Ukraine’s domestic structures, the 
varying historical legacies that Ukraine experienced could have had a crosscutting 
impact on its institutions (the next subsection discusses this in greater detail). 
Second, the state institutions of modern Ukraine were mainly shaped during 
the Soviet period, which made communist legacies determinant in Ukraine’s post-
communist transition. According to the institutional approach, the rule of the 
nomenklatura was preserved after 1991 and led to the establishment of competitive 
authoritarianism, where the former nomenklatura grew into a new capitalist class. 
Political leadership in emerging independent Ukraine represented the old system 
attempting to preserve itself by limiting the access to social ladders, which led to 
two social explosions, namely the Orange and Maidan democratic revolutions. 
Simultaneously, business and politics have merged, and manipulation of public 
opinion has continued even in the context of the democratic revolutions (Sections 
4.2.3-4.2.5). In this way, Ukraine’s transition represents a layering of the remnants 
of Soviet institutions onto the template of democratic institutions, where social 
demand and the international environment remain key driving factors behind 
Ukraine’s on-going attempts at democratisation (Sections 4.2.2 and 5.2.3.2).  
Currently, Ukraine has accomplished the first phase of its post-communist 
transition by abolishing communism and introducing formal democratic 
institutions as is envisaged by the transitologist approach. Indeed the system that 
has been established on the ruins of communism incorporates features of 
democracy. However, the functioning of Ukraine’s democratic institutions still 
includes communist traits, which impede the successful functioning of established 
institutions of the country’s market economy. Ukraine has yet to achieve 
substantial progress in making these institutions work transparently and efficiently. 
Therefore, only the process of democratic consolidation will signify the victory over 
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the remnants of communism that still prevent Ukraine from becoming a full-scale 
democracy.  
 
6.2.1.2. The crucial role of agency vis-a-vis structural constraints in the transition process 
This thesis argues that agency and policy-making may still prompt institutional 
change despite the enduring legacy of old institutions. This point also applies to 
Ukraine in the context of the path dependence approach, because Ukraine’s post-
communist democratisation began with a decision to abolish the communist 
system.  
On the one hand, the choice to abolish the communist system did not 
eradicate the impact of communist legacies on the newly built democratic 
institutions, because this decision was made by the members of the former 
nomenklatura and thus the representatives of the old system. As a result, there 
exists a qualitative gap between the newly established institutions of democracy and 
a market economy and still dominating/existing practices of communism, which 
reflects on the promise of the path-dependence approach that new institutions may 
function in parallel to some preserved institutional legacies (for example, the strong 
role of informal relations in modern Ukraine). 
Another premise of the path-dependence approach supported in this thesis is 
that structural constraints do not restrain political actors during critical junctures. 
This was reflected in that the very launch of Ukraine’s post-communist transition 
was agent-driven and it was based on the balance of power between the 
communists and the opposition forces, which in the Ukrainian case was in favour 
of the former. Nevertheless, the elites made a choice in favour of democratic 
transformation and market restructuring without any reference to Ukraine’s 
structural background. Similarly, the general passivity of population which is often 
viewed as a main structural constraint behind failed democratisation of the former 
Russian empire did not restrain the people from the 1905 and, later on, from the 
1917-1918 revolutions. Neither this alleged passivity prevented the Bolsheviks from 
successfully mobilising their supporters and establishing communist rule (Section 
3.4), which reveals the importance of agency during the critical juncture as a 
driving force behind subsequent institutional changes.  
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Even more important in this context is that, once the initial opportunity 
(momentum) for transition is lost and reformist elites do not take over, the fusion of 
old and new institutions takes place instead of a qualitative leap. For example, 
although the Ukrainian democratic revolutions are not comparable with the 1917 
Russian revolution, they also reveal that the initial decisions made in the aftermath 
of a revolution determine the course of subsequent reforms. Whereas the Orange 
revolution has generally failed due to the absence of reform initiatives, the Maidan 
revolution has succeeded in implementing only those initiatives that provided the 
new regime with public legitimacy (Sections 4.2.3, 4.2.5 and 5.3). As such the 
momentum of institutional change appears to be crucial in overcoming the impact 
of structural legacies through agency.  
Meanwhile, an absence of strategic planning and thus continuity in shaping 
institutional development remains the main problem of Ukraine’s transition. 
Although Ukraine has slowly evolved into a society where at least formal 
adherence to democratic rules became a social norm, Ukraine’s ultimate 
democratisation remains unstable and chaotic, while the absence of elites to support 
this movement with institutional framework delays and even interrupts this process.  
An absence of political will to promote Ukraine’s post-communist 
transformation is reflected in that some progress in Ukraine’s democratisation 
occurred only in gradual steps after the two democratic revolutions (Figure 4.3, 
Figure 4.5, Figure 4.9). In the absence of agents for a rapid institutional change, 
Ukraine’s institutions should gradually emerge from popular demand and under 
supervision of external actors that may assist in organising this move through a 
network of NGOs (the next sub-section will elaborate if and how external actors 
may support Ukraine’s institutionalisation). In this regard, Ukraine’s bottom-up 
drive towards democracy remains vitally important for the related aspects of its 
protracted transition such as unaccomplished nation-building, weak state 
institutions, and corruption.  
In the context of Ukraine’s nation-building, prioritising a single identity 
narrative and excluding other out-bond groups from society has resulted in war, 
radicalisation of society and a deeper societal rift as opposed to the desired 
consolidation. Therefore, promoting liberal political culture as part of multi-cultural 
democratic environment is crucial for building civic Ukraine (Section 4.3.2).  
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In this regard, Ukraine’s regionalism and the multiplicity of its identities 
may not necessarily become a source of Ukraine’s failure to successfully complete 
its threefold post-communist transition, because Ukrainians do not view identity 
differences as vitally important in their daily life and identity clashes do not take 
place in an absence of political manipulation. Furthermore, while most of 
Ukrainian identity narratives are ethnically-based and may advance to the 
development of bad nationalism, these identity narratives relate to the minority of 
Ukrainians. In contrast, public opinion polls indicate that the majority of 
Ukrainians share inclusive notion of identity and thus may embrace truly civic and 
liberal notion of Ukrainian identity. In this process Ukrainian civil society and 
political leaders are crucial for instilling liberal political culture, which once again 
demonstrates the importance of agency when dealing with structure-defined 
problems such as nation-building (Section 4.3). 
In parallel, the weakness of Ukraine’s state institutions which has prevented 
Ukraine’s democratisation, has also preserved the diversity of Ukraine’s political 
environment. Presumably, Ukraine’s political stalemate may produce a consensus 
on institution-building and thus benefit the construction of state institutions in a 
long run. Meanwhile, plurality of political agents should be sustained, with the 
main emphasis made on making state institutions transparent and accountable. 
Although an absence of non-corrupt elites is viewed as a key problem in this 
respect, post-Maidan Ukraine has also demonstrated that new elites have emerged. 
Their number is still not large enough to turn the tide, but they may slowly change 
the politics and political culture in Ukraine if and when their number grows 
(Section 4.2.5). With this background, liberal political culture may mould 
contrasting national identities and competing political camps, paving the way for a 
more sustainable and democratic development. This process is more durable than 
the desired rapid change but is more certain in achieving consolidation across the 
various trajectories of Ukraine’s transition. Ukraine’s civil society may serve as an 
alternative agent of democratisation who can pressure political elites to make 
necessary reforms and changes which will gradually lead towards a more 
consolidated democratic model that will suit all strata of population irrespective of 
their identity or class.  
As such, the institutional approach proves suitable not only for describing 
Ukraine’s institutional change in time through big critical junctures, but also in 
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explaining which legacies have hindered Ukraine’s post-communist transition and 
how they can be overcome through agency. Meanwhile, the importance of agency 
for overcoming structural and institutional barriers in the transition refers not only 
to the mechanism of critical junctures but also to gradual consolidation of 
Ukraine’s institutions on the basis of public aspirations. 
 
6.2.2. External factors of Ukraine’s post-communist transition and the 
role of the European Union 
Considering the global trend of growing authoritarianism, the role of 
external factors in Ukraine’s transition may be not as advantageous as predicted. 
Moreover, the underlying stimuli of external assistance to Ukraine’s post-
communist transition requires a more rigorous approach based on the incorporation 
of both normative and materialist aspects in the studies on democracy promotion. 
For example, Russia-EU political and ideological competition performs as a 
significant interfering factor that restraints Ukraine’s successful transition. While 
the EU is generally viewed as a normative actor and supporter of Ukraine in this 
process as opposed to more authoritarian Russia, EU normativity cedes to material 
interests in the context of its competition with Russia over Ukraine. Together with 
the EU’s failure to properly communicate why it has excluded geographically 
European Ukraine from its enlargement agenda, geopolitics prevents the EU from 
assisting Ukraine’s post-communist transition more effectively. 
Some of the reasons behind this failure may be found in structural 
explanations. Most of the territories of modern Ukraine have not been historically 
aligned with what is viewed as European civilisation; as a result, Ukraine lacks 
societal structures similar to European ones. In addition, Ukraine’s functioning 
state institutions were formed under Soviet rule; respectively, Russia’s impact on 
Ukraine’s societal structures was stronger than that of the EU or Europe. As such, 
the institutional transformation of post-communist Ukraine represents a middle 
ground between Russian influence exerted through historical legacies, the most 
important of them Soviet institutions, and the EU’s impact reflected in the 
establishment of post-communist democratic and market institutions. Finally, the 
role of agency in Ukraine’s transition remains a relatively equally impacted area by 
 
248 
both external actors, — although Ukrainian elites have been the primary decision 
makers, as discussed in Sections 5.2.3.2 and 5.3). 
Foremost, viewing Ukraine’s Christian Orthodox background and Slavic 
origin as part of the civilisational (structural) argument against Ukraine’s successful 
democratisation is not completely valid, because the Orthodox religious 
background and Slavic origin have proven compatible with modern democratic 
regimes as shown by examples of such countries as Christian Orthodox Greece and 
all Central European post-communist states of Slavic origin that have successfully 
democratised.  
Moreover, Ukraine represents a unique case in which cultural Orthodox 
identity overlaps with European political identity. The Cossack stratum was one of 
the examples of such a combination (Section 3.1). Furthermore, while part of 
Ukraine experienced the legacy of the Habsburg Empire and Austria-Hungary, the 
Russian empire also followed a path of modernisation by reforming its political and 
economic institutions in order to westernise and catch up with more advanced 
European economies at the time (Section 3.2). Although the establishment of the 
communist regime had interrupted this process, Westernisation naturally continued 
after the collapse of communism. In this context, neither Russian nor pro-Russian 
Ukrainian identities have prevented Ukraine’s successful democratisation. The 
problem lies in the interpretation of these identities in Ukraine itself, which is 
driven by preserved communist totalitarian political culture (Section 4.3).  
While the EU has clearly marked its political identity in the founding 
documents and established political and economic criteria for potential members, 
political leadership in post-Maidan Ukraine emphasises the civilisational dimension 
of Ukraine’s post-revolutionary transformation, strengthened by the military 
conflict with Russia (Sections 4.3, 5.2.3.3 and 5.3). Misconception also persists in 
the implementation of EU-promoted reforms and with regard to the EU’s perceived 
role in Ukraine’s transformation. On the one hand, the adoption of the EU’s acquis 
could have accelerated the transition of Ukraine’s post-communist democratic 
institutions, while the EU’s support of Ukraine’s civil society could have promoted 
consolidation of these institutions. However, the EU does not develop strong 
conditionality due to its normative considerations of being, in essence, a self-
restraining power, while Ukrainian elites resist the implementation of reforms that 
are envisaged in already promoted conditionality.  
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The EU’s bargaining power works for the Ukrainian elites only if it does not 
contradict their own interests (Sections 5.1.2 and 5.2.3.2), pointing to the crucial 
role of agency in post-communist transformation. In this context, the EU must 
either abandon its idea of self-restraint or accept the rules of game in Ukraine while 
shifting its attention towards deeper levels of Europeanisation (e.g. socialisation and 
persuasion). Presumably, even formal democratisation promoted by the EU 
through its acqis may advance Ukraine’s post-communist transition if civil society 
absorbs and lives up to the imported norms. As Ukrainian civil society is still 
relatively weak, it needs to strengthen further and to re-invent some of EU norms 
for Ukraine.  
Meanwhile, Ukraine’s general public performs as the main agent of 
democratisation in Ukraine, since its demands have been reflected in two 
democratic revolutions joined up by civil society (Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.5.2). 
Therefore and against the background of non-reformist elites in Ukraine, the EU 
still may promote democratic changes in Ukraine by targeting general public and 
civil society. And whereas this strategy does not contradict the EU’s overall 
developmental approach, it raises a set of problems related to perceptive and 
communicative components of Europeanisation.  
Despite the fact that the EU remains a main donor of developmental aid in 
Ukraine, communication and explanation of EU norms remains rather limited in 
the country. At the policy and cooperation level, mutual misperception is reflected 
in the fact that the EU, although remaining the main provider of technical 
assistance and thus expertise on reforms in Ukraine, achieves ambiguous results 
when it comes to the implementation of reforms, because such changes require 
specification, guidelines and, most importantly, control on the EU’s part. 
Meanwhile, EU perceptions among Ukrainian general public are somewhat 
mythologised, while the understanding of EU norms as ways of doing things 
depend on individual experience and identity. Altogether this points to the need for 
devising a more context-based approach towards Ukraine that would consider both 
European and Ukrainian expertise. 
Considering the lack of knowledge about the EU among Ukrainian general 
public, EU norms need to be clarified and explained more rigorously. While the 
degree of socialisation between Ukraine and the EU has increased in the aftermath 
of the Maidan revolution, this has not been reflected in a better understanding of 
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the nature of the EU or its norms. The declarative support to human rights and 
democracy in Ukraine is mingled with support for authoritarianism, reflected in a 
belief that one strong leader could resolve all Ukraine’s problems (Section 4.2.5.2). 
However, the more recent public opinion polls (Rating, 2018) indicate that majority 
of Ukrainians demand radical changes and are not satisfied with the current course 
of Ukraine’s development, meaning that such mood may result in radicalisation of 
society. Meanwhile, a narrative of being European has replaced a narrative of being a 
new Soviet person, yet illiberal political culture still persists in Ukraine. The on-going 
Donbas war only entrenches this problem, and the EU’s capacity to promote liberal 
political culture may be extremely beneficial to Ukraine in this context.  
Furthermore, although the EU has generally succeeded in creating a positive 
image of a normative self in Ukraine, not only this image is idealised (which may 
lead to strong disappointment which is already present in Ukraine), but also 
Ukrainian non-reformist elites exploit this image to achieve legitimacy within and 
outside Ukraine. Meanwhile, despite remaining an attractive integration pole in 
Ukraine, the EU is perceived as somewhat distant and unattainable among the 
broader public. As a result, EU norms remain detached from Ukraine’s realm and 
this hinders adoption of these norms.  
In this way, the EU communication problem reveals that both socialisation 
and mutual understanding are crucial for the success of EU democracy promotion 
efforts in Ukraine. In targeting the problem, EU programmes that aim for the 
education of young Ukrainians may be of significant benefit if they promote a more 
liberal yet critical perception of reality among the participants. The EU should 
improve its knowledge about Ukraine’s ways of doing things, its background and 
interests, as this could lead to a better fit of EU policies in the country and explain 
some of the communication gaps experienced by the parties (Sabatovych et al., 
forthcoming 2019).  
 
6.2.3. Counteprlaying domestic and external influences. What should and 
should not be done for more successful Ukraine’s post-communist 
transition 
The research conducted in this thesis has, as defined in the introduction (p. 14) 
incorporated the following four hypotheses: 
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 1. Domestic factors of post-communist transition are more decisive than 
external ones.  
2. The impact of the structural factors on post-communist transition has 
been less important than the political decisions which are not necessarily moulded 
by structural constraints.  
3. EU effects concentrate mainly on the institutional and interactional levels 
of post-communist transition.  
4. EU presence in Ukraine remains rather superficial, which requires a more 
context-based approach, including the need for a better understanding of Ukraine 
and its needs.  
As has been demonstrated in previous sections, Ukraine’s domestic 
influences interlace with the impacts of external factors on its post-communist 
transition. Since Ukraine has obtained its independence recently, the impact of 
Russia on the societal structures of Ukraine remains higher than that of the EU. 
Regardless, their external influences are reflected in Ukraine’s identity narratives 
that reinforce respective models of development and foreign policy preferences 
(Section 4.3.2). However, in already independent Ukraine, the role of local elites 
has become more important in determining Ukraine’s institutional transformations 
and in promoting the narrative of return to Europe among broader public, which 
facilitates the EU’s normative impact in Ukraine. 
Ukraine’s post-communist institution-building, therefore, represents an 
outcome of the interplay between the interests of Ukraine’s political elites and the 
impact of external actors in which the former prevails and confirms hypothesis one 
of this research that domestic factors of post-communist transition are more 
decisive than external ones. As was discussed in Chapter 5, a gradual shift towards 
Europeanisation in Ukraine’s foreign policy was caused by both a need to counter 
Russian influence and by economic opportunities provided by the EU in the 
context of its bargaining power. However, in the other areas the EU’s impact 
remains rather limited due to Russia-first approach and an absence of strong 
interest of the EU in Ukraine’s democratisation.  
The EU not only performs as a self-restraining actor in this regard by shifting 
responsibility to Ukraine’s elites, but the EU also supports those Ukrainian elites 
that are declaratively pro-reformist and pro-European despite their evident lack of 
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interest in full democratisation. As a result, EU initiatives in reforming post-
Maidan Ukraine have both improvements (conditional financing) and the 
persistence of old problems such as poor congruence to the context of Ukraine’s 
policy-making (land reform, export of round wood) and interests (trade relations).  
The discussion in Chapter 5 has also confirmed the validity of research 
hypothesis three about the EU’s limited impact on Ukraine’s structural problems 
and its stronger influence on Ukraine’s institutional building. Indeed, Ukraine’s 
formal approximation of EU legislation may lay the foundations for a more 
substantial democratisation, while approximation of trade standards may lead to a 
greater integration of European and Ukrainian markets and a corresponding 
spillover of EU norms and practices to Ukraine. The same logic has been observed 
with regard to the abolition of communism, when the establishment of the basic 
institutions of democracy has prevented Ukraine’s backslide to totalitarianism. 
In light of the persistence of non-reformist elites in Ukraine, the EU has also 
revealed certain policy changes such as conditional financing, which points to 
attempts by the EU to achieve better results in Ukraine. The main persisting barrier 
however is a contradiction between EU normative and material (realist) interests. 
The prevalence of the latter undermines the EU’s capacity to assist Ukraine in its 
post-communist transition by neglecting Ukraine’s national interests. In this 
context, the best option for Ukraine would include EU assistance in selected areas 
(such as civil society) with gradual absorption of EU norms. Yet considering the 
self-interest of Ukrainian elites and the demand for democracy among the broader 
public, the EU may still promote liberal political culture as a tool for a more 
substantial and deeper impact on Ukrainian society (as was mentioned previously 
in this chapter).  
The adoption of European values by broad social strata may lead to a 
gradual institutional change in favour of more transparent and accountable 
institutions and towards a consensus on nation-building. In addition Ukraine’s pro-
reformist and modernist forces may unite under EU aegis to support Ukraine’s 
bottom-up democratisation, as their number is slowly growing. Yet Ukraine’s 
domestically-driven decision to Europeanise, clearly demonstrates that Ukraine’s 
transition remains mainly a quest of its internal struggle, further confirming 
hypothesis one of this research. As such, EU support and monitoring over the 
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process of Ukraine’s institutional change may succeed only in providing Ukraine 
with the offer for membership and thus sharing adaptation costs with the country in 
line with argumentation by Pridham (2002; 2005) and Schimmelfennig (2008; 2012) 
on the effectiveness and limitations of Europeanisation beyond Europe.  
Meanwhile, in addition to the importance of balancing between interests of 
local elites and the EU, the balancing between Russian and European interests 
represents another challenge for Ukraine’s on-going transformation. The  Russian 
issue remains a prominent structural factor for Ukraine’s transition, and it is often 
viewed as a barrier towards Ukraine’s quicker integration into the European orbit. 
Yet depicting the Russian issue as the main barrier for Ukraine’s institutional 
transformation is misleading. As was demonstrated in Section 5.3, Russia’s impact 
on Ukrainian policy-makers is limited by Russia’s bargaining power (which is 
similar to limitations faced by the EU). In turn, Russia’s impact on Ukraine’s 
broader public is limited by the fact that it performs as a role model to only to 
Russophone Ukrainians (Section 4.3.2). Therefore, promoting one or another 
vector of integration and identity narrative depends fully on the choice of Ukrainian 
decision-makers, and the same refers to institutional changes, altogether supporting 
hypothesis two (on the determinant role of decision-making vis-a-vis structural 
constraints) and hypothesis one (on the determinant role of domestic factors of 
transition in comparison to external influences). 
In some respects, the Russian factor may even be seen as beneficial for 
Ukraine as it assists the country in terms of economic cooperation and offers 
substantial financial benefits in the absence of prospects for European integration 
(c3Ukr11). At the policy level, this may also enable Ukraine to be more cautious in 
adopting EU prescriptions that may not benefit the country’s specific interests (e.g. 
some trade or agricultural regulations). Together with discussion in the second half 
of Section 6.2.2, this confirms hypothesis four which states that the EU needs to 
develop a more context-based approach based on a better understanding of 
Ukraine’s needs and interests if it wants to broaden and strengthen its impact on 
Ukraine’s political and economic affairs. 
Thus, although Russia-EU competition is very damaging for Ukraine’s 
political stability, it has some positive effects in the economic sphere as both 
external actors have used economic carrots to engage Ukraine in their orbits of 
 
254 
influence. Prior to the Maidan revolution this had maintained Ukraine’s economy 
balanced and growing, while the country’s reorientation towards the European 
market and simultaneous loss of the Russian one after the revolution resulted in the 
loss of economic advantage under relatively vague economic prospects. 
 
6.3. Final remarks and recommendations 
This research has incorporated those theoretical views on post-communist 
transition which could have been assessed as useful in explaining features of and 
developments during Ukraine’s post-communist transition. The transitologist 
concept of actor-driven and elite-promoted democratisation has explained the 
initial stage of Ukraine’s transition. It can be also used to explain the non-
revolutionary character of a regime change in the early 1990s as well as the 
emergence and main developments during and after Ukraine’s two democratic post-
communist revolutions.  
The notion of an agency-driven transition has been justified primarily by the 
fact that regime changes featured in characteristics of a critical juncture that 
endowed political actors with power to overcome structural constraints. The 
transitologist argument on the importance of non-violent transition (O’Donnell & 
Schmitter, 2013) has also been useful in explaining non-violent transition in the 
early 1990s (and less so during the Orange revolution) as opposed to the Maidan 
revolution when the use of violence confirmed the weakness of state institutions 
and weak legitimacy of political regime.20  
However, in the aftermath of the initial stage of transition (when pacting or 
a peaceful revolution has already occurred), the argument on the importance of 
communist and historical legacies (Ekiert & Hanson, 2003; McFaul, 2002; Petrovic, 
2013) could explain the re-shaping and functioning of newly established democratic 
and market institutions. This fact supports the claims of the institutional approach 
                                               
20 While the use of violence in this case could be explained by the lack of institutionalised agency 
(Elster et al., 1998), violence per se has undermined already weak state institutions and amplified 
domestic problems of Ukraine’s post-communist transition. As a result, all those reforms that 
followed the Maidan revolution were driven primarily by external actors (the EU and IFOs), while 




and the path-dependency assumption that old legacies may reproduce themselves 
even when new institutions are already established.  
Although economic development was not determinant for the outcomes of 
transition, in line with the transitologist argumentation (Przeworski, 1991), 
economic growth proved to be an important condition for the consolidation of 
democratic institutions: both democratic revolutions in Ukraine were launched as 
attempts at such consolidation and both were supported by want-mores rather than 
have-nots (Chapter 4). Economic growth in the beginning of the 2000s and economic 
recovery after the 2008 global financial crisis blurred the distinction between the 
elites and ordinary Ukrainians, and Ukrainian citizens began to desire political 
liberties.  
Furthermore, this thesis has demonstrated that post-communist transition is 
not limited to market or democratic transformations only; socio-cultural aspect has 
remained a key problem of Ukraine’s transition. Although the country has achieved 
some progress in its post-communist democratisation and marketisation, Ukraine’s 
political culture has remained largely intact and still remains grounded in 
communist political culture. Only if the country proceeds with the incorporation of 
liberal norms into its political culture, the socio-cultural aspect of the transition may 
become a source of a change and support for Ukraine’s democratic consolidation. 
Importantly, Ukraine’s shift towards a more liberal socio-cultural model 
overlaps with political and socio-cultural interpretation of the Europeanisation 
process. Whereas theorisation and conceptualisation of EU assistance in post-
communist transformations initially supports the thesis about the importance of 
conditionality and thus the transitologist argument on democratic transition or 
formal democratisation, the shift towards socialisation and persuasion within the 
Europeanisation framework explains how democratic institutions may be 
consolidated (Börzel & Risse, 2009; 2012). As this thesis reveals, socialisation and 
persuasion may dismantle the socio-cultural barriers to Ukraine’s post-communist 
transition by promoting liberal values and culture in the country. 
Meanwhile, the hypothetical membership opportunity remains the main 
source of the EU’s transformative power in Ukraine: membership implies that not 
only the EU guides the process of respective transformations (and thus backs up the 
states in transition and shares responsibility for the success of transition, which is 
important for Ukraine) but also that the EU provides accessing states with clear 
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benefits that will overwhelm current adaptation costs (Schimmelfennig, 2012). In 
contrast, in the absence of the EU membership incentive Ukraine’s elites reject 
strong conditionality, while the persuasion mechanism still has to be elaborated as 
it takes more time to produce its effects. The problem extends to the fact that the 
EU’s enlargement fatigue has constrained its potential enlargement to the currently 
listed candidates (the Western Balkan states and Turkey, whose candidate status is 
currently de-facto frozen (Eldem, 2013)), and the membership incentive will not be 
available for Ukraine in the near future. In these circumstances, in the absence of 
membership incentive, motivating Ukrainian domestic actors towards a desirable 
change becomes complicated. As a result, the determinant role of Ukrainian elites 
in (non)-reforming the country persists, being a part of those domestic factors that 
are a decisive determinant of the current status quo and resist external influences. 
In attempting to promote strong conditionality and persuasion, the EU must 
maintain a careful balance of promoting working relationships with Ukrainian 
officials while at the same time motivating broader public to increase their pressure. 
In practice however, leading by example is rather complicated for the EU in 
Ukraine’s context, because the country represents a key challenge for the EU’s 
normative power with regard to two main issues: security (the Russian issue and 
geopolitics) and trade interests (calculus approach). 
Both Russia and the EU are applying different strategies for promoting their 
visions of security models in Ukraine. Considering that security is of vital 
importance for every international actor and is a key precondition for their survival 
and sustainability, it would be naive to expect Russia or the EU to prioritise 
Ukraine’s security interests over their own. Moreover, although a lowering of 
geopolitical tension between the two actors may significantly support Ukraine’s 
stability and enhance cooperation within the EU-Russia-Ukraine triangle, this 
seems unlikely to happen in the near future, particularly due to the on-going 
Russia-Ukraine conflict. 
Under such circumstances, Ukraine should attempt to limit the impact of 
external influences on its preferences or to balance against those influences that 
contradict Ukraine’s interest in sustainable economic development and 
democratisation. In various ways and to various degrees these are reflected in both 
Russian and EU positions on security and economic cooperation. However, 
Ukraine’s key problem in this regard and another reference to the crucial role of 
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domestic factors in its transition refers to the inability of its political leadership to 
make decisions that advance the country’s overall well-being and long-term 
progress as opposed to serving personal interests of state captors.  
In the relationship between external influences and Ukraine’s domestic 
policy-making, some of the specifics of Ukraine’s policy-making aspects refer to the 
absence of Ukraine elites’ state awareness: those who were considered Polonised or 
Russified in historical context are viewed as pro-Russian or pro-Western in modern 
Ukraine. Irrespective of the narratives used, Ukrainian elites prioritise self-
enrichment over national interests, which determines their choices of the vectors of 
foreign policy.  
Therefore, promoting transparency and accountability among state 
institutions, political parties and civil organisation may help the fight against 
corruption and promote consolidation of democratic institutions in Ukraine. In this 
respect, the role of the EU and other international actors can be crucial for Ukraine 
(Section 5.2.3). Furthermore, frequent changes of leadership are essential for 
depriving political actors of the ability to capture state; Ukrainian presidents have 
tended to conduct most of their reforms (including positive ones) during their first 
terms of presidency while consolidating power and promoting authoritarianism 
during their second terms.  
While Ukraine’s state capture has prevented the construction of strong 
democratic institutions in the country, political and economic pluralism of 
competing oligarchic clans has nonetheless prevented Ukraine from becoming an 
authoritarian state under the leadership of a strong president. In addition, the 
diversity of Ukraine’s identity narratives, political parties and business groups 
should not be considered a problem for Ukraine’s democratisation.  
Although Ukraine’s regionalism is often viewed as a threat to Ukraine’s 
socio-political consolidation due to the regional differences in identity narratives, 
economic specialisation and political culture, Ukraine’s regionalism does not 
threaten Ukraine’s sovereignty per se. While the future status of Crimea and 
Donbas remains in question, most Ukrainians in the other regions of the country 
share a common desire to live in a democratic and prosperous state, which may 
become a building block for its consolidation in the future (Section 4.3.2). The key 
starting point for that is the resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which, as 
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with many other tasks in Ukraine’s post-communist transition, depends on the 
ingenuity of Ukraine’s political leadership. 
 
6.4. Limitations of the study 
This research has been conducted by a Ukrainian, who may be considered 
biased by some readers but who has been hoping to provide a more detailed, 
context-based, independent and critical approach towards studying the role of 
external agents in Ukraine’s transition. Similarly, the researcher’s geographical 
distance and thus remoteness from Ukraine should have enabled her to offer a more 
objective and critical approach of developments in her native country.  
The research for this study has focused on post-communist transition of 
Ukraine exclusively and is thereby limited in its capacity to produce comparative 
results.  Nevertheless, some theoretical and policy-making aspects may be 
potentially generalised to other cases.  
This study has examined the EU’s role in and the impact of other external 
actors on Ukraine’s domestic affairs primarily from Ukraine’s viewpoint.  The 
causes and motives behind the external actors’ stances and policies towards 
Ukraine have been investigated only to a limited degree. The study has not aimed 
to provide in-depth research on the nature of the EU, its policies or plans for 
Ukraine.  
By merging theoretical developments, particularly in the area of  theory on 
post-communist transition and Europeanisation, this research did not cover theories 
of international relations or European integration in-depth, although some 
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APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. What do you think of while hearing the term ‘post-communist 
transition’?  
2. How then would you describe a successful transition?  
3. What domestic problems in your opinion prevent Ukraine from 
successful post-Soviet transformation? 
4. Do you think the history of Ukraine’s state becoming may affect its 
modern socio-economic and political changes? 
5. How would you evaluate the role of Ukraine’s political leadership in 
its on-going transformations? 
6. Do you think that state institutions limit the actions of Ukraine’s 
political and economic elites, or the elites affect the way Ukrainian 
institutions perform? 
7. What role might general organisation and similar actors play in 
Ukraine’s further transformations?  
8. Does your organisation have any professional involvement with the 
EU, its institutions or member-states? 
9. When thinking about the term “the European Union”, what three 
issues come to your mind? 
10. How would you describe an overall common between Ukraine and the 
EU? 
11. What period in Ukraine’s cooperation with the EU was in your 
opinion the most productive? 
12. Can the EU advance to Ukraine’s successful post-communist 
transition? If yes - how? If not – why not? 
13. Does the EU affect Ukraine’s political decisions? 
14. Do you believe the EU may shape an understanding of 
“normal”/”normative” in Ukraine? 
15. Are there any domestic problems in Ukraine, which the EU cannot 
assist with? 
16. Do you think Ukraine is capable of becoming a prosperous democracy 
without a membership in the EU? 
17. What is the role of geopolitical factor in Ukraine’s post-Soviet 
development? 
18. When it comes to Ukraine as a whole, what is more accurate in your 
opinion: ‘history matters’ or ‘it's all about the staff’? 
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APPENDIX B. INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Information Sheet  
National Centre for Reesearch on Europe  
Telephone: +64 27 300 4561 
Email: iana.sabatovych@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
06 November 2015  
 
Is there a successful transition without European integration? An 
investigation of the key determinants of Ukraine's post-communist 
transformation 
 
Information Sheet for Interviews with the participants 
  
My name is Iana Sabatovych, and I am a PhD student at the University of Canterbury, 
New Zealand. The study you are offered to participate in investigates the determinants of 
Ukraine’s post-communist transition. The project particularly focuses on the extent to 
which the EU is able to affect Ukraine’s socio-political and economic transformations upon 
the absence of membership incentive.  
  
As a follow-up to this investigation, you will be asked to take part in semi-structured 
interviews, which should take approximately 30-45 minutes. 
  
Participation is voluntary. You will be provided with the transcript of your interview and 
will be able to make changes to the data if you wish so. However, once analysis of raw data 
starts, it will become increasingly difficult to remove the influence of your data on the 
results. You will have as much time as you need to review the data as well as to decide on 
whether you want it to remain in the project. However, upon the submission of the edited 
transcript, you won’t be able to withdraw the data from the analyses. 
 
The results of the project may be published, but you may be assured of the complete 
confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation: your identity will not be made public 
without your prior consent. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality, de-identification will 
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be carried out according to the University's Human Ethics Council guidelines. This means 
that you have been assigned a code that will be used on all the data you provide.  
 
Furthermore, research participants’ identifying data will be stored separately from the de-
identified data on locked hard drives and in password-protected electronic form. The data 
will be backed up at university server and will be also password-protected. This means that 
only the researcher will be able to link you to the data and no identification will be 
disclosed. The de-identified data will be accessible only to the researcher, Iana Sabatovych, 
her direct supervisor, Dr. Milenko Petrovic, and co-supervisors, Prof. Martin Holland and 
Assoc. Prof. Natalia Chaban. All data will be stored for a period of 10 years after the 
completion of the PhD study and will then be destroyed.  
 
Please note that a thesis is a public document and will be available through the UC Library. 
For that reason you are asked to indicate to the researcher on the consent form if you 
would like to receive a copy of the summary of results of the project or other materials 
complemented on the base of the data from your interview. 
 
The project is being carried out for the PhD degree by Iana Sabatovych under the 
supervision of Dr. Milenko Petrovic, who can be contacted at: 
milenko.petrovic@canterbury.ac.nz. He will be pleased to discuss any concerns you may have 
about participation in the project. 
 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the appropriate department and the UC  
HEC Low Risk Approval process, and the participants should address any complaints to 
The Chair, Human Ethics Committee, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, 
Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz). 
 
If you agree to participate in the study, please complete the consent form and return it to 
the researcher prior the interview. 
 
Thank you very much for your participation, 
 
Iana Sabatovych 
 
 
